Speech and conversation

Thank you so much Ian.
Distinguished guests,
Ladies and gentlemen.

It's great to be here tonight, great to be here at the German Marshall Fund. 
And as you said, Ian, 10 years ago, almost exactly 10 years ago, when I started my tenure as Secretary General of NATO, the first platform, the first speech was actually delivered here at the German Marshall Fund. 
So it's great to be back and to end my tenure giving a speech to the same institution.
And thank you so much for the excellent cooperation we have had over these years.

Then, as some of you may know, early 2014 when I was first approached and asked whether I was open to become the Secretary General of NATO, I did, as I always do.
I went to my father and asked for advice. And he said, not so much happens at NATO.
So he was not very enthusiastic about the idea of me going down there and having some boring years.
And I listened very carefully to him, because he joined the Foreign Service in Norway in the 1950s. He was Minister of Defence and Minister of Foreign Affairs.
And he attended more NATO meetings than almost any other Norwegian. 

And maybe he was right that NATO was traditionally quite static. 
But ‘static,’ quiet, is absolutely not the right way to describe the Alliance over the last decade. 

Since I took up my post as Secretary General in 2014,
the world around us has changed profoundly. 

We have seen Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. 
The rise of ISIS.
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. 
Growing competition with China. 
The COVID pandemic. 
More sophisticated cyber-attacks. 
And the increasing impact of climate change on our security.
So, the list goes on. 

During my time as Secretary General, the relevance of NATO has been questioned. 

The Alliance has been described as:
Divided.
Obsolete. 
And braindead.

But the reality is that NATO is:
Strong.
United.
And more important than ever. 

We have, over these 10 years, undergone their biggest transformation in a generation.

We have strengthened our defences. 
From having zero to tens of thousands of combat-ready NATO soldiers on our Eastern flank.
From thousands to half a million troops on high readiness.
And from three to twenty-three Allies spending at least two percent of GDP on defence.

We have strengthened NATO as an institution.
Doubling our common budget to ensure we can effectively deliver.

And our family of Allies and partners has grown. 
Montenegro, North Macedonia, Finland and Sweden joined our Alliance. 
And Ukraine is closer to NATO than ever before. 

In 2014, we only provided marginal support to Ukraine. 
Now, our support is massive. 
And NATO is coordinating the support through our new command in Germany. 

We also broadened our partnerships in the global south.  
Deepened relations with countries in the Indo Pacific. 
And NATO-EU cooperation has reached unprecedented levels. 

I am proud to have served as NATO Secretary General.
And to have steered this Alliance through a decisive decade.

As I look back at this incredible journey, 
let me reflect on five lessons that are key to NATO’s continued success in the future.

First, we have to be willing to pay the price for peace.  

The more money, 
the stronger our defences, 
the more effective our deterrence, 
the greater our security. 

Since 2014, spending across the Alliance has gone up substantially. 
All NATO Allies now invest at least 2% of GDP in defence or have plans to get there soon. 
And for the first time, total defence spending across Europe and Canada is above the 2% target. 

So the good news is that we have delivered on the pledge we made ten years ago. 
But the bad news is that this is no longer enough. 

That is why NATO Allies have agreed to spend at least two percent of GDP on defence. 

And it is why we have agreed on robust defence plans,
with specific capability targets that outline what each Ally needs to provide – in terms of weapons, forces and readiness – for our security. 

To meet these agreed targets, Allies will have to spend significantly more than two percent of GDP on defence in the years to come.

The second lesson is that freedom is more important than free trade.

Not so long ago, many Allies believed that buying gas from Russia was purely a commercial matter. 
That was wrong.

Russia used gas as a weapon to try to coerce us.
And to prevent us from supporting Ukraine.

We must not make the same mistake with China. 
Depending on Chinese rare earth minerals,  
exporting advanced technologies, 
and allowing foreign control of critical infrastructure
weakens our resilience and creates risks.
Of course, we will continue to engage with China. 
But we must not trade short-term economic interests for long-term security needs.

At the same time, and this is important, security cannot be an excuse to introduce protectionist measures against friends and Allies.
On the contrary, the more we limit trade with potential adversaries, the more important it is to preserve open economic relations among Allies and ourselves.

Barriers and tariffs between our countries will increase costs. 
Reduce quality. 
And stifle innovation. 

This will undermine our security. 
Because it will undermine the strength of our economies. 

NATO prevailed during the Cold War not least because we believed in open economies and competition between our countries.

