(1) Opinion of Carl Bildt (see No. 77).

(2) See No. 79.

(3) Ibid., p. 8.

(4) See sect. 3 item 54 of this chapter.

(5) In the document of the of Assembly of WEU, 'A European defence policy', issued on November 17, 1994, it was indicated that "at the peak of its power , the Soviet Union had about 350 000 troops stationed at over 1 000 military bases in the three Baltic states" (see document No. 1445, item 97, p. 13 of the Fortieth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU).

(6) See No. 98, p. 5.

(7) J.B.K. Lough writes in his research: "Kozyrev's deputy, Vitalij Churkin, confirmed that Yeltsin's order had been drawn up without the consultation of the Foreign Ministry." (see Nr. 98, p. 10).

(8) In fact, the agreements were signed not with the Russian Defence Ministry but with the Russian state. (See sources No. 6,7,8).

(9) See No. 96, p. 50.

(10) Ibid., p. 57.

(11) Ibid.

(12) See No. 97, p. 47.

(13) Ibid.

(14) See No. 96, pp. 57-58.

(15) See No. 79, p. 16.

(16) "If Moscow fully accepts the independence of the Baltic States and fully respects their rights, one can be sure that Russia has entered the family of nations. But if Moscow questions their sovereignty or undermines their independence, that would signal that Russia might once again become a threat to the international system." (Carl Bildt. See No. 77, p. 73).

(17) See No. 77.

(18) See No. 78, p. 39.

(19) Ibid.

(20)Such an evaluation was given by the Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Margaretha af Ugglas, on May 19, 1994, in her speech in Kaliningrad.// See also No. 94.

(21) In No. 79 there is a separate section: 'The Emergence of Kaliningrad as a Regional Security Issue.'

(22) See No. 94.

(23) Ibid.

(24) Ibid., p. G35.

(25) See source No. 60, p. 7.

(26) Ibid.

(27) Paul Goble notes that "Russia's claims of the 'violations of human rights' force the Baltic states to take a defensive stance and isolate them." (See No. 72).

(28) See No. 79, Ch. 'The Question of the Russian Minorities.'

(29) Ibid., p. 39.

(30) See No. 88.

(31) See No. 89.

(32) See No. 98.

(33) See No. 78, p. 32.

(34) Ibid., citation from Le Figaro, September 30, 1994.

(35) The same opinion was expressed by the German Foreign Affairs Minister, Klaus Kinkel, while on a visit to Vilnius (ELTA, April 7, 1995).

(36) Such an opinion was expressed by the Norwegian Foreign Affairs Minister, Siri Bjerke, during her visit to Vilnius. (ELTA, November 24, 1994).

(37) ITAR-TASS, March 28, 1995.

(38) Paul Goble (see No. 72).

(39) Paul Goble writes: "A second and even more troubling control mechanism is corruption. None of these states are strong enough to effectively counter Russian-dominated organised crime." (See No. 72, p. 333).

(40) Ibid.

(41) Henry Kissinger, 'It's an Alliance, not a Relic', The Washington Post, August 16, 1994.

(42) Ibid.

(43) Ibid.

(44) Z. Brzezinski made this conclusion public in his presentation in Riga, at an international conference "The Baltic States on the Way to the European Union." (LETA, December 4, 1994).

(45) International Herald Tribune, October 21, 1993.

(46) Zbigniew Brzezinski: "The expansion of NATO is a natural process, closely connected with the widening of Europe unity, and any such expansion will reinforce a stable relationship with Russia. After all, the reconciliation of Central Europe and Russia is more likely in a setting of security than in a geopolitical vacuum." (See No. 105).

Chapter 2.

(1) Circa 30 thousand men were already fighting in guerrilla detachments in 1945. In comparison - there were only 20 thousand men in the Lithuanian Army before June 15, 19940.

(2) During the entire decade, 70-80 thousand people fought in guerrilla detachments or were in hiding. Within that period, due to killings, deportations, and imprisonment, the number of permanent residents in Lithuania decreased by 400,000 persons. Circa 200 thousand colonisers were brought from Russia. Approximate assessments indicate that among the permanent residents of Lithuania, men ages eighteen to thirty-eight fit for military service, might number 300 thousand. Almost one in fifteen perished in guerrilla warfare.

(3) Source No. 20, p.57.

(4) Ibid., p. 61

(5) Ibid., p. 331.

(6) Ibid., p. 322.

(7) Se source No. 33, p. 97 doc. No. 23.

(8) The USSR began an economic blockade of Lithuania on April 20, 1990, and break off it on July 2, 1990.

(9) See source No. 33, p. 205, doc. No. 116.

(10) The Statement said that "the parties will recognise each other's state sovereignty." The activities of the parallel authority structures established by the USSR was deemed as invalid. All the states were urged to "firmly denounced the actions of military coertion against the independence of the Baltic States and their peaceful in habitants. " (See source No. 39)

(11) See item 39 and note 46 of this chapter.

(12) In the Treaty of July 12, 1920, the Russian Federation had renounced for all time any of its rights towards Lithuania.

(13) "Following the 1917 revolution (coup), many nations subjugated within Imperial Russia enjoyed a brief independent existence prior to their de facto reintegration during the civil war period alongside the RSFSR into what under the 1922 Treaty of Union would become the USSR". (See 73, p.246).

(14) Shorthand record from the author's archives.

(15) See source No.1, article 1.

(16) This was specifically underscored in the preamble (see source No.1).

(17) The USSR State Council headed by the Soviet President Gorbachev adopted a decision No. Gs-1 on September 6, 1991, 'On the Recognition of Independence of the Republic of Lithuania.' It announced the decision "to recognise the independence of the Republic of Lithuania," to form a plenipotentiary USSR state delegation for negotiations and conduct negotiations with the Republic of Lithuania.

(18) Supra note 17.

(19) See No. 73, p. 246.

(20) Other former USSR republics became only bearers of USSR obligations under USSR international treaties, but not the successors of its rights.

(21) Press Release of the Lithuanian Government of September 12, 1991. Also LETA-Baltija, September 11, 1991.

(22) Source No. 22, p.47, doc. No. 7.

(23) Ibid. p.46, doc. No. 6.

(24) Ibid. p. 52, doc. No. 15.

(25) Ibid., p.57, doc. No. 22.

(26) This communiquù was signed by the heads of the delegations -Sergei Shakhrai, Russia's Vice-Premier and Ceslovas Stankevicius, Vice-Chairman of the Lithuanian Parliament.

(27) The draft was received by the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania on January 22, 1992 Reg. No. 000298 (a copy from the author's archives).

(28) A copy of the decree from the author's archives.

(29) April 8, 1992 Note No. 166 of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(30) According to 'Information on Staff Training of the Russian Armed Forces Dislocated in the Baltic States' (Department of International and Public Relations, Ministry of National Defence of Lithuania, Vilnius, April 30, 1993).

(31) Telegram of Vytautas Landsbergis No. 430 of April 28, 1992, to the Russian President Yeltsin.

