NATO Headquarters Palais de Chaillot, Paris, France Conference held between 17 to 21 November 1958

NATO Parliamentarians Conference Speech delivered by General Secretary M. Paul-Henri Spaak Mr. President, Gentlemen, I am sincerely happy to be among you this morning and I have several good reasons for this: the first is that your meeting plunges me back to some extent into the Parliamentary atmosphere for which, in spite of everything, I am still somewhat homesick, and also enables me to see again so many faces I know, so many men whom I know to be good Europeans and good "Atlanteans" ; the second reason is that the Atlantic organisation as it is and perhaps still more as I wish it to be, cannot, I believe, realise its aims unless it is supported by a strong current of public opinion of enlightened, aware, well-informed and, if possible, enthusiastic public opinion. Moreover, I am convinced that the Parliamentarians of the NATO countries can be an essential and even a decisive factor in this task of educating and influencing public opinion. Finally, I am very happy to be amorng you this morning because I hope that your organisation will have a great future. I am, of course, speaking in my own name and I want to tell you that my long experience has taught me that Parliamentary control is necessary and indispensable. Naturally, when I was a Minister, I was sometimes impatient of Parliamentary control, but reflection has lea me to a conclusion which I must confess and announce: to wit, that there cannot be great international institutions, and above all there cannot be an Atlantic Community such as I hope for in the future, if Parliamentary control, which is one of the necessities of our democratic system, is not completely and freely guaranteed. These are the reasons, I repeat, which make me glad to co-operate in your work today. We are on the eve of the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Atlantic Alliance, and it seems to me that this is an important opportunity to see what stage the activities of the organisation have reached. That is what I am going to try to do before you today, and I apologise for reminding you of certain things which you well know, but which must be said again when one is drawing up the balance sheet of our activities. I want to draw up this balance sheet in a spirit of optimism. and even, at certain moments, in a spirit of enthusiasm, for I believe that this is necessary. I shall also do it in an objective and even in a critical spirit. Forgive me for going back to the bcginning when stating THE problem and for reminding you of things which are obviously well-known, but one can neither understand nor appreciate what the Atlantic Alliance has done, if one does not keep some basic ideas clearly in one's mind. Why did we form an Atlantic Alliance in 1949? If one were to sum up the necessity which impelled us to conclude this Alliance, I believe one might say in a few words, without the risk of deceiving oneself, without the risk of violating historical truth, that we joined together in 1949 to stop the expansion of Soviet imperialism, particularly in Europe. If there had not been the Communist "coup d'etat" in Prague in 1948, it is probable that the Atlantic Alliance would not have been born, and that the Western countries would have continued to try to realise the foreign policy which was theirs immediately after the war and which was based essentially on disarmament, on unlimited confidence in the United Nations and, above all, on the will to maintain the Alliance with the U.S.S.R., which had made it possible to win the second world war. It was thanks to the 1948 Prague "coup d'etat", the culminating point of the policy pursued by the Russians during ten years, which had enabled them to annex the Baltic states, to seize part of Finland, part of Poland, part of Germany and part of Rumania, which had enabled them to set up satellite governments in practically all of Eastern Europe and the Balkans, that the statesmen of the West realized that, if they did not stem this invasion in some way, the Prague "coup d'etat." could recur, mutatis mutandis, at other times and in other places. The democratic countries reacted rapidly in 1948. One year later, the Washington Treaty was signed, the Atlantic Alliance was born and its main objective -I repeat that we should bear this in mind when summing up our efforts - its main objective was to halt the expansion of Communism in Europe without having recourse to force or to war. I stress this objective so emphatically because it is possible for me to draw a conclusion here and now from what I have just said. This optimistic conclusion, which should aive us grounds for rejoicing, is that our original objective and the efforts we have made to attain it through the Atlantic Alliance have been one hundred per cent successful. If you give some thought to the matter, you will be obliged to recognize - and I expect you will do so with satisfaction - that, since 1949, Communist expansion in Europe has been halted. Pessimists or sceptics will reply "what luck!", or "what a happy coincidence!". I do not think myself, that this is a matter of luck or of coincidence; I think that it is the logical result and the result we had a right to expect from our efforts. In fact, when Soviet Russia realized that we had built up a genuine and solid defensive barrier, capable of resisting its expansion in Europe, it had to alter its aims, or rather its tactics. When I say that the Atlantic Alliance has achieved its main objective, you might, I think, have a valid question to ask me. You might say: "Mr. Spaak, why do you go on with this speech? You have summed up our achievements. You are the Secretary General of an organization which, you claim, has been one hundred per cent successful in achieving its aims, what more do you want? The books have balanced,"just carry on as before." This reasoning would be inadequate and incomplete, and if we followed it new, we should be falling far short of the task that history has set for us. The Atlantic Alliance in 1949 provided what I think was an adequate reply to the