Opening remarks

Good morning, everyone. And thank you for the warm welcome, Christophe.

It is wonderful to see many of you again after welcoming you to NATO earlier this year.

I know the Secretary General, Mark Rutte, was delighted to attend your joint meeting with the Committee on Foreign Affairs in January.

And he is looking forward to attending the Conference of Presidents next week.

This is all part of our commitment to step up NATO-EU cooperation.

And both of us are in close and regular contact with colleagues across the EU institutions.

The Secretary General said it himself when he was here in January, the security situation in Europe is deeply worrying.

There is an arc of instability stretching from Europe’s eastern flank across our southern border.

And while we are ready to deter and defend our nations today, we may not be ready for what is coming our way in five years’ time.

However the war in Ukraine ends, we will face a battle-hardened Russia that is rapidly reconstituting and has not given up its ambitions to reshape European security.

China is also conducting a massive military build-up, including of its nuclear forces, with no limits or transparency.

And other threats to our security persist, from cyber-attacks to the sabotage of critical infrastructure, and the ongoing threat of terrorism.

Keeping our people safe is our most sacred duty as public servants.

It is what our citizens expect. And it is what our stability and prosperity depend on.

But prioritising defence and security spending over other domestic concerns is one of the hardest decisions we as elected officials have to make.

Trust me, as a former Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister, I know.

Investing in strong defence requires political courage and leadership.

And we have seen bold decisions in abundance recently.

Allied leaders are responding to the Secretary General’s strong message that two percent of GDP will not keep us safe in a more dangerous world.

Two-thirds of NATO Allies now spend at least two percent of their GDP on defence.

In 2024 alone, European Allies and Canada increased investments by 20 percent.

And since 2014, they have added more than 700 billion dollars for defence.

That’s not just good for our security. It’s also good for jobs and our economies.

And Allies are now pledging to go even further and faster.

Because the security of one billion people is at stake.

A dozen Allies have recently announced huge boosts to their defence spending and to modernise their militaries.

Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland have already pledged to move to five percent of GDP in the coming years.

Others, including Czechia, Denmark, France, Norway, and the UK, have committed to go well beyond two percent.

The German parliament just loosened the debt-brake to unlock unprecedented extra defence spending.

And Allies not yet at two percent, like Belgium and Canada, have announced plans to get there soon.

So leaders are really stepping up at the national level. And at the European level too.

President von der Leyen’s Rearm Europe initiative promises to leverage up to 800 billion euros for defence.

We welcome that Europe is finally stepping up to shoulder a greater responsibility for our shared security.

But this does not mean that going it alone is a winning strategy – for either Europe or the US.

The stakes are too high and the challenges to our security are simply too great.

The Secretary General was very clear about this when he came to the Parliament in January.

And it was his strong message when he spoke with President Trump in the Whitehouse last week.

What we need is a stronger European pillar within a strong NATO.

Because the transatlantic relationship remains the cornerstone of European security and of global stability.

There has been a lot of talk about disagreements between Europe and the US recently.

But there are many things we all agree on.

And we have heard this repeatedly from President Trump and members of his top team, including when the Secretary General was in Washington last week.

We all agree that Ukraine needs real and lasting peace. Not another Minsk three.

We all agree that Europe needs to take more responsibility for its own security and invest more in defence.

And we all agree that we need a strong NATO, underpinned by our iron-clad commitment to defend each other through NATO’s Article 5.

NATO and the European Union are natural and indispensable partners. And we already do so much together.

From the maritime domain to protecting critical infrastructure, and strengthening our cyber defences to countering information threats.

In recent years, we have expanded our cooperation to include areas like new technologies, space and the defence industry.

For Europe and North America to remain strong, we need to stick together and play to our respective strengths.

NATO is focused on hard security, and defining military plans, capabilities and standards.

The EU can use its unique economic leverage to boost defence production and innovation.

And invest more in military mobility to ensure we can get the right forces to the right place at the right time.

But to be truly successful, we need to involve non-EU Allies as much as possible in Europe’s initiatives on defence.

It is inconceivable to think we can keep Europe safe without the Canada, Iceland, Norway, Türkiye, the UK and US.

This is not just a question of geography. It is also a question of cash, capabilities and credibility.

Given the challenges we face, we need the entire transatlantic family on board.

