Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. Enhancing Security of Lithuania and Other Baltic States in 1992-94 and Future Guidelines Ceslovas Stankevicius [Back to Index] Chapter 2. Lithuania's Negotiations with Russia and Withdrawal of the Occupation Troops from the Territory of Lithuania Section 1. Brief Historical Preview [1] When the battles of World War II ended in the greater part of Europe, thousands of Lithuanian citizens rallied in the Freedom Fighters Army and began an armed struggle against the USSR occupation forces and regime.(1) The heroic struggle of the Guerrilla Army to liberate Lithuania against the numerically superior USSR NKVD troops lasted from 1944 to 1953. During that ten year war, Lithuania lost about 40 thousand fighters.(2) More than 20 thousand of them fell in battle, others were arrested and imprisoned for long terms in Russia's concentration camps, where many also perished. [2] After the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union had suppressed the armed resistance of the Lithuanians, a non-violent resistance movement rallied and took over the action. Unarmed resistance organisations and groups continuously demanded that occupation forces be withdrawn and Lithuania liberated. For example, in September 1975, the Lithuanian national democratic movement, together with Latvian and Estonian freedom organisations, addressed a statement to the Heads of the Major Powers and international organisations which urged a rapid withdrawal of the USSR occupation troops. In August 1979, in the widely known Address of the 45 Balts to the General Secretary of the United Nations, Kurt Waldheim, the Balts demanded the withdrawal of occupation troops and the assurance of free development for the Baltic States. [3] Lithuanian political organisations in exile raised the same demands, mostly in the United States of America. They sought international political support for the cessation of Lithuania's occupation. For example, the foreign diplomatic missions, the Supreme Liberation Committee of Lithuania and the Directorate of the Lithuanian World Community, at its Washington conference held October 21-22, 1968, adopted a Manifesto which demanded that USSR troops be withdrawn from Lithuania. [4] The withdrawal of the occupation forces was constantly demanded by the Lithuanian Liberty League (LLL), an organisation that functioned underground prior to 1988, and openly, since November, 1988. In 1975, at the session of the CSCE commission in Washington, the LLL raised the issue of the withdrawal of occupation troops. This issue was also raised in the LLL Program Manifesto of 1988 and in other LLL documents. In 1989, the LLL initiated a massive campaign to collect signatures demanding the withdrawal of the USSR occupation troops from Lithuania. The Sajudis of Lithuania joined this campaign and 1,650,000 signatures were collected and presented to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. [5] On March 12, 1990, the parliament of the restored independent Lithuania (The Supreme Council) adopted a decree(3) invalidating the military conscription law of the USSR for the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania. By its decree(4) of March 14, 1990, the Lithuanian parliament ceased the operation of the USSR military commissariat offices. In the Appeal(5) to the President of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Gorbachev, on March 13, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania appraised as illegal the stationing of Soviet troops on Lithuanian soil, and proposed negotiations regarding their withdrawal. By the Law of the Republic of Lithuania of July 17, 1990, the compulsory conscription for national defence forces was introduced. [6] On August 7, 1990, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania approved(6) the goals and provisions for negotiations with the USSR. Among them was determined to be a goal to reach "an agreement on the terms and stages of the withdrawal of the USSR Armed Forces from the Republic of Lithuania". On April 14, 1990, the leaders of the USSR, Gorbachev and Ryzhkov, sent a stern telegram to the Lithuanian Government. The telegram contained an ultimatum to the Supreme Council of Lithuania - that within two days some of the fundamental decisions entrenching the re-established independence of Lithuania should be revoked. In the event that this demand would not be carried out, the Soviet leaders threatened to apply economic sanctions.(7) After a few days, the Soviet Union began an economic blockade of Lithuania which lasted for 74 days.(8) In December 1990, the Government of the USSR took a hard line toward Lithuania and any talks that had taken place before between both sides were broken off. On January 10, 1991, Gorbachev gave an ultimatum to the Supreme Council of Lithuania in which demanded to re-establish the validity of the USSR Constitution.(9) On January 13, the Armed forces of the USSR carried out aggressive acts in Vilnius and in other parts of Lithuania. Consequently, the leadership of the USSR, until the end of the existence of the USSR, resisted officially recognising the re-established independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and avoided beginning genuine negotiations with them on the issue of the withdrawal of occupation troops. Section 2. The Normalisation of Relations Between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation [7] Negotiations on the normalisation of relations between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation began in the autumn of 1990. However, these negotiations did not acquire a genuine international character until the beginning of 1991. By that time the government of the Russian Federation and its policy had not yet been shaped. In January, 1991, while Gorbachev's controlled USSR Army tanks crushed peaceful, unarmed people in Vilnius, and seized the Vilnius television tower and other buildings, the Head of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, condemned the use of military force against the citizens of Lithuania. On January 13, 1991, in Tallinn, Yeltsin together with the heads of state of the Baltic countries, Landsbergis, Gorbunovs and Ruutel, signed a joint statement addressed to the UN and other international organisations. In this Statement actions of military coercion were firmly condemned and independence of Baltic States recognised.