Brussels 19-21 September 1990

Address given to a Conference sponsored by the United States Mission to NATO on the Future of the Atlantic Alliance Speech by Secretary General, Manfred Wörner My subject today is the future of the Atlantic Alliance. It is not an exercise in prediction, something which is always hazardous and even more so in the fast moving, unpredictable world in which we live these days. We have just lived through two years of decisive historical change, old problems have lost much of their salience. New problems have appeared on the scene and become more acute. The security environment which gave birth to NATO and with which it has lived for forty years has suddenly gone. Of course, the Alliance has not been on the sidelines. It has shaped change and it has adapted to change. In the process it has been prepared to be imaginative and even radical as we saw last July at our London Summit. Yet the question remains, what overall concept are all of these structural transformations designed to serve? How has historic change affected our Alliance? What consequences have we drawn? And how far advanced is our task of re-conceptualising NATO's security mission in a world that, with the passing of the Cold War, has become more peaceful, yet as the Gulf crisis illustrates, remains unacceptably dangerous? From the moment Communism began to crumble, this Alliance made a fundamental judgement: that the opportunities this gave us to shape a better, more secure and more just world far outweighed the risks that the demise of the bi-polar system would bring. For the most significant development is the peaceful revolution in the Soviet Union as well as in Central and Eastern Europe and the far reaching detente, indeed the really genuine and durable detente, between the two super powers and the two blocs, and I dare not speak about blocs any more, as blocs have disappeared. This promises to lead to a lasting reconciliation and to permit the construction of a new European peace order, based on a partnership in security in place of Cold War confrontation and this indeed, I consider, still to be the most important part of our Alliance, to build such a new and lasting peaceful order of co-operation and security in Europe. Yet barely has this new order begun to take shape when the Gulf crisis has erupted to subject it to its first serious test. The North-South conflict which we had all tended somewhat to forget has returned suddenly to centre-stage, and against the background of global problems such as the distribution of resources, population growth and energy supplies which have been exacerbated by religious fundamentalism, proliferation of ballistic missile technology, nuclear and chemical weapons and by terrorism and drugs. Europe too, has by no means become a haven of tranquillity. The fate of glasnost and perestroika is still uncertain and it is an open question where the development of the Soviet Union will ultimately lead. Clearly, it is our hope, it is our strong wish and it is the intention of our co-operation with the Soviet Union to help and assist the forces of reform. We are interested, let me repeat this here once again, in the success of Gorbachev and those who together with him are trying to shape a new Soviet Union. We cannot yet tell if the courageous revolutions of the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe, driven by the quest for freedom, will actually produce successful democracies and economic reforms. In many places ethnic problems, border disputes and power struggles have raised their head. Nationalism, a force that most of us believed to be extinct or at least approaching extinction, is trumpeting its resurrection in many parts of Europe. Thus, while it would be irresponsible and inaccurate to claim that the risks associated with change threaten our Western security as much as the strategic presence of the Soviet Union in Central Europe during the Cold War years, it would be equally foolhardy for us to treat such risks as the innocuous side effects of this historical upheaval. This Alliance can stamp its imprint on events; it has done so, it will continue to do so. Our vision of a Europe whole and free, and of a more secure and co-operative international order, is a realistic possibility. We are no dreamers, we are realistic politicians, and it indeed is possible to build this new Europe. Yet the ambivalence of an era of enormous change with its opportunities and risks means that we can have an influence only if we are united, determined, and strong enough in political and also in defence terms. My central message is a very simple one: we will only succeed in shaping history, driving the historic process of transformation, if we maintain the cohesion of our Alliance, which is the most important instrument of historic change that exists on earth at this very moment. As I told the Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives yesterday, I have just come back from Poland and Czechoslovakia, and I went to the Soviet Union in July. Clearly many hopes are directed towards our Alliance. We did not discuss in Poland or Czechoslovakia the question of membership, but clearly the feeling is that this Alliance is the decisive factor of stability which can to a large extent influence the future development of Europe. Our Alliance has always been a community of destiny for nations that are drawn together by common values, convictions, and basic interests, a political Alliance thus, but equipped with military means. Today when the time of direct threat to our security has dwindled, its political role is becoming ever more significant. That political role lies in the shaping of East-West relations, in the construction of a new European security architecture, in steering the arms control process, maintaining a healthy transatlantic relationship which does not go by itself, and in meeting new challenges to our security. In