(32) A copy of the telegram from the author's archives. This telegram clearly reflects an old Soviet attitude. For example, it is interesting to note that Grachev expressed his indignation that the Lithuanian national defence units "seized" the officers' club in Kaunas. He even ignored the fact that this building was built before the occupation in 1940 and the construction was financed by the Lithuanian officers.

(33) BNS, June 1, 1992.

(34) This was affirmed by the officials of the Russian and Lithuanian consular institutions and representatives of the Prosecutor's Office of both states in the act of transfer of Col. Chernykh to Russia signed on April 8, 1992.

(35) Source No. 22, p.108, doc. No. 87.

(36) Ibid, p. 76, doc. No. 44.

(37) The former USSR Armed Forces held occupied 65,433 ha, or 1,5 percent of the entire land mass in Lithuania for 49 years.

(38) A letter No. 1/1426, May 21, 1992 of Col. Gen Gaponenko, Commander of the Baltic Border District of the Russian Federation, addressed to the Head of the Republic of Lithuania, Landsbergis (a copy from the author's archives.)

(39) The demand was recorded in a bilateral protocol of negotiations which were held in Moscow on May 27, 1992.

(40) According to the data presented by Russia's Defence Ministry's, there were 10,200 families military personnel in Lithuania.

(41) According to approximate assessments presented by the experts of the Lithuanian delegation conducting the negotiations, only the damage directly inflicted by the occupation troops as well as the damage caused by their presence to the people, to nature, to assets, to the economy, and to agricultural assets and woods could amount to 80 - 90 bill. US$.

(42) Through precise evaluation by experts, it was ascertained that the value of the weaponry of the Lithuanian Armed Forces and its military assets comprised not less than 680 mil. US$.

(43) ELTA; ITAR-TASS, April 4, 1992.

(44) See source No. 22, doc. No. 81, p.104. Also see the statement of Ceslovas Stankevicius, Head of the Lithuanian delegation to NAA (Lietuvos aidas, May 19, 1992).

(45) CSCE Helsinki Summit 1992. Delegation of Lithuania. Interpretative Statement. Helsinki, July 1992 (a copy of the statement from the author's archives.)

(46) See source No. 21.

(47) See source No. 2.

(48) Russia did not sign the following four negotiated agreements:- regarding the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the territory of Lithuania, which contained general adjusted provisions, which, in addition, also contained, as an inseparable part of the agreement, the special Statement of the Republic of Lithuania regarding the damage inflicted by the USSR (Source No. 2);- the agreements No. 3, No. 4, No. 5 (See list of sources).

(49) Russia demanded anew: - to reject the Lithuanian statement as an inseparable part of the negotiated agreement, which stated that Lithuania would not bestow on Russia's Armed Forces the status of a legal presence and that negotiations should continue on the procedure and conditions for the compensation of the remainder of the damage;- to alter the articles of the agreement on the compensation by supplying new weaponry for the ones seized by the USSR from Lithuania's Armed forces in 1940, and on the compensation for the ecological damage inflicted by the USSR Armed forces;

• to remove from 1st article of the main agreement (see source No. 2) the negotiated formula that Russia recognises its international obligation to withdraw the troops;
• to entitle the withdrawing forces to sell real estate, or on this basis, to establish military factories or other enterprises as a joint venture between Lithuania and Russia;
• to allow military personnel to retire from the units being withdrawn and allow them to remain in Lithuania;
• to assume the obligations of granting retired personnel political and civil rights in Lithuania, transferring their rented flats into their private property, as well as granting privileges to Russian military pensioners.

(50) A copy of the resolution from the author's archives.

(51) See the resolution of September 21, 1992 of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Russian Supreme Council.

(52) Russia did not initially supply Lithuania with information on the numbers of Russian troops stationed on its territory. At the beginning of 1992, there might have been around 40 thousand soldiers and officers; counting other personnel and members of officers families, up to 60 thousand. As of May 25, 1992, Russia officially announced that her Armed Forces in Lithuania numbered 35,084 military personnel.

(53) See the September 22, 1992 report of the Commandant of the Kaunas district, Maj. Vilkelis to the Ministry of National Defence.

(54) According to the documents submitted by local governments and kept in the archives of the Lithuanian State delegation for negotiations.

(55) LETA-ELTA, August 31, 1994.

(56) This evaluation was made by the Head of the Lithuanian State delegation for negotiations with Russia on the Lithuanian Television, on October 3, 1992.

(57) See source No. 58.

(58) It is interesting to note that it was these finalised agreements that received no comments from Russia and were not signed by Russia for unknown reasons.

(59) See source No. 58.

(60) See source No. 50.

(61) Ibid.

(62) See letter No. 02-853 of May 27, 1993 of the Lithuanian National Defence Ministry addressed to the State delegation for negotiations (a copy from the author's archives).

(63) The Lithuanian Minister of National Defence gave his consent on this issue during the visit of the Russian Defence Minister, Grachev in Vilnius on 18-19 May, 1993.

(64) REUTER, BNS, August 31, 1994.

(65) ITAR-TASS, REUTER, December 7, 1994.

(66) ITAR-TASS, June 16, 1994.

(67) See item 39 of this ch.

(68) REUTER, August 31, 1994.

(69) LETA-ELTA, December 7, 1994.

(70) LETA-ELTA, August 30, 1994.

(71) RIA, August 29, 1994.

(72) INTERFAX, July 21, 1995.

(73) ITAR-TASS, August, 22 1994.

Chapter 3.

(1) See chapter 2, item 43 of this paper.

(2) See chapter 2, item. 44 of this paper.

(3) The Treaty of the Republic of Latvia and the Russian Federation on the Conditions, Terms, and Procedure and Legal Status of the Complete Withdrawal of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation from the Territory of the Republic of Latvia (the appendix of the Treaty contains the time-table for the withdrawal).

The following agreements were signed as an integral part of the Treaty (according to art. 2 of the Treaty):

• The Agreement on the Legal Status of the Radio location Station of Skrunda for the period of its temporary functioning and dismantling;

• The Agreement on the Issues of Social Protection of the Military Pensioners of the Russian Federation and their Family Members residing on the Territory of the Republic of Latvia (this agreement contains a requirement of ratification);

• The Agreement on the Issues of Social Protection of the Armed Forces and Boarder Guards and their Family Members Temporarily Present on the Territory of the Republic of Latvia pending their Complete Withdrawal, effective as of its signing date.

(4) The Treaty Signed by the Republic of Estonia and the Russian Federation on the Withdrawal of Russian Federation Armed Forces from the Territory of the Republic of Estonia and the Conditions of their Temporary Presence on her Territory (the agreement does not contain any time-table for the withdrawal).

The following agreements were also signed:

• "The Agreement on the Procedure and Terms of the Termination of the Exploitation of Nuclear Reactors on Pakri in the Estonian Republic, and on the Measures Safeguarding Nuclear Security and Prevention of Radiation", which became valid from its signing until September 30, 1995.