(10) After these bloody events, Lithuanian-Russian negotiations became more active and acquired a character of real negotiations between the two states in settling the inter-state relations between them. [8] On July 29, 1991, the Heads of the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation, Vytautas Landsbergis and Boris Yeltsin, signed in Moscow the Treaty on the Foundations of Inter-State Relations between the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation. In that treaty, Russia recognised, without any reservations, the independence of the state of Lithuania, restored by the Act of March 11, 1990, as the state- successor of the independent Republic of Lithuania founded in 1918. At the time the Treaty was being signed, Boris Yeltsin had already been elected in direct general elections President of the Russian Federation. [9] It is relevant to emphasise that, in the preamble of the July 29, 1991 Treaty, Russia recognised that the USSR annexed Lithuania in 1940, and stated that the consequences of the annexation be eliminated. Recognising this fact, the leadership of Russia took a fair and honourable stance. The consequences of the occupation and annexation carried out by the USSR include not only the 50 year long military occupation, but also the damage amounting to many billions of dollars inflicted during that period to the Lithuanian residents, economy, and State. Russia recognised the necessity of remedying the consequences of the annexation of Lithuania, carried out by the USSR. After December 24, 1991, it became the direct obligation of the Russian Federation as the state-successor and continuer of the rights and obligations of the USSR.(11) [10] On July 29, 1991, due to Russia's pressing demand, the Agreement on the Social and Cultural Co-operation in Developing the Kaliningrad Oblast between Lithuania and Russian Federation was signed as well. This agreement remains valid for a 5 year term. Article 8 of the agreement provides guarantees only for the transit of civil cargo through Lithuania to the Kaliningrad oblast. This article particularly and deliberately emphasises that it is not designated for the transit of military cargo or for other military transportation. [11] The Lithuanian-Russian Treaty of July 29, 1991 was ratified by the Lithuanian Parliament on August 19, 1991 at the time of the coup in Moscow. It is important to emphasise that the Russian Supreme Soviet ratified the Treaty half a year later on January 17, 1992, i.e., after the Russian Federation had already become successor and continuer of all the USSR rights and obligations. [12] It should be noted that in both cases, in 1991, as in 1920, the restored independence of Lithuania was recognised by Russia, who had the shape of the Russian Soviet Socialist Federal Republic (RSSFR), but not yet that of the USSR.(12) The USSR emerged only in 1922 when the Bolsheviks coerced the former nations of the Russian Empire to become part of the USSR.(13) The Lithuanian and RSSFR Treaty of July 12, 1920, became the foundation of later treaties and provisions for relations with the USSR. On July 18, 1991, after his meeting with BorisYeltsin in Moscow, Vytautas Landsbergis noted in the joint briefing that the USSR and not Russia, with whom a treaty was to be signed on July 29, 1991, remained the subject of the Peace Treaty with Russia of 1920. "We decided not to link it (i.e. the 1920 Peace Treaty) to this treaty. Most probably we shall have to refer to the Treaty (i.e. the 1920 Peace Treaty) when regulating our relations with the USSR."(14) The 1991 Treaty with the RSSFR became the foundation for relations with the Russian Federation as the state-successor of the USSR. On July 29, 1991, Lithuania recognised the RSSFR as a subject of international law, and the RSSFR recognised the restored independence of the Republic of Lithuania as a continuer(15) of the state established in 1918. As was mentioned above, the RSSFR also recognised the fact of the annexation of Lithuania by the USSR.(16) At last on September 6, 1991, "taking into account concrete historical and political circumstances of Lithuania joining the USSR," the State Council of the Soviet Union decided to renew its recognition of the independence of the Republic of Lithuania.(17) By this resolution the USSR adopted an official decision to negotiate with the Republic of Lithuania as an independent state on various issues, including military.(18) [13] In the beginning of 1991 the RSSFR leadership headed by Yeltsin maintained in 1991 the concept that the RSSFR had been the successor of Kerensky's Russia, that does not recognise the legitimacy of the take over by the Bolshevik power.(19) This position was often put forward to the Lithuanian delegation for the negotiation. At last, by declaring, on December 24, 1991, that Russia became the successor of the rights and responsibilities of the USSR, the Russian Federation recognised and closed the legal and political gap in the continuity of Russian Empire between 1917-1991.(20) Thus, the 3/4 of a century long chain of statehood - the Russian empire - RSSFR -USSR - RSSFR - RF - CIS - became consecutive in political and legal continuity. Section 3. Negotiations with Russia on the Withdrawal of the Troops of the Former USSR from the Territory of Lithuania [14] On September 10, 1991, immediately after the USSR State Council recognised the independence of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia on September 6, 1991, the representatives of the respective governments met with the Soviet Minister of Defence, Shaposhnikov to discuss the issues of withdrawal of the armed forces. He stated that the withdrawal of the armed forces could be expected to begin no earlier than 1994, after the completion of the withdrawal from other Eastern European states.(21) On December 24, 1991, i.e. on the same day as the USSR ceased to exist, and the Russian Government stated that the Russian Federation was taking over all the rights and obligations of the USSR, the Government of Lithuania sent an official note(22) to the Russian Government demanding the complete withdrawal of the former USSR troops from the territory of Lithuania. [15] On October 5, 1991, in Vilnius, the Council of the Baltic States, speaking on behalf of the three states, issued a Statement(23) in which the Council demanded "to start the immediate withdrawal of the USSR Army from Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania", and by December 1, 1991, to withdraw completely all kinds of Soviet troops from the capitals - Riga, Tallinn and Vilnius. On January 5, 1992, in Jurmala, the Council of the Baltic States issued a mew document which once again called for an immediate and complete withdrawal of the former USSR troops from the territories of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.