Defence
Planning
Committee

Brussels
1-2 June 1983

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Synopsis

The Defence Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 1st and 2nd June, 1983.

2. Ministers reaffirmed that a strong and cohesive Alliance remains indispensable to guarantee the security of its members and to foster stable international relations; the strength and cohesion of the Alliance derive from the solidarity of its members and their unity of purpose in pursuing common objectives.

3. The security of NATO is ensured through the deterrence of aggression by means of a strong defence and vigorous efforts to reach agreement on militarily significant, equitable and verifiable arms reductions. Deterrence and arms control are thus integral parts of the security policy of the Alliance. Both are fundamental to NATO's long-standing objectives of strengthening the peace and pursuing, through dialogue and mutually advantageous co-operation, a constructive East-West relationship aimed at genuine détente. Ministers expressed their resolve to modernize their forces and pursue arms control as representing the most effective way of enhancing the security of the Alliance at lower levels of forces. In this context, and also referring to the relevant statement of Heads of State and Government at Williamsburg, Ministers re-emphasized their determination to move forward with the double-track decision of December 1979 on intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) modernization and arms control (1).

4. NATO's strategic concept of flexible response and forward defence remains valid and continues to be the basis for NATO defence. The undiminished presence of the United States and Canadian armed forces in Europe and the United States strategic nuclear commitment to Europe remain integral to the security of the Alliance as a whole. Of equal importance are the maintenance and continued improvement of the deterrence and defence capabilities of the European members of the Alliance. Ministers expressed their determination to continue to provide the resources and to take the measures necessary in a fair and equitable way to ensure the effectiveness of NATO's deterrent. Ministers noted the extent to which Greece, Portugal and Turkey rely on adequate Allied assistance to carry out their missions more effectively to the advantage of all. Ministers agreed to continue to explore the possibilities for further support and assistance.

5. The prospects for continued peace and stable political relations between East and West depend on the acceptance by the Soviet Union of the legitimate requirements of other nations, the maintenance of an overall military balance and on Soviet willingness to contribute to the creation of a climate of confidence. In this respect, Ministers noted with concern the continuing build-up of Warsaw Pact forces across the entire spectrum- strategic to conventional. The Soviet Union continues to allocate very substantial national resources to the research, development and production capabilities needed to sustain the build-up of its military strength which goes far beyond its defensive needs. This growth of military strength, particularly the increased global mobility of its forces, allows the Soviet Union to exert pressure in many parts of the world. Furthermore, Soviet pressures on Poland and the Soviet invasion and continued occupation of Afghanistan point out that the Soviet Union is willing to threaten or to use force beyond its own frontiers.

6. Ministers recalled their common interest in the security, stability and sovereign independence of countries outside the NATO area and their conviction that respect for genuine non-alignment is important for international stability. While recognizing that the purpose of NATO is to preserve the security of the North Atlantic Treaty area, Ministers once again acknowledged that developments beyond the NATO area might threaten the vital interests of members of the Alliance. They agreed to take full account of the effect of such developments on NATO security, defence capabilities and the national interests of member countries and recalled the Bonn Summit at which the need to consult and to share assessments on the basis of commonly identified objectives was reaffirmed.

7. Recognizing that the policies which nations adopt outside the NATO area are a matter for national decision, Ministers stated that those countries, such as the United States, which have the means to take action, should do so in timely consultation with their Allies, as defined in the Bonn Summit documents. In this context, Ministers acknowledged that there could be cases where other individual Allied nations, on the basis of national decision, would make an important contribution to the security of the Alliance by making available facilities to assist deployments needed to strengthen deterrence in such areas. They agreed that member nations, as they may decide, have a wide and diverse range of possibilities from which to choose in making useful contributions to promote stability and deterrence in region outside the Treaty area involving vital Western interests.

8. Ministers reviewed progress on a study by the NATO Military Authorities on the implications for the defense of the NATO area of the United States plans for is rapidly deployable forces. It will be necessary to establish on the basis of the NATO Military Authorities' Final Report the measures to be taken.

9. It is against this overall political and strategic background that the new Ministerial Guidance, the major political directive for the defence planning both by nations and the NATO Military Authorities, has been developed. This Guidance which has today been approved by Ministers addresses what needs to be done to ensure the continued viability of NATO's deterrent strategy. In particular, it gives direction for the preparation of NATO force goals for 1985-1990. Notwithstanding current improvements to Alliance defence capabilities, it is clear that sustained Alliance efforts are necessary in order to ensure the continued credibility of NATO's strategy of deterrence. This challenge must be faced on a collective basis.