• The Agreement on Social Guarantees for Military Pensioners of the Russian Federation on the Territory of the Republic of Estonia, which became effective when the Parties announced the fulfilment of the necessary legal procedures.

(5) Latvia ratified the Treaties on November 24, 1994 (BNS, 1994 11 24). The Duma of the Russian Federation ratified the Treaties with Latvia on November 16, 1994 (INTERFAX). The documents of ratification were exchanged on February 28, 1995 (ELTA).

(6) On July 21, 1995, the State Duma of the Russian Federation ratified the agreement with Estonia on the withdrawal of the armed forces, as well as other agreements, including the one on the social guaranties to the military pensioners (BNS, July 21, 1995). The Federation Council of Russia ratified the Russian and Estonian agreement an the social guarantees to the military pensioners on July 27, 1995. On the same day the Council failed twice to collect the necessary number of votes for the ratification of the agreement with Estonia on the withdrawal of the armed forces (BNS, July 27, 1995). The Council ratified this agreement on October 4, 1995 (ITAR-TASS, October 4, 1995), while the Estonian Parliament postponed the ratification of this agreement which was set for October 11, 1995, until 1996.

(7) See source No. 10.

(8) See source No. 14.

(9) See source No. 1.

(10) See ch. 2, item 28 of this paper.

(11) See source No. 9.

(12) SEGODNIA, August 26, 94.

(13) See source No. 13.

(14) See ch. 2, item 29 of this paper.

(15) See source No. 9.

(16) See source No. 13.

(17) See source No. 2 (5; 6 and other art.).

(18) See source No. 9 (art. 1 p.4; art. 2; art. 3 p.4; art. 4 p.3).

(19) See source No. 13 (art.1 p. 6; art. 4; 5; 6; 7; 8).

(20) See source No. 13 (art. 7; 8).

(21) See source No. 9 (art. 7 p.5).

(22) See ch. 2, item 27 of this paper.

(23) See source No. 9 (art. 3 p.9).

(24) The Vice-Chairman of the Latvian Saemos Andreis Krastynsh severely criticised the provisions of the treaty when it was still being drafted because: it did not provide any compensation for the damage inflicted during the occupation; it recognised the property of the Russian troops in Latvia; foresaw military facilities to be turned into joint military ventures; it allowed the demobilised Russian military to remain in Latvia (LETA, 1994 04 09).

(25) See ch 2, items 39 and 41 of this paper.

(26) See source No. 13, art. 8.

(27) Latvia's Prime Minister, Valdis Birkavs, had spoken about this issue on April 15, 1994 (BNS); Latvia's Prime Minister Maris Gailis had also spoken about this issue at the UN General Assembly (LETA-ELTA, 7/12/94).

(28) See source No. 13 (art. 12, p. 4).

(29) See source No. 16.

(30) See chapter 6, item 23 of this paper.

Chapter 4.

(1) According to amb. John D. Maresca, "Russia's 'sphere of influence' is likely to be defined by the area in which its 'peacekeeping' activities are considered legitimate, or at least are not contested". (...) "The Russian 'sphere of influence,' once established and widely accepted, will form the de facto new Yalta line, and will be to difficult to change thereafter" (see No. 104, p. 18).

(2) December 24, 1992.

(3) ITAR-TASS, October 14, 1994.

(4) For example, Adviser to the Russian President Sergei Kuragin (See No. 80)

(5) See No. 80.

(6) Sergei Kuragin proposes to restore a united state on the basis of the following principles:

• a unanimous idea that would unite nations and be based on values and experience of the Soviet period;
• high degree of independence of the subjects of the union state to the extent of delegating to them certain common state functions very strictly defined;
• bilingualism, using the Russian and the national languages;
• a united parliament with wide powers and elected from the whole territory ;
• integrated: armed forces, economic complex, foreign policy, banking and financial system, budget, planning system, common citizenship (Ibid.).

(7) Lt.- Gen. Leonid Ivashov also suggests that nations be gathered under the Russian banner restoring a union state in the post-Soviet space based on the Russian traditions and principles, albeit less centralised than the Soviet Union (Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 7, 1995).

(8) ELTA, on the basis of the information from Wireless File, February 7, 1995.

(9) See No. 69.

(10) See, for instance, Richard Ovinnikov, 'SNG ne obuza dlia Moskvy' ('CIS is not a burden for Moscow'), Nezavisimaya gazeta, April 16, 1994.

(11) This was confirmed straightforwardly in an interview by Chairman of the Federation Council Vladimir Shumeiko (ITAR-TASS, October 1, 1994).

(12) See No. 85.

(13) See No. 82, p. 83.

(14) Ibid., p. 85.

(15) Ibid., p. 86.

(16) At the meeting of the heads of the Russian diplomatic representations in the CIS and the Baltic States, on January 18, 1994 (Diplomaticheski kuryer, No. 2,1994).

(17) This position was expressed by Kozyrev in the following way: "Any plans to create a sphere of influence at the expense of Russia's exclusion from the post-Soviet space not only have no future but also dangerous. No one has the capability or can take this special role which belongs to Russia in guaranteeing stability in an enormous region" (ITAR-TASS, September 8, 1994).

(18) Interview, Kaliningradskaya pravda, April 6, 1995.

(19) The group includes Deputy-Chairman of the Russian Federation Council Anatolij Dolgolaptev, Deputy-Chairman of the State Duma Artur Chilingarov, President of the Russian Association of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs Anatolij Volskij (INTERFAX, March 15, 1995).

(20) INTERFAX, May 15, 1995.

(21) This was stated by the Belarusian president Lukoshenka after the CIS summit in Minsk (INTERFAX, May 26, 1995).

(22) Such evaluation was presented by the Russian External Intelligence Service in a public statement on October 1994 (INTERFAX, September 21,1994).

(23) See source No. 28, item 3.5.

(24) Ibid., item 1.2.

(25) Ibid., item 1.5.

(26) Ibid., item 4.8.

(27) See exposition of the statement in INTERFAX, September 21, 1994.

(28) INTERFAX, September 21, 1994.

(29) See source No. 28, item 3.9.

(30) Ibid., item 3.4.

(31) Ibid., item 3.9.

(32) Without doubt the intention is to preserve the particular rights of the Russians they enjoyed in the USSR.

(33) See source No. 28, items 3.7; 3.9; 3.10.

(34) Ibid., item 3.8.

(35) Ibid.

(36) See source No. 37.

(37) Ibid., art. 2.

(38) ITAR-TASS, October 19, 1994.

(39) See source No. 25.

(40) Statement of the Director of the Russian Federal Border Protection, Col.-Gen.Andrei Nikolayev (RIA Novosti, February 22, 1995).

(41) See source No. 25.

(42) Statement of the Director of the Russian Federal Border Protection, Col.-Gen. Andrei Nikolayev (Vestnik informatsii GRANITSA, No. 3, March 1995)

(43) See source No. 26.