all these areas the Alliance can and must strive to ensure the development, discussion and formulation of a coordinated Western approach. Where else could this task be carried out if not in this Alliance? The European Community will certainly play an increasingly important role in these areas but it cannot replace the Alliance, for only the Atlantic Alliance incorporates the United States and Canada as well as important states on the European periphery that are not members of the European Community. And it is obvious today, looking at the development of the whole of Europe, how important the flanks and not only the southern flank, but also the northern flank, have become. Without the North American democracies, European security for the foreseeable future can neither be built nor maintained. Again, let me give you one impression from my travels through some of the Central and Eastern European countries, including the Soviet Union : there is a clear desire to see the United States and Canada remain in Europe, of course with reduced forces, but remain nonetheless. So the first reason why NATO will be indispensable in the future as at the moment or in the past is that it is the main vehicle of Western consent and Western political input. Let me make one thing very clear from the outset, there is absolutely no question of NATO claiming responsibility for every problem on this earth, for this would clearly overburden its capacities and to nobody's benefit. Manifestly NATO is and will remain a security Alliance - an Alliance that guarantees the security of its members. Yet the notion of security has to be looked at in a much more comprehensive way. It has today become less than ever a purely military concept. In addition to its military component, there is an important political and an important economic dimension. It incorporates disarmament questions, weapons proliferation, terrorism. Also security can clearly be affected by events outside our Treaty area as demonstrated by the present Gulf crisis. Who could deny that the maintenance of an uninterrupted supply of oil is a vital issue for the security of all the members of the Alliance? This Alliance has a long tradition in dealing with so-called 'out of area' problems, yet the Gulf crisis presents many different and new features. For it is a challenge to the West on several levels: the moral issue of seeing a small state taken over by a larger neighbour; the political issue of seeing an aspiring regional power acquire weapons of mass destruction; the economic issue of a major disruption in the supply of oil at a crucial moment in the economic reconstruction of Central and Eastern Europe and with many Third World states in a precarious situation. Again I would refer to my experiences in Poland and Czechoslovakia. If you held a discussion with their leaders, you would see how much this crisis is already affecting their policies and their attempts to reconstruct their economies. There is also the issue of long-term stability in the already explosive area that is the Middle East, and last but not least the human challenge of thousands of refugees and hostages whose lives have been put at risk. So this is clearly a political struggle that has a direct bearing on our Western security, and not only on our Western security of course, which neither we, nor the international community at large can afford to lose. For if the prize of applying the United Nations mandated sanctions and implementing the five Security Council resolutions will undoubtedly be high, we have to realise that the prize of allowing the Iraqis to escape with impunity will undoubtedly be higher still and will have to be paid sooner or later. Notwithstanding the enormous effort being made by the United States in leading the international community against the Iraqi aggression, the first lesson of the Gulf crisis is clearly that the sanctions will work only if all the members of that community stay together and share the responsibilities and burdens in both the economic and military domains equitably. Let me grate-fully recognize the constructive role played from the outset by our former adversary and now partner, the Soviet Union. The role of NATO in the context of the Gulf crisis has been questioned and even severely criticized by some, especially in the United States. I fully understood the concerns and the emotions which lead to such a reaction, but first let me state some facts. NATO has never before in the history of regional conflict shown such a high degree of solidarity. We were the first international organization to strongly condemn the Iraqi aggression. We have consulted virtually on a daily basis on the events as they have unfolded. Two special meetings of Foreign Ministers have contributed effectively to maintaining and reinforcing our solidarity. All Allied member countries have contributed in one way or another to the implementation of the United Nations sanctions and to the support of those Allies who are directly committed to the defence of Saudi Arabia. Two member countries, the United Kingdom and France, have meanwhile deployed, or are going to deploy ground forces, in addition to those of the United States in Saudi Arabia. The Alliance has strongly reaffirmed its com-mitment to the security of Turkey, giving Turkey clear backing for its active, courageous and important role in the execution of the sanctions. In short, given the constraints imposed on the Alliance, it has done as an organization what it could to be helpful in implementing the United Nations sanctions and in supporting the United States and other Allies in the deterrence of further aggression. Let me also very clearly state my personal opinion that some Allies could and should do more. Among other steps it would be helpful if, in addition to Great Britain and France, other Allies could also send ground troops to the Gulf as suggested by the United States