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SGPO 76/62

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17 September 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR : Secretary General, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation  
SUBJECT : Appraisal of Berlin Contingency Plans  
Reference : SGM-479-62 ✓

1. We have received information from the Standing Group that Corrigendum No. 2 to SGM-479-62 has been dispatched by courier 15 September 1962.

2. For your advance information, this Corrigendum:  
(a) Deletes lines 21 and 22 of page 11 of reference and lines 27, 28, and 29 of page 17 as well.

(b) Further, the Corrigendum will add as enclosure comments by the Netherlands Government as follows:

"1. From a purely military point of view considering the grave situation at the moment of execution of NATO Contingency Plans, the appraisal as given in reference document can be concurred with in principle.

2. In the opinion of the Netherlands military authorities the proposed extent of execution of alert measures may however have a tendency to surpass the contingency aim, in particular, in the case of maritime, and to a lesser extent air plans. It is recognized that before execution of any ground plan, a state of full preparedness for war is essential, as ground operations by their very nature, involve a greater risk of escalation. The consequences on military and civil matters following a political decision to bring NATO on a certain alert footing, might be considered too grave and not in consonance with the situation. For the greater part, the formal alert system is now coupled to the Contingency Plans. Moreover, the danger arises that the Soviets - by again and again deliberately heightening the tension - might compel the Alliance to reveal its formal alert system to them. Consideration should therefore be given to the possibility to execute, at least partly, special selected measures for assigned and earmarked forces only, with the aim of extending the range of graduation and flexibility of the plans as well as of reducing the possibility of compromising the NATO alert systems.

3. Notwithstanding the fact that the Council gave instructions to that purpose, no plans are incorporated in reference document as to the appropriate alert measures for NATO forces, prior to initiation of any tripartite military plans. The requirements can only be appraised from the given references.

4. In case of implementation of major tripartite plans, the measures required from NATO are so extensive that the contents of para 2 above apply to that situation in even higher degree."

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SEE: DN (M.W.)

J. M. GUERIN

Lieutenant General  
STANDING GROUP REPRESENTATIVE

Copies to : DSG/ASG for Economics & Finance  
Executive Secretary

1995, 1998, 1996, 1999, 2000, 2005, 2003, 2007, 1997