Palais de Chaillot 2 April 1953

Verbatim of the Press Conference given by Lord Ismay Lord Ismay - You have been given a paper which was not meant to be handed out yet. It was only to explain some of the points I was trying to make about the annual review and trying to explain this idea of improving the quality rather than quantity, and I thought my explanation might not be very convincing, so I wrote it out. But if you would leave it alone for the moment, there is nothing in it to explain and it is not the object of the Press Conference. The object of the Press Conference is this. I got back from America and Canada on Monday last and I wanted to meet the Press as soon as possible after my return — I have been very busy up to now — in order at least, to show that I was not there on holiday. I had a pretty hectic time and I have a few things, I think, that might interest you about that trip. I travelled close on 7,000 miles in Canada and the United States. I had six public speeches, of which 4 were broadcast, 2 special broadcasts, 8 Press Conferences, 6 off-the-record talks and 7 official meetings. The point I would like to make is that I found agreement in all my conversations with the Canadian Government and the U.S. Government. I found agreement on the fundamental questions of NATO policy and organisation, so far as it has gone. I found wide-spread interest in NATO, but a considerable ignorance in both countries. I am quite sure that in all the countries of the Alliance more should by done to educate public opinion as to what it is all about, because as I have said, so frequently, it is very hard to ask people to make sacrifices and exertions if they do not know what it is all about. I did find considerable ignorance. There was no questions in anybody's mind that I met, that the United States and Canada were committed to NATO, that it was a definite commitment. I did find in some places some doubts, on the sort of isolationist side, whether it was a wise commitment, but nobody questioned the fact that there was a commitment. The sort of questions thqt I was asked were: "why should America spend all this money on defending Europe?" The line I took was that if Europe were over-run, apart from all civilization going, purely on the material side, the whole of the industrial and material resources of these vast regions would fall into Russian hands; they would have the largest pool of skilled manpower in the world. They would add 100 or 200 or 300 millions of slave labour to their already large collection, and indeed their power then, their power for mischief would be overwhelming. Therefore my conclusion was, and is, and always will be, that aggression in Europe and the danger to Europe is nearer in terms of distance and time than it is to the Americas, but for them it is just as mortal in the long run. I was asked a great deal about EDC. There was very little comprehension, I found, about what EDC is. It was confused with NATO and I was at considerable pains to point out that although everyone of us devouthly hoped that EDC would be ratified as soon as possible, it would mean a substantial reinforcement to NATO. I pointed out that NATO was conceived and the Treaty signed long before there was any question of German re-armament, and that although it would be a great blow if EDC is not ratified, it is not a mortal blow. NATO carries on just the same. I got from various people in the United States the question: "Are we doing too much, or are we doing too little?" And I got in Canada: "Are our Government doing enough?" — and that was from the Opposition Party. I took the line that all of us Allies were committed to doing our utmost. What that utmost should be could only be decided by the consciences of individual Governments, because only individual Governments know all the considerations that have to be taken into account, the economic, the political, the military, the social, and so forth. Therefore, all I could say was that thirteen countries always think that the foutheenth is not doing enough, but I did say that it must depend on the conscience of the country concerned, and that was all you could appeal to. No-one could give anyone orders. There was a good deal of questioning about why Yugoslavia and Spain and Sweden and Eire were not in NATO and the only line I could take was that, although from a military point of view it could be obviously a strengthening, NATO was a Club and no-one could join it without the unanimous approval of the fourteen Members and that although the question had never been raised, it seemed doubtful whether any of these three or four would have absolute unanimous approval. So much for my trip. It was very strenuous and I believe worthwile, certainly from my point of view. I come back far better equipped for my job after having met and talked with the principal Ministers and officials in both those countries. I did not go out to accomplish anything special. I went out on a routine visit, the same as I have been to five countries in Europe. I did just want to tell you how the Annual Review is going. It is nearing completion now within this building. It is a terrific job and as I have said in that paper, we are trying to adjust details of the military requirements, including all the separate items of military equipment of the economic and political situation in each country. It is the kind of thing that has certainly never been done before in an alliance and the degree to which the Allies provide each other with minute data on their resources and stand up to the other thirteen for cross-questioning is a measure of their confidence in each other and of their devotion to a common task. It is really a very extraordinary thing that a country should go into the box and be interrogated as to why it is not doing more than this, or why it should not do that. It is a very long business. I will not repeat what I have put down in the paper about quantity versus quality. My only reason for putting it down was that I got the sort of feeling when it appeared in the last communique that some people formed the impression that this was a camouflage to get away form the fact that we had not increased in numbers sufficiently and people said to me "What do you mean improvement in quality?" I have tried to set down here some of the directions in which quality has improved. About the tour, there is one more thing I would like to mention. There was a sort of feeling that Europe was dragging its feet. I was able to release those figures which were released here simultaneously, showing that the defence expenditure of all European countries, in fact all the Members of the Alliance, has increased progressively in the last four years, and in fact, that so far as Europe is concerned, the increase all over the board in these four years is 120 %. I found those figures enormously useful and I was thankful that I collected them before I went and just had them checked up at the last moment. Question - During which years was this increase? Lord Ismay - From 1949 to 1953. I will have another Press Conference, if you care for it, before the Ministerial meeting starts on the 23rd, about the middle of this month, in which I hope to be able to tell you what problems will be laid before Ministers. There is only one other point I would like to refer to. You all remember that when Holland and Belgium and the U.K. to a lesser extent, were stricken by floods, they got help from all the other members of the Alliance. The same thing has happened to Turkey over the earthquake. The United States Red Cross sent along 