of America. Looking to the future, it seems obvious that we have to draw lessons from the current crisis. The main question is, should the Alliance as such play an increased role in dealing with regional conflicts which directly affect the security of its member nations? I believe that we all have to think carefully about that. Of course, nobody thinks of NATO dealing with all regional crises and all global challenges, but being the decisive security Alliance of the Western World, can we afford to be limited to consultations in cases where the security of our member nations is at stake? This is a legitimate and an essential question and we have to deal with it. My only advice is not to burden our solidarity and cohesion, which is very firm, by such a debate at this very moment. Our primary goal now must be to maintain solidarity and to do what is necessary in practical terms to reach a successful solution to the crisis. We should discuss the consequences of this crisis on our Alliance and for our Alliance's future after the crisis is over. I myself intend then to participate actively in such a debate, because as you can imagine, 1 have very clear ideas and convictions about that. A further and indeed indispensable role of the Alliance is in maintaining and reinforcing the transatlantic security community plus ensuring the continuing commitment by the United States and Canada to Europe. If NATO were to disappear tomorrow, the community of destiny that the Alliance has established between the North American and European democracies would be damaged, severely damaged. Both continents whose populations will represent less than 10% of the world total by the end of the century would be isolated and at a time when their active solidarity will be as necessary to face the challenges of tomorrow as those of yesterday. Without a close working relationship to North America, how can the European democracies balance the continuing enormous military might of the Soviet Union, even in the cooperative context towards which we are striving? How could they respond to the immense challenge of social and economic reconstruction in Central and Eastern Europe? Finally, how could they meet the challenges of the North-South agenda I referred to earlier and to which Europe, with its numerous Mediterranean neighbours and trading economies must of course be especially sensitive. Finally, the Alliance is altogether indispensable in guaranteeing stability in Europe and even beyond. This is no less true in times of a reduced direct and immediate threat to our security. I would even say more so, for the threat posed by the massive Soviet military presence in Central Europe was in its way predictable and relatively easy to quantify. Now we see new risks to our security that are less easy to predict and to quantify, and which consequently cannot be managed in the same way that we dealt with the European balance of military power in the past. The new risks, therefore, are no longer confined to military attack on our territory but are as likely to originate from a breakdown in regional stability which could either spill over into our Alliance's own area or alternatively be exploited against our interests and solidarity. So clearly we need a continued coherent defence. This Alliance will not only be a political Alliance but also a military Alliance in the future with reduced manpower, with reduced arms and equipment in a much more stable environment, clearly able to deter anybody from envisaging the use of military means, able to prevent war in the future, and to deal with risks affecting the security of our member nations. This role of ensuring stability, which is clearly recognised as I said to you even by our neighbours in the East, is one that cannot be transferred from the Atlantic Alliance to another body. Neither the European Community nor the CSCE whether individually or together, can maintain stability across Europe. The European Community despite its ultimate objective of political union and the dynamism of European integration, and I fully subscribe to it not only as a European but also as the Secretary General of this Alliance, does not have a close link with North America nor at present sufficient capacities in the security field. We perceive the wider responsibilities that result from its increasingly powerful economic position, yet more time will be needed for the Community to evolve and endow itself with the requisite tools. The CSCE, despite its contribution to enhancing security with the implementation of confidence building measures and through crisis management functions, does not have the integrated defence structure and as yet the common social and value systems that alone can guarantee cohesion and effectiveness to deter or defend against aggression. So clearly the Atlantic Alliance has a future role, as a bedrock of stability and as the essential supporting pillar, security pillar, of a new European order. Let me briefly comment on the tasks ahead. The first task is to build a new Europe based on four pillars: the North Atlantic Alliance; the European Communities; the Council of Europe; and an institutionalized CSCE process embracing all the European nations, including the Soviet Union. In my talk with the Soviet leadership, I could transmit the unanimous attitude of all our member nations of our Alliance as such, that clearly we want to build this new Europe together with the Soviet Union, on a basis of equal rights and equal participation. It would be foolish, and nobody is foolish, at least inside our Alliance, to try to exclude or isolate the Soviet Union. What could that produce if not instability and additional risk? So clearly this new Europe will include the Soviet Union and I think our view is shared by many member countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation that the CSCE structure, as important as it is, cannot replace or