Europe and North America must also continue to work hand-in-hand together to support our partners.

We saw this in Kosovo, when I visited with the North Atlantic Council last week.

And the Secretary General was also in Bosnia and Herzegovina, where NATO supports EUFOR ALTHEA under the Berlin-Plus arrangements.

As the Secretary General reiterated during these visits, the Western Balkans is a region of strategic importance for NATO.

We will not allow security in the region to be jeopardised.

And we count on all political leaders to work together towards reconciliation and lasting peace.

Finally, of course, NATO and the EU have worked in lockstep to support Ukraine.

And to impose costs on Russia, including through sanctions.

NATO Allies provide 99 percent of all military support to Ukraine.

And the European Union’s economic, humanitarian and military aid has been vital.

NATO and the EU are cooperating across the board, including when it comes to training Ukrainian soldiers.

Europeans are also taking more responsibility for supporting Ukraine.

Last year, European Allies and Canada provided 60 percent of the financial support we pledged to Ukraine.

Countries, led by the UK and France, have shown they are ready and willing to support the peace.

We welcome the recent substantial pledges from Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, the UK and others.

And initiatives like the Danish model to invest in the Ukrainian defence industry.

 

NATO continues to support Ukraine in many other ways, including through our comprehensive assistance package.

And our Joint Analysis, Training and Education Centre which I had the honour to open in February.

This is the first joint entity run by NATO and a partner nation.

It also makes us stronger and safer, as we learn valuable lessons from this war.

Not least from Ukraine’s development of cutting-edge capabilities, including drone production.

So ladies and gentlemen,

Europe is really stepping up.

Investing more in defence and security.

Playing a bigger role in supporting Ukraine.

Rebalancing the burden of responsibility within NATO.

Developing critical capabilities and enablers.

And showing that within a strong NATO, Europe can be a true security provider together with the US.

All of this will be high on our agenda when NATO leaders meet in The Hague for our Summit in June.

And I will be very happy to discuss these and any other issues with you today.

Members of this Parliament play a crucial role in communicating to our publics the importance of investing in strong defence and a strong transatlantic bond.

So thank you again and I look forward to our discussion.

 

Rasa Juknevičienė, Lithuanian MEP

Thank you very much and welcome, Ms Shekerinska, here in our committee and I will start by saying that, responding and agreeing what you just said, that the EU is determined to take responsibility for the continent's security, and we have, we must do this. And I would like to start not only expressing my solidarity on the tragic events in your country, but also expressing good wish and wishing you everything the best for membership in EU, because now it's more than ever, it's clear that we need you here in EU, and you need EU, not only as an alliance for better life, but for the life for the future. I have two questions, first, at the 2019 NATO anniversary in Washington, DC, former NATO Secretary General, Stoltenberg, said that Article Five is not set in stone. Today, this is understood not only by those who are close to decision making within NATO. Yesterday, news reached us, not yet official, that the US is giving up the role of NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe, known within military as SACEUR, so I do think I know that you will not be able maybe answer this question in direct way, but still, if this would be a de facto us withdrawal. So what's about the future of NATO? And second, I have a question about how to convince the member states that they use security as a solidarity commitment. Poland already spends almost 5% on defence. My country’s over 4% although pensioners in our region need pensions as the same EU citizens as for example, in Spain and other countries, they are not delivering those 2%. They were agreed and a long lasting requirement of NATO countries to spend at least 2% so I think, is because societies do perceive the threat of war differently. So what we can do more, because now is the time to giving, for giving from the countries not only taking in order to defend European Union or European continent.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you for asking. Sven Mikser, thank you.

Sven Mikser, Estonian MEP

Thank you Chair and thank you for the presentation. And I very much agree with you when it comes to the need to increase our defence spending and improve our capabilities. However, when we speak about deterrence, then deterrence, obviously is a combination of military readiness and political resolve and political messaging. At these very confusing times we are all trying to manage our transatlantic relationship, and I appreciate that the NATO Secretary General is in a very particular, particularly difficult position when it comes to this. However, I could not help noticing last week, when Secretary General spoke after his discussions with the US president. And his statement included what appeared to be a call for a long term normalization with Russia, even though he stressed that we are not there yet. It's rather difficult for me to imagine that this call would represent a sort of political consensus among Allied capitals, Allied governments. At this point yesterday, we discussed at SEDE committee how we can proceed with the documentation and investigation of Russian war crimes in Ukraine in this new situation where the US appears to be rolling back its involvement in this endeavor. And my concern is that if any post war settlement would include some sort of impunity for war crimes or crimes against humanity or crime of aggression, which is a leadership crime, all those crimes committed in Ukraine, then this inevitably would, in a long term, weaken the political element of deterrence. So what can you say to allay those fears of mine?