communist threat existing at that time, but the question we face today is whether in 1953 the Atlantic Alliance, as it was conceived and as it has functioned - that is to say as it has functioned during the last 10 years, is still a complete reply to the threat which Communism continues to represent for the world in general. In this respect, my reply cannot be positive; I believe that in 1914 the communist threat was essentially, or rather principally, European and principally a military one. I believe that in drawing up the Alliance, we forced the Soviets to modify their objectives and their tactics. Today, however, in 1958, after a solid front has been established in Europe, the communist threat throughout the world is more particularly - I would not say solely, or even essentially, but more particularly - an Asiatic and African one and is more economic and social than military. Having reached this stage in my speech, I must at once make my views absolutely clear. This does not mean that we can in any way modify or reduce our efforts at the European level; if we do this I, for my part, am convinced that the danger which we averted in 1948 or 1949 will reappear, and that we must keep up what we are doing in Europe, particularly from the military point of view and not only keep it up but develop it by means of modernisation; I am convinced that we must not at the same time lose sight of other dangers and other direct throats to the West which have appeared in other parts of the world. Gentlemen, in preparing the speeches which I am obliged to make a little too often - I apologise as I am well aware that I repeat myself sometimes, but I cannot always find new things to say each time I talk on NATO as the problem remains what it is in actual fact - I compare certain dates which I consider interesting. The North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949; in May or June 1949 the blocade of Berlin came to an end; in October 1949 the civil war ended in Greece; I think it might be concluded that during this year of 1949, after the North Atlantic Organisation had been set up, Communism from that time limited its offensive action in Evrope. But in June 1950 South Korea was attacked by North Korea and, we entered into a new phase of international policy, centred on Asia and Africa. I feel that this is a present truth of which we should be well aware, but which should not be taken too literally, and personally I feel that in recent weeks or months I have perhaps said too often that the danger was becoming essentially or principally African and Asian; during the last few days, the last few weeks, as Mr. Khrushchev, who most kindly sometimes corrects our mistakes, has reminded us that the danger might still be European by reviving in rather strange circumstances the difficult question of Germany and in particular that of Berlin and in doing so he perhaps recalled us to a more positive realism by reminding us that Europe should not be considered as absolutely safe from difficulty and danger. Perhaps we ought to thank him for having brought us firmly back to earth. As far as I am concerned, I am not too upset, from a general point of view, about what is happening in Berlin, for alas, Europeans and Westerners in general need to be woken up from time to time, and I regret to have to say that the wisdom of the West is in direct proportion to its fear. As soon as events seem to be more difficult, the need for our Alliance, for integration and co-operation between our forces seems more useful and more obvious. Before starting on the actual balance-sheet of our achievements, I should like to tell you, in line with these premises which I have tried to set out, that we cannot have a clear idea of what we have done and what we have to do now, unless we realise exactly what the Communist threat is. I am often very surprised to see that 40 years - and even more than 40 years - after the Communist October revolution, so many people still seem to be ignorant of the real significance of the Communist phenomenon. Many people seem to consider that Communism quite simply represents an extremist party with peculiar and particularly daring economic and social concepts; I think that this idea is mistaken. I believe that we should not be against Communism because it has brought about great social changes. Gentlemen, I am absolutely convinced - please allow me to say this - that it is the mission of the West as much as of the Communists to achieve great social transformations and that we must accept the idea that one of our essential tasks is to do battle for a just society. If you will allow me to sum up my 'feelings about this in a few words, we must fight to create a society in which the weak will be protected, in which everyone will have an equal chance in life, so that in the end the elite which leads the world really will be the elite by right of the value of their work, their competence and their talents, and in order to realise this aim, we must not fear any kind of social reform. Nor do I think that we should be against Communism because it supports economic concepts which are open to criticism. Gentlemen, I do not want to deny that it would be interesting to compare the doctrine of liberalism and free enterprise with the doctrine of a controlled economy. I would be the first to admit that these controversies can be both useful and interesting. But whatever their importance, they do not justify the necessity for armed conflict. No..... We must realise that the Communist threat is not an economic threat, nor a social threat; the Communist goal is much wider: the ambition of Communism is to be at the well spring of a new civilisation in which the essential foundations of our spiritual, intellectual, moral and political life will be challenged. And our whole spiritual inheritance which is, after all, our most important possession, is threatened by this aspect of Communism which claims to be a universal doctrine and of which its leaders say - in what sometimes seems to me a rather childish way - that it is borne on the tide of history and will necessarily triumph over