(44) As stated by the Chief of the Russian Federal Border Service, Nikolayev (INTERFAX, June 10, 1995).

(45) NTERFAX, May 24, 1994.

(46) See source No. 18.

(47) See source No. 36, item 1.3.4.

(48) See source No. 19.

(49) See source No. 70.

(50) INTERFAX, February 14, 1995.

(51) See No. 82, p. 93.

(52) See source No. 32.

(53) INTERFAX, May 26, 1995.

(54) Ibid.

(55) The negative appraisal of the activities of Russian governmental bodies is also presented in source No. 28, items 1.14;1.15;

(56) See source No. 46.

(57) See source No. 30.

(58) Post factum, INTERFAX, BNS, May 18-20, 1995.

(59) BNS, April 18, 1995.

(60) On April 22, 1995, the Baltic Assembly adopted a statement which said that "by its actions and statements the Russian Federation often shows its aggressiveness on the international arena", "in most of its statements with regard to the neighbouring countries [Russia] does not follow the universally recognised international legal norms" (Atgimimas, April 26, 1995).

(61) See article by Lt.-Gen. Leonid Ivashov (See No. 81).

(62) See 'Vedomosti S'ezda narodnykh deputatov Rosijskoi Federatsii i Verkhovnovo sovieta Sovieta Rosijskoi Federatsii', 1993, No. 6, p.181; No. 34, p.1395.

(63) The text of the law was published in Krasnaya zviezda, May 18, 1995.

(64) See source No. 35.

(65) ITAR-TASS, April 5, 1994.

(66) Konstantin Zatulin's interview in Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 5, 1994.

(67) See source No. 31.

(68) See Richard Pipes' interview in Lietuvos rytas, February 25, 1995.

(69) Marshall Shaposhnikov's interview in Megopolis-express No. 9-30, October 5, 1994.

(70) See source No. 81.

(71) Ian Katbertson (ITAR-TASS Kompas, No. 6, February 9, 1995; translated into Russian from World Policy Journal).

(72) ITAR-TASS, June 21, 1995.

(73) Yurij Deryugin, 'Rosijskaya armija: narodnaya ili gosudareva' ('The Russian Army: People's or Ruler's?'), Nezavisimaya gazeta, October 4, 1994.

(74) Interview with the Secretary of the Security Council of Russia Lt.-Gen. Valerij Manilov (Moskovskiye novosti, June 5-12, 1994).

(75) See No. 84.

(76) See source No. 29.

(77) Ibid., art. 8, 12, 13, 15.

(78) Ibid., art. 2.

(79) Ibid., art. 11, 12.

(80) Ibid., art. 13.

(81) See No. 86.

(82) See source No. 28, item 3.10.

(83) Supra note 1.

(84) See source No. 34.

(85) The Seimas was forced to discuss this issue in a special session when at the end of March 1995 two Russian combat helicopters MI-24 flew for a provocative purpose at a dangerously low altitude above the Lithuanian capital city Vilnius and the residential areas of Kaunas.

(86) In the article 'Rossia: security in 1990' (see No. 76).

(87) See No. 91.

(88) Statement of the Secretary of the Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Ministry Januska (BNS, October 31, 1994).

(89) BNS, May 30, 1995.

(90) See source No. 28, item 4.5; source No. 36, item 1.3.4.

(91) See source No. 36, item 1.3.4.

(92) Ibid.

(93) Ibid., item 2.3.5.4.

(94) See No. 90.

(95) Announcement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Lithuania (ELTA, March 28, 1995).

(96) See source No. 36, item 2.3.6.

Chapter 5.

(1) It is interesting to note that in 1951, the USSR Academy of Science published P.I. Kushner's (Knyshev) monograph 'Etnicheskyie teritorii i etnicheskyie granitsi' (Ethnic territories and ethnic borders), where the author proved scientifically and made a conclusion that this region had been Baltic-Lithuanian land of old ("iskonno baltijsko-litovskiye zemli").

(2) See No. 92.

(3) For example, the number 200 thousand was indicated in Lidiya Malash's article (Megapolis-Express, June 14, 1995), in the explanatory statement attached to the draft resolution of the European Parliament (source No. 60), and in the draft resolution of the US Congressman Christopher Cox (see No. 61).

(4) Admiral Yegorov's report at the Conference 'Co-operative Security in Northern Europe', Vilnius, 24-27 November, 1994 (see No. 106).

(5) ITAR-TASS, March 17, 1994; BNS, March 21, 1994.

(6) In his meeting with the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom, Douglas Hurd on October 19, 1994, the Russian Defence Minister, Grachev indicated that the CFE treaty allows Russia to keep 6000 tanks in the Kaliningrad district. Such an attack force in the middle of Europe is more suitable for an offensive doctrine rather than a defensive one. (INTERFAX, October 19, 1994).

(7) In the opinion of Richard Holbrook, "the problem of the Kaliningrad district looks complicated only from the geographical point of view, and very simple politically. It is a part of Russia and it does not present a threat on its own. In our opinion, this Russian region will not act independently of Russia, thus the issue of Kaliningrad is an issue of relations with this country in general."(BNS, November 25, 1994)

(8) See Ch. 4, item 19 of this paper.

(9) According to Maj. Zaccor, there are about 200 thousand reserve officers living in the Kaliningrad district (see No. 94, p. G35).

(10) Komersant-Daily, June 8, 1995.

(11) Editor of the newspaper Armiya Rossii (Russia's Army), Zhilin reported that 73% of officers in the region feel sorry about the defeat of the coup in 1991. There are four underground officers' organisations in the region who are ready to carry out a coup and take the power (NEGA, February 11, 1993).

(12) See source No. 17.

(13) Radio Free Europe, February 17, 1992.

(14) President stated: "Lithuania, whose territory is used for transit to this Russian enclave, is not indifferent to the future of the Kaliningrad district and the Lithuanian minority residing there. (...) Lithuania proposes to examine issues pertaining to the Kaliningrad district as part of the round table mechanism established by the European Stability Pact. We hope that all interested parties will give support to this initiative." (BNS, September 30, 1994)

(15) In the letter of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs addressed to the Kaliningrad Duma and signed by Churkin, it says, "The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs is against the proposal raised in Brazauskas's speech to discuss the issues of the Kaliningrad district at a round table within the framework of the Stability Pact, because its aim is to raise the issue of demilitarisation of the region, and probably even of its status, at an international forum." (BNS, November 10, 1994)

(16) "The Baltic Assembly is of the opinion that the future of the Kaliningrad region is of concern to the whole of Europe and efforts should be united in order to solve this issue. In this regard, the Baltic Assembly proposes: 1) to view the demilitarisation of the Kaliningrad district as an essential element of the security process in Central and the rest of Europe. (...) Appeals to the Baltic Council of Ministers and urges it to hold an international round table discussion on the issue of demilitarisation of the Kaliningrad district and its further development." (Atgimimas, November 16, 1994)

(17) At the meeting with the Danish Minister of Construction of Housing, Kofod-Svenson, in mid-September 1994, in Copenhagen. (ITAR-TASS, September 16, 1994)

(18) ELTA, December 12, 1994.

