Address

by NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer
at the Fondation pour la Recherche stratégique, Paris

Ministers,
Excellencies,
Distinguished guests,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

As you can imagine, there is no shortage of conferences to mark NATO's 60th anniversary at the moment.  I might even say that if NATO received dividends for each event, its civil budget this year would undoubtedly be much more comfortable, and its Secretary General would be much happier. 

But being here, today, at the École militaire is particularly significant.  First, because those 60 years have not been years just like any others in France in comparison with other Allies – it has not escaped my notice that, had it taken place a few days ago, this study day might have been held on the anniversary of General de Gaulle's famous letter of 7 March 1966 to President Johnson.  Second, because French strategic debate has always had an originality of its own and, as Secretary General of NATO, I cannot but be interested in "taking the pulse" of French thinking on the Alliance and its challenges in the 21st century – especially in such a high-level framework, under the patronage of President Sarkozy.  Finally, and particularly because I recognize the importance of the debate developing at this very moment on renewal of the France-NATO relationship, just one week away from a very important parliamentary debate.  I should therefore like to thank the Fondation pour la recherche stratégique for its invitation and to congratulate it on choosing the ideal moment for this prestigious study day.

I have been asked to address you as a prelude to your afternoon session, which is on the theme "New challenges, new missions, a transatlantic project for the 21st century?".  It was Alphonse Allais, or maybe it was Tristan Bernard, who said that "The job of a forecaster is a hard one, especially when he's dealing with the future".  That is to say the question put to me is not a simple one.  Having said that, I am Secretary General of NATO and not a forecaster, and the approaching end of my term of office gives me a certain freedom.  I shall therefore try to sketch out an analysis, if not a reply to this fundamental issue for the future of our Atlantic Alliance.

It seems to me that in 2009 two issues, above all others, stand out as being most urgent: the many security challenges and the deep economic and financial crisis.  The very chronology of the weeks ahead is a perfect illustration of this:  many of the NATO Heads of State and Government who will attend the Summit in Strasbourg and Kehl on 3 and 4 April will first have attended the G20 in London on 2 April.  Although these issues may appear to be separate, they share a number of significant features:  firstly, their consequences are exacerbated by globalization and the increased interdependency between states; secondly no single state or organization can fully address these challenges on its own; third, the severity of the constraint imposed by the crisis on defence budgets cannot but sharpen the traditional difficulty of balancing resources between domestic policy and foreign and defence policy.  Broad international cooperation and coordination between nations and regional and international organizations are now essential. 

As far as security challenges are concerned, NATO has been making a major contribution to enhancing international peace and security since its inception in 1949.  It is important for the international community, and for France, that NATO continue to be a useful tool, making that contribution well into the future.  But what form should that contribution take? It is essential that those who wish to participate effectively in the debate on the future of the Alliance should have a good idea of what is possible and necessary. 

Clearly, in the public mind, in France as in the other Allied nations NATO seems synonymous with its current mission in Afghanistan.  And indeed, Afghanistan is our operational priority.  But Afghanistan is not merely an operational commitment.  Afghanistan also demonstrates the multi-dimensional nature of crises and of the notion of security.

Security is becoming increasingly complex.  This development is clearly described in the excellent analysis of the Livre Blanc on defence and national security:  "complexity and uncertainty are becoming major features of the new international environment", it says, right in the introduction.  But despite such clear analyses, I do not believe our international organizations, including NATO, have yet begun to exploit them fully.  We have still not fully adapted our thinking on security, nor our policies, to be able to keep pace with the rapid evolution of our environment.

During my time as Secretary General, I have seen the considerable changes that have already taken place within the Alliance, in particular to develop expeditionary capabilities and to broaden the strategic debate.  But more remains to be done and we must carry on its adaptation, because there are times when I feel that we continue to approach 21st century challenges with a 20th century mindset – and means. 

Similarly, when I look outside of the Alliance, I note that in many ways the international institutional setup is also still stuck in a rather conservative mindset.  In simple terms, although our security environment has globalized, our international institutional setup remains compartmentalized.