(24) [16] On January 17, 1992 ( i.e., on the same day, as the Russian Supreme Soviet ratified the Lithuanian-Russian Treaty), a Lithuanian-Russian Summit took place in Moscow. In a bilateral communiquù(25) signed by Vytautas Landsbergis and Boris Yeltsin, the former USSR troops present on the territory of Lithuania were officially defined as the "withdrawing forces under the jurisdiction of Russian Federation". It was agreed that these troops would be completely withdrawn and that this would be done in accordance with a special agreement. It was also agreed that, pending the completion of the withdrawal, these troops shall not undertake any actions which might violate the sovereignty and laws of the Republic of Lithuania. [17] On January 31, 1992, the first session of the state delegations for negotiations between the state of the Republic of Lithuania and the Russian Federation took place in Vilnius. During that session, the Russian party raised the question of the possibility of allowing some military objects of the former USSR, important to Russia, to remain for a certain period of time on Lithuanian territory. The Lithuanian party rejected this proposal outright without considering it, reiterating its demand for the withdrawal of all the troops. Lithuania demanded the withdrawal of all the troops by the end of 1992. The Russian party did not accept this deadline. The bilateral negotiation communication(26) fixed the agreed-upon date of February 1992 for the beginning of the withdrawal of Russian troops from Lithuanian territory. It also stated that negotiations on the procedure for the withdrawal and the termination of the withdrawal be held and that agreements be made promptly. [18] From the beginning of negotiations with Lithuania and the other Baltic States till August 1992, Russia held on to its standard position which it had prepared for the uniform agreements with the CIS republics concerning the status of temporary presence of the former Soviet armed forces and the conditions of their possible withdrawal. On January 16, 1992, Moscow dispatched to the heads of the CIS the draft of the standard agreement "On the legal status and the conditions of withdrawal of the former USSR Armed Forces temporarily deployed on the territory of the Republic of (xxx)."(27) Its preamble provided that "the legal basis should be created for the stationing of the former USSR Armed Forces until their withdrawal" from the territory of respective CIS republic. The draft also provided that these armed forces had to ensure "security and sovereignty along external borders" of respective CIS republic. It was also foreseen to legitimise: full freedom of action of military units, Russia's jurisdiction, Russia's right to ownership of military facilities, rights of military personnel to citizenship, housing guarantees, etc. The draft also stipulated that during the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the former USSR each CIS republic would participate, with its own resources and finance, in the construction of facilities in the new locations of deployment in Russia. By the decree issued by the Russian President, Yeltsin on January 29, 1992, a one state delegation was formed "to prepare agreements with the [all] states - republics of the former USSR on the whole of military-political issues, with Shakhraj appointed as Head of the delegation.(28) [19] At the beginning of February 1992, the Lithuanian party presented the Russian party draft agreements prepared by the Lithuanian party. The negotiations of the experts of both parties took place in Vilnius on February 11-14, and in Moscow on March 18-19, and again in Vilnius on April 23-24. These negotiations did not yield any significant results. By the decree of the Russian President of March 18, 1992, Ambassador for Special Missions, Viktor Isakov was appointed as Head of the Russian delegation for negotiations with Lithuania.(29) However, the Russian party was obviously not ready to agree upon essential issues. In disagreeing with the substantiated provisions of the Lithuanian party, the Russian party was simply delaying the negotiations on the articles of the agreements suggested by Lithuania. On February 27, 1992, the withdrawal of a small technical army unit was demonstrated to the press; however, a serious withdrawal had not yet begun. [20] Lithuania prohibited the USSR troops, illegally stationed in Lithuania, from performing any land and air force exercises on military grounds and other Lithuanian territories. Lithuania prohibited the movement of military units and equipment on the roads of Lithuania without permission obtained in advance. Lithuania demanded that Russia did not hinder the Republic of Lithuania from executing a sovereign border control and remove occupation forces from Lithuania's borders with Poland and in the Baltic sea. Lithuania prohibited the transfer of any military contingent, including new conscripts to the Russian troops deployed in Lithuania. [21] Despite Russia's obligation to respect Lithuania's sovereignty and comply with her laws, Russia's troops continued these violations. On April 19-22, 1993, the Commander of the Russian north-western Army Group, Col. Gen. Mayorov organised staff exercises of all the units that were stationed in the three states. As was indicated in the description of exercises the aim was to neutralise the national military formations of the Baltic States and take over the main facilities.(30) Lithuania established the fact of constant violations and made official protests, which were left with almost no response from Russia. Representatives of Western countries and international organisations were also informed about the Russian troops' violations of Lithuania's sovereignty and her laws, the devastation of Lithuania's forests, the pollution of the environment, and the introduction of new troops into Lithuania. [22] Despite Lithuania's ban, new military contingents were illegally brought into the country. On April 28, 1992, the Lithuanian Head of State, Landsbergis appealed to the Russian President to cease the transportation of new troops through the airports of Kazlu Ruda and Kedainiai.(31) On April 30, 1992, the Foreign Ministry of Lithuania presented the Foreign Ministry of Russia a note of protest regarding the illegal transfer of new military units into Lithuania. On May 22, the Government of Lithuania was again forced to express a protest to Russia on the covert transfer of 600 new conscripts into Lithuania. Meanwhile the Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev refused to recognise the sovereign rights of Lithuania. In his telegram of May 31, 1992 to Vytautas Landsbergis he protested against the resolution of the Lithuanian Government of May 28, 1992, which forbade to carry in Lithuania the armaments and the personnel for the Russian military troops. He also protested against the traffic rules introduced by the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence without co-ordinating them with Russia. Grachev threatened to prevent "the actions towards the armed forces and the military personnel on the territory of the republic that were unlawful and violated the law ("nezakonnych protivopravnych")" and "resort to all measures to ensure honour and dignity of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and members of their families."