the Western form of civilization which they oppose. I have not the slightest intention of implying that we are fighting a religious war but it seems to me essential that, when we consider the problems which face us, we should try to gauge exactly how great these problems are. We should, in fact, realize that the challenge of Communism is a universal, world-wide challenge, that it is not simply the U.S.S.R. challenging the most-powerful of the partners in the Atlantic Alliance, the United States. No. This challenge has been offered by Communism as a whole to the whole of the free world and I feel that one of the greatest mistakes we could possibly make would be to think that individual countries of the free world, even the most powerful of them, could attempt to accept this challenge alone. The world-wide challenge of the Communist world must be accepted on a world-wide basis by the free world and it is in this atmosphere and under this aspect that we must consider the problems we have to solve. Gentlemen, I apologize for this rather long introduction. It was needed in order to explain both the criticisms I am about to make of the Organization of which I am Secretary General and the ambitions I have for this Organization. I should like to list the headings of the balance-sheet of NATO activities. I must say at once that they are net listed in order of importance - I have employed an oratory precaution, a speaker's tactic. I intend to begin with the less good and to end with the best. The headings which I should like to consider in your presence are, therefore: 1. Economic activity. 2. Scientific activity. 3. Military activity. 4. Cultural activity. 5. Political activity. I shall begin, Gentlemen, with economic activity for the reason I have just given you in spite of the efforts which have been made, NATO's activities in the economic field must be put down on the negative side of our balance-sheet. I am sorry to have to say so. Article 2 of the Atlantic Treaty has never been brought to life although it remains an excellent subject for speech-making. I have already heard a great many speeches - including some which I have made myself - on the need for economic integration and an economic effort, particularly as regards the under-developed countries. I assure you that, during the past ten years, I have heard a great deal said about the need for the Western countries to agree on a co-ordinated policy of assistance to under-developed countries. I have made so many speeches on this subject and have heard so many that, I must confess, they now make me feel a little sick! However, this is one of the most essential problems of the West. As I said a few minutes ago, I think that one of our most important tasks is to reply to this offensive which in the coming years will be more economic and social than military. As in Europe, we were able to reply to the military threat by uniting, I do not see that there is any other way of successfully meeting the economic and social threat than by co-ordinating our efforts. I think, Gentlemen, that Communism has lost a great deal of its importance and influence en the Continent of Europe. We have only to look at the election results of the Communist forces in Europe in 1945 and to compare them with those cf today in order to see what progress has been made. I will quote the example of my own country. I remember that in 1945, just after the war, there were 21 Communist members in the Belgian Parliament. Although there has been a considerable increase in the number of seats, I think that there are today only two Communists in the Parliament. This shows the very considerable progress which has been made. The results arc more, or less the same in many other European countries. This is explained by the fact that the economic and social conditions offered by Communism have no longer anything to offer to the peoples of our countries. This is not the case, however, in the under-developed countries. When the under-developed countries compare their own standard of living with that offered by Communism, there is obviously something to attract them, and perhaps the level of wealth which we enjoy seems to them to be an ideal which would be too difficult to reach, while it may seem preferable to them to adopt as a first aim and first stage the standard of living which has been reached by Communism. And it is obvious that in the underdeveloped countries, the results not only of propaganda but of Communist economic policy are important and worthy of our attention. But, Gentlemen, what is rather disquieting is that all intelligent people, let us admit it, diagnose the position correctly. Everyone knows that this is one of the problems which we have to solve. These same intelligent people also know the remedy and that we should reach agreement in the West in order to have a common policy. We know the disease; we know the cure; but there appears to be some kind of fatalism and feeling of incapacity or impotence which weighs us down: knowing the disease and knowing the cure, we are incapable of actually applying it. I know that economic problems are more difficult to solve than political or military problems. There are so many individual interests -and, I would like to add, so many legitimate individual interests - already existing and so many invested interests, so that it is difficult to ask countries to apply co-operation in the economic field and to give up their national egoism. The countries have understood already that they might one day be called upon to fight together; they have not yet understood that they must learn to live together and that it is not sufficient to try in an Alliance like ours to solve the possible problems to which a war might give rise; it is also necessary to be able, and I think this is even more important, to solve together the problems which arise in peacetime. But we are a long way from having done this. I know that my speech is disappointing because I myself cannot yet see how it is possible, within the Atlantic Alliance to solve these problems with which we are faced. I mean that we are in a position which seems