(19) ITAR-TASS, October 27, 1994.

(20) The draft resolution was submitted on January 27, 1994 by the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Security of the European Parliament (see source No. 60).

(21) Resolutions, p. C,1,2 and the Explanatory Statement.

(22) See No. 95.

(23) See No. 100.

(24) See No. 101.

(25) See interview in the newspaper Megapolis-express on March 2, 1994.

(26) Lietuvos rytas, May 5, 1995.

(27) ITAR-TASS, March 12, 1994.

(28) ITAR-TASS, March 9, 1994.

(29) See source No. 63.

(30) Kaliningradskaya pravda, June 10, 1995; BNS, July 6, 1994.

(31) Kaliningradskaya pravda, September 2, 1994.

(32) BNS, April 13, 1994.

(33) ITAR-TASS, September 16, 1994.

(34) Supra note 4.

(35) This was said by the Chairman of the Russian Federation Council, Shumeiko in Moscow (RIA "Novosti", February 23, 1995), as well as by Vice Chairman Anatolij Dolgolaptev during his meeting with the NAA Chairman, Karsten Foight (INTERFAX, March 17, 1995).

(36) BNS, May 30, 1995.

(37) See source No. 61.

(38) ITAR-TASS, July 4, 1995.

(39) See No. 92.

(40) Ibid.

(41) Ibid.

(42) Kaliningradskaya pravda, September 2, 1994.

(43) See No. 93.

(44) Vestnik informaciyi GRANICA, No. 7, July 1995.

(45) See source No. 60, item 14.

(46) Russia's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergei Krylov said that Russia "will resists and does everything it can to prevent Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia from joining NATO," it will not mind, however, their membership in the EU (BNS, September 2, 1995). A similar position was formulated in "Strategiya dlia Rossii" (Strategy for Russia) (Source No. 28, item 4.5).

(47) This was stated by General Vassily Proskurin (BNS, April 26, 1995).

(48) ELTA, February 18,1994.

(49) In Russia's reply of March 10, 1994, it said that "it would be possible to avoid similar situations in the future when an appropriate agreement on military transit is drafted which would establish rights and obligations for the countries." (ELTA, March 10, 1994).

(50) BNS, January 28, 1994.

(51) Ibid.

(52) INTERFAX, July 3, 1994. ELTA, July 4, 1994.

(53) BNS, July 7, 1994.

(54) Press release of the Public Relations Department of the Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Ministry; ITAR-TASS, July 8, 1994.

(55) See No. 62.

(56) The text of John Major's speech of August 2, 1994, distributed by ELTA.

(57) To the journalists, John Major said: "I am fully aware of the Lithuanians' fear that the troops can move to Kaliningrad. However, circumstances have changed and, in my opinion, it would be right to achieve such an agreement. I think that the majority of the EU heads of state share this opinion. This agreement requires some courage; however, this would be a correct step." (Lietuvos aidas, August 3, 1994).

(58) BNS, August 12, 1994.

(59) ELTA, September 5, 1994.

(60) BNS, September 29, 1994.

(61) The title of the Regulations see in the list of sorces (source No. 65).

(62) ELTA, November 11, 1994.

(63) The statement said: "A treaty on military transit, whatever its contents, would violate Lithuania's security and independence from Russia, would diminish Lithuania's international status, and would in fact mean military co-operation with Russia."

(64) ELTA, October 21, 1994.

(65) ELTA, October 26, 1994.

(66) For example, such a position was expressed in the Lithuanian President's interview on November 29, 1994, to ITAR-TASS.

(67) ELTA, October 26, 1994.

(68) BNS, October 27, 1994.

(69) He said: "The regulations for military transit, as approved by the Lithuanian Government, will enter into force on January 1, 1995, and Russia will be bound to adhere to them." (ELTA, BNS, INTERFAX, October 28, 1994).

(70) The meeting was attended by Prime Minister Slezevicius, Foreign Affairs Minister Gylys, and Ambassador Bulovas (BNS, October 28, 1994).

(71) Member of Parliament and former Foreign Affairs Minister, Algirdas Saudargas, said after a meeting between the Lithuanian parliamentary delegation with the Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Krylov, in Moscow, on October 18, 1994: "Mr. Krylov said very explicitly that Russia desired an agreement on transit, but not transit as such."

(72) BNS, October 26, 1994.

(73) BNS, November 17, 1994.

(74) ITAR-TASS, November 29, 1994.

(75) BNS, December 5, 1994.

(76) BNS, December 9, 1994.

(77) ITAR-TASS, December 8, 1994.

(78) Lietuvos rytas, November 19, 1994.

(79) See source No. 59.

(80) NTERFAX, December 22, 1994.

(81) BNS, December 22, 1994.

(82) See Valstybes zinios (The State News), No.13, Vilnius, February 19, 1994.

(83) Press release of the Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Ministry, January 18, 1995.

(84) According to the verbatim report of the press conference.

(85) See Valstybes zinios (The State News), No. 9, Vilnius, January February 27, 1995.

(86) See source No. 34.

(87) BNS, INTERFAX, September 22, 1994.

Chapter 6.

(1) In his interview to Lietuvos rytas Richard Pipes, the former member of the US National Security Council and the Director of the Eastern Europe and the USSR Department, said that the fact that Russia is more "concerned" with the Russian problem in the Baltic States rather than in Central Asia shows that this is a political game, the reason of which is the fact that Russia has not abandoned its hegemonic goals.

(2) See source No. 28

(3) Among the preconditions of the armed forces put forward by Kozyrev there was a demand to change laws related to the rights of Russian-speakers (See source No. 21).

(4) For instance, this tendency is reflected in Russia's Memorandum of May 1992 addressed to the Council of Europe (See source No. 23)

(5) Article 1 of the Recommendation No. 1201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe defines a national minority as a group of individuals who:

"
• reside on the territory of the state and are citizens thereof;
• maintain long-standing, firm and lasting ties with the state;
• display distinctive ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic characteristics;
• are sufficiently representative, although smaller in number than the rest of the population of the state or of a region of the state;
• are motivated by concern to preserve together that which constitutes their common identity, including their culture, their traditions, their religion or their language."

(6) Interview of the Estonian Prime Minister, Tiit Vahi (Estonyja, May 19, 1995).

(7) Paul Goble has pointed to this sircumstance as well. (See No. 75).

(8) Richard Pipes (supra note 1) compares the situation of Russians in the Baltic States with that of the German colonists in some European countries after the Second World War. At that time it did not occur to anyone to speak about political rights of Germans. (Lietuvos rytas, February 25, 1995).

(9) See No. 79, p. 23.

(10) Ibid., p. 22.