Now please, don’t get me wrong:  I am not arguing that we need new institutions.  I am arguing that we need the existing ones to evolve.  What we need are more visionary policies within our institutions and greater coherency between those institutions.  I believe that for all of us, there is now a major opportunity to re-align our approach to security to the new realities.

At the beginning of next month, then, NATO will celebrate its 60th anniversary.  It is an impressive age for an Alliance of sovereign nations drawn from two continents.  So it is certainly worthy of celebration.  And it is taking place with an auspicious backdrop:  a new US Administration is in place, determined to take a fresh approach.  There is clearly a European willingness to respond positively to it.  Furthermore President Sarkozy’s commitment to more Europe in NATO and more defence and security policy in the EU has clarified France’s position.

Allow me to say in this connection that the current discussions on French participation in the Alliance's military structures are healthy and that it is important that issues relating to the defence of a country should be the subject of such debate.  I do not wish to interfere in this national discussion, whose outcome will be a sovereign decision by France – besides, I already addressed a joint session of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committees in the National Assembly a month ago.  I should just like to say that last week many of the Alliance foreign ministers meeting in Brussels welcomed the idea of closer involvement of France, emphasizing that it would help to strengthen the Alliance's capabilities to face the new challenges.  I also think it will help to reinforce French influence on defence and security issues, both in NATO and certainly also in the EU.  Above all, I think this new French approach could create a political space for an in-depth transatlantic debate on the future of European security.

This is a unique constellation, then.  And Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy made similar observations in their joint OpEd in Le Monde last month.  We must translate all this into political momentum – and we will.  I expect that at the NATO Summit, Heads of State and Government will adopt a short but powerful “Declaration on Alliance Security”.  This highly political document will reiterate NATO’s fundamentals as a transatlantic community where security is indivisible, and where collective defence is at its core. 

Furthermore, I expect the Summit to give the green light to start work on a new Strategic Concept.  Why?  It is not a whim, a wish to adopt yet another document. Nor does it mean that the 1999 Strategic Concept is out of date:  in many ways, if you re-read it today, you will see that it has withstood the ravages of time quite well. But one also has to recognize that that Strategic Concept was very marked by peace support operations (the Alliance had a massive presence in Bosnia and was in the midst of the Kosovo operation); of course it pre-dates 9/11 and the resurgence of the international terrorist threat; and it was developed and adopted by 16 nations – today we are 26, and we  hope we shall soon be 28.

So this process will engage all Allies in a major intellectual debate about all aspects of NATO and, ipso facto, will lead to the founding of a new strategic consensus within the Alliance – which is what gives it its strength.  This debate will allow an in-depth analysis that will not only help NATO to evolve but might also serve as a catalyst for an evolution in the manner in which the international organizations interact.

Given the globalized nature of the threats and challenges we face, a major feature of the debate will doubtless be the meaning of collective defence and Article 5.  Article 5 is still without question the cornerstone of the Alliance. But I believe we need to take a broader approach and gradually consider the notion of collective security, rather than strictly collective defence.  This is exactly the same approach that France has taken with the Livre Blanc, which recognises that the split between the two notions of defence and security is tending to disappear. 

But beyond this approach, what are the other themes that need to be seriously debated with a view to such a Concept?  When I say "seriously", I mean going to the heart of things and freeing ourselves from knee-jerk positions sometimes inspired by ritual inclusion, or conversely precipitate inclusion, of a topic in a ministerial communiqué.  Let me offer four ideas for your consideration.

First, cyber defence.  In the Cold War, we made huge efforts to protect our equipment from being paralysed by the effects of an electromagnetic pulse – the infamous “EMP”.  And our military authorities acquired considerable experience and know-how in defending against such effects.  Today, a cyber attack against our networks is far more likely than an EMP, yet the principles of defence and protection are largely similar.  So we should consider drawing on the unique capabilities that already exist in our military and look to build on them.  They could, for example, form a rapid response service to support Allies and perhaps even partners in the event of an attack.  And given the vital role that space and satellites now play within our cyber networks, should we not also start to follow activities in space more closely and consider the implications for our security?

Second, energy security.  The disruption of a country’s energy supply can destroy the economic and social fabric of a country in a way that resembles a war – yet without a single shot being fired.  It is therefore vital that NATO defines what added value it can bring, for example in terms of protecting critical infrastructure or securing chokepoints through which supply lines run – and I believe NATO already has the means to make a major contribution in this respect.