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you. For Patriots, Pierre-Romain Thionnet.

Pierre-Romain Thionnet, French MEP

Thank you, Madam Deputy Secretary General. I'll be speaking French this morning for this comment. Mr Gomart recalled in his introduction, there have been important statements by the US administration members thereof, Hegseth, for example, recalled two things about NATO: that we should put an end of this unbalanced relationship between Europe and the US, and to put an end to this imbalanced relationship, the best thing would be for Europe to take up their responsibilities more in our meetings, based on the industrial EDIP, for example, we talk much about military capacity, investment, quantitative elements, increase in defence budgets, very crucial. But we also know, if we think about defence, we know that it is also a capability to bring together forces in the Transatlantic Alliance and commandment. Therefore, I'd like to come back to what our colleague from the EPP has just mentioned, we're talking about sharing the burden. And it makes sense then that if there's a quantitative investment that is increased on the European side, that should then mean a better sharing of command positions and responsibility, so based on the recent statements, but beyond those statements, is it not a simple way to better share the burden, and that would mean that Europeans would also have command positions in the European theater, for example, it's a logical conclusion to those comments. Thank you.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Petras?

Petras Auštrevičius, Lithuanian MEP

Thank you. How far is NATO going to cooperate with the European Union? Maybe we need protocol number four, number five and number six at once in order to reach a kind of breakthrough in our cooperation, in our joint actions, because it's inevitable and it's really urgent. So are there any plans, I mean, from the NATO side to come up with the constructive proposal, for example, inviting the European Union to do something and to agree on further cooperation in this regard, and how much the NATO side is ready to extend partnerships with countries more like-minded, which probably expressed already readiness and willingness to join the Alliance in future, but to have real defence cooperation now, because we need more like this, in particular on the European NATO, let's say pillar. So are there any intentions to, for example, to propose some comprehensive partnerships with those countries in order to achieve this cohesiveness in this regard, thank you.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you. For the Greens, Villy Søvndal.

Villy Søvndal, Danish MEP

Thank you very much. Thank you very much for being here. First of all, I'm not so sure where the relationship between EU and US is moving. I would like to be wrong like that very much. But I think when you're discussing defence, you cannot only express what you hope. You also have to express the case which is the worst case to prepare your population in your country to be able to take the measures that's needed. I was a former Danish foreign minister at a time where it was very easy. It was during the Obama administration, and the reason why it was easy was that we shared values. We shared the basic values about how this world looks like, and where we wanted to move it to. We do not share these values with the present American administration, to my view, my point of view. We were very occupied by making strong international institutions. UN, US is drawing out of the UN institutions. NATO, where the president of US has expressed himself in a way that creates doubt, if there is a chapter five working in NATO, but also a lot of other international institutions. Ukraine, we shared a common wish to protect Ukraine. In my point of view, the present American administration shifted sides and started first negotiations with Putin, and then later informed Ukraine what they had been discussing, of course, also in the view of international law, as I started with, I would like very much to be wrong, and I appreciate the cooperation we had with the US, I hope it will someday be possible to reconstruct that relation. But in between, my best advice would be, prepare for the worst scenario, which is that we have in every respect, to be able to stand on our own feet. Thank you.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you.

Siegbert Droese, German MEP

Thank you, Mr Chair. I speak in German. Thank you very much for your report, madam, I find it remarkable that NATO certainly recently has spoken more about peace in Ukraine than is being spoken about peace in the European Commission. I well remember the visit from Secretary General Rutte, who spoke about the figures, the figures that we would need for European defence, and what that would cost the member states. And I remember how he responded to the question of the European Union, discussing this defence union, and that the Member States should rather stick to this 2% goal, meaning that NATO would then be guaranteeing our security and defence in the future, and that the European Union should concentrate rather on diplomacy and economic stability. So that was one way of framing the issues. Trump had a telephone call with Putin, and the quote that's come out of that is that Donald Trump was advocating friendly relations to Russia and also China would also be involved. Secretary General Rutte also put things in a similar fashion a week ago. Of course, he referred to the end of the war in Ukraine, that would be the precondition, but he really did say that relations with Russian need to be reconstructed. So my question is, could you tell us what Secretary General Rutte meant by that, what could these relations at the end of the war encompass? Thank you.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you, madam. May give you the floor, but you have 10 minutes, because if it's possible to have a second round of questions, it'd be great. Thank you.