substitute for NATO. The next task ahead is to build a close relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The third task will be to proceed with arms control in the way we described in the London Declaration. The fourth task is to fully implement the changes which the London Summit asked us to carry out, and that means especially to change our military strategy. Indeed we have begun to do so along the lines stated in the London Declaration. I have not enough time to go into details but there are a lot of my colleagues present this morning who could do it at least as well as I could. Then of course, we have to manage the membership of a united Germany in NATO along the lines which we agreed upon with Germany and with the Soviet Union. And last but not least, we have to meet those global challenges which clearly affect our own security. I am confident that we can meet these challenges. The Alliance is in good shape; solidarity and cohesion have made it possible for our policies to be successful and this success has certainly put the wind in our sails, and this in turn has further strengthened the unity and resolve of the Alliance. It has successfully passed the test of overcoming the obstacles to the full NATO membership of a united Germany. That too is cause for optimism. At the same time I will not hide that I see some concerns or difficulties on our path that we have to avoid or to overcome. I am fully confident that we can do so, so I am just giving you a hint of what I see as problem areas which we have to deal with in the future. One concerns the potential developments in Europe. I have mentioned the role of the European Community. The EC is clearly playing the key role in the process of European political and economic unity, and I do not doubt that it will also give itself an identity in the security field in the course of time. This is legitimate and it is not only legitimate; I think it is in the interest of our Alliance, as has been stated by the London Summit Declaration. So we should not see the relation between our Alliance and the European Community as one of competitors or even of rivals. But clearly since the European Community will deal more and more with political questions and with security questions and we are dealing partly with the same questions, there is an overlap. This overlap can and must be dealt with through timely coordination and information which can be done without additional mechanisms or organisational structures by our member nations, by contacts between the staff. If I look at some proposals made last week about military instruments for the European Community, these are long-term goals, and the discussions and events of the last days have proved that they will not come into place as early as some may hope. My answer would be the same : clearly there has to be coordination from the very first moment on. Clearly this can and should take place only in the context of our Alliance as is acknowledged by all our member nations. But that does not mean that the Alliance somehow supervises. It does mean that now and for the foreseeable future the decisive instrument of Western security will remain this Alliance. Clearly, NATO can and should not be reduced to a purely military role. I point to a second concern : a development in the United States that would point to the vanishing Soviet threat and the special burden that the United States has to bear on account of its global responsibilities as a reason for a complete or nearly a complete American withdrawal from Europe. These tendencies would be further strengthened by a European policy of going it alone, or by a perception that, in important policy areas, the United States is presented by its European Allies with faits accomplis. The process of reciprocal decoupling must be a voided at all costs, since there is unanimous attitude of all our member countries that for the foreseeable future, the Northern Americans have an indispensable role to play in ensuring stability. Another certain danger resides in the growing sense of popular euphoria regarding security questions which admittedly has been dampened down somewhat in the wake of the Gulf crisis. Naturally, the desire for a peace dividend is not only understandable but also justified, and naturally a phased reduction of our troop strength, equipment and defence budgets is a common objective of all Allies. We have already begun to do this. This process can be continued, yet it must be predicted very closely on the results of arms control negotiations and on Soviet reductions and must also be coordinated within the Alliance so that at the end of this process there is certainly a smaller defence but one that is still coherent and consistent with a military balance in Europe tomorrow and our residual military requirements. Let me state once more very clearly, knowing that many journalists are here today and that this is a speech on the record, that if I point to such concerns, it is not because I consider that they already constitute dangers to our Alliance, or I because I believe that we could not overcome them. We are dealing with them, and I think we have started to deal with them very successfully. We will master them, I have no doubt about that. I only want to prevent complacency and a false sense of self-confidence or indeed a premature and inappropriate feeling of triumphalism. So in the future, as much as in the past, determination, leadership quality, courage, perseverance, cohesion, solidarity will prove essential if we are to keep our Alliance on track and we have to keep it on track simply because there is no alternative. With this Alliance, with its cohesion, with its leadership, we can build the new Europe we are striving for, together with our newly won partners in Central and Eastern Europe. So I think a whole and free Europe in a more peaceful and just world is within our reach, and we will not fail.