And remember that in Article Two of our founding treaty, the Washington Treaty, it is stated clearly that we should encourage each other to strengthen our economic collaboration between Allies.
So let’s take this commitment seriously. 
Protectionism against Allies, does not protect our security.

The third lesson is that military strength is a prerequisite for dialogue. I know this from my time as Prime Minister of Norway. We have to speak to our neighbours. However difficult it might be. But dialogue only works when it is backed by strong defences. This is clearly demonstrated in Ukraine.

We all want this war to end.
The quickest way to end the war is to lose it.
But that will not bring peace. 
It will bring Russian occupation.

Today, President Putin believes he can achieve his goals on the battlefield.
And he believes that he can wait us out.
That is why he continues to wage his brutal war.
I do not believe that we can change Putin’s mind.
But I do believe that we can change his calculus. 

By giving Ukraine more weapons, we can make Putin realise he cannot get what he wants by force.
And make it so costly that he will have to accept Ukraine has a sovereign, democratic right to persist as a sovereign, democratic country.
The paradox is that the more weapons for Ukraine we are able to deliver, the more likely it is that we can reach a peace and end to the war.
And the more credible our long-term military support, the sooner the war will end.

As President Zelenskyy has stated, Russia has to be part of future peace talks.
The Minsk agreements after Russia’s first invasion in 2014 did not bring peace.
Any future deal must be backed by strong military support to Ukraine and credible security guarantees to ensure lasting peace.

There can be no sustained security in Europe, without a stable Ukraine.
And no lasting security for Ukraine, without NATO membership. NATO’s door is open.
Ukraine will join.

Now, to my fourth lesson: military power has its limits.
We saw this clearly in Afghanistan.

Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, it was right to go into Afghanistan.
Our military intervention had a clear UN mandate. And received broad political support across the Alliance.
We degraded al-Qaeda and prevented Afghanistan from being a safe haven for international terrorists.
So our mission was not in vain.
And I honour all those who made the ultimate sacrifice. 

But the Afghanistan mission lasted too long.
When I arrived at NATO in 2014, the plan was to end our military presence in a couple of years, and transition to a political partnership.
But seven years later, we were still there with thousands of troops. What started as a focused counter-terrorism operation became a large-scale nation building mission. 

A democratic and united Afghanistan with equal rights for all was a worthy goal.
But it was too ambitious.
We saw the cost of mission creep.

After twenty years, we were still not winning the war.
The Taliban were gaining ground.
And there were no united Afghan authorities that could take responsibility when we left.
The fact that the Afghan government and the security forces collapsed so quickly demonstrated why it was right to leave.

What should have been a stable and strong state structure was a house of cards.
There was no reason to believe that staying another twenty years would have provided a different outcome.
So the lesson learned is that the purpose of any future military operation outside NATO territory must be clearly defined and must be honest about what we can and cannot achieve.

So, to my fifth and final lesson. And the most important one. We must never take the bond between Europe and North America for granted. NATO is not written in stone.
It is the result of deliberate choices and political will.
We have heard voices on both sides of the Atlantic calling for America and Europe to part ways.
Focusing on short-sighted national interests over longer term cooperation will not serve us well.

Isolationism will not keep anyone safe.
We live in an interconnected world.
Security challenges are too big and competition is too fierce for any country to go it alone.
Investing in the transatlantic relationship is the only winning way forward. 

Europeans must understand without NATO, there is no security in Europe.
80 percent of NATO’s defence spending comes from non-EU allies.
And it is not only about resources.

It is also about geography.
Without Türkiye in the South, Norway in the North, and the US, Canada and the United Kingdom in the West, it is impossible to envisage the security of the European continent. 

The transatlantic Alliance has served Europe well.
Paving the way for closer European integration.
The reunification of Germany.
And the spread of democracy and freedom throughout Central and Eastern Europe.
It is a lesson of history that the Europeans must remember.

The transatlantic Alliance has also served the US well.
America’s friends and allies make indispensable contributions to US security and interests.
NATO Allies have stood side by side with the US from Korea to Afghanistan.
And have paid a high price. 

It is simply not true that Europeans are free riders.
No other major power has as many friends and allies as the United States.
Any policy that seeks to undermine this is squandering one of America’s greatest assets.

Ladies and gentlemen, 

When I took up this job a decade ago, I could not have imagined how much our Alliance would transform. Just as I cannot predict what lies ahead. But of this I am sure. While the challenges we face may change, the answer is the same.

We are stronger and safer, Europe and North America, together in NATO.

Thank you.
 