NATO Deputy Secretary General, Radmila Shekerinska

Thank you very much for the questions and I won't quote the specific question so that I'm more efficient, but I'll try to cover all of them. Thank you very much for supporting enlargement. It's not part of NATO's, of course, domain, but what we have said again and again is that, of course, what EU enlargement succeeded in is to extend the space of security and peace. And we count on the EU continuing this commitment. And we have heard very strong voices when we were visiting the region, how important this, not only just the hope, but also the tangible process, is for all of the countries, Bosnia and Herzegovina, for Kosovo, but also for the whole region.

Let me now deal with the general issue of burden sharing, or US-Europe, NATO questions, since quite a number of them were asked. Yes, I have referred to disagreements that are visible, vocal and clear, but there are certain things on which we agree, and there was a very clear commitment at our defence ministerial, but also during Secretary General’s visit to the White House, that the United States, the new United States administration, is really committed to NATO, to the Transatlantic relationship, to Article Five, but that this commitment also contains an expectation, and that this expectation is that all the other Allies will contribute more. And I have to say that this is hardly a new thing. I mean, I have been a defence minister before we joined NATO, and even as a partner, I would hear the same discussions. And if you go back in history, you will hear the same calls by a number of US presidents I knew since the 60s, someone said it's actually there from the 50s. And on the other side, I actually agree that in most cases, this was always a European position, that there has to be a need for more Europe within a strong NATO. So I do believe that when it comes to this, instead of only focusing on the what if, although I know what you mean, we should focus on what needs to be done.

Because when we say a stronger European pillar within a strong NATO, what do we mean by this? We do mean to invest more. We do mean to produce more, and we mean to do more, which means that we will need more defence spending on behalf of all Allies, more capabilities, which need more defence production, and I'll come back to this, and also taking a bit more responsibilities apropos your question. And I believe that if you look at the structure within NATO, and especially throughout the European continent, you will see that Europe has taken even until now a significant share of this burden. I mean, quite a number of European Allies are already lead nations of our multinational forward land forces in Central and Eastern Europe. Now, not mentioning them, but KFOR is also led by a European commander, if I'm not mistaken, an Italian one. And then the battle group in Bulgaria is led by Italy, the battle group in Estonia by the United Kingdom. The battle group in Lithuania is led by Germany, etc. Sweden will soon lead the newly established presence in Finland. We have European Allies supporting strongly the air policing missions throughout the continent. So it is something that is currently an ongoing process, and it speaks volumes of the responsibility of the Allies, but also the commitment to do more in defence.

Of course, the question when we talk about these kinds of defence spending decisions, the question is, can we convince all member states to contribute? I think words were never enough, but what is happening around us, and the current security situation has been a clear signal for most Allies that this is not just a political decision that we have undertaken. In 2014 we took a decision of 2% in a completely different global security environment, and what the Secretary General stated clearly in the European Parliament was that, after this incredible global shift, increased instability, a number of critical vulnerabilities, it is clear that we need to invest more in our defence capabilities. And this is what NATO does. You know, we really focused for the defence ministerial that will happen in the beginning of June, we focused completely on what kind of capabilities do we need? Because even the discussion that is complicated enough on defence spending, it's not enough. I mean, as an expert said a few months ago, you don't go and defend your country with percentages of GDP. You really fight it if you have a defence capability, and you fight it by creating these deterrence with having the capabilities. So what we focus very much was on developing these capability targets for the Allies, consulting them and our hope and our real focus for June is very much that we will have a clear agreement.