to me difficult and inferior to that of the Russians. Gentlemen, I do not wish to plead the cause of liberalism nor yet of a planned economy. However, I feel I must say that, as far as aid to under-developed countries is concerned, the Russian planned economy is a considerable advantage to them - a trump card, in fact, for it enables them to act quickly and on a better ground than the one we have chosen. I am convinced that the future of Western economic policy towards the under-developed countries does not lie in gifts or presents, or in a certain form of assistance which, whatever precautions are taken, always has a slightly superior and paternal character. Our future economic policy towards the under-developed countries must be, like that of the Russians, a policy based essentially on trade relations, but the free world is not, at present, equipped to undertake these negotiations or this policy in an efficient and effective manner. We have a great many economic organisations and it is quite unjust to deny the efforts which have been made so far; it is both unjust and stupid. These economic bodies, however, are too perfect, their economic concepts are too absolute and, I fear, they are not sufficiently inspired by political thinking. What we in the West lack, at the present moment, is a body which would consider all economic problems from both the political and economic angle, as the Russians are able to do. As a matter of fact, I do not even think that NATO should be this body, for the needs in this sphere exceed the limits of our Atlantic Alliance, but it is certainly here that we should define the policy which, one day or another, should be applied by other bodies more suited to the task. There is one ray of hope in this negative part of my speech and that is scientific co-operation; this may, one day, be a stepping-stone towards a better co-ordinated economic policy. You know how this scientific experiment came into being. Although events succeed each other with great rapidity and public memory is short, you will probably still remember the sensational - there is no other suitable adjective - communique issued in Washington at the end of last year when Mr. Macmillan met President Elsenhower. Two of the biggest partners in the Atlantic Alliance declared that the salvation of the peoples of the Alliance lay not in economic and scientific independence but in inter-dependence. Gentlemen, for many of us, and for many Europeans who, for ten years, had been using these words and had been applying these ideas to the construction of Europe, this communique said nothing particularlynew. How many times have we maintained that our salvation lay in interdependence! ... But when the Prime Minister of Great Britain and the President of the United States solemnly declared that salvation lay in inter-dependence, this was a declaration which should have been received with respect and the importance of which should have been appreciated by the whole of Western public opinion. Gentlemen, this declaration was made just after the great success achieved by the Soviet Union in launching its Sputnik. I have said that our memories are short. We soon forgot the disappointment and the slight shame felt by the West when the first Sputnik was launched and we had the impression that the Soviet Union had taken a considerable step forward in a very important field. At that time, part of Western public opinion even reacted in a rather exaggerated way and a feeling of tenor was added to the feeling of disappointment. At that time it would probably have been possible to achieve a great deal and it way on these lines that the Washington communique was drawn up. Since then, gentlemen, the Americans in their turn - as was foreseeable,I can say this now because I said it at the time - have themselves launched several Sputniks into space. Since then American submarines have travelled underneath the polar ice cap, and sensational successes have reminded the Western world that the Western Alliance was probably not behind the Soviet Alliance. This was all very good for our amour propre; it was less good for our caution, in that the impetus given when the first Soviet Sputnik crossed the stratosphere seems already to have been halted and we now appear to think we can return to the old ways and the old mistakes. In December, it was decided that NATO should have ,a scientific body and an American Professor was appointed as scientific adviser to the Secretary General who, I might add, was badly in need of him. A NATO Scientific Committee was also set up, with an excellent membership. I really do think that the members of this Committee are very good. We have made progress. During the past few months - less than a year - we have been able to organise a high-level fellowship programme; we have been able to organise certain joint courses for scientists; we have a number of projects and there is no doubt that we are working on the right lines. But, gentlemen, as in all fields, my chief concern is to know whether the real progress that is being made really measures up to the events of today and the rapidity of developments. Our organisations, despite all that has been done, works slowly and sometimes clumsily, and it often takes several months to do what we should do in a few weeks. In the scientific field,then, we have made some progress and progress is also being made, at least I hope so, in economic co-operation, in the manufacture of the new weapons. As regards standardisation and manufacture of the old weapons, results are mediocre and disappointing. As regards the new weapons, where we can work on more virgin soil, the prospects are greater and there has been more real progress. But although all this is in the right direction and despite my native optimism, I find this insufficient and I think that we should do more and do it faster and more boldly. As far as the military picture is concerned, gentlemen, I will say nothing. Last year I was obliged to devote a part of my speech to you to this military field, because important questions arose. These questions now seem to me to have been