Vienna, Austria 2 Nov. 2000

"NATO and the Challenges of Security in the Euro-Atlantic area" Speech by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General Ladies and Gentlemen, It is a great pleasure to be here in Austria. This is my first trip here as Secretary General, and I am very pleased that we have the opportunity to meet and to discuss the security challenges we face as we enter the 21st Century. I think that Austria is, in a sense, the perfect place to have this discussion -- because this country has always been, in many ways at the centre of Europe. During the Cold War, this was something of an uncomfortable position, because the middle of Europe for those four decades was a lonely place. Austria was caught between two large, well-armed and mistrustful Alliances -- or to use an American expression, between a rock and a hard place. In a very real sense, the Cold War set clear parameters on this country's foreign policy for four decades. For NATO, too, the Cold War imposed massive constraints on our policy. Our security agenda was defined for us, and it was, in some ways, a negative agenda. It was about preventing the "worst case" -- a massive war in Europe. And as a result, NATO's members were forced to focus inward, on their own security. But when the Cold War ended, all the rules changed. The security environment was no longer frozen. In general, of course, things were much better. But the end of the Cold War was certainly not the end of history. And the collapse of the Soviet Union allowed NATO to explore new and imaginative ways to preserve and build security in Europe. NATO has taken full advantage of this opportunity. Almost from the day the Soviet Union dissolved, the Alliance has developed a broad and comprehensive agenda to promote security in the post-Cold War world. We have defined new relationships with the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. We have opened up our organization to new members. We have built a new relationship of trust and cooperation with Russia. We have taken on major crisis management operations in the Balkans. And, finally, we have begun to build a new relationship between North America and Europe that reflects 21st century realities. Let me discuss each of these in a little more detail. First and foremost: the Alliance has developed fundamentally new, cooperative security relationships with almost all the newly independent countries of Central and Eastern Europe. Why? Because historically, after empires collapse, bad things happen. Nations and peoples feel alone, and nervous. In an unpredictable environment, they may make fragile and dangerous security pacts with their immediate neighbours. The result is often a volatile security system, with no solid foundation or structure, and a real possibility of violent conflict. Conflict which leads to tides of refugees and asylum seekers, which spreads the tension to neighbouring countries. Conflict which spawns ethnic hatred, instability, corruption, drug- and gun- running, human trafficking, money laundering - the dark shadows of our time. Conflict which can also, in the worst case, spread to our own doorsteps. To preclude this from happening, NATO created the Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. And today, NATO is the dynamo at the hub of a new set of profound security relationships across the continent. Forty six countries -- NATO members, former Warsaw Pact countries, ex-Soviet Republics, and neutrals, including of course Austria and Switzerland -- now train and exercise together, discuss security issues together and even carry out peacekeeping operations together. The value of this inclusive framework is very clear. Every country in Europe has a structure through which it can enhance its security interests. No small, rigid regional alliances are necessary. No unilateral solutions are required. Through PfP and EAPC, security across Europe has been structured towards inclusion, cooperation and flexibility. All European countries can be included, in a way that serves their individual requirements. That alone is a massive change from the past, and another major contribution to the stability of the continent. This inclusive, flexible framework has evolved dramatically. In the early days, Partnership was essentially a one-way street, whereby NATO would help newly independent countries with their post-communist transition. But that soon changed. More and more countries came in, and not just former adversaries. And many of these would bring tremendously valuable peacekeeping experience to the table. So Partnership evolved into a two-way street. Partner countries would gain from NATO experience in defence planning, defence budgeting, or establishing sound civil-military relations. NATO would benefit by spreading the burden of managing European security on more shoulders. And the Partner countries themselves are choosing how they can best contribute to achieving our common goals. Indeed, we are a long way from the early days, when NATO would offer a menu of activities from which Partner countries could choose. Today, Partner countries know that it is they who decide how far and how deep co-operation can and should go. It is they who share the responsibility for the future of these endeavours. That is why they have remained interested -- and active. Austria is a perfect example. Despite being a neutral country, you have been one of the most active PfP Partners. Austria even organises a wide range of peacekeeping, training and other activities for the benefit of other Partners, on very favourable terms for their participation. In addition, in May 1999, the Austrian International Peace Support Command has been formally recognised by the NATO Council as "PfP Training Centre". These are important contributions, and I congratulate you for them. Through your active and imaginative participation in PfP, Austria is contributing substantively to improving the collective capabilities of the Euro-Atlantic community to work together on peace-support operations. Some have argued that the undeniable success of our Partnership policies would essentially make another part of NATO's strategy redundant: NATO enlargement. If Partnership is so beneficial, if it draws Alliance members and Partner countries ever closer together, why go further? Why risk diluting NATO, or alienating Russia by keeping the door open for further accessions? Let me say very clearly: Yes, Partnership goes a long way towards enhancing security in Europe. But the second element of NATO's agenda post-Cold War Agenda has been to ensure that the end of Europe's political division is also reflected in our institutional landscape. If our institutions remained locked into their