 

Bettina Klein
All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary General, pleasure to be here, great that we have the opportunity to have, as Ian indicated, roughly 20, 25, minutes for our conversation.

And then we will then open up to the public, also online. When you are watching us, you can send us your questions. We will see how many we will get in here. Before I pick up on a few of your remarks, just now, this is one of the last occasions at least, you are going to speak publicly in your capacity. So let me start with the question we are all interested in, how does it feel?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
It feels very strange, and to be honest, there are mixed feelings. I'm ready to go back to Norway. NATO will be in safe hands with the excellent new Secretary General, Mark Rutte. He has the experience, he has the knowledge. He has been the Prime Minister of coalition government and knows how to make compromises, which is the key to become a good Secretary General of NATO.

But he also has demonstrated the commitment to the Transatlantic Alliance and the support Ukraine. So he knows how to compromise when compromises are needed, but he also knows how to not compromise and to not compromise on our core values. Now I'm not answering your question because it's easy to speak about something else. How it feels well?

So I will miss NATO. I will miss Brussels, I will miss the people. But the beauty of being a politician for as many years as I've been is that I've stepped down many times before. I remember I stepped down as Minister of Finance back in 97, I thought it was the end of the world, but it was not.

And then I stepped down as prime minister in 2001 of the two short years. And then I stepped down in 2013, and something nice has happened every time. So, there's a bright future, even for former Secretary Generals of NATO.

Bettina Klein
You quoted famously your father. Not much is going on at NATO. So things changed a bit. So you quoted between obsolete and brain dead. So how difficult was it to navigate between those remarks, those times? I remember pretty well how NATO reacted then.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
I think that the best way for NATO to prove that we are vigilant, we are alive, we are kicking, we are a strong alliance is actually what we do.

So instead of starting a discussion about these labels that was put on us, what we did, is prove that that was wrong. The reality is that we have seen the biggest reinforcement of our collective defence in a generation. In 2014 we had zero battle groups, zero NATO combat ready troops in the Eastern part of the Alliance. And now we have thousands, [eight] battle groups and thousands of combat ready troops.

We have, we have gone from a few thousand forces on high readiness to half a million.

And again, defence spending going from three Allies, the United Kingdom, United States and Greece, the only Allies that were at 2%, even the Baltic countries, Poland, they were far below. So by doing what we have done, the support to Ukraine, increasing our deterrence and defence, strengthen our cyber defenses, everything we have done over these years, and then also four more members.

If we were so bad, why would all these countries like to join? So I think just action speaks louder than words. So instead of engaging in the discussion about these labels, we have just demonstrated by what we did that we are vigilant, strong and fit for the future.

Bettina Klein
That sounds to me that are quite, quite proud of what you have achieved during the last ten years. Let me pick up on a few things you said and what you labelled as the most important lesson, this was the last one, actually: We never can take the bond between US and NATO for granted. You said, we have to invest into the transatlantic relationship.

What does it mean specifically, beyond the finances, or is it about the money, about expenditures, capabilities? What do you mean specifically?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
I mean both finances, capabilities, but also politically. On the finances. I think it has been absolutely fair of the United States to criticize European Allies for not investing enough and we have to remember that this has been a consistent message from presidents actually dating back to John F. Kennedy.

It was President Obama that was the when he actually made sure that we were able to agree at the NATO Summit in in in in Wales, in 2014 the commitment to go to 2%. Then President Trump was also very clear on this message, as you may remember. And then, and then President Biden has conveyed the same message.

They have used different language and but the core message has been the same. And of course, when I say invest in our trans-Atlantic security, I mean that Europeans and Canada have to show that we are willing to carry our part of the burden.

And the good news is, that's exactly what the Europeans and Canada now are doing. But it's more than that. It's also to understand the political relationship, the idea that we have to be together, not create competing structures that will overlap and duplicate NATO.

And then one of the most important things in my speech, and I may repeat that just to make sure that you all understood it, was that one thing is to see the dangers of economic dependencies on potential adversaries, not to not to be dependent on Russian gas, or not to be too dependent on rare earth minerals for China.

But a totally different thing is to introduce economic barriers against friends and Allies.

Bettina Klein
That's quite right. But there was another point you mentioned…

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
Yeah the point is that to invest in the Trans-Atlantic bond, is about defence budgets, but it's also about not creating competing structures, and it's about understanding that integrating our economies, but also with friends like Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, others will actually strengthen us, and the opposite will weaken us.

So, so that's important, that is investing in our relationship.

