Speech

It is a great honour for me to speak this evening at the Library of Congress on my first official visit to the United States as Secretary General of NATO. I wish particularly to thank Senators Roth and Lieberman, and Representatives Solomon and Hamilton, for having requested the Congressional Research Service to organise this important conference in collaboration with NATO and the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
I was very pleased to learn that the theme of this conference is "NATO's Future and US Interests", because this gives me the opportunity to emphasize my strong personal conviction that a dynamic and changing North Atlantic Alliance will be as critical to US and European interests into the 21st Century as it has surely been throughout the second half of the 20th century. I have great ambitions for this Alliance, because I truly believe that the history of the past 50 years teaches above all that the US and the European Allies can accomplish little going their separate ways, whereas working together there is little that we cannot achieve. And it is NATO which brings us together and provides us with a common instrument to deal with the enormous security challenges and opportunities of the 21st century.

Before I say anything else this evening, however, I would like to salute the Members of the US Congress who are present here tonight, as well as those who are not. I know that for you, as for President Clinton and the Administration, the sending of US troops to Bosnia was not an easy or popular thing to do. But it was the right thing to do.

The reluctance to involve American soldiers in European troubles is not anything new; it is as old as your history, going back to George Washington's famous Farewell Address. But in this century, you have overcome this reluctance on four occasions: World War I, World War II, the Cold War, and now in Bosnia. You have done so because American Presidents of both parties, supported by a bipartisan consensus in Congress and the country, have recognised that the United States has a vital interest in a peaceful and democratic Europe.

Of course, when the Cold War ended there were some who argued that the time had come for American disengagement from Europe: the threat of Soviet invasion had ended and all the nations of Central and Eastern Europe had embraced democracy and free markets. Perhaps now America could concentrate on its domestic challenges, and leave to the Europeans the management of their own problems.

This hope was understandable, but it was not realistic. The fact of the matter is that the end of the Cold War also meant the end of a period of unusual stability in Europe that had been enforced by the two-bloc system. Whereas US engagement and the NATO umbrella had succeeded in fundamentally changing Western Europe, the same could not be said for the eastern half of the continent. The question was whether Central and Eastern Europe would once again become a cauldron of ethnic hatred and a theatre of conflict and great power rivalry, or whether instead its nations could at last be integrated into the wider transatlantic family of democratic nations.

And so it became increasingly clear in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall that America's historic role in Europe, through NATO, was by no means finished. The time had come not for retreat, but for further engagement; not for a weakening of the transatlantic link, but for its widening and strengthening. Moreover, to meet the new challenges, NATO itself had to change from the static, military shield of the Cold War to a more flexible and dynamic organisation oriented to the now fluid security environment in Europe. The transformation of the Alliance is not complete, but we have already altered our strategic concept, force structures and political and security missions in fundamental ways.

As a result, the new NATO is now pursuing four broad security objectives in the new Europe:

First, to maintain the overall strategic balance in Europe as we have done since 1949. Providing this climate of security remains our number one mission, and is critical to achieving our new objectives. Without NATO's integrated military structure and the continued presence of American troops in Europe, we would risk undoing much of what we have achieved in Western Europe over the past half century, as the major European powers might be tempted once again to reorient their defence postures and policies along national lines.

Second, to extend the zone of democracy, security and stability eastwards, a process which we have begun through the establishment of the Partnership for Peace programme in 1994, which is the first truly pan-European security system since the early 19th century. PfP includes all of our former adversaries from the defunct Warsaw Pact, including Russia. Extending NATO's security community will also mean opening NATO's membership. But NATO enlargement will require a strengthening of both PfP and the NATO-Russian relationship, so that we do not create a system of haves and have nots or new dividing lines in Europe.

Third, to undertake crisis management and peacekeeping missions beyond NATO's geographic treaty area. Pressure upon the Alliance to assume such new missions came in large measure from the United States; some of you may remember the catchy phrases "NATO: out of area or out of business" and "Bosnia alive or NATO dead". And indeed it is indisputable that the Alliance must be prepared, as we are doing today in Bosnia, to deal with the instabilities on the European continent which were unleashed by the end of the Cold War. While our aim through PfP and our outreach to the east is to prevent future Bosnias from occuring, we have to be willing - with an appropriate mandate and on a case-by-case basis - to undertake peacekeeping and, if necessary, peace enforcement operations in order to prevent a given crisis from threatening our vital security interests.

