E- .4.2-05/1 ORGANISATION DU TRAITE DE L'ATLANTIQUE NORD ATLANTICO TREATY ORGANIZATION PUBLIOU LE SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DÉLÉGUÉ. SECRÉTAIRE GÉNERAL ADJOINT POUR L'ÉCONOMIE ET LES FINANCES LECTURE DEPUTY SECRETARY GENERAL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY GENERAL 1680 FOR ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 1991 E&F/CA.61/511 Ы MISE Note for the Secretary General :1987 ı 8000 Norstad's letter of 16 November 1961, his comments on the Greek and Turkish replies to his / DÉCLASSIFIÉ Plan of Action, and amended comments on the <u>Belgian and Netherlands replies</u> Please find attached the letter which General Norsted sent yesterday morning. 1989 1998 1997 PUBLIC DISCLOSURE 1995

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PLACE DU MARÉCHAL DE LATTRE DE TASSIGNY (Porte Dauphine) PARIS - XVIe KLÉBER 50-20 - Poste 23-76 21st November 1961 1989

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you on 16th November 1961 and which you were kind enough to give me S000

In amplification of the information contained in his earlier document (SHAPE 188/61 of 15th September), SACEUR annexes to this letter his comments on the replies received from Greece and Turkey to his Plan of Action, as well as amendments to his previous comments on the answers received from Belgium and the Netherlands, in view of additional information provided by these countries. that General Norstad's letter and the annex have been circulated to all delegations and that the International Staff therefore has no action to take on these papers.

I would like, however, to draw your attention to the fact that in his letter of transmittal General Norstad comes back to a point which he touched on in his letter of 15th September 1961, when he stated: "I further recommend that the Council consider, as a matter of urgency, further steps to meet the requirements of an all-out emergency, should such a situation appear imminent". wondered at the time exactly what this sentence meant, and intended to ask SACEUR for further explanations, but for one reason In his letter of 16th November, or another this was not done. General Norstad refers to this sentence and gives some examples of the measures which he feels the Council should consider. Here are my first reactions and comments on these points.

a) SACEUR asks the Council to approve at an early date the recommended end-1966 Force Requirements.

On this point it must be recalled that the Council took the necessary action in approving C-M(61)102 of 31st October 1961, and is

still awaiting MC 96 from the Military Committee. I should add that SGREP has now given me a draft of LC 96, dated 13th November, which I am studying in detail and about which I hope to be in a position to send you a short note in a few days. The important point is that this draft of NC 96 has still not been considered by the It is intended that this Committee in permanent Military Committee. session will consider this document at their meetings up to 1st December 1961. However, if action has not been completed by that date, the whole subject will have to be considered by the Military Committee at Chiefs of Staff level at their 11-12 December meeting It seems, therefore, that SACEUR's insistence upon prompt approval of MC 96 by the Council is a little premature and no real action can be taken by the Permanent Representatives at the present time.

- b) The Council should undertake a review of the actions which would minimise delays in implementing the various alerts as may be required by the situation.
- c) The Council should urge nations to conduct a review of those alert measures they have reserved as national prerogatives with the aim of streamlining their procedures and ensuring that all measures will be executed promptly when an alert is declared.

SACEUR is right on these two points and there is something to be said for improving the whole procedure, under which the detailed implementation of alert measures is discussed between the governments on one hand and the NATO military commanders on the other (not only the Supreme Commanders but also regional commanders). I understand that Lord Coleridge has just sent you a note calling your attention to the need for improving the situation and for putting the Council back in the picture, which is not the case at All negotiations on the detailed implementation of alert measures are conducted by the governments, who are not compelled to report to the Council. In consequence, if a country, for various reasons, wishes to reserve its right to take final decisions on certain measures only when the situation demands, thereby refusing any kind of automaticity in their implementation, the International Staff will only become aware of the position the country has taken when, under some kind of pressure from us, the military agree to send the International Staff a list of the points which have been settled and of those which remain to be worked out.

To sum up, there seems to be scope for a good deal of improvement in this field.

d) The Council should urge all nations to take the necessary action to remove any obstacles dictated by national policy which tend to prevent achievement of maximum readiness for Allied Command Europe.


This vague and yet comprehensive formula means a lot. I would quote as examples of what SACMUR has in mind:

- the unwillingness of some countries (Denmark, Norway and, to some extent, France) to accept nuclear warheads on their territory in peacetime.
- the unwillingness of the Canadian authorities to agree to the use of nuclear weapons, at least for the time being.
- the unwillingness of France to agree to the establishment under the infrastructure rules of special ammunition depots on French soil. (The French have agreed only to such special ammunition depots being built on German soil for use by their forces stationed in Germany).
- the fact that the French authorities have withdrawn under national command their naval forces based in the Mediterranean.

These are only a few of the points which cause SACHUR concern, and they are all dictated by national policy. Most of them have been touched upon during the Annual Review examinations this year, as well as in previous years, but each of them raises very difficult political questions and could not, therefore, be further explored during the examining sessions. I personally question whether it would be advisable for the Council to bring up these matters for a full-fledged discussion in which the positions of the governments might be stiffened, rather than made more flexible, as a result of pressure from their partners. I would venture to suggest, therefore, that an exploration of these difficulties might be better made in the first place by the Secretary General himself in bilateral talks with each of the Permanent Representatives concerned.

e) Finally, SACDUR wishes the Council to examine the state of readiness of those NATO logistic agencies having a wartime function, such as the various transportation, POL, and supply agencies, with a view to insuring their capability to respond to a wartime condition.

This point is well taken, and I for one must say that I am convinced that this suggestion is a good one. The task here should first be ascertained by those of my colleagues who have agencies



in their fields of responsibility, i.e. Hr. Garrett for POL and supply agencies, Lord Coleridge for PBOS, PBEIST, etc. certainly be useful to undertake an exercise to try and judge what these agencies would be capable of in the event of an emergency. Here again, I do not think it would be wise to open a debate in the some homework would need to be done first, and Council right away; that would be the task of my colleagues, with the concurrence of the Board of Directors or Committees dealing with these agencies. only underline for your information that during the whole series of Annual Review examinations this year we have heard complaints about deficiencies, especially in aircraft readiness, due to delays on the part of NHSSA in the delivery of spare parts to the countries We shall insert a special paragraph on this very asking for them. serious situation in the Secretary General's overall appraisal of this year's Annual Review.

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To sum up, I think that General Norstad's letter cannot be left unanswered. I do not suggest that its content should be discussed by the Council until preparatory work has been undertaken to prepare such a discussion. In the meantime I would suggest that you send an acknowledgment to General Norstad to let him know your reactions to his letter and the way in which the matters raised by him might be treated.

F.D. Gregh