Bettina Klein
That brings me to your first to your first lesson. You mentioned we have to pay the price for peace. That goes in the same direction, I guess. I mean, I remember very well the discussions in my country, Germany, how difficult it was to come to 2%. You just said, that's the bare minimum. We have to go further, Besides the capabilities, do we have a benchmark in mind, a figure that should be reached and in what terms do you think?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
Well, so what we have agreed in NATO is. Because in Wales, in 2014 we agreed that we should strive to move towards 2%. So the way 2% was formulated was like a kind of something, some ceiling, something we should strive to move towards.

Then after some years, we realized that that was not enough. So then last year in Vilnius, we changed the language and said that 2% is the minimum. So we changed 2% from a ceiling to a floor.

I stress this because what I don't like is people who leave an organization and suddenly they say something totally different, to what they have said all the years they've been there. There is a consistency between what I say now and what I've been working for over these years. But I stress now even more the idea of the need to go beyond 2%.

But then the other thing is that we have agreed these new defence plans, and that's about specific capabilities. How many tanks, how many battleships, how much readiness, how much ammunition do we have in stocks and so on. It's very hard to put the price on this, because, for instance, readiness depends on, you know, wages, national costs. So each and every Ally has to estimate the cost. But it's obvious, when you look at Allies, that it's significantly more than 2%.

So I'm not able to give you two point something, or three or something, but I'm only saying that when you look at the language minimum, and we compare that with the capability targets we have agreed it's obvious that it's significantly more than … [inaudible]

Bettina Klein
I mean some pay already more. But how smoothly will this go? Politicians, they have to, you know, they have to take account the public opinion, not only in Germany, but also in this country. How do you think the audience, the public, should be convinced to spend more, maybe much more than 2%.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
So first of all, I would like to defend the politicians. They're not so bad, and they are right when they say: this is difficult. And I have been a politician for decades, and I understand it's very easy to be in favour more money for defence. That's the easiest thing in the world. The difficult thing is that if you use a billion more on defence, you have a billion less for something else. So the difficult thing is to say there is less for health or less for education, or I increase taxes, or I borrow more, because the problem is that many NATO Allies, they now have a debt ratio which is at 100% of GDP, or even above, meaning that with an interest rate of 4% they pay twice as much in interest than they pay on defence, if they pay 2% on defence.

So for many Allies, the interest rates on the loans, the debts, is bigger than the defence budget. So it's not easy, as you can always, not always, but many countries can always borrow. But borrow is not the answer for most Allies. So therefore, you either have to increase taxes, not easy, or you have to cut on something else, not easy.

Bettina Klein
So lose elections at the end?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
But sometimes loose elections is the right thing to do.

Bettina Klein
You would recommend they should stay strong and convince the public. This is what I get now?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
I said this just to anyway, to convey to you, and also listeners, that I realize that this is difficult, but the task of me, the Secretary General of NATO, and of political leaders, is then to explain why this is necessary. Why it's necessary to actually take some pain, to take those difficult decisions, to have this money for X and Y and Z, because nothing is more important than peace and security. Without, without ensuring peace and security will not succeed with anything else, with climate change or health or whatever it is.

And the good news is that, Germany is an example, but also many other countries in Europe, is that not so many years ago, it was almost impossible to talk about 2%. Now it is possible to talk about 2% and not only possible to talk about 2%, but it's supposed to do 2%.

And that's because people have realized, the voters have realized that this is serious. This is a full-fledged war going on in our neighbourhood, and therefore there is a much higher awareness and willingness to actually take the burden of increased defence spending, even though it has consequences for all the budgets.

Bettina Klein
Maybe we should add, meanwhile we have a war unfortunately on the borders of the European Union and NATO. Maybe that changed, unfortunately, for that reason, the consciousness. But that brings me to the point, you also mentioned military strength is a prerequisite of dialogue. You said something similar 10 years ago with GMF, when you had your first speech here. Completely different situation, but we had already something going on, 2014 concerning Ukraine and Russia at the time. Let me ask you said to a colleague in an interview with a colleague of mine from FAZ last week, that you do regret that NATO did not do more to prevent this war and to strengthen Ukraine. Remind us why did that not happen? Was there no consensus, but there was also no bilateral agreements? I understand that you would have, you know, been favoured for.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
I did something in that interview that I normally don't do, and that is that I answer hypothetical questions. And the question was, what did we do anything wrong and what we had done differently? So with all the caveats that to answer and to speculate about hypothetical situation is always risky, I would just say that I remember the period between 2014 and 2022 as a period when some Allies, and also, actually I and some in the NATO leadership, we tried to convince Allies to provide more military support Ukraine. That was not easy, neither to get agreement as NATO. We did some capacity building, some training, some Allies, the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada actually had some training activities. I remember one of my first visits to Ukraine.