Fourth, to deal with new challenges to transatlantic security, particularly those stemming from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. These are challenges that the North American and European Allies face in common and that we can tackle successfully only by working together. We proved this during the Gulf War which, though not a NATO operation as such, benefitted greatly from decades of working together in the Alliance and from the power projection capabilities offered by NATO infrastructure in Europe. Our future challenge is to develop cooperation with the countries along the Mediterranean's southern rim. NATO's new dialogue with nations of the Maghreb and the Middle East has just begun, but it is an area with great promise that I wish as Secretary General to see developed further.

In sum, I believe it is abundantly clear that NATO has begun successfully to transform itself as the Alliance moves to transform the security environment of post-Cold War Europe. However, our efforts to create a better future for Europe have at times been overshadowed by the eruption, in former Yugoslavia, of unappeased hatreds from Europe's past. For it is a sad fact that while we were busy proclaiming the arrival of a new era of peace and cooperation, the parties in the Balkans were threatening to drag us back into a dark age of ethnic conflict and balance-of-power rivalries. Even worse, the Bosnian war was starting to divide the NATO Allies and jeopardise the Alliance's most precious asset - our internal cohesion and solidarity, especially as embodied in the transatlantic link.

I do not need to recount here the story of the mistakes and missed opportunities of the past four years. What is important is simply this: the difference between the earlier part of the crisis and now, the difference between failure and success, was the active involvement of the United States in this major challenge to the security of Europe. I do not mean to imply that the US must act alone; NATO can realize its full potential only when the United States and Europe are both involved and acting together. My point is simply that challenges such as Bosnia cannot be managed unless the US is willing to play a role commensurate with its responsibilities within the Alliance.

I know there are many in Congress and throughout America who wish this were otherwise. To them, I would say two things: first, that Europe alone did not have the capacity to mount such a complex air, sea and land operation, the largest on the continent since World War II. The fact of the matter is that a substantial US ground force commitment was necessary to give credibility to the operation, in the eyes not only of the parties to the conflict, but also to the other would-be contributors. This geopolitical fact of life is reflected in NATO's military structure itself, which is commanded by American military officers.

The second point I would make to Americans is this: you are not alone in Bosnia - far from it. The bulk of the forces in IFOR are not from the United States; they have been supplied by the European Allies who have been committed on the ground in former Yugoslavia for almost four years now, and who are also contributing substantially in material and indeed in resources to rebuild Bosnia.

In fact, while IFOR could not have been launched without the leadership of the United States, neither could the US under current political circumstances have undertaken such an operation alone. Bosnia is a model for the way NATO has worked ever since its inception. In Bosnia as in the Cold War, the United States plus Europe is the recipe for success.

Let me assure you that we will indeed succeed in Bosnia. I have been there twice in the past month, and I am confident that our forces will manage to keep the peace for the duration of the IFOR mission. I do not really believe that they will face any major or organised military challenge. The parties got a very educational exposure to the power at NATO's disposal last August and September; they know our capabilities and our willingess to use them if challenged. Moreover, they want the war to finish; that is why their leaders signed the Dayton Peace Agreement. And their peoples desire peace even more.

The real questions about IFOR's success have to do with two issues unrelated to the military operation as such, namely national reconciliation and national reconstruction in Bosnia.

Reestablishing peaceful coexistence after a bloody civil war is no easy thing to accomplish. Based on my own observation, it seems to me that the desire to live again as one people exists on all sides in Bosnia, but there is a climate of mistrust which is encouraged by factional leaders who themselves do not want peace. For this problem, there are basically three remedies: the bringing to justice of those guilty of war crimes, and a generous amnesty for everyone else; free and fair elections, now scheduled for August, to produce leaders committed to peace and national reconciliation; and finally a willingness on the part of the international community to hold the leaders in Belgrade, Zagreb and Sarajevo responsible for keeping the promises they made in Dayton. These leaders want to join Western political, economic and security institutions and need to understand that their prospects for doing so will depend upon the long-term survival of an independent Bosnia.