(32) At the same time Grachev issued an order allowing the Russian military to use weapons in the Baltic States "in special cases."(33) [23] On April 7, 1992, in Klaipeda, with the sanction of the Lithuanian Prosecutor's Office, Ivan Chernykh, a colonel of the Russian Guards was arrested on charges with criminal actions in Klaipeda against the Lithuanian Republic during the Moscow coup in 1991. This raised tension between Lithuania and Russia. Marshal Shaposhnikov addressed with the telegram to Vytautas Landsbergis. Tension was reduced on April 8, when, with the guarantees of the Russian officials and a financial pledge, Ivan Chernykh was handed over to the official Russian representatives after the latter acknowledged in writing the lawfulness of the actions of the Lithuanian side.(34) [24] The Russian military acted illicitly not only in Lithuania, but also in Latvia and Estonia. On May 29, 1992, the Baltic Council adopted a statement of protest regarding the threatening illegal actions of the Russian troops in all the three Baltic States.(35) The Council indicated an incident during which, on May 28, men of the Russian military unit No. 20170, armed with machine-guns, blocked the premises of the local government in Dobele, Latvia, and other state offices and bridges, causing a serious threat to the security of the residents. The Council interpreted these actions as provoking conflict and as flagrant violation of Latvia's laws. The Baltic Council demanded that this incident be investigated and that those responsible for it take responsibility. [25] Numerous instances of wilful behaviour forced the Council of the Baltic States to state, on March 16, 1992, that "the former USSR troops continue to act as conquerors, disregarding Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian laws < ... >, continuing artillery shootings and bombings on land and at sea, and damaging the environment. The illegal commercial activity of the Russian armed forces increases; for example, the sale of weapons and assets, as well as of wood".(36) The Council demanded that Russia take the firmest measures to block such actions. [26] The negotiations between Lithuania and Russia became blocked because the positions of both sides differed substantially. Lithuania based all of its grounds for negotiation on the principles and norms of international law, and on illegality of the occupation and forced incorporation of Lithuania into the USSR. During the entire period of negotiations, Russia sought to impose her conception concerning the basis of the relationship between Lithuania and Russia. Russia presented herself as a successor-state of the USSR with rights to relations with her former republics that had separated from her. Lithuania verified that she had never acceded to the USSR, but was occupied by the USSR. Therefore, the occupational institutions and structures of the USSR imposed by force on Lithuania in 1940-1941 and 1944-1990, including the so-called LSSR authority, were illegal. Their decisions are in no way binding on the Republic of Lithuania and have no legal consequences. [27] Lithuania maintained the provision that the USSR as the occupying state could not legally acquire any property or profit in Lithuania. All of the real estate in Lithuania was unquestionably the property of Lithuania and could not be an object of negotiation. By a law promulgated on November 28, 1991, Lithuania had established that the premises and buildings occupied by the USSR troops belong to the Republic of Lithuania. In spite of this, Russia made claims to the property and buildings constructed on the territory of Lithuania for the needs of the USSR troops, as well as other assets, and sought to possess them jointly or to obtain compensation from Lithuania. [28] The positions of both sides differed regarding the grounds for the obligation to withdraw the troops. Russia wanted to convert this obligation into one resulting only from the forthcoming agreement. Lithuania maintained the provision that the immediate withdrawal of occupation troops is an absolute and unconditional international obligation of Russia. This obligation obviously could not arise from the forthcoming agreement because it was rooted in the very fact that it was a violation of international law. Negotiations were being held, not on whether the Russian troops would be withdrawn, but on the question of the order of the withdrawal, the timetable, and other matters related to the termination of the occupation. Thus, the decisive word herein shall belong to Lithuania, not to Russia. Therefore, Lithuania insisted that in Article 1 of the so-called main agreement (source No. 2) Russia acknowledged its international obligation to withdraw the armed forces from the Lithuanian territory. [29] Russia sought that the withdrawing troops be granted the legal status of temporary presence. Lithuania firmly maintained the provision that the former USSR troops, from the beginning of the occupation until the day of their withdrawal from Lithuania, were and would remain the occupying troops illegally present in the country. However, basic human rights were recognised for those persons serving in the troops. Therefore, while preparing the agreements on the manner and procedure for the withdrawal of the troops, only legal questions pertaining to the military and their family members were to be regulated and not those of the armed forces units. [30] Lithuania did not recognise any extra-territorial rights in the territories occupied by the troops(37) and firmly stated that, without exception, only the laws and power of the government of Lithuania shall be valid. The mere fact of the continued illegal presence of foreign troops could in no way limit the sovereign authority of Lithuania. Lithuania could adopt and enforce independent decisions without the consent of Russia; for instance, unilaterally take over military objects whose transfer was being delayed. Lithuania acted in this way when Russia postponed the transfer of border posts and border check-points. Lt. Gen. Gaponenko, Commander of the Baltic Border District of the Russian Federation, recognised the sovereign right of Lithuania to guard its own borders, although he insisted that border facilities were the property of the Russian Federation and their transfer could be decided only by way of negotiations.(38) On May 27, 1992, Lithuania once again demanded for immediate transfer to the Republic of Lithuania the protection of its own state borders.