We visited Yavoriv, just outside Lviv, where we had some training activities. So Allies did something, but what we did was not big enough, not large enough to really make a difference. And the reason was, of course, that this was this idea that we could provoke Russia to be aggressive. Well, we didn't do so much, and Russia was very aggressive. So my lesson from that is that I think that if we had been earlier, stronger in our support Ukraine. At least the threshold for Russia to attack Ukraine would have been higher, and the cost for them would have been higher. And at some stage, Russia must understand that the cost of continuing this war is too high, so they have to sit down and agree a lasting peace arrangement.

So well, my answer is that yes we could have done more, Allies and NATO. I think the reasons why we didn't do more - we did something, I know no other countries did more than NATO, but we could have done even more - was partly that maybe Allies were not fully aware of the risks of a full scale in nation and partly, as I now speak, 2014, 2015, 2016, so we were very aware of that, like in 21 but in the first years after 2014, and partly, there was this idea that this could provoke [Russia].

Bettina Klein
When change perspective, some people might argue on another political spectrum. Could have NATO done more to make sure that Russia isn't going the way, also inside the country politically as it is going now. Because I'm also picking up on your speech 10 years ago where you said, "Okay, we have to be strong, or they need to be dialogue", that completely collapsed. Would you say that there was also kind of a mistake on NATO's side when we watched from this perspective?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
It is Russia that bears the responsibility for that, the dialogue between NATO and Russia has broken down, because we really tried. We tried in the 1990s and we had some progress. We were able to agree this NATO Russia Founding Act, kind of the framework for our dialogue. We established the NATO-Russia Council, and we had some activities together. And we had also progress bilaterally between US and Russia on arms control. And I saw one part of that myself as Prime Minister of Norway. We had a good work relationship cooperation with Russia in the north on delimitation lines in the Barents Sea, on fisheries, energy, and many other things, vis a vis travel between the northern part of Norway and Russia. And I continue to believe that it was absolutely right to really try to create a better relationship with our neighbour, Russia, after the Cold War. The question is, and I don't think we're able to find a fixed date, but the question is, when was it obvious that that didn't work?

Even after Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 we made an effort. We tried to improve our relationship with Russia. And as late as January 2022, when we knew that Russia was planning a full scale invasion, we knew that they had built up all the forces and intention of invading Ukraine. Even then we met in the NATO-Russia Council to really try to make the last diplomatic efforts to prevent this war. So we have really tried to engage Russia politically and to develop the political dialogue. But of course, when they have a full scale invasion of a neighbour, responsible for killing thousands of people, bombing cities, civilian infrastructure, then of course, the room for meaningful dialogue has almost disappeared. Having said that, as President Zelenskyy has stated, at some stage, there has to be some negotiations with Russia.

And he has said that Russia needs to be part of a peace process, because it's with your enemies. You need to find solutions. At the end of the day you don't like them, you can think they are aggressive, but still, you need to find them.

Bettina Klein
And under which preconditions? Make one example, please.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
What do you mean preconditions?

Bettina Klein
Negotiations with Russia?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
First of all, I think it's for Ukraine to decide what are acceptable conditions. Second, what I strongly believe is that President Putin has the ambition of controlling Ukraine, he doesn't recognize Ukraine as a sovereign independent nation, even though Russia has signed on that many times, including the Budapest Memorandum, where Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons. Russia, many other countries, signed on guarantees for the territorial integrity of Ukraine, violated that and tried to take control of Ukraine.

So I don't believe that President Putin would change his mind on Ukraine, but I think we can change his calculus, because there is a limit for how high price is willing to get that and therefore military support to Ukraine is not a guarantee, but it maximizes the likelihood for convincing President Putin that he has to sit down and agree a peace arrangement with Ukraine, where Ukraine prevails as a sovereign, independent nation.

And then it's for Ukraine and Russia to negotiate. Our responsibility is to enable the Ukrainians to send that message that he cannot win on the battle of it, that the price will be too high. That's the first step, to agree some kind of arrangement. The second thing is that when that disagreed, it is important that that's the real end, because you have to remember that the war didn't start in February 2022, the war started in 2014 thousands of people have been killed from 2014 to February. 2022. First, Russia took Crimea, we said that was unacceptable.