So instead of just talking percentages of GDP, we focus on what needs to be done with those defense with that defense spending, I agree on the more precise question, there were quite a number of stories. I mean, just two weeks ago, there was an announcement that allegedly, US troops are withdrawing from NATO exercises? This was not true. They participated in a number of exercises that are ongoing on our continent, but sometimes it is difficult, really, to keep pace with all these fears and concerns. We fully agree with you that deterrence is also about messaging. And the way in which we display our unity matters. The messages that come out of defense ministerial, the foreign ministerial that will take place at the beginning of April, at the summit, they will matter. But of course, action speaks louder than words. So whenever there is an announcement by a certain ally that they are increasing their defense spending, it is part of our deterrence. Whenever there is a move on budgetary changes, this is also deterrence, and whenever we actually come up with new defense capabilities that is even heard louder.

So we also will have to do more at the next meetings among allies to be very clear about how our plans are, what are our joint goals, and to send this message of deterrence, both when it comes to our security, but also when it comes to global security. When mentioning global security, I will just say that we are developing relationship with different partners. And for the next meetings, we are envisaging our four partners from the Indo-Pacific to join us, and the focus very much is on developing cooperation with these four IP countries to cooperate on defence production, on innovation. This is an area where we actually can take full advantage of the different experiences, but also strong sides.

On the issue of how do we divide a bit the responsibility when it comes to commands and control, I think the important part is to have the fair burden sharing, and it will be visible in all the different formats that I have mentioned so money, capabilities, command. But as I mentioned, this is something that is happening as we speak. On the issue of Russia, what the Secretary General stated and reiterated, especially at his last interview, was that he knows that the context of a reconfigured relationship with Russia is only there for the really long run, because there is no expectation that Russia will overnight change not only its behaviour in Ukraine, but also its behaviour in Europe. With their signalling, their statements, their defence spending, shows that they are really interested in undermining the European security architecture in more general terms.

So this is not something that the Secretary General had in mind for, you know, a short run or now. What we have is actually as an Alliance, a strategy on how to deal with these issues, and this is something that we will continue discussing, and this will constitute part of our joint, united Allied policy towards our relationship with Russia, and it will require the endorsement of all Allies, because this is how the Alliance works. You know, with an endorsement of all 32 so thank you.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you, Madam, second round of questions, Juan Ignacio Zoido, please.

Juan Zoido Álvarez, Spanish MEP

Thank you very much. Chair. Good morning. Ms Shekerinska. I think most of the people in this room are convinced that NATO is an essential partner to the European Union. However, some political parties are promoting the opposite, including suggesting that we leave NATO in Spain, part of the government is using an anachronistic discourse, and this morning, there's going to be a vote in the Congress in favour of Spain leaving NATO. This discourse goes against common sense, and it goes against all of the warnings that NATO’s Secretary General has given us last week. We are going through a time of great geopolitical sensitivity, and we cannot send dangerous signals at this time, or ambiguous signals about the situation. We need unity. I'd like to know what do you think about this discourse that we've seen, and how can we avoid this undermining of Europe's credibility and NATO's credibility? Thank you very much, and good luck.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you. Michał Szczerba, no, sorry, Tonino.

Tonino Picula, Croatian MEP

Thank you, Madam Deputy Secretary General, dear Radmila. First of all, I would like to express my deepest condolences to you and the people of North Macedonia for this terrible tragedy in Kočani where so many young lives were lost. We are in the most challenging geopolitical times since the Cold War. That means we bear huge responsibility towards our citizens, who more and more feel security as priority. European security is not a given. Those days are gone. That's why we need to boost defence spending and funding needs to be secured in parallel without successful and good cohesion policies. You have outlined it in your introductory remarks about how do you assess the security situation in the Western Balkans and what do you see as a biggest threat to security and stability, particularly in countries with EU and NATO missions. Thank you.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you. Michał Szczerba.

Michał Szczerba, Polish MEP

Yes, Mr Chair, thank you very much. And thank you, Deputy Secretary General, for your presentation. And I have to tell you that let's have no illusions, because a paradigm shift has taken place in the US, and we have to work with it. But I would like to tell you that there was a response these hours in the US Capitol Hill on the news, which was created by NBC about withdrawing the US leadership of Supreme Allied Commander Europe, the discussion is going on, and we had, what we can say, a very rare reaction of both two chairman of the armed services, both in the Congress and in the Senate, on this. So the situation looks very, very serious. So could you like a little bit elaborate on this? Coming back to Ukraine, a frozen conflict without security guarantees for Ukraine, would not last long. So this is we have to have in mind, and NATO and the EU we should work together on this, to make the position of Ukraine in this negotiation, to strengthen this position and to increase pressure on Russia. But I also have a good news for you. You can deliver it also to the Secretary General. This is the joint white paper, and especially the new chapter, which was presented on border protection, the project, the flagship project of the Polish Presidency, the Eastern border shield, was mentioned in here, and it's a very important integrated land border management system that will also benefit to the Eastern Flank of NATO. Thank you very much.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you, I’ll ask again: one minute each. Matej Tonin, please.