(11) Such a conclusion was made by the Head of the OSCE Mission in Estonia Mr. Timo Lahelma (BNS, February 10, 1994). // On February 23, 1994, the OSCE Commissioner, Max van der Stoel also stated that he did not find any significant violations of the rights of the Russian speakers in Estonia. (BNS, February 23, 1994).

(12) INTERFAX, April 12, 1995.

(13) ITAR-TASS;ELTA, April 13, 1995.

(14) ITAR-TASS, August 24, 1994.

(15) According to the information released by the Director of Citizenship and Migration of Estonia, Andres Kollist, by May 1995, 80 000 people had left Estonia for their homeland (BNS, May 19, 1995).

(16) BNS, February 6, 1995.

(17) ITAR-TASS, September 22, 1994.

(18) BNS, October 19, 1994.

(19) On February 10, 1994. a high-ranking official from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Aleksandr Udaltsov, said to the Estonian Ambassador in Russia, Yuri Kahn, that Russia does not commit itself to withdraw all the KGB personnel or secret agents from Estonia (BNS, February 10, 1994).

(20) The research carried out in Latvia, in 1989, by the Russian Sociological Institute, showed that among the Latvian entrepreneurs, 20,2% were of Latvian nationality, 59,4% - Russian, 7,2% -Ukrainian and Belarussian, and 3% - Jewish. (Renald Simonyan, 'Mnenyja', Segodnia, June 22, 1994).

(21) See No. 82, p.100.

(22) See source No. 51, p.16.

(23) Ibid.

(24) ELTA, March 20, 1995.

(25) See source No. 24, p. 116.

(26) Russia's Memorandum to the Council of Europe (See source No. 23).

(27) The status of foreigners in Lithuania is regulated by the following legislation:

- Law on Ethnic Minorities of November 23, 1989;

- Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners of September 4, 1991;

- Law on Citizenship of December 5, 1991;

- Law on Immigration of September 4, 1991; and

- Law on Emigration of November 3, 1991.

(28) The Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania Resolution No. 1-2080 of December 10, 1991// Selected Documents of the Supreme Council, vol. 4, Vilnius, 1992 (in Lithuanian).

(29) Interview of the Chairman of the Russian Community in Lithuania, Tatyana Mikhniova (Lietuvos aidas, December 20, 1994).

(30) This data provided by the Lithuanian Minister of Internal Affairs on April 18, 1994, in his answer No. 1/519 to an inquiry of the members of the Seimas (Parliament) of Lithuania.

(31) See No. 82, p. 47.

(32) REUTER, August 30, 1994.

(33) Ibid.

(34) See No. 82, p. 47.

(35) LETA-ELTA, April 20, 1995.

(36) ITAR-TASS, January 24, 1995.

(37) BNS, May 19, 1995.

(38) BNS, December 22, 1994.

(39)In January 1994, Andrei Kozyrev said, that the CIS and the Baltic States are the historical region of Russia's and Russian influence, where Russia is seeking dual citizenship. (See source No. 86).

(40) BNS, March 29, 1994.

(41) INTERFAX, April 19, 1994.

(42) Diplomaticheskiy vestnik, No. 8-9, 1994.

(43) ITAR-TASS, February 24, 1994.

(44) See No. 75, p. 82.

(45) Pravda, April 29, 1994.

(46) Rossiyskiy viestnik, June 2, 1994.

(47) ITAR-TASS, July 20, 1994.

(48) See source No. 23.

(49) RIA, April 9, 1994.

(50) Paul Goble indicates (see source No. 45) that in 1992 and 1993 the Latvian Government registered more than ten arbitrary paramilitary organisations supported by Moscow.

(51) INTERFAX, March 4, 1994.

(52) See note 60.

(53) NTB-ELTA, October 26, 1994.

(54) See Ch. 2, item 31 of this paper.

(55) Of the 9943 pensioners, 9567 receive pension for the military service, 287 - for disability, and 1089 pensions are paid to members of family upon the loss of a breadwinner (this information is based on the data of the Pension Service with the Russian Embassy in Lithuania and was obtained by the author at the Lithuanian Ministry of Social Care on March 31, 1995.)

(56) At the Russian Duma, when ratifying the Latvian-Russian agreement concerning social protection of military pensioners, the Russian Ambassador in Latvia, Zotov said that the agreement gave the right to the 22 000 military pensioners and their family members to live in Latvia with no obstacles and guaranteed them the right to accommodation (ITAR-TASS, October 28, 1994).

(57) As stated by the Russian Ambassador in Latvia, Sergei Zotov to the INTERFAX agency on February 28, 1995.

(58) RIA, August 31, 1994.

(59) According to the former Estonian Minister without Portfolio, Endel Lipmaa (REUTER, August 31, 1994).

(60) The Russian Defence Deputy Minister, Gen. Anatolij Salamatin announced, that 70 percent families of the 42 000 Russian officers transferred to reserve in the Baltic States, wish to move to Russia. Approximately 30 000 flats must be built in Russia for this purpose. The US intended to finance the construction of 5000 flats, and other Western states - 1000 flats (INTERFAX, March 14, 1995)

(61) See source No. 16.

(62) See source No. 12.

(63) See source No. 15.

(64) See source No. 16, art. 1.

(65) See source No. 15, art. 2.

(66) On August 31, 1994, the Estonian Cabinet of Ministers formed a commission which includes representatives of the Decolonisation Centre and the OSCE mission. This commission considers applications of the Russian military pensioners for permanent residence in Estonia. The commission also has a task to find a legal definition of the concept "threat to the Republic of Estonia." (ETA-ELTA, August 31, 1994).

(67) See source No. 12, art 2.

(68) The Latvian Government announced that after signing agreements Russia submitted to Latvia a list with 1115 demobilised Russian officers who had to leave but did not include at least 620 persons (BNS, November 26, 1994).

(69)The Latvian Foreign Affairs Minister, Valdis Birkavs (BNS, November 24, 1994).

(70) INTERFAX, February 28, 1995.

(71) ITAR-TASS, December 2, 1994.

Chapter 7.

(1) Art. 14 of the Oslo Final Communiquù (See source No. 47, p. 32).

(2) See source No. 33, doc. No. 63, p.130.

(3) The Munich statement said that regardless of any economic difficulties no state must be 'allowed to hinder the application of the principle of international law to the effect that military forces may not be stationed on the territory of another State without its consent.'

(4) See 'Helsinki Summit Declaration', Art. 15 (source No. 49, p.5).

(5) Art. 15 of the Brussels Final Communiquù of December 17, 1992 (See source No. 47, p.51).

(6) At the Brussels meeting of the NACC ministers on December 17, 1992 it was stressed that the withdrawal process could not be linked with other problems (see source No. 47, p.p. 23-24).// Art. 4 of the June 11, 1993 statement of the Athens meeting of the NACC ministers said that the process of the withdrawal of the armed forces from the Baltic states could not be delayed because of any practical difficulties (see source No. 48, p.p. 23-24)

(7) BNS, February 11, 1995.