solved. Moreover, I have seen that you have had the good fortune to obtain the co-operation of the most important military authorities of NATO and it would be rather ridiculous on my part to try to add something to the information already given to you. I will merely say that the military results achieved by NATO are in my opinion encouraging, but this effort cannot be reduced; on the contrary, new problems are constantly arising, problems of supply and modernisation, and the Members of Parliament who are most aware of the necessity of NATO should be the people who defend our military requirements in their own countries. I know that this is not always easy but I think I can have confidence in your clear sightedness and in your political courage. I should also like to see developments in NATO, not only on the information level but also, although I hesitate to use the word, along cultural lines. I do not think that the defence of the West can be restricted to a good military organization or even to economic co-operation or good political consultation. I think that we should do more and do better. Gentlemen, a few days ago, Mr. Krushchev informed us of his country's ambitions in the economic field. He has just stated that, in a few years' time, production in the Soviet Union will be so well-organized and so abundant that the standard of living of the people will be as high as that of the richest and most powerful of our allies, the United States. I do not know, Gentlemen, what you feel about this statement. I, personally, should be very happy if the communist world succeeded in organizing itself well, if it defeated poverty and raised the standard of living. I think, that this would be a good thing because I am not at all sure that rich Communist would have the same attitude towards world problems as poor Communism. From this point of view, then, I think that Mr. Krushchev's news was good news. However, Gentlemen, the problem has not been solved, We, on our side, cannot rest content, with high production; what we must make clear, I think, is that although we want high production and a fair distribution of wealth, we also want to keep our, way of life and our political principles, that our aim is certainly to be rich, but to be rich in a free world where the individual can develop all his potentialities. A world in which only economic problems were solved could not be an ideal world for us; moral, spiritual and political problems must also be solved in accordance with the principles of our civilization. This is what we must explain to the world. Public opinion must become aware of this global aspect of our efforts. Only if we can make public opinion understand this will the Atlantic Alliance have accomplished its task and be in a position to achieve, one day, the aims I think it should achieve. To this end, we must develop the information and cultural aspects of our activities and I should be happy to have, as well as the Scientific Council I mentioned a few minutes ago, a Cultural Council which could show the peoples of the West what we have in common, what we are striving for and what is essential in our civilization. It could also explain why we have not yet accomplished the whole of our task and point out the goals we still have to roach before being fully worthy of the moral principles we quote so frequently. Now, Gentlemen, I come to what, in my opinion, is by far the most positive of Atlantic achievements this year; I mean political co-operation,I sincerely think that we have made considerable progress in this field but, strangely enough, I find a great deal of criticism of this aspect of NATO in the press, in speeches and sometimes even in memoirs! As far as this field is concerned, I think that if NATO is suffering in any way, it is merely from growing pains. As we go on solving problems, we create others for ourselves. I must say that I am pleased, but at the same time concerned when reading certain criticisms. There is no unresolved problem in the world today about which some people do not turn to NATO and say: "But what are you doing? Why do you not settle this problem?" It is obviously an indirect tribute to us when people say; You ought to settle it, because that proves that they believe we are capable of settling it; I am therefore pleased because that extends our scope. It must be recognized, however, that people who adopt this attitude completely forget what NATO is, how it was set up and what are its real responsibilities. I repeat that the North Atlantic Treaty was originally a regional agreement with clearly defined geographical limits and it is within these geographical limits that NATO's responsibilities lie, but I will not put forward this argument as a reason for saying that those who wish to see us achieve other aims and resolve other problems are in the wrong. I agree with those who think that this geographical limitation is an artificial one, and that nothing will be gained by solving problems in Europe and North America if we are still faced by serious difficulties in other parts of the world. I therefore accept the now responsibilities that are being passed to us. But what public opinion - and yourselves. Gentlemen, before public opinion in general - must know is that great progress has been made regarding political, consultation. For. us the Charter is what is called the "Report of the'Three Wise Men'"; the Canadian, Italian and Norwegian Ministers said; "If you wish to avoid crises within the Alliance, if you wish the Alliance to continue, you must have political consultations, not only on problems in Europe and North America, but on problems arising throughout the world. They said; "You should consult each other,not in order to have a single foreign policy..." Ah, Gentlemen, that is an ideal which I do not reject; I simply observe that it would be premature and that if we are realistic we cannot believe that it would be possible today for the 15 countries of the Alliance to have a single foreign policy. "But at least", said the *Three 'Wise Men', "have a co-ordinated foreign policy and realise that no purpose is served by having a