(39) Russians continued to delay the matter, therefore the Lithuanian military groups entered the border posts and took positions alongside the Russian garrisons. This was accomplished without conflict, even though Lithuania had to act critically close to the point of crisis. [31] Russia sought to dismiss a part of the officer corps to a reserve unit during the period of withdrawal and to legitimise them in Lithuania. Russia also sought the recognition of their political and civil rights. Lithuania rejected these demands made by Russia, maintaining the provision that all Russia's military and their family members(40) belonged to the contingent of the troops to be withdrawn and could not be legitimised in Lithuania as her legal residents. [32] Lithuania agreed that, prior to the completion of the withdrawal of the troops, Russia's military and their families could make use of Lithuania's medical facilities, kindergartens, schools, public utilities and social services. However, all the services rendered should be remunerated by the Russian Federation. [33] Lithuania demanded that the flats rented by the families of the USSR military personnel shall be transferred to the Lithuanian authorities in an orderly manner. Upon their departure, civil persons who had privatised their flats in compliance with the laws of the Republic of Lithuania or had legally acquired other real estate had to sell it to citizens of Lithuania. [34] Russia sought to relate the terms of the withdrawal of military units with the terms of the construction of new housing for them on Russian territory. Lithuania maintained the provision that problems arising for Russia shall be solved separately by herself and cannot be linked with the withdrawal of the troops. This provision was supported by the Western countries who rendered international aid to Russia for the establishment of her military on Russian territory. [35] Part of the damage to Lithuania was inflicted by the mere presence of the occupation forces- the destruction of landscape, the pollution of the environment, and in other ways.(41) Therefore, at the negotiations regarding the procedure for the withdrawal of the troops, Lithuania sought to resolve issues pertinent to the compensation for the damage inflicted. Initially, Lithuania demanded compensation for the weaponry and the military assets of the Lithuanian Armed Forces seized in 1940 in the form of new weapons and military equipment necessary for the restoration of Lithuania's defence capacity.(42) [36] Lithuania did not accept Russia's explanations that the responsibility for crimes committed rested with Stalin's communist regime or with its specific structures. Lithuania maintained that whatever pertained to the regime in Russia and was subject to its internal responsibility, in dealing with Lithuania, belonged to the domain of another state's international responsibility. [37] Since Russia had no intention of altering her position in the negotiations, in general, the possibility of reaching an agreement became dubious. On April 4, 1992, in Vilnius, there was a meeting of the negotiating delegations of the Baltic States. The delegations discussed the state of affairs of the negotiations with Russia, exchanged experience and affirmed that the negotiations and the withdrawal process reached an impasse.(43) Realising this, the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party submitted a motion to the Lithuanian Parliament to hold a referendum regarding the demand for the unconditional withdrawal of the former USSR Armed Forces and for compensation for the damage inflicted by the USSR. On April 27, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania passed a bill to hold a referendum, which took place on June 14, 1992. Over 76 percent of Lithuania's citizens entitled to vote participated. 90 percent of those participating in the referendum expressed the demand that "the withdrawal of the former SSR troops from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania be commenced immediately and completed in 1992, and that the damage inflicted to the people of Lithuania and the state be compensated". [38] On June 30, 1992, the Lithuanian state delegation for negotiations with Russia had officially presented the Russian party a detailed timetable for the withdrawal of all the former USSR troops from the territory of Lithuania by December 31, 1992. The timetable was well-founded on the calculation of the quantity of military cargo and the required number of freight cars, as well as the capacity of the system of Lithuanian railways. [39] Prior to the Helsinki Summit meeting, at an ordinary NAA session, on May 15-18, 1992, in Banff (Canada), the delegations of the Baltic States signed and disseminated a statement drafted by the Lithuanian delegation. It proposed to include a provision into the documents of the CSCE Helsinki Summit that "a CSCE member-state must fulfil the demands of another CSCE member-state to immediately and unconditionally remove its army from the territory of said country."(44) It was also proposed that the delay in implementing such demands be acknowledged as a violation of the CSCE principles. Similar proposals to the CSCE were presented by the Baltic Assembly on behalf of the three parliaments in the Address, adopted in Palanga, on May 31, 1992. Article 15 of the OSCE Helsinki Summit Declaration adopted on July 10, 1992, required the making of agreements and timetables for the rapid, orderly, and complete withdrawal of foreign troops from the territories of the Baltic States. Thus, the necessity of rapid withdrawal of the illegally present occupation troops was recognised to be an international problem, and a clear decision regarding it was made. This document was also signed by Russia. Undoubtedly, the adoption of this document also facilitated the demand of Lithuania's citizens expressed by voting on the referendum. When adopting the Declaration of the Helsinki Summit, the Lithuanian delegation read the Interpretative Statement which, following the procedure, became an official document of the Summit. In the Statement Lithuanian called attention to the demands of the referendum of June 14, 1992 and declared that, being a successor state of the USSR Russia will be obliged to fulfil the duty that this status entailed, to eliminate all the consequences of the 1940 annexation, including compensation for the damages inflicted to Lithuania.