The other key factor will be the ability of the international civilian agencies operating under the direction of Carl Bildt to begin quickly to bring about positive changes to the ruined infrastructure and economy of Bosnia. People need to see tangible evidence that peace will mean an improvement in their lives - and they need to see this soon. Mr. Bildt has a highly demanding and complicated task. But he does not yet have the necessary resources. He is off to a good start, but his mission cannot succeed unless the resources and personnel requested are made quickly available to him. And if he does not succeed, neither, in the long run, can we. And so I would strongly urge my friends in the American Congress, as I do my friends in Europe, to give Mr Bildt the support he needs to complement and consolidate the work our fine troops are doing.

But I really do not admit the possibility of failure. Too much is at stake, which is why we went into Bosnia in the first place. The fact is that we cannot achieve our security agenda for peace and stability in the wider Europe if we do not achieve peace in Bosnia. What perhaps is not well understood, however, is that IFOR is not a detour from this agenda, but is really in effect a trial run for the various elements which will constitute the transatlantic security architecture in the 21st century.

Think about it for a moment. IFOR is not just a NATO operation. NATO's 16 Allies in fact, represent only half the total of contributing nations. Perhaps most noteworthy, Russia is also participating in IFOR. This proves that in spite of sometimes heated rhetoric, it is indeed possible for NATO and Russia to work together in a partnership of equals and deal pragmatically with the real security challenges of our times.

Also serving with us in IFOR are many other of our close partners in the PfP programme. Indeed, their ability to operate to NATO standards is already a vindication of PfP's effectiveness, just as their performance in IFOR will undoubtedly improve the readiness of candidates for NATO membership.

Finally, IFOR comprises yet another set of participating countries - neutral nations such as Finland and Sweden, and even non-European nations such as Morocco, Malaysia and Jordan. These are nations with which NATO had strictly nothing to do for more than 40 years. Their presence in this NATO-led operation is one more sign of the astonishing road the Alliance has travelled in the short time since the end of the Cold War. And the presence of all the non-NATO nations in this coalition for peace is an indication of where the Alliance is heading in the years to come.

Where we are heading is towards the creation of a security architecture for a united and democratic Europe, with NATO as its cornerstone. The steps we take in 1996 in this direction will be critical, especially the intensified dialogue we will begin in April with potential candidates for NATO membership. We will also have to redouble our efforts to develop a special relationship with Russia, explaining that the enlargement of NATO will strengthen, and not weaken, stability in the wider Europe. And we will have to continue to expand the activities of the Partnership for Peace, which will become of increasing importance to those nations which may not be candidates for early membership in NATO.

As I have said before, we cannot achieve this ambitious agenda without the continued leadership of the United States in NATO. But it is not necessarily the case that the US will always have to assume a predominant role in every future contingency. In this sense, IFOR is also teaching us lessons about the further changes which will be necessary to NATO structures to prepare the Alliance not only for enlargement, but also for the assumption of greater defence responsibilities by the European Allies. As Secretary of Defence Perry said in Munich a few weeks ago, Bosnia demonstrated the need to "make NATO's command structure more responsive and more flexible, and streamline the planning and force preparation process, and simplify and speed up the entire decision-making process".

Spurred by the recent decision of France to draw closer to NATO's military bodies, we have begun to examine structural reforms which could permit the European Allies to assume command of NATO forces and assets for a given operation where the United States chose not to become involved, especially on the ground. I think such a reform is timely and ought to be welcomed in the US as a means of permitting equitable burdensharing across the Atlantic. However, I believe strongly that we should do nothing which undermines NATO's unique and proven integrated military structure; we should not throw out the baby with the bathwater. At the end of the day, the transformation of NATO should not be a process which in any way results in a lessened American role or commitment to the Alliance; it should result in the Europeans doing more and all of us together doing more to promote our common security interests.

I say this because I have a strong personal belief in the transatlantic link and the continuing importance of American engagement in Europe. As a young man, I was a student in the United States, and I began my professional career here. As Foreign Minister of Spain during the Spanish Presidency of the European Union last year, I did my utmost to widen US and European cooperation to areas beyond the security field. These efforts were embodied in the "New Transatlantic Agenda" signed in December by President Clinton, Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez and EU President Jacques Santer.

And now, as Secretary General of NATO, I have the opportunity to help prepare for the 21st extending our security community across the whole of Europe, through PfP, enlargement and a cooperative relationship with Russia. And we must succeed in managing jointly the global challenges beyond Europe which confront the Allies on both sides of the Atlantic. But I am eager for these challenges, confident that this Alliance will still be equal to its historic mission.