powerful military machine if you have at the same time a foreign policy which is disorganized, contradictory and even in opposition!" ' In reality, the "Three Wise Men" were restating an obvious fact, but a fact of the greatest significance: that a military organization can only be the tool of a common policy. If there is no common policy, the tool cannot be used. Of course, they said "Consult in order to try to reach agreement" and I shall come back to this point in a moment. Well, we have done much in the field of consultation. We have made progress which has probably exceeded what would have been thought possible and you were not, of course, surprised by a sentence in the communique issued by the Ministers, which was drawn up at the Copenhagen Conference, in which the Ministers, after hearing the report on progress concerning consultations, stressed how considerable this progress had been. They have stated that this community spirit which is beginning to appear within the Atlantic Alliance is probably the most important event which has occurred in our present era. The Ministers, gentlemen, had all the facts at their disposal; they know that this type of consultation is new and extraordinary, even revolutionary, in diplomatic practice, and how much reason we have to rejoice at the relatively rapid progress which is being made. I have said, and I should like to emphasize again, that a revolution has occurred in the history of diplomacy. I think that the word which once characterised the policy of the great powers, some of them for centuries and centuries,is "individualism" which was, perhaps, the most striking feature of national sovereignty. You will see how much times have changed, gentlemen, when you realise what happens now in the Permanent Council of the Atlantic Alliance and when you realise that no longer is there a single question of foreign policy arising in the world which is not discussed by the Council before any action is taken. On certain questions, particularly those concerning relations with the East, with the Communist world, for months and months now, not a single initiative has been taken by the more powerful partners in the Atlantic Alliance without their having obtained, daring preliminary discussion, the agreement and support of all the less large and the smallest of their partners. The results of this political consultation have, in certain spheres, been perfect. I am not giving away any secrets by saying that, where replies to letters from Marshal Bulganin or Mr. Krushchev are concerned, or in the preparation of a summit conference, nothing has been undertaken by the United States, by Great Britain or by France without the replies made to the Communists or the thorough action taken by the three great Powers having been the subject of thorough prior consultation in the Atlantic Council. The only word I can find to describe this new picture is "moving", when we see - and I take this example because it illustrates my feelings very well - that President Elsenhower does not write to Mr. Bulganin or to Mr. Khrushchev without making sure that his letter is approved by the head of the government or by the Foreign Minister of the smallest country in the Alliance. Public opinion must be made aware that something entirely new has happened and that diplomatic traditions and customs have been turned upside down, and WE must thank the large countries for the effort they have made to apply the new rules in a responsible manner. I should like you to realise that these consultations have not been a matter of pure form. Many of the drafts submitted to the Atlantic Council have been not only discussed, but also commented on and criticized and, in most cases - I say in most cases to allow myself some margin for possible argument - in nearly all cases I think, the large countries which have submitted the text of their letters or notes have taken the remarks made into account. Thus we can now say - and this is a historical truth - that when the United States, Great Britain or France, or any other country speak about their relations with the Communist countries, they speak not only in their own names but also in the name of the whole Atlantic Alliance. We have not restricted ourselves to this type of consultation. Already, without any resolutions having been adopted, we have gone beyond the geographical limits of the Alliance. The best proof of this I can give you is to tell you what happened yesterday in the Permanent Council meeting, during your discussions; We held a private Council, as we now do nearly every week and, sometimes, two or three times a week. This private Council consists of only the Ambassador, permanent delegates and one or two assistants; we have limited the number of participants in order to ensure more full and frank political discussions and in order to create a favourable atmosphere for this type of discussion. Yesterday, in this restricted Council meeting, what did we discuss? ... The situation in Berlin. We considered the Rapacki Plan; we heard a report on the two conferences taking place in Geneva, on nuclear tests and on surprise attacks; owing to lack of time, we were not able to listen to one delegate who had promised to give us a report on Middle-East problems; we heard the regular report by the United States delegation on the situation in the Far East. Consequently, as you see, yesterday, in the Atlantic Council, we discussed all the international problems facing the whole of the free world. I therefore have the right to say that this consultation system is now applied. But I must also admit that this method has given rise to new problems. I should like everyone to realise that consultation is not an end in itself, it is only a means and the end would be agreement between the consulting countries. When the 'Three Wise Men' told us to consult each other, they said: "Consult in order to reach an agreement". Well, I feel free to confess, because I know very well that in an undertaking like ours perfection cannot be reached at once, that in certain cases we have consulted each other without coming to any agreement. I have made