Devant la Commission de la dfense et des affaires trangres du Parlement europen Bruxelles, 16 juin 1997

Vers le Sommet de Madrid Allocution du Secrtaire gnral de l'OTAN Mesdames et Messieurs les Dputs, La cration d'une nouvelle architecture de scurit et de dfense europenne est une oeuvre de longue haleine, qui exige de la patience et de la cohrence. Parfois cependant, les circonstances nous permettent de faire des progrs spectaculaires. Je suis persuad, qu'avec le recul du temps, les observateurs considreront l'anne 1997 comme l'un de ces moments. Pour eux, 1997 sera l'anne qui aura marqu le 50me anniversaire du Plan Marshall, qui a engag l'Europe sur une voie nouvelle qui allait lui faire connatre une volution dynamique. Ils considreront 1997 comme l'anne o les contours d'un nouvel ordre de scurit se sont dessins, et o certains de ses lments essentiels ont t mis en place. Ils considreront 1997 comme l'anne o l'Alliance atlantique a fait un pas dcisif en signant un Acte fondateur sur la coopration avec la Russie. Et, je n'en doute pas, 1997 restera l'anne du Sommet de Madrid, o l'OTAN aura apport une nouvelle contribution dcisive la scurit europenne dans son ensemble. Nous prparons la tenue de ce Sommet avec optimisme. L'Alliance s'est adapte au nouvel environnement de scurit. Elle a aussi profondment modifi la dynamique et l'orientation de la scurit europenne. J'en veux pour preuve le succs de ses efforts pour mettre fin la guerre en Bosnie. Bien videmment, des tensions et des difficults entre les parties persistent. Celles-ci doivent toutes poursuivre leurs efforts pour atteindre leurs objectifs dans le cadre de l'Accord de Dayton. Nous maintiendrons notre pression pour qu'elles agissent dans ce sens. Mais l'enseignement principal tir du conflit de Bosnie est peut-tre que l'implication active des Allis nord-amricains dans les affaires de scurit europenne a permis de transformer un chec en succs. Il est vrai que l'opration mene en Bosnie apporte une confirmation clatante de la valeur du lien transatlantique, et de la valeur de l'OTAN. Lorsque l'Europe et l'Amrique du Nord taient en dsaccord, les progrs taient impossibles. Lorsque nous avons russi nous mettre d'accord, nous avons pu aller de l'avant. Cela montre que l'OTAN est un formidable instrument de gestion des crises et qu'elle peut exercer une influence importante sur la scurit et la stabilit europennes. La Bosnie n'est pas le seul signe que l'volution de l'OTAN est bien engage. Un autre signe a t l'accord avec la Russie sur un Acte fondateur OTAN-Russie. Cet acte est significatif en ce sens qu'il va au-del des dclarations d'intention formelles et tablit des procdures et des mcanismes concrets de consultation, de coopration et de coordination. Ces mcanismes sont vritablement innovants. Nous avons cr un nouveau forum: le Conseil conjoint permanent OTAN-Russie, qui se runira chaque mois, ou d'autres occasions la demande. L'Acte fondateur expose galement de manire dtaille les domaines pouvant faire l'objet de consultations, et peut-tre d'une coopration, entre l'OTAN et la Russie, notamment la prvention et le rglement des conflits, le maintien de la paix, la prvention de la prolifration des armes de destruction massive et les changes d'informations sur la scurit et les politiques et les forces de dfense. La conversion des industries de dfense, les questions d'environnement lies la dfense et la prparation civile aux situations d'urgence y figurent aussi. Bien entendu, comme pour n'importe quel document, il faut maintenant donner vie l'Acte fondateur OTAN-Russie. Pour cela, nous devons maintenant prvoir les modalits et les procdures du mcanisme de coopration, et tirer pleinement parti des possibilits que nous offre l'Acte. Il s'agira d'un processus d'apprentissage mutuel, qui sera certainement fructueux.