(45) [40] Russia, however, decided to use the tactic of applying pressure to the Baltic States. On August 6, 1992, Russia's Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev invited the Foreign Ministers of the three Baltic States to Moscow and, first of all, raised the demand for the protection of the so-called Russian-speakers as a precondition for the withdrawal of the troops. Kozyrev stated that Russia would withdraw troops from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia by 1994, if the following conditions were fulfilled: 1) laws concerning the rights of the Russian-speakers would be changed; 2) claims to border zone territories would be discarded; 3) the armed forces were given a legal status for their presence until their withdrawal; 4) strategic military possessions were preserved; 5) the demands for compensating the damage inflicted by the USSR during 1940-1991 were rescinded; 6) the Baltic States would undertake the construction of houses for the military of the units being withdrawn, in accord with the terms of the time-table for the withdrawal; 7) Russia would be given guarantee of free military transit to Kaliningrad; 8) the real estate and other possessions left by the departing troops would be compensated to Russia; 9) social protection of the military and their families would be guaranteed; 10) the Baltic states would abstain from one-sided actions during the withdrawal period; 11) discrimination of the Russian legal and natural persons in the sphere of ownership and property relations would be abolished.(46) Lithuania assessed these demands as an ultimatum, as unjust, and without foundation, and therefore, unacceptable. [41] In August 1992, the situation of the negotiations changed in an essential way. Russia renounced some of her former legally groundless positions, and turned its attention to the substantiated arguments of Lithuania. Thus, both parties succeeded in reaching a compromise in negotiating the majority of the articles of the agreements in an acceptable manner. The extremely important Article 1 of the so-called main agreement was agreed upon in the following wording: "The Russian Federation acknowledges its international obligations to withdraw the armed forces and shall carry out an organised and complete withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Lithuania no later than by August 31, 1993."(47) Russia consented to compensate for the weaponry and assets of the Lithuanian Armed Forces seized in 1940, as well as for the ecological damage inflicted by the USSR Armed Forces of the USSR after December 24, 1991, while Russia became the successor of the responsibilities of the USSR. In the general context of all the agreements, Lithuania consented to compromise on the date of the termination of the withdrawal - August 31, 1993. She also agreed that further negotiations be conducted at a later time regarding the other part of the damage inflicted by the USSR. [42] In this way, the negotiations between Lithuania and Russia eventually became constructive. A particularly positive role was played by experts of the Ministry of Defence of Russia who took over the initiative from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, making the negotiations more efficient and constructive. The last round of negotiations was held with the representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vitalij Churkin also participated in them. The negotiations which took place in an intense way in Moscow ended early in the morning of September 8, 1992. Seven agreements were fully negotiated and prepared for signing, including the agreement on the timetable for the withdrawal of the troops. However, in the evening of September 8, 1992, at the final meeting of the Heads of States and the delegations of Lithuania and Russia held in the Kremlin, Russia decided to sign only three of the agreements. [43] The following agreements were signed: on the timetable for the withdrawal of the troops; on issues regarding the organisational and technical aspects for the withdrawal process; regarding the procedure for the functioning of the troops, pending their withdrawal. All three agreements became valid upon being signed. As was agreed by the Contracting Parties, they were later deposited with the UN Secretariat. [44] Four of the negotiated agreements remained unsigned.(48) The Russian side stated that those agreements would possibly be signed in October. The Lithuanian side agreed. However, on October 8, 1992, Russia presented proposals which actually substantially revised the September 8 fully negotiated, albeit unsigned, agreements. Russia again returned to her initial groundless provisions which she had given up in previous negotiations(49) and which contained mutually acceptable decisions. The violation of the compromise reached during the negotiations on September 8, 1992 and a return of the negotiations to their initial positions threatened to jeopardise the withdrawal of the troops at the determined date. [45] The Foreign Affairs and International Economic Relations Committee of the Supreme Council of Russia adopted a resolution on September 21, 1992(50) concerning the September 8, 1992 agreements of Lithuania and Russia and recommended that the Russian President postpone signing the remaining agreements, pending "the proper preparation of them regarding the rights and interests of Russia and her citizens on the territory of Lithuania". The Committee maintained that the agreements of September 8 "are a serious restriction of political and property rights of the Russian Federation, a fundamental violation of the rights of the military and their families in Lithuania."(51) In the opinion of the Committee the signed agreements had to be considered as invalid until the signing of the main agreement. [46] While the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Russia demanded alteration on what had been negotiated previously , but yet unsigned, the withdrawal of the troops proceeded in compliance with the signed agreement of the time-table(52), although there was a sufficient number of violations. On September 21-22, 1992, in gross violation of the agreements of September 28, 1992, the Russian 108th Regiment of the Seventh Guards of the Airborne Division carried out combat exercises and shelled the quarry of the Rokai (off Kaunas) Ceramics factory while there were people and equipment working at that moment. High voltage electric facilities were put out of order, damages were estimated at 425 thousand Roubles. People hid beneath tractors and were not affected.(53) The Lithuanian Government expressed protest regarding this incident. Very often departing Russian military units left unpaid bills for services. For example, according to the documents provided by the Lithuanian local governments, in 1992 alone the Russian units who left Lithuania did not pay at least 540 thousand Litas (135 thousand US$).(54) In Latvia the situation was similar: in August 1994 the indebtedness of the Russian armed forces to the Latvian local governments and enterprises was estimated at 404 647 Lats for heating and 92 842 Lats for railway freight.