Then they waited for some months, and they went into eastern Donbas took eastern Donbas, we said that was unacceptable. Then we had the Minsk one agreement that ended the fighting. Then Russia lasted for some months. Russia violated the Minsk I delimitation line, or ceasefire line. So it ceased its ceasefire line, and they moved the fronts further West. We had Minsk II, that lasted for less than eight years, and then we had a full scale invasion.

Bettina Klein
Now, maybe in the Minsk III?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
Also, the thing is, we cannot have Minsk III. This agreement has to be a credible agreement. So the question, since you cannot trust the signature of these people because they have broken their promises so many times, Budapest Memorandum, Minsk I and Minsk II, then we need something that underpins such a peace agreement. And that's two things. One is to arm the Ukrainians so they can deter a future Russian aggression. Also what we didn't do from 2014 to 2022, significantly arming the Ukrainians, that must happen this time. What didn't happen between the Minsk agreements and 2022 was that we didn't give enough weapons to Ukraine. This time we have to enable them to deter future Russian aggression.

The other part is security guarantees, and then we can again discuss exactly how those security guarantees are formulated and the framework, but the end of the day has to be some kind of guarantees from the big NATO powers like the United States. And then, that's NATO membership. Article Five. And therefore NATO membership is actually a means to get a lasting, credible peace in Ukraine.

Question
Thank you so much, Secretary General, I had a question on your last point on NATO membership for Ukraine. Even though there's a lot of rhetoric about this and a lot of expectations in Kyiv, I think a lot of colleagues here would feel that within the Alliance there's still a diversity of views about NATO's future membership and the timeline for that. So what would be your advice for the Allies moving forward? How can they handle these high expectations from Ukraine and avoid disappointments and confusion or the dynamics of Bucharest? Thank you.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
Why we are waiting for a final decision on an invitation for Ukraine to join? The most important thing we can do is to prepare them and to move them so close as possible to NATO membership. And that's exactly what we are doing. We have agreed this big package of working more closely with them to create what we call interoperability, to ensure that Ukrainian forces are fully interoperable, have the same doctrine standards as NATO. We have agreed the NATO command for providing support to Ukraine.

That's also a way to ensure that we are fully coordinated and that we, while we help them to fight the war today, also prepare for the future defence of Ukraine. We have removed the requirement for a Membership Action Plan. Before you know, to join NATO, it was a kind of two-step process. First you were you were awarded, or you achieved this Membership Action Plan, and then you had that for some years, and then you there was an invitation. We have removed that requirement.

So the next, the next step for them is invitation. And thirdly, we need to find a way to ensure that we create the political conditions for Allies to agree. And I think what you just spoke about, to create the framework for a process that can end the war will also help us to move Ukraine towards membership. And as I said, guarantees for that [unclear]. Well, NATO, membership can be part of that.

Bettina Klein
Gentleman on the first row, please introduce yourself briefly.

Question
Thank you. My name is Jacob Fischer. I used to work for the Council of Ministers of the European Union for almost four decades. First of all, thank to you for your eloquent speech and sound advice you give to us Europeans, thank you for that. When the Russian second war started in February 2022, I took Ukraine refugees at home.

There have been eight up to now, and we had strong and long discussions. And the main fear is that we in Europe want so dearly to have peace, that we want Ukrainians to give up something so that will be a second Munich 1938 - that's their fear. My fear is that later on, China will do the same with Taiwan. And we in Europe do not want to defend that country, that we want to leave it to the United States. What are your views on this? Thank you so much.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
Again, I think it's important to distinguish between what kind of responsibilities we have. It is for the leadership and the people of Ukraine to decide what are acceptable conditions for an agreement, and that will be a difficult decision for them to take. And I will not, in a way, in any way, try to make that decision for them. What I can do, and we can do and NATO can do, is to put them in the strongest possible position when they are making that decision.

And again, what we know with certainty is that the stronger they are militarily, the more likely it is that President Putin has to realize that he will not win on the battlefield. And I know that some are concerned, and the situation on the battlefield is difficult, but you have to remember where this war started. When the war started, most experts told us that Kyiv would fall within days, and Ukraine within weeks. The Ukrainians have liberated 50% of the territory Russia occupied in the beginning of the war, they have been able to open up a corridor in the Black Sea.

They sank the flagship Moscow and many other Russian ships, and they are inflicting heavy losses on the Ukraine – on the Russian forces. So the Russians are paying a price. We must maximize that price, to maximize the likelihood for Russia to change the calculus.

Bettina Klein
We have a question from the lady in the second row.

