"NATO and the Development of the European Security and Defence Identity"

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The debate on ESDI has been with us in one form or another for a very long time. So long, in fact, that a false idea of immobility has gained ground. Of all the ideas set out at Maastricht and NATO's 1991 Rome Summit, the ESDI seems to have the least visibility and made the least progress.

The idea that nothing has happened on ESDI is false, of course. What is true is that the progress that has been made has been fitful and at times difficult. There never has been any dispute on the principle or the aim of what we are doing. The Europeans should develop their ability to operate together, while preserving the transatlantic framework of their security and defence policy. There is no dispute about that - either between Europeans within NATO, or across the Atlantic.

The problem has come in the implementation. There were two main reasons for this. First, because the attempts to define and develop the ESDI have been conducted in different fora. The division of labour implied in 1991 between NATO, WEU and the EU was never very clear and did not always permit a coherent approach to security and defence in Europe. There are major overlaps in interest, and it is impossible to partition security into its parts and allocate them to institutions. Just as the EU sought to develop its Common Foreign and Security Policy, so the Alliance also began to define its own security policy more broadly and more politically. Inevitably, each institution saw its role, its priorities in a different perspective.

The second reason for the problem of implementing ESDI, I would suggest, is a certain lack of imagination. Or, at least, the age old difficulty for strategic thinkers of not being able to predict the future. 1991 was a very optimistic year in terms of security expectations. The most formidable of all European problems - its division - had been solved. There appeared no reason why other, lesser problems could not also be solved in time through a combination of diplomatic and economic instruments.

What many failed to realise five years ago was that NATO's military structures would remain invaluable for preserving peace and security in Europe. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Alliance's role has gone through several phases - through monitoring and enforcing embargoes, to the use of air power to support the UN, and now in implementing the Dayton Peace Accord.

No one now disputes that NATO's military structure has been a key instrument in bringing peace to Bosnia. Or that it is an asset which can serve broader interests of the Allies and the international community. It would be impossible to re-create such a structure outside NATO, and fatal to undermine this structure within NATO.

That is why the Berlin ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council was so significant. It opened a whole new chapter. For the first time the decision was taken to create a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO. All Allies are committed to developing the capacity for European-led actions.

There is a commitment to changing the NATO structure to facilitate this, and it is one of our main priorities as we prepare for a Summit next year.

The new structure will be streamlined and reduced. France and Spain will, I hope, participate fully in it. One of the basic features of the reform is to create a visible European arrangement within the structure. Within a streamlined structure, the European military will play a greater part. To succeed, the new structure should reflect the full European dimension of NATO, including most obviously Spain and France - countries which have been involved in NATO's Bosnian operations in a major way from the very start.

In future crises NATO will continue to be fully capable of undertaking all missions, including non-Article 5 operations. For any major problem, the best and safest choice is NATO. Yet, it is also possible that some operations, which may differ in scale or be local in character, could be launched by the WEU with NATO's help. We want to build that additional option - a European-led, WEU-directed operation - into our new structure.

This is not because we need eventually to replace NATO with a European Defence System. On the contrary. The reason is a practical one. We cannot predict all possible contingencies, and we should not tie ourselves to one organisational response. Sharing the European security burden with the United States means that we should not expect the US to lead every action or contribute significantly to every operation. There may be times when a European-led force would be appropriate. In that case, the US, as an Ally committed to European security, would support the WEU, through NATO, even though it might not want to assume the full weight of leadership.

Another point that should be clear is that we do not want an Alliance within an Alliance. The ESDI is not a grouping, but a potential within NATO. It is of concern and interest to all Allies. I believe firmly that it should be organised on the principle that all European Allies may participate in it; NATO is more than a combination of EU countries and the United States. We have other European and North American Allies who contribute significantly to our common security. They should not be marginalised inadvertently by the development of the ESDI in an exclusive way.

It is clear that NATO will remain the ultimate guarantor of security. It can combine and coordinate the Allies' aim to strengthen stability throughout the continent. The more that the Europeans can do this with the United States, the more successful we will be. I believe it is a totally false idea that the United States is losing interest in Europe or that its eventual military withdrawal is inevitable. Events in the Balkans demonstrate that to have any influence there, we must act together, with the United States.

NATO's restructuring is just one element of a series of changes which together will lead to a new NATO, in terms of outlook as well as organisation. This new NATO will provide a strong sense of reassurance throughout the continent. NATO enlargement is already having a powerful effect on the way Central and Eastern Europe is developing.

Within the next few years, we will have new members, a strengthened Partnership for Peace and special arrangements with Russia and Ukraine. This broader outward-looking Alliance will give a strong integrating dimension to Europe as a whole.

NATO does not need an enemy to exist. The Alliance remains as relevant today as it ever has. NATO's members work together in the Alliance because they can bring their combined energy to bear in shaping European security. NATO's key strategic objective is to help create political conditions which make crises and conflicts less and less likely. This is what we mean when we speak about building a new European security architecture: building a set of political relationships where each state feels secure and at ease. This - not the antagonism of the past - is the context in which NATO's approach to the Mediterranean must be viewed. NATO must look to the South, as well as it must look to the East.

Through our Mediterranean dialogue, NATO currently is in dialogue with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. These relationships will help us gain a better understanding of one another's security concerns and reduce some of the misunderstanding and mistrust that exists between us. NATO does not see the world in terms of cultural clashes. Rather, it focuses on avoiding instability - the threat which all of us have to guard against.

How could the dialogue evolve? We are not talking a Southern version of "Partnership for Peace". PfP draws its momentum and significance from the unique and deep-rooted divisions which scarred Central Europe for so long. It cannot be applied wholesale to the Mediterranean region. In the Mediterranean we can learn from PfP, but we have to find and apply specific solutions.

There is much scope for activity, not least by expanding our level of contacts and information exchanges. Ideas will be discussed by Alliance Foreign Ministers at the NAC in December. The initiative has started well; and it will maintain its momentum.

Ladies and Gentlemen, what we are doing in the Mediterranean is one example of complementarity. Most of the top issues we have to address will require European organisations to work more closely with each other. In Bosnia, we have a microcosm of what we should be aiming for. There we see the competences and various skills of all our institutions combining. NATO is providing a secure environment; WEU, EU and OSCE are all there too. The elections held in September succeeded because it was a team effort. The next phase, in 1997 will see, even more so, a combination of organisations working together. My visits to the countries have convinced me of the real practical benefits of this approach.

The ESDI has required NATO to develop links with the Western European Union. The WEU and NATO will be the most obvious example of synergy. I believe also that as we move increasingly from questions of NATO reform to dealing with concrete issues, the question of real complementarity with the European Union will also arise.

NATO and the EU have common strategic interests. We ought increasingly to recognise that fact and act on it. This conference will, in the next two days, look closely at the question of United States and EU Partnership. Having worked on the details of the EU-US action plan agreed in Madrid, I am pleased that the ideas are taking shape and being acted on. I am sure that the fundamental partnership that exists between North America and Europe through NATO will also be in the forefront of your discussions.