one interesting observation, which is that as far as our relations with the Communist countries of the East are concerned, and this was the essential problem which forced us to unite in 1949, we reach an agreement in 99% of cases. However, as we move farther away from the geographical framework of the Alliance, although consultations are taken seriously, it sometimes becomes more difficult to reach an agreement because our various responsibilities and interests differ so widely. I should also like to make it clear, in view of what has been said in certain newspapers and sometimes even in certain parliaments, that it is not true to say that the great powers which have had to shoulder responsibilities in the Middle East, for instance, or in the Far East, took action without consulting their allies. I can state, with regard to the Middle East, that before the events occurred, before the Americans landed in the Lebanon or the ; British in Jordan, the situation in the Middle East had been discussed several | times and the Americans, like the British, had informed us of their very sincere wish to have the matter settled by the United Nations, although they had also told us that, in certain circumstances, it would be impossible for them not to respond to a request for help from certain friendly governments. In what I am now going to say, I may over-step the bounds of my speech, but I am a former parliamentarian and I am speaking to parliamentarians. Speaking quite personally and no longer as Secretary General of the Alliance, should like to say that, in my opinion, the Americans and the British were right to do what they did in the Lebabon and in Jordan. An extremely serious problem arose in that area, which raises a question of principle which should be carefully thought about. Has a legal, friendly government the right to call for help from its allies when it finds itself at the mercy of events brought about both by internal rebellion and external pressure? ... I shall go so far- as to say: be careful not to answer 'no' to this question! I do not think that at any foreseeable future date we shall be confronted with the problems of a general war, but I do not believe that the Soviets have renounced their aim of world domination and I am almost convinced, as far as one can be in this kind of political pro-phecy, that the form that their action will take will be a repetition in Asia and in Africa of the method which they found so successful in Europe. In Europe up to 1944 they employed a policy of internal political subversion backed by external pressure which enabled them to set up governments which we call satellite - in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and in the Balkans. They did not fight a war to obtain these diplomatic victories. They used the very special method which I have just defined. It was exactly this situation which existed in the Lebanon a few months ago, and it is a situation that we can today see in other areas in Asia and Africa; and let us not be too confident, although the situation has considerably improved; similar situations could easily arise in certain parts of Europe if we relax our effort of military organisation. Think of what happened in Greece; exactly the same situation existed there. A legally appointedd and friendly government called on Great Britain and the United States for assistance and, thank God, the United States and Great Britain responded promptly and probably saved Greece from suffering the same fate as had been suffered by other Balkan countries. Had this action not been taken, and in my view it was quite legal and valid politically, heaven knows what might have happened! I believe, therefore, that this is a great political problem and that the greatest caution must be exercised before giving a negative reply. It should be known in any case that the United States and Great Britain warned us, but then something happened which created a problem. It would not be quite, true to say that all countries gave their agreement. This is the problem which arises from political consultation. I am speaking quite frankly, because it is only by being frank that we shall be able to settle our difficulties. A number of countries remained silent regarding this statement of policy. It must be recognised that this method of consultation is new, not only for the great powers, but is something new also for the less large countries and particularly for the small countries of the Alliance. Here I take the example of Belgium, the one I know best. Belgium has never really had a policy in the Middle East. We have, of course, certain interests in this part of the world, important economic interests that we try to defend as well as possible, but from the political point of view we knew that the responsibility lay with a tertain number cf large countries. From the moment when we claim that we can be consulted because we know that a conflict breaking out in the Middle East could have direct repercussions on our own situation, we are committed; from the moment when we call for consultations and still more take part in them, that is, give our views, then our responsibility begins, and this represents a completely new factor in the foreign policy of a large number of countries. It is also necessary to know what we are doing when we say; we call on the great powers to explain their policy to us and fine out if we are in agreement with them, or have any observations to make, before they take action. I realised at this point that the machinery was not altogether adequate because after statements made by large countries, a number of countries remained silent. The question which I ask myself is: What does diplomatic silence mean? Does diplomatic silence mean No? Or does it mean yes? I must confess that I have not yet solved this important problem. But we should not conceal from ourselves the fact that this silence can lead to misunderstandings in certain cases, for the large country can say: "I have stated my policy, no-one has opposed it, no-one has contradicted my arguments: this must mean that everyone agrees to it." Whereas, those