(55) [47] Very often it is wrongly assumed that the negotiations on the army withdrawal from Lithuania continued in 1993. Such a mistake occurs because of the confusion of objects of negotiations. It is necessary to emphasise that the agreements signed on September 8, 1992 were entirely sufficient for the withdrawal of the troops and they were being implemented. It was recognised on an international level as well. For instance, On October 25, 1992, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the resolution "On the Complete Foreign Troop Withdrawal from the Territories of the Baltic States", in which the "recent agreements on the complete withdrawal of foreign Armed Forces from Lithuanian territory" were welcomed. There was a comprehensive and final agreement reached on September 8, 1992 regarding the procedure and terms of the army withdrawal. The object of negotiations was already a different one. The dialogue or negotiations between Lithuania and Russia which followed were not on the procedure and terms of the army withdrawal. This was only Russia's effort to impose negotiations on the agreements reached on September 8,1992, in order to alter them in Russia's favour. In other words, since October 1992 efforts were made to negotiate for new negotiations. For this purpose, Russia pressured by suspending the army withdrawal and by resorting to other means. In principle these were different objects of negotiations, despite the fact that the second one was also connected with the army withdrawal. [48] By the end of 1992 the Lithuanian national defence units were bigger and gradually grew into the armed forces of Lithuania. In its "Act on the Restoration of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Lithuania" (No. 1-3066) of November 19, 1992, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania solemnly declared the restoration of the Lithuanian Armed Forces. During the last quarter of 1992 the withdrawal of the Russian army was proceeding at full speed. Russia, however, also applied pressure. On October 29, 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin proclaimed a decree temporarily suspending the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. This decree was formulated with the political goal of linking the withdrawal of the troops with the alleged human rights problem in the Baltic States and of raising this issue on an international level. The decree of the Russian President on the suspension of the pull out of the armed forces was intended to coincide with the elections to the Lithuanian Seimas and the Congress of the Russian People's Deputies to be held on December 1.(56) However, in the letter of November 5, 1992, to the Head of the Lithuanian Republic, Vytautas Landsbergis, the Russian President "confirmed clearly and unambiguously his intention to withdraw the armed forces form the Lithuanian territory."(57) The President explained the temporary suspension of the withdrawal by the problems related to it, one of them being the unsigned agreements on legal and social guarantees for the military and their families during the withdrawal period.(58) The President proposed to speed up the amendment ("uskorit dorabotku") of the general agreement on the army withdrawal which remained unsigned. In his reply of November 12, 1992, Vytautas Landsbergis noted that in the agreements co-ordinated on September 8, 1992, "solutions were found which were mutually acceptable and balanced." He also said that the new Russian proposals "were so important that they could affect in principle the whole of the agreements that were reached with such a great difficulty, and even overstep their boundaries."(59) [49] In fact, despite the suspension of the withdrawal declared by the Russian President, the army withdrawal from Lithuania continued. By the end of 1992, 78% of the forces to be pulled out in 1992 according to the signed timetable were removed.(60) Among the units withdrawn from Vilnius there was the infamous 107th Motorised Rifle Division which participated in storming the Vilnius television tower and the Printing House on January 13, 1991. The entire Border Guard Forces were also pulled out, as well as the units of the 169th and 466th air defence brigades from Visoriai near Vilnius. All units participated in the withdrawal operations, except the 3rd Coast Guard Division in Klaipeda. The Lithuanian authorities took under their jurisdiction 52 military facilities, among them the largest Northern barracks in Vilnius, the barracks in Ukmerge, Marijampole and Pabrade.(61) [50] In November, 1992, a general election to the Seimas took place in Lithuania and in February, 1993, a Presidential election was held. Both elections were won by former communists and Soviet nomenclature. Algirdas Brazauskas was elected as the President. Russia had a great interest in the results of these elections While the new governance of Lithuania was being formed and the State delegation for negotiations was being changed (April 27, 1993), Russia waited. She did not make any secret of her hope that the new governance in Lithuania would make one-sided concessions to Russian demands. [51] As the time for the withdrawal of the troops ended, many of the articles of the unsigned agreement that remained unsigned since September 1992, became outdated. Thus, Russia did not pay attention to it and sought to achieve its aspired goal. In May, 1993, the new Lithuania's governance allowed itself to become dangerously involved in correcting the September 8, 1992 negotiated agreement. On Moscow's demands, at the end of May, the delegations met for negotiations in Vilnius where no agreement was reached. Soon after that, without consulting the negotiations delegation, the Lithuanian President sent the Russian President his rewording of the draft of the previous agreement. On May 18-19, 1993, the Russian Defence Minister, Pavel Grachev visited Vilnius. Together with the Lithuanian Defence Minister, Audrius Butkevicius they discussed the following issues: the order of transfer of military facilities; transfer of certain military property, ammunition and equipment to Lithuania; transfer of the technical documentation of the military airports, etc. The Lithuanian Minister agreed that the stockpiles of the artillery shells be removed from the depot in the Radviliskis region after the deadline of the army withdrawal - by December 31, 1993.