(8) This was announced by the US Deputy Secretary of State, Robert Frazer (ITAR-TASS, Washington, September 1, 1994).

(9) REUTER, August 31, 1994.

(10) ITAR-TASS, October 2, 1992. (11) See chapter 2, items 45 and 47 of this paper.

(12) See source No. 55.

(13)The title of the seminar: "Baltic Security: Establishing a Constructive Russian-Baltic Parliamentary Dialogue."

(14) See source No. 56.

(15) With this assistance the new building of the Skrunda station was blown up by a US company on May 4, 1994.

(16) BNS, July 6, 1994.

(17) Ibid.

(18) Lithuania submitted the PfP Presentation Documents to the NATO leadership on June 10, 1994, Latvia - on July 8, 1994, and Estonia - on July 8, 1994. The Lithuanian-NATO Individual Partnership Programme was approved at the North Atlantic Council on November 30, 1994.

(19) Lietuvos aidas, October 27, 1994.

(20) According to a representative of the US State Department, the objective of the visit of the US Deputy Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Lynn E. Davis was 'to give an incentive to a dialogue on arms control and regional security' and 'to demonstrate once again the allegiance of the United States to the course of political integration and co-operation in this region' (ITAR-TASS, New York, October 27, 1994).

(21) Lietuvos aidas, October 27, 1994.

(22) With the Estonian Prime Minister,Tarnd, the Lithuanian Prime Minister, Slezevicius, and the Latvian Prime Minister, Birkavs.

(23) According to the pro memoria of March 14, 1995 of the Lithuanian Ambassador in Estonia.

(24) Lietuvos rytas, November 2, 1994.

(25) For example, in 1995 the Danish expenses for this purpose exceeded US $ 2 million. Norway allocated about US $ 1.5 million for 1996 (this information was obtained from the International Relations Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of National Defence). The US allocated US $ 3.7 million for the procurement of equipment and vehicles (ELTA, April 20, 1995). In 1994-1995, the United Kingdom spent 1.8 million pounds of sterling for the creation of the Baltic Battalion (See No. 52, par. 37, p. xvii).

(26) A voice of America (in Lithuanian), October 24, 1994.

(27) This information was obtained by the author from the International Relations Department of the Lithuanian Ministry of Defence.

(28) Supra note 27. For example, two Lithuanians were admitted to the US military academies in 1995 where they receive full financial support from the US.

(29) Lietuvos aidas, November 2, 1994.

(30) The following is planned in the sphere of military relations: to organise discussions between the representatives of chiefs of staff; to pass regulations as to the protection of the information received during co-operation and the status of the US military personnel (Lietuvos aidas, November 2, 1994).

(31) From the military property of the former GDR, Germany handed over two light aircraft L-410, 130 trucks, 40 light cross-country vehicles and various ammunition (Supra note 27).

(32) ITAR-TASS, Bonn, September 1, 1994.

(33) Beginning with 1995, each year, apart from various courses, 6-7 Lithuanians will be studying in various German military schools (Supra note 27).

(34) ELTA, August 15, 1994.

(35) Lietuvos aidas, October 5-6, 1994.

(36) For example, in 1993, in the Odense school for NCOs, there were about 20 Lithuanian NCOs. in 1994 - another 20 Lithuanian NCOs in Odense and 32 platoon commanders in Oskoboel (Lietuvos rytas, November 2, 1994). There are a few Lithuanian officers on special officer courses and Home Guard academy on a regular basis. It was agreed that from 1996, each year 4 Lithuanians will study in Danish military schools (Supra note 27).

(37) In 1995, Denmark donated to the Lithuanian national defence system 57 trucks, 39 jeeps, more than 200 radio stations, 20 PCs, equipment for military hospitals and various ammunition (Supra note 27).

(38) 30 jeeps with spare parts, a new field hospital, radio communication equipment and a few tons of various ammunition. (Supra note 27).

(39) Supra note 27.

(40) By 1995 Sweden had donated to the Lithuanian national defence system: two coastal patrol boats, 7 trucks and 7 jeeps, 4 fire trucks, 13 armoured vehicles, 40 stationary kitchens, medical equipment and various ammunition (Supra note 27).

(41) See source No. 40.

(42) See source No. 41.

(43) Valstybes zinios (The State news, Lithuania), No. 11, February 3, 1995.

(44) INTERFAX, November 23, 1994.

(45) ITAR-TASS, February 27, 1995.

(46) Aleksandr Einseln, Juris Dalbinis and Jonas Andriuskevicius.

(47) BNS, November 29, 1994.

(48) Linas Linkevicius, Janis Trapanis and Enn Tupp.

(49) See source No. 42.

(50) Ibid.

(51) See Resolution text in Atgimimas, November 16, 1994.

(52) See Recommendation of the forty-first Ordinary Session of the Assembly of WEU "On Security and Military Co-operation in the Baltic Sea Area." Doc. 1494, p.4, pnt. 1,2.

Chapter 8.

(1) See documents prepared by the working groups which included many high-ranking officials and experts: "Strategy for Russia", Nezavisimaya gazeta, May 27, 1994.// "Russia and NATO: Guidelines of the Foreign Policy Council", Nezavisimaya gazeta, June 21, 1995.

(2) See No. 90.

(3) BNS, February 6, 1996.

(4) Zbigniew Brzezinski views NATO enlargement as a solution for reconciliation between Russia and Central Europe. // See Zbigniew Brzezinski, "A new coherency on Central Europe", The San Diego Union-Tribune, June 29, 1994.

(5) See Declaration of the Heads of State and Government Participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held at NATO Headquarters, Brussels, on 10-11 January 1994.

(6) Source No. 53.

(7) Source No. 66.

(8) European Council at Corfu, 24-25 June, 1994, Presidency Conclusions, SN 150/94, p.16.

(9) See " Extraordinary meeting of the WEU Council of Ministers with states of Central Europe, Bonn, 19th June, 1992." Assembly of WEU Information service, Paris.

(10) Assembly of WEU, 38th Ordinary Session. Information Report, p. 28. Committee for Parliamentary and Public Relations, February 1993. Assembly of WEU Information Service, Paris.

(11) "Recommendation on WEU's relation with Central and Eastern European countries," Assembly of WEU, 39th Ordinary Session, Document 1387, point. 2. November 8, 1993.

(12) Lithuanian Foreign Affairs Ministry, Information Department; ELTA, November 14, 1994.

(13) See Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisations?", Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.

(14) Such view was stated in the Memorandum of the Lithuanian Christian Democratic Party of June 23, 1993 to the Lithuanian President (See source 27, p. 29).

(15) For example, such point of view was referred to in source No. 109, p. 53.

(16) BNS, ETA, November 30, 1994.

(17) The official text of Mr. Warren Christopher's speech in Prague on March 20, 1996.

(18) See "A European defence policy", Assembly of WEU, Fortieth Ordinary Session, document No. 1445, item 142, p. 16.