Question
Thank you very much. Greek newspaper, Ta Nea. During your tenure, you have witnessed, you have experienced quite a few ups and downs in the Greek Turkish relations. A few years ago, we reached a crucial point. I would like to ask you, first, how did you navigate through those crucial moments? And secondly, if you were to draw a sixth lesson tailored to Greece and Turkey, what would you say? Thank you.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
So first of all, Greece and Türkiye are two highly valued and important NATO Allies. They contribute to our shared security, to our collective defence in different ways. And they both play an important role in NATO, and they are, of course, part of the decision making we make on the daily basis. When there have been some differences and some challenges in the bilateral relationship, most of that has to be solved through bilateral dialogue.

And I welcome every time there are meetings, dialogue between the two countries to address these differences. Second NATO has played, and I guess also in the future, will be ready to play a role as a platform to help to facilitate dialogue and to address the differences. And we had done that at several stages, also to address the risk of, incidents over the Aegean Sea, at sea and in the air.

We have some military lines, also structures that have you used to prevent any incidents, and NATO should continue to do that. So I don't, I don't have a sixth lesson, but I just believe that Allies should be friends.

Bettina Klein
Lady there in the third row I think. We need a microphone there.

Question
Hi. Thank you very much for providing your insight so succinctly and easily for us to take with us. My question is about the European Union and its increased focus and efforts when it comes to defence, culminating in appointing a defence commissioner just a few days ago. So I'm curious, with a structure like that, do you see any clear synergies, or would they rather be competing structures, as a lot of the European countries are also NATO countries. Thank you very much.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
So I welcome more EU efforts on defence, as long as they are done in a way that doesn't duplicate or compete with NATO. And there is a lot EU can do. And I read that the new commissioner’s main task was, for instance, to address the fragmentation of the European defence industry.

And that's extremely important, because the reality is that the European defence industry is not as competitive as it should be, because it's already fragmented, and that increases costs, and by increasing costs we are getting less weapons, ammunition for the budgets we have available. And I think EU has the instruments to address that fragmentation. But what EU should not do is to start to build alternative defence structures.

For instance, an intervention force. We have the NATO intervention force. And every time European Allies have asked for help, we are there, Bosnia or Kosovo or elsewhere. So I don't understand why there is a need for a different, competing intervention force. Not least as because that will require, to be any meaningful force, command and control. And the backbone on NATO is command and control. And I'm not revealing a big secret that you know, NATO's command structure is very impressive, very strong, but we struggle a bit to man all the positions, so it will be a bit strange if the same countries are not able to send as many officers to our command structures as they should, are starting to build an alternative structure.

Also defence planning - I've seen some language indicating that NATO, that the EU should start to do to agree capability targets. Countries can only have one set of capability targets, they cannot have two. And that's NATO's responsibility, also, because we represent 100% of NATO strength, the EU is 20% so the 20% cannot define what 100% should do on capability targets. Or on standards. A key responsibility to NATO is to have standards and that's one thing is about the diameter of the artillery shells. But you know, when you speak about cyber, space, then standards is extremely important and very complicated.

So, on these areas, it has to be one set of standards, one set of capability targets, one command structure, and that's NATO. But they have assured me many times that the plan is not to create competing structures, not to start parallel defence planning processes or capability targets, but I really wish EU all the best in our common defragmentation, because that's adding the costs.

Bettina Klein
Having said that, I think we should mention that a lot happened during the last 10 years between EU and NATO. I mean, there is a level of cooperation, I think that hasn't been the case 10 years ago. So we have a question on the last row here the gentleman.

Question
Thanks very much [inaudible]. Thanks, first of all for your great remarks. I have two related questions about the Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. First in the run up to the war, arguably, there was an intelligence failure in Western Europe. And my question is whether you think the intelligence capabilities in some of the key European capitals have improved over the past two and a half years, either by way of assets or by way of interpretation and analysing intelligence. And prospectively, how do you expect this war to evolve?

Some like the Polish Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski says that it might continue for another 10 years, which might entail millions of casualties on both sides, tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of civilian casualties. Billions, if not trillions, of euros in terms of costs. Do you expect this to go on for another 10 years, and then how in the best-case scenario where Ukraine can actually prevail, what does that mean on the Russian side? Who is in the Kremlin? What terms do they negotiate with Ukraine? Thank you.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
So first on intelligence, I think we need to remember that we had extreme precise information about the invasion. We predicted it exactly as it happened. And not only had we intelligence in NATO predicting the invasion, but we did something we normally don't do. We shared the intelligence publicly. So, there were public statements in the media in the autumn of 2021, stating clearly that Russia now was not only building up the capacity, but also had the intention of invading.