50,000 dollars out of which were provided 10,000 blankets, 30 cases of medical supplies and blood plasma. The British Government sent them £10,000. From Greece a group of doctors and nurses are already on the spot. The Netherlands Red Cross flew medicaments to Turkey the day after the disaster, including Penicillin and Streptomycin. From Denmark two planes went with medical supplies and rescue equipment. From Belgium Penicillin and from Canada medical supplies to the value of 10,000 dollars. So it just shows that the Allies do really round each other when they get into trouble, even when they are attacked by nature. Are there any questions? Question - Can you tell us what the Atlantic Council is going to do about the reported ammunition shortage in Europe? Lord Ismay - I have not seen any reports of the ammunition shortage but you can be quite sure that if there is a serious ammunition shortage, it will be given first priority by the Council, because it is a very serious matter. Shortages are rather difficult to define. Question - Would you give an opinion, personal or otherwise, on the latest succession of Soviet peace moves? Lord Ismay - I would not attempt, even personally, to try to answer the riddle. All I do venture to comment on is the line that we should take about it. I would say this. That we have always wanted to meet round the table with them; we always want to talk if they want to talk serious business. I am sure that President Eisenhower has expressed that and so has Mr. Churchill and so have others, that if they could get them to talk around the table with a real will to make peace, they will get a very sympathetic audience, but meanwhile, while all this is going on, I believe that our task is quite clear. The NATO nations, in fact all the free countries, are assembled to resist aggression because they feel that they have something to defend. They are not the only countries in the world threatened with aggression, but all the threatened countries are not in this Organisation. The NATO countries have really something in common here. Until we see some practical results of talks, it would be, to my mind, absolute folly to relax in any way or to alter the policy we are adopting observing that our Alliance is not only for immediate defence, as I have said time and again, it is for enduring progress. We do hope that this little family of nations, or rather, large family, will co-operate in other far more useful and happy fields than defence. I am not talking of federation, that is miles ahead, but I am talking of economic, social and cultural co-operation and that sort of thing. But the main thing is, I feel quite sure, that to alter our policy because various kites are flown would be absolute madness. We are not threatening anybody, we are not aggressive to anybody. We have not nearly enough, even if we thought of it, or wanted to. All we want is security and peace, and we must go on fighting for that and making sacrifices for it, and exertions. Question - Could you explain what you meant by "some practical results of the talks?" Lord Ismay - If all the wounded were exchanged, for example, as a first step. As a second step, I would like all prisoners exchanged. It is a frightfully cruel thing to think of all those people banished from their homes, kept in servitude. I am sure that some of you have had the unfortunate position or may have had the unfortunate position of being captives, and when you see no hope of the end of the war it is pretty grim. I would call that one practical result. Question - Do you agree with General Ridgway's statement today that the Russian threat of aggression has not reduced one inch since two year's back? Lord Ismay - I agree with him 100%. Question - I have seen various reports of that statement. I did not hear it, but I have the notes from which Field Marshal Montgomery spoke. He may not have stuck to the notes but his notes give a very very different impression from the extracts that appeared in the Press. He may have departed from them. I would make this general observation. First, that in my judgement — and I am entitled to a view, even if it is a wrong one — he is the greatest battle Commander that the British have produced since the Duke of Wellington. He is a most magnificent soldier. He is a master of simplification and of concentration. Napoleon used to say: "There are many good Generals in Europe, but they see too many things at once. I only see the enemy masses and destroy them." It is a very admirable quality in a soldier, but it is not so easy to apply to the wider fields of policy and diplomacy and so forth. Therefore, he may have over-simplified. But his two main points were these. The first, that the important thing was for countries to gear themselves up. Let me explain that. No country can afford to keep immense numbers of troups ready to fight at any moment. You can only have your covering forces ready to take the first shock, to be the shield behind which the second line can mobilise and come up to their help. The point he wanted to make was that countries should be so organised that their second lines are better trained, better equipped and quicker mobilised so that they can appear in the battle at an earlier date and be more effective. That was one point. The second point he made, according to his notes, is one with which I am afraid I entirely agree. I have often made it myself. I have made it to the British Parliament, I have made it in the Press before I took office. I have not changed my views at all since I took office. NATO is a start but we have got to somehow think in global terms, global policy and global strategy. NATO is restricted to fourteen nations. We are not the only nations that are threatened or would lose our all if attacked. I have always said that, but still I justify NATO entirely on the grounds that here is the greatest danger, here is the heart of the free world in Western Europe. If that goes, the blow is mortal. If other bits went it would be a grievous forfeit, but not mortal. Therefore we have somehow to get machinery to think in global terms. Those were his two points. I am quite sure — it is very typical of him — he threw out the old idea of too much paper and over-staffed headquarters. It is what I have said over since I was old enough or senior enough to say anything. But it is frightfully hard to reduce the amount of paper when you try, or to reduce staff. I think it was just on the spur of the moment. Question - Pourriez-vous nous indiquer si le Secrétariat, en étudiant la situation économique, financière et militaire de chaque pays, a considéré que certains pays ne faisaient pas un effort suffisant pour 1953, et pourriez-vous nous faire une référence particulière à la France, à l'Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis. Lord Ismay - I would like the Staff Officer who deals with the Annual Review to deal with this more fully. I will merely content myself by saying, as I have mentioned in that note, that the Annual Review is still under study, it is not yet complete. It is just these things that we are looking into. Mr. Barnes - I do not think, Sir, it would be appropriate to say anything more at this moment because actually the Annual Review Committee, consisting of the fourteen delegations is currently meeting on the report and say evaluation of its conclusions would, I think, be pre-judging the issue. Lord Ismay - Not only is it currently meeting, but it is going to meet until 1 a.m. tonight, 1 a.m. tomorrow night, and 1 a.m. the next night — and I hope they will not drag me in for it!