which did not give their explicit agreement can say: "No. I did not give my approval". Ambiguity can thus arise from this method of consultation. And, in order to improve our consultation system, which is so important, we shall shortly - during the next ministerial meeting, in fact - have to consider the results of our methods and take a decision. I have said that as questions depart from the geographical area of the Atlantic Pact, consultation becomes more difficult. This does not mean that consultation in such cases is useless or non-existent. The United States of America, who, I should like to stress, play the game in very good faith, and are prepared to discuss their foreign policy with fifteen countries varying-in strength and importance, did not avoid discussion on the Far East. I cannot say that this discussion was particularly useful or profitable, because the reserve and caution of certain countries was vary great. Where the Far East is concerned, I wish to make one remark only. I cannot say whether I am for or against the United States' policy in that part of the world; it is not my business for the moment. I only wish to draw the attention of the Parliamentarians from NATO countries to an argument used by Mr. Dulles in Boston some weeks ago and which I found most important. Mr. Dulles said: "I do not ask for help from the countries of the West in the matter of the Far East; I know that this is the United States' own responsibility. The United States is ready to take on its responsibilities but," said Mr. Dulles, "there is one exceptionally important thing in the Far East, which is that the Chinese communists want to obtain something they have a right to by force. And that we cannot allow." I should like to draw your attention. Gentlemen, to this aspect of the problem. On reading reports of many political congresses held in Europe, I have been struck by the frequent discussions of this Far East problem during which no-one mentioned this principle which seems all-important to me: that even a war which we believe to be just cannot be allowed. It is not enough to say that the Chinese communists are right about Formosa and that they should therefore be given the islands in question. What we must say is that they have no right to use arms and war to obtain what they want. This is a rule to which we cannot allow any exceptions because, if we allow a single one, if we claim that a war in which we think we are right is an admissible war, we abandon all the advantages won by international law since the end of the first world war, we justify at one stroke all the wars of the past and we lend ourselves to the justification of all the wars of the future. In general, when countries make war, they think that they have good reason for doing so. Almost all conquerors, and we must grant them this, thought they were right when they declared war. We cannot, therefore, allow any argument on this point. And we cannot allow anyone, or any government, to use force in order to have its rights recognised. I think that this is very important. It is one of the constant factors of American policy and Mr. Dulles was right to say: "If, one day, the Americans yielded on this principle in the Far East, how could you ask them to apply it firmly in other parts of the world and even, one day perhaps, in Europe?" The events of the last few days show once again that - without being at all pessimistic - we are perhaps less safe from certain incidents than we would like to think. I shall conclude this question of consultation, on which I have said a good deal, because in my view it is the most positive, perhaps the most important, element of our activity during recent months, by saying that, although progress has been made, there is still much to be done. In this field of consultation we have also had to deal with conciliation within NATO itself. We have not hesitated, despite certain difficulties to concern ourselves with possible divergencies of view between various members of the Alliance. We have had to deal with the important and very difficult questions of Iceland and Cyprus; after very satisfactory progress which led us to believe that we were about to be successful, we failed at the last moment, but I hope only temporarily. These consultations, however, proved useful in our Organisation. I now come to the end of a speech - and I apologise for having made it rather long - in which I have tried to show the impartial and critical spirit in which I approach the activity of the Organisation of which I am the Secretary General, and also, I hope, both a certain realism and very great ambitions for the Organisation under my responsibility. It is because I have great ambitions for NATO that I believe that I should be difficult and critical when considering its actions and achievements. I have great ambitions because I become daily more convinced of two things; that the fate of Europe depends on the unity of the European peoples; and that the fate of the West depends on the unity and cooperation of the Atlantic peoples. Faced by the far reaching problem of the threat of communism, extending over a wide geographical area and a wide variety of subjects (military, economic, social, cultural) I became more firmly, deeply and surely convinced that it is only by means of common action that we can take up the challenge. I am equally convinced that if we do not allow ourselves to be overtaken by events, and that if we succeed in achieving more completely the high ideals we now hold, we shall give Mr. Krushchev's prophesy the lie, and we shall prove that it is not true that communism is carried on the wings of history, that it is part of history and that there is a kind of historical fatalism condemning our civilisation to destruction and ruin. I am convinced, on the contrary, that in this struggle - which I hope with all my heart will be a peaceful one - the West can triumph. The Atlantic Alliance must become an Atlantic Community, and in this struggle in which so much of importance is at stake, it will probably be the Atlantic Community, if it becomes a reality, which will turn the balance.