And we need to understand that it's normally easier to identify capacity than to identify intention. And among the intelligence services, I think there was a very broad agreement about the number of tactical battle groups and tanks and planes and soldiers the Russians had around Ukraine. Because then you count. It's harder to know exactly what is the intention. And the combination of capacity and intention that really gives you the precise picture. But, the US, the UK and NATO, we had the clear picture that we had the capacity, but also intention of Russia to invade.

So this was something that when the invasion happened, there was no surprise whatsoever. We were shocked, but not surprised. And therefore we were well prepared. On the morning of the invasion, we did actually what we had planned for and trained for. That was to activate the NATO's defence plans, meaning giving our Supreme Allied Commander, SACEUR, more authority to move more forces to the eastern part of the Alliance, to send a clear message to Moscow that don’t try to attack a NATO Ally, and we stepped up the support to Ukraine.

Then you are right, and I will be careful commenting too much on that. But it has been publicly and also commented by the leadership in some European NATO Allies that they saw the capacity, but they didn't take full into account the intentions. They didn't share their views on intentions. I will not answer for them. I would just say that NATO and the majority of NATO Allies, there was absolutely no doubt. This is a story of a long-predicted war or invasion that happened in February 2022.

Then let me add that we had precise information in the fall of ’21, months ahead, but in many ways, we have actually prepared for this since 2014. I'm not saying that when I came to NATO in October 2014 that I knew with certainty that Russia was going to have a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. But we knew that Russia was willing to use military force against Ukraine. We knew that they were threatening Ukraine, but also other countries in Europe. That's the reason why we started the big military build-up. That's the reason why we were so focused on 2%. I was traveling around asking for more defence spending; they called me Mr. 2%. It's not a compliment at that time. So, that's the reason why we start to scale up, why we decided in 2016 at the Warsaw Summit, long before ‘22 under the full-scale innovation, to have battlegroups in eastern part of the Alliance. So, we started the preparations for an eventuality like this in 2014. We knew in the fall of ‘21 what was going to happen, and we were very prepared when it happened.

Bettina Klein
Okay, thanks so much for your questions. I'm afraid we have to come slowly to a conclusion here before I hand over to Ian. Maybe I'm allowed to ask at least two of my remaining questions. I would ask you to be very briefly. One, what's your biggest, your most important advice to Mr. Rutte, when you hand over on October 1st?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
So I will not give him advice, and especially not publicly. So if he calls me and asks for advice, I will give advice. But I have so big trust and so great trust and confidence in him. And we two have known each other for many years. We were Prime Ministers together.
We met for the first time around the NATO table when he was a new Prime Minister and I was starting to become a bit old Prime Minister in 2010 at the Lisbon Summit. Also, Prime Minister Norway, Prime Minister of the Netherlands, and then we have worked for 10 years, doing my tenure here at NATO. And he has the qualities, the experience to really do this job in an excellent way. So no advice, unless…

Bettina Klein
Maybe keep riding your bicycle?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
How he moves around in Brussels, I think he can decide that himself. So no, he's a great man. That will be excellent. But of course, the biggest task will be to keep 32 Allies together. That's a big family, a great family. But sometimes what is a challenge to keep them all happy at the same time.

Bettina Klein
Okay, last question concerning your own future. You said you will move back to Oslo probably. There were not only rumours, but some reports last week that you're going to be, and I'm sorry I have to ask this as a German journalist, there were some rumours and some reports that you are going to be the next chair of the Munich Security Conference. I'm not expecting a confirmation, maybe?

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg
The question is why do you ask that? [laughs]

Bettina Klein
Actually, my question was much longer. I wanted to talk to you about the future of the Munich Security Conference and which priorities the next chair maybe should have. The active chair said we should open it more up to the global south. Any constructive idea for the future of the conference, no matter if you are going to be the next chair or not?

NATO Secretary General
I didn't give Mark Rutte any advice. I'll not give any advice to the Munich Security Conference. To be honest, I’m still responsible for NATO for a couple of more weeks. My focus is on that. There's a full-fledged war going on in Ukraine. I will go to New York to meet many leaders there to try to convince them and to urge for more support for Ukraine. That's my task. That's my focus now. So I will not speak about what I would do after NATO as long as in NATO. And then when I leave NATO, maybe you can ask again.

Bettina Klein
Okay, anyway, all the best for your future, Mr. Secretary General, thank you so much for the conversation.