10. If the Alliance is to be able to implement its agreed strategy the necessary resources will have to be provided. Ministers reaffirmed the current resource guidance formula aiming at real increases in defence expenditure in the order of 3% annually for the nations of the Alliance in general. In the light of the growing disparity between the forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the Allies have also agreed to continue to do their utmost to make available all the resources needed to provide the requisite strengthening of their deterrent and defence forces.

11. The Guidance emphasizes that nations must take the steps necessary to improve the capabilities of NATO's forces in order for them to be able to perform more effectively their required missions. It is particularly important to increase the combat capability and effectiveness of NATO's conventional forces. Improvements should include modernization, better readiness and sustainability of in-place forces, fulfilment of the requirements of SACEUR's Rapid Reinforcement Plan, the provision of a more effective air defence and the provision of additional reserve units.

12. Recalling the 1982 Bonn Summit initiative for exploring ways to take advantage both technically and economically of emerging technologies, Ministers noted the significant potential offered thereby to make substantial improvements in the conventional defence of the Alliance and agreed on the future work in this area. Having in mind the objectives of military and cost effectiveness, they acknowledged the progress made in the appropriate NATO bodies towards co-ordinating national efforts in ensuring the successful exploitation of emerging technologies. They urged that in their future planning nations should take account of NATO defence planning initiatives for further progress in this field, including opportunities for transatlantic co-operation.

13. Ministers endorsed the need to seek ways to redress escalating defence costs by more effective application of national resources to defence. They noted ongoing work in improving co-ordination of defence plannning in NATO as well as emphasizing the special importance which they attach to armaments co-operation within the scope of the transatlantic dialogue.

14. Effective steps undertaken to restrict the transfer of militarily relevant technology to the Warsaw Pact serve to preserve the West's technological advantage, particularly in the development of conventional armaments. Nations should continue to consult and exchange information within NATO to identify militarily relevant technology in order to assist international consultations on this subject, thereby ensuring better protection of such technologies by national governments.

15. Another matter to which the Alliance is currently giving increased attention concerns the provision of adequate infrastructure funds. To meet the most urgent requirements, they agreed to an increase to the financial ceiling of the current five-year NATO Infrastructure Programme.

16. Stressing the importance of arms control as a necessary complement to the maintenance of an adequate defence posture in each area of NATO's interlocking triad of forces, Ministers underlined that the stability and security of all countries concerned would be greatly enhanced by an equitable and verifiable agreement leading to substantial reductions in strategic weapons, as proposed by the United States at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START). They also re-emphasized their support for the United States negotiating position in the INF negotiations, including the proposal for an interim agreement, which has been developed in close consultation with the Alliance (2). In this context, Ministers reiterated that for these arms control negotiations to be successful, the Soviets must be convinced that NATO is determined to deploy its INF missiles as planned and that, in the absence of a concrete agreement obviating the need for deployments, these deployments would begin at the end of 1983 (2). Ministers welcomed the fact that the United States would continue to maintain an active and flexible negotiating position. They stressed that the Alliance commitment to negotiations would, if necessary, continue even after initial deployment.

17. In the general context of arms control, Ministers also welcomed the United States proposals to the Soviet Union for negotiating confidence-building measures aimed at enhancing international stability and reducing the risk of war. Recalling the Bonn Summit initiatives on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR), the shortcomings of the East's February 1983 proposal and the tabling of a draft Western Treaty in Vienna, Ministers expressed the hope that the East would respond further in a serious and constructive manner.

18. Defence and security policy in democratic societies is based on broad consent. The dialogue on questions of security concerns all our citizens. Ministers welcomed the public attention that is being given to the Alliance and its deterrent strategy. A strong Alliance has helped to maintain peace for more than three decades and will continue to provide the basis on which to ensure both peace and freedom for its members, while improving peaceful relations through dialogue and negotiation. NATO is a defensive Alliance: its weapons will never be used except in response to an attack.

The Spanish Ministers of Defence informed the Defence Planning Committee of the present state of the review that the Spanish Government is undertaking. regarding its participation in the Alliance, pending which he reserved his Government's position on the Communiqué. At the same time, however, the Spanish Minister stated that his Government shares in the Communiqué in so far as it may reflect positions in the relations of Spain with the member countries of the Alliance.

The Danish Minister of Defence repeated Danish Government support for the double track decision but at the same time he presented to his colleagues the motion passed by the Folketing on 26 May.

Footnotes:

1. Greece reserves its position on the last two sentences.

2. Greece reserves its position on the second and third sentences.