

cc. DSG

DSG/ASG Economie et Finances
Secrétaire Exécutif

SGRep

30th November
~~2nd December~~ 1961.(Dear General,

Thank you for your letter SHAPE/188B/61 of 16th November with which you forwarded me your analyses of the Greek and Turkish replies to the Plan of Action for NATO Europe, and revised analyses on Belgium and the Netherlands.

In your letter you have also given examples of the further measures to meet the requirements of an all-out emergency, which you mentioned in your earlier letter of 15th September. It is in connection with these measures that I am now writing to you.

As far as approval of the recommended end-1966 requirements is concerned (point a. of your letter), you will recall that the Council, in adopting Resolution C-W(61)102 on 31st October, recognized that there was an urgent need to take action on the end-1966 force requirements before the end of the present year so that defence programmes of member countries could be developed and implemented without delay. I feel that until the Military Committee approves MC 96 and forwards it to the Council there is little that the latter can do in the meantime.

With regard to points b. and c., I quite agree that something must be done to improve the whole alert situation. As you may know already the Council yesterday, on the basis of the recommendations in MC 43/10, requested nations to undertake appropriate action to enable them to make further delegation of authority to major NATO Commanders under provisions of NATO Alert System (MC 67/1 (Final)), in particular the steps to be

General Norstad,

~~SHAPE~~Supreme Allied Commander
for Europe
SHAPE
PARIS

taken under states ORANGE and SCARLET if these should be declared before Reinforced Alert. However, neither I nor the Council are fully informed as to the present status of negotiations between the major NATO Commanders and national governments. What I feel is needed is a frank, concise report showing the extent to which the various alert measures have been agreed, the nations which are proving recalcitrant and the difficulties, from the military point of view, caused by their recalcitrance. I understand that you will be reporting on these lines to the Standing Group at the end of the year and I intend to ask the Standing Group, when I see them, whether you can send me a copy at the same time, so that I can look into the possibility of initiating Council action to improve the situation in Europe, without waiting for the Standing Group to coordinate the reports of the three major commands.

I share your concern regarding the many obstacles, dictated by national policy, which tend to prevent the achievement of maximum readiness in your Command (point d. of your letter). A number of these were touched on in the Annual Review Examining Sessions this year, as well as in previous years, but as they raise very difficult political problems, they could not be fully explored in that forum. I personally question the advisability of putting this matter in front of the Council before some preliminary work has been undertaken, since Government positions might become more rigid rather than more flexible as a result of pressure from their NATO partners. I believe it would be better, as a first step, for me to explore the difficulties in bi-lateral talks with each of the permanent representatives concerned.

Your suggestion that the Council should examine the state of readiness of those NATO Logistics Agencies which have a wartime function, with a view to ensuring their capability to respond to a wartime condition (point e.), is a good one. Here again at its meeting yesterday the Council emphasized to the authorities concerned, and to the NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee, the importance to the military of the early activation of national and international movement agencies. As you may know, we are making progress with regard to our ability to activate in war the civil agencies in which

-3-

you are interested, and we are planning for certain of them to take part in your FALLEX 62 to test our arrangements.

If you should have any comments to make on what I have said above, would you please let me know.

(Yours sincerely,)

D. U. STIKKER