Matej Tonin, Slovenian MEP

Madam Shekerinska, I'm glad to have you here welcome into the European Parliament. As a disclaimer, I have to say that I was very satisfied when you were appointed as a Deputy Secretary General, because when we served together as defence ministers, I remember you as a doer, and in today's time, that's very important. So I will touch upon defence spending. In Wales, ten years ago, we promised each other that until now, we will spend 2% of our GDP for defence spending. But there are still nations who didn't deliver. Unfortunately, my country is among them. And my question is very simple, what will our Alliance, NATO will do with countries which doesn't want to deliver and they are not… they just don't give a [cursive language] about the solidarity. That's the question of credibility. So I was always thinking, if you have countries which don't feel that they are threatened, maybe we can establish a NATO fund where we can invest our money if we don't want to build our defence capabilities. So are there any innovative approaches on how to push countries to reach the spending targets?

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you. Next, Andrey Novakov.

Andrey Novakov, Bulgarian MEP

Thank you, Chair. Madam Shekerinska, the thoughts and the prayers of Bulgarian people are with you. We talk a lot today about messages, the messages that some of the member states on the Eastern Flank of NATO received is that if you don't have minerals under your soil, then you better pray, because it seems that to be part of the equation you need to have something to offer in order to secure your land. I know that the negotiations are going on. We received a lot of promises by the Russian side. And I want to quote one which the Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia, Mr Sergey Ryabkov, gave in Geneva to the Deputy Secretary of State, Wendy Sherman, on 11th of February, 2022 and I'm quoting here, “there is no reason to fear of such scenarios. We are not planning, nor have intentions, to conquer Ukraine.” Ten days later, we know what happened, so don't judge if we don't believe what Russians are saying. Thank you.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you, next Hélder Sousa.

Hélder Sousa Silva, Portuguese MEP

Deputy Secretary General, madam, the credibility of the EU as a defence player depends clearly on the capability to have effective interoperable forces in NATO and a robust, innovative industrial base. And for this purpose, I have two questions. First, recent supply shocks show the vulnerability of the EU in munitions, advanced arms systems and energy supply. What role can NATO play to make sure that there is logistic resilience of all of its members in a prolonged conflict scenario? The second is on the Balkans. Now, I saw that NATO, and I was pleased to see this, that NATO considers this area a crucial area, and does not intend to lead a void. Bosnia, just a few weeks back, I was there, and what I saw that the situation is extremely complex. Complicated. Would it be needed to bolster the EUFOR in Bosnia, and would NATO be prepared to do that? Thank you.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you. Next one, Bart Groothuis.

Bart Groothuis, Dutch MEP

Thank you for coming here. Deputy Secretary and I have short questions. The first is, whenever we engage with NATO in the past decades, we asked for Europe to build strategic weapons system or strategic enablers. A consequent response, especially from the US part NATO, was, “don't do it, We don't want you to double anything in Europe”. How can we trust NATO assessments on gaps, on what we need to do in Europe to actually build a European pillar in NATO? Does NATO have accurate assessments in that respect? The second is, I agree with what my Polish colleague just said on SACEUR. Those are very frightening messages that come to us from the Republican side of the Hill, and they say we want to withdraw SACEUR. The best thing about SACEUR is he had back reach, back reach in Pentagon. He could actually mobilize American assets for Europe whenever that was possible. What are the consequences, in your view, when they actually would withdraw SACEUR from the NATO Alliance in Brussels? And the last is, what if the EU command and said command would be withdrawn? Those are things I hear on the Hill as well. The Trump administration is actually actively debating on it. What is the strategy of NATO when it comes to withdrawing such assets from Europe? Those are things I'd like to hear. Thank you.

Vice-chair of the Committee on Security and Defence, Christoph Gomart

Thank you, madam. The floor is yours for a few minutes. Thank you.