(62) [52] There were no unsolved matters concerning the removal of the armed forces. The only thing that Russia was seeking was to impose on Lithuania the agreement with amendments until the deadline, through which the occupation army would be legalised at least for the few remaining days, the fact of occupation denied and the compensation for damage revoked. Toward the end of the summer of 1993, Russia's pressure on Lithuania increased. On July 29, 1993, Lithuania's Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys was summoned to Moscow to negotiate alterations in the agreement tabled by Russia. The President of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas was invited by Russia's President Boris Yeltsin for a visit to Moscow on August 2, 1993 where he was to sign the agreement containing the alterations dictated by the Russian side. The Lithuanian political parties, the press, and the public objected firmly and unanimously to the Presidential mission to Moscow and the signing of such an agreement. Moscow suggested a new date for the meeting of Presidents in Moscow - August 23. [53] On August 20, 1993, the Foreign Ministry of Russia, in its special statement, repeatedly announced that Russia "had made a decision to postpone the withdrawal of the troops from Lithuanian territory". That was the final attempt to undermine the Lithuanian governance. Nevertheless, Lithuania held her ground. Thanks to the efforts of the public the visit of Lithuania's President did not take place. On August 31, 1993, the last Russian military train crossed the state border of Lithuania. Officially the withdrawal of the Russian armed forces was complete. With the permission of the Lithuanian authorities only small platoons remained to guard two depot with artillery shells.(63) They had to complete the removal of the remaining stockpiles of shells within three months. [54] A year later, on August 31, 1994, the army of the former USSR left Latvia and Estonia. In their August 31, 1994 joint statement the Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian Presidents evaluated the withdrawal of the army from Latvia and Estonia as a memorable day for the whole of Europe: "Once again our three nations became masters of their fates, for the first time after 1940." On that day the Latvian and Estonian Prime Ministers, Valdis Birkavs and Mart Laar expressed their gratitude to international organisations and friendly countries for assistance in seeking this long awaited outcome. In their concluding statement which was adopted in Palanga (Lithuania), the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Nordic and Baltic States welcomed the removal of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union from Estonia and Latvia. It said:" Fifty five years after the beginning of the Second World War the Baltic States became independent from any foreign occupation military units."(64) On December 7, 1994, the UN General Assembly debated the issue of the army withdrawal from the Baltic States carried out in conformity with the UN November 25, 1992 Resolution No. 48/18. The Russian representative Sergei Lavrov announced that "from March 1992 to August 1994 more than 100 thousand troops, 30 thousand families which comprise about 105 thousand people, 41.5 thousand pieces of equipment, about 700 thousand tons of military stockpiles were removed from and 230 warships left Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia."(65) Section 4. The Legacy of the Occupation Troops [55] The occupation armed forces withdrew leaving behind deeply imprinted marks of their presence in the Baltic States. In the places of their deployment they left behind thousands of hectares of highly contaminated territories and devastated forests. It took some time to assess the damage inflicted by the occupation army to the Lithuanian environment. In June 1995 the Lithuanian Ministry of Environment Protection announced the conclusions prepared jointly by the Lithuanian and foreign experts on the damage inflicted to the environment during the period of military occupation by the USSR-Russia. The experts inspected 462 facilities which were used by the occupation army and which occupied the territory of about 67 thousand ha. They established the facts of contamination of soil, forests and water with oil products, chemical materials, buried explosives, metal and other waste, etc. The experts estimated the damage at 1 bln. 760 mln. US$.(66) Lithuania's demand to compensate for the damage inflicted by the occupation was supported at the referendum on June 14, 1992. At the international level, this demand was officially presented to Russia not only at the bilateral level, but also at the Helsinki Summit.(67) [56] In Latvia, the Soviet Army had occupied 100,000 ha of land or 2% of the entire Latvian territory. the Latvian Minister of Environment Protection, Girts Lukins, announced on August 31, 1994, that it will take 20 years and require between 10 and 20 bln. US$ to clean the environment contaminated by the armed forces.(68) The Latvian Prime Minister, Maris Gailis officially raised the demand for the compensation of damage inflicted by the occupation army at the UN General Assembly, on December 7, 1994.(69) The Estonian Minister of Environment Protection, Andres Tarand stated, that in Estonia the damage inflicted to the environment by the USSR-Russian occupation army was estimated to be more than 59 bln. Estonian kroon.(70) This damage was done to the 85 000 ha territory or 2% of the entire territory of Estonia, where the 570 military facilities were located.(71) During the ratification of the Russian-Estonian agreements on July 21, 1995, regarding the withdrawal of the army from the Estonian territory, the Russian Ambassador Vasilij Svirin stressed at the Russian Duma that these agreements "protected Russian interests", and that "all financial, property and other claims connected with the presence of the army on the Estonian territory, including ecological, are considered fully agreed."(72) In August 1994, in Helsinki, the NACC Working Group discussed behind closed doors the issue of the environment in the Baltic States and the Baltic Sea contaminated by the Russian armed forces.(73) [57] Article 4, item "f" of the May 1, 1974 Declaration of the UN General Assembly on the new economic international order established that "countries, territories and nations which are occupied by other states have the right to full reimbursement or compensation for exploitation and exhaustion, as well as for damage inflicted to environment and other resources of said country, territory or nation." This principle is also included in Article 16 of the 1974 Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. It says that it is the duty of all states to liquidate all the forms of external aggression, occupation and domination and the economic and social consequences thereof. The states which pursue such a policy of coercion, bear economic responsibility to the countries, territories and nations and are obliged to reimburse and fully compensate for the exploitation of resources and their depletion, as well as for the inflicted damage. The USSR, which had committed fundamental international crimes, also had such responsibility and duty. When on December 24, 1991, the state-offender - the Soviet Union - underwent critical changes and ceased to exist in its previous form as a subject of internal law, the said duty was fully passed over to the state which assumed and continued the rights and obligations of the USSR.