Third, climate change.  We can see that climate change already has security implications.  In Africa, for example, where lack of water and reduction in arable areas are directly responsible for certain conflicts and tensions.  In contrast, in the High North, where retreat of the ice cap is a reality, I am pleased to say that climate change has not yet led to any increased tension.  But the potential is there, ambitions are being voiced and we need to be prepared to respond.  Energy security and climate change are, moreover, two issues that underscore the need for the Alliance to fundamentally re-think its maritime doctrine.

Fourth and finally, the comprehensive approach, as we call it in our jargon.  In Afghanistan, and elsewhere, the key to success lies in a comprehensive approach of civilian and military actors.  We all agree on that.  But each institution continues to work according to its own culture and its own preferences, without necessarily seeking convergence of the results.  I have to admit that in my five years as Secretary General, this has been one of my biggest frustrations.  I believe that a new Strategic Concept must make an even stronger case for cooperation among our major institutions – starting with NATO and the European Union.  A closer relationship between these two institutions would enhance the effectiveness of both organizations in a comprehensive approach.  Such cooperation would also allow an improvement in the international institutional set up, which I mentioned earlier.  This is clearly understood here in France, and I greatly value France’s efforts to turn this aspiration into reality.  Javier Solana, who is here, and I are working daily to improve EU-NATO relations.

All these points represent political approaches, but let us be clear:  the value the Organization can add depends on its military capabilities.  NATO is not a civil agency, nor will it become one.  It is a politico-military organization and in order to be able to contribute fully, it must have the necessary capabilities:  capabilities appropriate to the new threats and challenges; expeditionary capabilities that can fit into new crisis contexts where the military dimension is just one aspect; capabilities, finally, that can cover the whole spectrum of military action, from combat, through training of local soldiers, to stabilization.  The French Livre Blanc shows that difficult choices can be made in order to determine priorities.  In the same way, the new Strategic Concept must include these military issues and prioritize them.

How this future Strategic Concept is to be developed has yet to be determined – it will undoubtedly be one of the points that the Heads of State and Government will want to discuss personally in Strasbourg/Kehl.  Proposals are on the table:  a group of wise men, or a new Harmel Report.  It will be mainly up to my successor to manage the smooth running of this process.  I nevertheless express the hope that it will revive a real strategic debate within NATO.

In fact, even though the world has globalized, we still find it hard to discuss regions and issues when NATO is not directly involved.  It is clear that not every “failed state” and not every crisis in the Middle East will automatically lead to a call for NATO, but we should certainly at least discuss these issues and exchange information.  In the early 1950s, one of the first issues debated in the newly created North Atlantic Council was the situation on the Korean peninsula.  In some ways, perhaps we had a better grasp of globalization back then than we do now.  Again, please don’t get me wrong – I am not suggesting that NATO should deal with everything everywhere.  Some people have incorrectly interpreted the term “global NATO” in this way.  NATO does not seek to become “global cop”.  NATO is not the United Nations.  But what I am suggesting is that anything that we can do to deepen our knowledge and thereby improve our understanding of the implications for our security will prepare us better for the future – and this is something we should encourage.  So I shall continue to push for strategic debate that goes beyond the simple Euro-Atlantic centric perspective.  This will help us not only to better understand the complexities and interactions of our security environment, but also to identify how NATO can make the most appropriate contribution to the international community’s efforts in this field on the basis of the added value that NATO can supply.   

Ladies and Gentlemen, 

I have provided you with my personal thoughts on some of the elements that a new Strategic Concept might contain.  Clearly, it’s not an exhaustive list – I should also have mentioned the growing dangers of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means, and the balance in Alliance policy between deterrence, non-proliferation policy and contribution to disarmament efforts.  And as I said, many elements of the 1999 Strategic Concept remain valid and must be retained in a new document.  But if we want to safeguard our security in today’s rapidly changing environment, the first steps will be to improve our understanding of the concept of security, and to expand our institutional toolkit accordingly.  I look forward to France playing an active role in that debate, and in many ways, that debate is starting today, here, with this study day. 

Thank you very much.