La Bosnie et les nouvelles relations OTAN-Russie sont deux exemples qui montrent que le processus de transformation en cours l'OTAN va dans la bonne direction. Mais il nous reste le mener bien. C'est la raison pour laquelle le Sommet de Madrid revt une telle importance. Les dcisions et les orientations qui permettront de conduire ce processus de transformation son terme logique y seront adoptes. Un bref examen de l'ordre du jour suffira confirmer l'ampleur de nos attentes: Premirement, nous inviterons un ou plusieurs pays engager des ngociations d'adhsion avec l'Alliance. Notre objectif est d'accueillir les nouveaux membres en 1999, anne du cinquantenaire de l'OTAN. Deuximement, nous dvelopperons un Partenariat pour la paix renforc, dans un nouveau cadre de coopration, le Conseil de partenariat euro-atlantique. Troisimement, nous essayerons de parvenir un accord avec l'Ukraine sur l'tablissement de relations spcifiques et efficaces. Quatrimement, nous renforcerons notre dialogue avec les pays de la Mditerrane. Cinquimement, nous continuerons progresser dans la construction d'une identit europenne de scurit et de dfense au sein de l'Alliance. Siximement, nous prvoyons un accord sur les principales caractristiques d'une nouvelle structure militaire. Collectivement, ces dcisions seront le reflet de la transformation fondamentale de l'OTAN et de son objectif. Ainsi, le Sommet de Madrid aura une importance capitale : il ouvrira la voie qui permettra l'OTAN de mettre en place une nouvelle architecture europenne de scurit et de dfense. Je voudrais tout d'abord voquer l'ouverture de l'OTAN de nouveaux membres. Notre objectif est d'accueillir les nouveaux membres pour le cinquantime anniversaire de l'OTAN, en 1999, aprs avoir men bien les ngociations d'adhsion et leur ratification ultrieure par les Parlements de nos seize pays. La perspective d'un largissement de l'OTAN a dj des effets positifs. Stimuls par l'ide de rejoindre la communaut occidentale, nombreux sont les pays qui ont engag, chez eux, des rformes dmocratiques et qui ont rgl, avec l'tranger, des conflits bilatraux dj anciens avec d'autres pays. C'est ainsi que la Hongrie, la Roumanie, la Slovaquie, la Pologne, les Etats baltes et d'autres encore ont conclu, ou sont sur le point de conclure, des accords qui mettront un terme des divergences longtemps restes sans solution. Si ces progrs ont pu tre raliss, c'est parce que l'Alliance a lanc, au bon moment, le signal annonant qu'elle tait prte l'ouverture. Ouvrir l'OTAN de nouveaux membres est pour nous la fois une obligation morale et inluctable envers les nouveaux candidats. Ils veulent appartenir cette communaut exceptionnelle qui est la ntre parce qu'ils partagent nos valeurs, parce que leur donner ce sens de l'appartenance est positif pour eux comme pour le reste de l'Europe et, enfin, parce qu'aucune loi naturelle n'imposerait la communaut atlantique des dmocraties de rester jamais limite aux seize Allis qui la composent aujourd'hui. Les nouveaux membres de l'Alliance apporteront un supplment de stabilit au continent europen. Refuser l'largissement quivaudrait choisir l'immobilisme, or il y a bien longtemps dj que l'OTAN a rejet une telle option. Members of Parliament, But in order to ensure security and stability for all of Europe we will also have to take into account the needs of those who do not join or who may join later. This will require not only keeping the door open to future members, but it will also require a strengthening of the Partnership for Peace, the key initiative which demonstrates NATO's commitment to Europe's wider security. At Madrid in July, we will launch an enhanced form of PfP. This will dramatically expand the scope for participation. Military exercises will cover the whole spectrum of possible crisis interventions. Partners will be involved in planning and preparing for contingency operations, building on the success of our common experience in Bosnia. There will also be possibilities for closer political dialogue and consultations. The next stage of PfP will be developed within the framework of a Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), launched at our Foreign Ministers meeting in Portugal last May. The EAPC replaces the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. It provides a single political framework for all our co-operation activities and a forum where Allies and Partners can meet and determine our future co-operation together. Our goal is to bring together the best elements of the NACC political consultation process and of the military cooperation under Partnership for Peace. The EAPC will thus have a key role to play in future in the planning, elaboration and execution of PfP operations. In creating the EAPC in close coordination with Partners, the Alliance is once more responding innovatively to new political realities, new operational requirements, and increasing Partner needs. The emergence of new democratic states is a feature of the new security order. Their ability to survive and flourish as independent states is a key test for all of the institutions and individual nations alike. In this sense, Ukraine occupies a crucial place in Europe. An independent, stable and democratic Ukraine is of strategic importance for the development of Europe as a whole. The links between Ukraine and NATO are already very deep and extensive. Under Partnership for peace, Ukrainian officers are present at our military headquarters in Mons, Belgium and Ukrainian troops regularly meet and exercise with NATO. In Bosnia, they stand shoulder to shoulder in the same multinational operation, bringing peace where only two years ago there was war. At the beginning of May NATO opened up a new Information and Documentation Office in Kyiv. This was the first of its kind in any Partner country. It therefore represents the beginning of a new phase. Simultaneously, we have concluded a Charter setting out a distinct and effective relationship