pre-1990 memberships, this continent's transition would remain incomplete. In essence, we would have left Europe divided where Stalin drew the line in 1945. That is why last year's accession of the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland was so crucial. It was the ultimate proof that in this new Europe, geography is no longer destiny. It was a resounding demonstration that in this new Europe, nations can determine their own fate, by their own free choice, and not have it determined by someone else. Nine countries are currently asking for NATO membership -- nine countries eager to emulate the successful path chosen by our three most recent members. We cannot promise them a timetable for accession, nor guarantee them membership. But we cannot, and will not, let a new divide freeze in Europe between those who have security and those who do not. That is why keeping NATO's door open remains a strategic imperative. Why some Partner countries will become members. And why we are helping them to better prepare themselves for eventual membership. But even as we are building bridges into NATO for some Partner countries, we must also build a stronger bridge of cooperation between NATO and one very important Partner: Russia. That is the third major element of NATO's agenda to build lasting peace and stability in Europe. If the past century has made one lesson very clear, it is that no other single nation's development can affect European security more profoundly than Russia's. And NATO was determined, almost from the day the Soviet Union collapsed, to engage with Russia. To help her through her post-Communist transition. And, at the same time, to deepen our cooperation in the management of common security challenges. We all know that this road has been a little bumpy. The NATO-Russia relationship is clearly the most challenging. Today, after the Kosovo "ice age", our cooperation is picking up momentum again. But getting back to the status quo before Kosovo is not enough. We should aim higher. We should aim for a relationship where disagreement in one area does not lead to a breakdown of our entire cooperation. This would be a strategic advantage for all of Europe -- and, in my view, such a relationship can be achieved. When it is, we will have truly built a framework for solid, enduring security from one end of Europe to the other. The Kosovo crisis illustrated how important this is. Russia was key to reaching the political solution we were all seeking then -- and Russian cooperation will again be important when we face future crises. Is this important? Absolutely. Because the fourth element of NATO's new agenda is to manage crises, when diplomacy alone is not sufficient to keep the peace. The conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo posed an immediate challenge to our values, and our interests. If we were to build a new, 21st century Europe in which human rights are respected, we had no alternative but to stand up to tyranny, to ethnic war, to mass killings, to mass rapes, to concentration camps and violent irredentism. And if we were to prevent the dangerous effects of these conflicts from spreading to our doorsteps, in the form of guns, or refugees, or political instability, we had no choice but to take action. In both cases, we did act -- and the result was worth it. Bosnia is getting closer and closer to standing on its own feet as a self-sustaining country. Kosovo is more secure than it has been for a decade, and has just had free elections to begin its path to democracy. From my perspective, NATO's strong and determined stand against Slobodan Milosevic was one of the main reasons that the Yugoslav people deposed him, and elected a leader who seems to want to live at peace with his own citizens, and his region. And in both Bosnia and Kosovo, Partner countries have played a vital role. They have provided their political support to the Alliance, and contributed troops to the NATO-led missions that are helping to keep the peace. Of course, different Partners are contributing in different ways, to reflect their individual capabilities and policies. But the key is that we are all on the same team, working together towards the same goal -- and as a result, achieving results we could never have hoped to achieve working separately. Kosovo also revealed a fifth challenge for NATO, as we enter the 21st Century, also important to Euro-Atlantic security. Simply put, we need to rebalance the relationship between Europe and North America. Kosovo made it very clear to everyone that Europe might be an economic giant, and it might have real political influence -- but when it comes to doing the heavy lifting on issues of peace and security, Europe still isn't pulling its weight. When push comes to shove, the United States still has to carry a disproportionate share of the burden. This was blatantly demonstrated once again during the Kosovo air campaign. Over time, both sides will come to resent that imbalance if it is not addressed -- and transatlantic resentment will not help us meet our other challenges effectively in future. That is why the European Union and NATO are now working together to enhance European capabilities. As Europe becomes more capable, the burden on North America will ease, for two reasons: first, because Europe will be able to contribute more to NATO operations; and second, because Europe will be able to take the lead in crisis management operations when NATO does not wish to. Will this help enhance Euro-Atlantic security? Definitely. The relationship between North America and Europe will remain balanced, and therefore more healthy, over the long term, on the most fundamental issue of all: peace and security. We can have all the transatlantic arguments we want over bananas -- but we have to get the security relationship right. The development of European capabilities is the right way - indeed, the only way -- to make sure we do. Ladies and Gentlemen, One look at the map of Europe shows how much the security environment has changed -- for Austria, as much as for NATO. Instead of being isolated between two major Alliances, Austria now has a huge variety of neighbours: NATO members, Partner countries aspiring to join the Alliance, and a happily neutral neighbour in Switzerland. And all of these countries have one thing in common with Austria, and the rest of the Euro-Atlantic community: they are each making a contribution to the security of this continent, according to their own needs and at their own speeds. From my perspective, that is the strength of the new Euro-Atlantic security architecture -- and this gives me great hope for the security of our citizens today, and the safety of future generations. Thank You.