(19) On March 20, 1996 in Prague, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher said to the representatives of the twelve Central and Eastern European states: "And we are ready to meet a third challenge, the one we must meet together. That challenge is to reunite this continent, to erase outdated boundaries of the Cold War."// See the official text of Mr. Warren Christopher's speech in Prague on March 20, 1996.

(20) "Enlargement will help us erase a Cold-War dividing line drawn solely by the accident of where the Red Army stopped in 1945."// Ibid.

(21) "Recommendation on WEU's relation with Central and Eastern European countries," Assembly of WEU, 39th ordinary session, document 1387, point (v), 8th November, 1993.

(22) RIA, October 26, 1994.

(23) See article Yurij Davidov "Prorubit li Rossiya okno v NATO. 'Osobyje otnosheniya,' kotoriye nuzhny Moskve" (Will Russia cut a window to NATO? 'Special relations' that are necessary to Moscow), Segodnia, February 23, 1996.

(24) Ibid.

(25) Ibid.

(26) Supra note 17.

(27) Henry Kissinger, "It's an Alliance, not a Relic", The Washington Post, August 16, 1994.

(28) For example, in an analogous situation, on June 21-23, 1993 in Copenhagen, the European Union made a political statement obligating to co-operate with all the specified future members.

(29) Jeffrey Simon described his concept of the associated NATO membership in his article in 1993 (see No. 71). He also wrote about such a possibility in his article in 1995 (see No. 108).

(30) Stanley R. Sloan, "Negotiating a new transatlantic bargain," NATO Review, No. 2, March 1996.

(31) INTERFAX, March 20, 1996.

(32) REUTER, April 16, 1996.

(33) Supra note 17.

(34)The appeal was signed by these political parties: Centre Union, Democratic Labour Party, Democratic Party, Christian Democratic Party, Liberal Union, Social Democratic Party, Lithuanian National Union, Independence Party, Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives).

(35) See source No. 57.

(36) The importance of the membership of the Baltic states in the WEU was also emphasised by the Minister of Great Britain, Malcolm Rifkind, during his visit in Vilnius (Lietuvos aidas, February 6, 1994.)

(37) Lietuvos aidas, January 28, 1994.

(38) The Lithuanian representative stated: "The Individual Partnership Programme, agreed and accepted today, opens a new qualitative era of bilateral relations between Lithuania and NATO which will lead in time to the membership of Lithuania in the North Atlantic Alliance." (See source No. 43.)

(39) BNS, January 31, 1995.

(40) See the draft Basics of Ensuring National Security of Lithuania (source No. 54).

(41) Latvia also treat the PfP as a practical step towards NATO membership. It is trying to achieve compatibility and interoperability of its national defence institutions and the means applied therein with those of NATO, and to prepare its institutions for joint operations. (See No. 87)

(42) Active reserve - reserve forces trained annually on a regular basis.

(43) The Seimas voted its approval of the Draft Law on the Basics of Ensuring National Security of Lithuania (source No. 54) on February 21, 1996.

(44) See source No. 54.

(45) The declaration was signed by these political parties: Centre Union, Democratic Labour Party, Democratic Party, Christian Democratic Party, Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees, Social Democratic Party and Homeland Union (Lithuanian Conservatives).

(46) See doc. No. 966, Valstybes zinios (News of the State), No. 39, May 12, 1995.

(47) See doc. No. 2245, Valstybes zinios (News of the State), No. 101, December 13, 1995.

(48) Members of the Working Group: Vytenis Andriukaitis (Social Democratic Party), Povilas Jakucionis ( Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees), Gediminas Kirkilas (Democratic Labour Party), Linas Linkevicius (Minister of National Defence), Leonas Milcius (Lithuanian National Union), Saulius Peceliûnas (Democratic Party), Romualdas Ozolas (Centre Union), Algirdas Saudargas (Christian Democratic Party), Ceslovas Stankevicius (Advisor to the Christian Democratic political group in the parliament), Antanas Stasiskis (Homeland Union/Lithuanian Conservatives).

(49) The Basics of Ensuring National Security of Lithuania (draft) is a separate binding legal act, a supplement to the Law on Basics of Ensuring National Security of Lithuania (draft).

(50) Ibid.

(51) Ibid.

(52) Ibid.

(53) Ibid.

(54) The examples of Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey confirm that security guarantees are, indeed, guarantees of democracy and stability. The importance of security in the establishment of democracy was pointed out by R. Asmus, R. Kugler and S. Larrabee in their article on NATO enlargement in "Foreign Affairs,' October 1993: "Those who insist that democratic credentials must be presented prior to alliance membership should remember that need for a stable security framework is greatest when democracy is most fragile and threatened." (See No. 99, p. 30).

(55) The Basics of Ensuring National Security of Lithuania, draft. (source No. 54).

(56) Ibid.

(57) Ibid.

(58) Ibid.

(59) Ibid.

(60) Ibid.

(61) Ibid.

(62) Ibid.

(63) Ibid.

(64) Ibid.

(65) Ibid.

(66) Ibid.

(67) Ibid.

(68) Ibid.

(69) Ibid.

(70) By the spring of 1995, the regular armed forces of Lithuania (without the border police units) comprised 10 battalions 9272 strong, of them 1796 commissioned officers, 2501 non-commissioned officers, 1462 re-engaged, 2218 conscripts and 292 contracted employees. Another ten thousand were on the voluntary national defence service. The armed forces had at their disposal twenty four aircraft and helicopters, two sea frigates, a guarding ship and three patrol boats (Lietuvos rytas, April 24, 1995).

Bibliography

(1) The Memorandum was signed by the representatives of the Republics of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.

(2) The Concept was signed by the Republics of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Russian Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

(3) The document was prepared by a working group: A. Adamishin, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; A. Volskij, President of the Industrialists Union; Y. Vorontsov, Adviser for Foreign Policy to the Russian President; Lt. Gen. G. Ivanov, Head of the Board of Military Construction and Reforms; S. Karaganov, Member of the Russian President's Council; A. Koshokhin, Director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Research; A. Kokoshkin, Deputy Defence Minister of the Russian Federation; M. Kolesnikov, Chief of the General Staff; S. Lavrov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation; V. Lukin, Chairman of the Duma Foreign Affairs Committee, former Ambassador to the USA; V. Petrovskij, Ambassador, Deputy General Secretary of the UN; S. Stepashin, Director of the Federal Counterintelligence Service; S. Shakhraj, Vice Prime Minister of the Russian Federation; G. Yavlinskij, Duma Deputy, Chairman of the Council of the Economic and Political Research Centre; and others.

(4) The Agreement was signed by the representatives of the Republics of Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Russian Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.

(5) Prepared by the working group led by the member of the President's Council, S. Karaganov. The group included, Chairman of the International Relations Committee of the Duma; S. Yushenkov, Chairman of the Defence Committee, A. Arbatov, member of the same Committee; A. Averchev, Chairman of the International Relations Committee of the Duma; A. Volskij, President of the Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs; and others.