between NATO and Ukraine, to strengthen Ukraine's participation in securing the stability of Europe. This Charter will be signed at the level of Heads of State and Government at the Madrid Summit. Security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean. That is why the Alliance has been making an active effort to forge closer ties through our Mediterranean initiative. Its purpose is to dispel some of the damaging misperceptions and apprehensions that exist on both sides of the Mediterranean shore. We are quite aware that our Mediterranean dialogue can only complement other international efforts, such as by the EU, OSCE and WEU. Yet our dialogue with non-NATO countries in the Mediterranean underlines that we believe it is possible to create good, strong and friendly relations across the Mediterranean - just as we have done across Europe. At our Foreign Ministers' Meeting last May, Ministers forwarded to the Madrid Summit a recommendation to create a new committee on the Mediterranean which would have the overall responsibility for the dialogue. It would allow the political discussions with Mediterranean partners to take place in the format of 16+1. That is, each Mediterranean partner will meet regularly with the Allies in a formal framework. This will give the dialogue greater weight and visibility within the Alliance. The Alliance, after Madrid, will therefore have a Mediterranean dimension and outlook firmly fixed within it. Let me now move to a point on NATO's agenda, which interests you particularly - a European Security and Defence Identity. To me, such an Identity is an inevitable development. It is part and parcel of a true Union. Without a military instrument, there can be no true Common Foreign and Security Policy. Without a Common Foreign and Security Policy, there cannot be a true Union. And only a stronger, more united Europe can be a strategic partner of the United States in managing global security challenges. Yet for too long, the debate on a European Security and Defence Identity has been bedevilled by a false debate on a European defence versus an Atlanticist one. This period of competing philosophies is over. We are putting the question of how to develop an ESDI to where it belongs: out of the abstract and into the real world. We have been developing the means by which European Allies could draw on NATO's support for future operations led by the Western European Union. This preparation involves, among other things, the identification of Alliance assets and capabilities that might be made available to the WEU on a decision by the North Atlantic Council; the establishment of European command arrangements for planning and conducting WEU-led operations; and appropriate military planning and exercises. We expect these measures to be endorsed at the Madrid Summit. If we can achieve such a separable, but not separate, European operational capability in the future, it should be possible, if so decided by the North Atlantic Council, for a European component of the larger structure to act in a crisis. As a result of these changes, the new NATO will be more in line with the political, economic and military realities of the late 1990s and beyond. I now come to perhaps the most complex aspect of NATO's adaptation - the new command structure. I have said many times that NATO cannot fulfil its new missions with old common structures. The Bosnia operation has taught us that we need our military command structure to be more flexible, more mobile, and to offer more opportunities for involving our Partner countries in joint operations. The reform of the command structure is therefore the precondition for the achievement of our wider goals. Our aim at the Summit is to conclude the main details of a reformed, more flexible command structure, tailored to the new strategic environment. On some parts of the work our military have progressed well, for example, on the Combined Joint Task Forces concept. This will enable us to deploy more rapidly into a crisis area, and to involve our Partners from the outset in the planning of a joint operation. The results of the first real trial of a CJTF will be available later this year. And we will implement the concept in accordance with the practical lessons learned. However, in other areas our work has some way to go before completion. We want increased flexibility and we also want a structure considerably smaller than the old one: only about one third of the existing headquarters will remain. But this is not merely a work of reduction; it is one of major restructuring. There is a developing consensus on the outlines of a new structure, particularly at the top strategic level. But the details are also crucial. Where the lower level headquarters should be, and how to delineate responsibility remain to be determined. These issues can be settled in time for the Summit - but it may take longer than we first thought to get all the details right. And implementation will depend on getting the details right. Ladies and Gentlemen, the changes described above will have far-reaching consequences for the Alliance. The Madrid Summit certainly will lead to profound changes in the way the Alliance works. We can expect a major intensification of our consultation and contacts with Partners - politically as well as militarily. The whole system will become much more open and transparent. The Alliance has been able to engineer such a change within itself because our strategic vision and goal of a united democratic Europe remains intact. The unity of the Allies has thus been the main reason why NATO has changed so far, so fast, and without the major internal crisis of identity or strategic purpose, which some had predicted after the demise of the Soviet Union. NATO's coherence is the result of the common perception of the Allies that together they can, through NATO, play a key role in shaping a stable and safer Europe for the twenty-first century.