NATO Deputy Secretary General, Radmila Shekerinska

Okay, yeah, I'll try to go one after the other in very few minutes. I fully agree with you that the message that we need to send is that NATO is the cornerstone of collective defence, and within that cornerstone, we need to inject more European resources, more European capabilities, and clear commitment within the structure. On these messages, I think that we all can play a certain role. And instead of just responding to different comments, I think we should focus on sending this message, and this was very clearly our intention, also in the Western Balkans when we paid this visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina and then to KFOR, the message that we have sent is that both NATO and EU remain committed to the region and that we really work together.

Tonino asked me about the different challenges in the Western Balkans. Of course, everyone has received the news from Bosnia and Herzegovina with serious concern. The Secretary General was very vocal about this. He stated that NATO will not allow for a security vacuum, but this is actually in a country where we are supporting the EUFOR Althea under the Berlin plus arrangement, and this is probably an area where we would need even more constant cooperation between our two organizations. We welcome the fact that EUFOR decided to increase their troops and their reserve there. And if there is a need, I mean, I think it will be, it will be useful to go along these lines. But the general security concern for the region is that there are too many open issues. And unfortunately, there is not much of a political appetite to solve them, and as long as they persist, there always will be a nationalist rhetoric, people who will use it in order to score few points and to improve their election chances, but also to steer fear and concern among citizens in order to prevail. So this is why although we were meeting in a KFOR format, the message was very clear: we support the EU led dialog now with the new representative, Sørensen, we stand ready really to support him in any possible way.

But just a side comment on what Tonino mentioned about the condolences. You know, this is our experience in North Macedonia, when some problem really happens, it is first your neighbours and your region and the EU that come to your assistance. And I really see this, and I want to welcome and thank all the member states of the European Union and all the others who are really very quick in doing this. So this is maybe a lessons learned for everyone.

On the… and this more or less addresses a robust EUFOR is stronger. Our KFOR mission in Kosovo is the longest serving and largest NATO mission, and we have actually really strengthened the KFOR and we invited some of the Allies to contribute even more capabilities

On defence spending, and we need more doers. So I agree with you, and there are various ways in which an Ally can support the military capabilities. Actually the capability targets that we are sending to Allies are very demanding, and as the Secretary General mentioned, they will be much, much above 3% so it's not a question that Allies have nowhere to put the money into. It's on the contrary, the capability targets will be financially demanding, but also what we have seen is after a certain number of countries announced their higher defence spending, after it became clear that the defence capability targets will be higher, this was also the signal that the defence industry needed. We have talked to many Allies who were complaining that they have increased defence spending, but it's very difficult to get these capabilities in due time because there are huge delays in the in the execution of the contracts. The defence industry, on the other side, was complaining that they are not certain that this commitment will be realistic and sustained. So having this message by NATO, having this message now by the EU, actually does create this signal for defence industry, and we have seen that they are responding to that signal.

On the issue, yeah, on the question of, “does NATO have the best assess assessment for capabilities”. Well, we pride ourselves to really be strong in this field, and the problem with the capabilities that we have now is not that they were the wrong ones. Is that the debts among some of the Allies, they were written in paper, but they were not materialized because of defence cuts or lack of significant contribution to defence budgets. So it is clear that on certain priorities, we all have to do more. And some of you, I think, started naming it. It's basically, it's ammunition, but it's air defence, it's long range weapons, it's logistics, it's military mobility, where the EU actually does more, its large land, manoeuvrable formations, on all of these things, the capabilities were there. They're upgraded, some say, like 30% stronger capability targets, almost for every Ally, especially for those that have lagged behind in the past.

US officials have made their commitment to the Alliance during our meetings, during the defence ministerial, very clear, and we believe that these are important messages. And we believe, as I said, we need NATO. We need more European NATO. We need the US commitment within NATO. And it is through these three elements that we can make our security environment better, and we can vouch for the security of our citizens, not just now, but in the years, years to come.

I take your note, the Bulgarian note, on “do we trust Russia?” Well, you know, some of the examples that were mentioned here, some of the each and every one of our countries has examples like this, right? And what we have said is that we have welcomed the attempt to secure a ceasefire to lead towards meaningful peace negotiations, but we have also said that we will trust their intentions only when we see their action. So the ball is definitely in the Russian corner, and we will not take these things for granted. And on this I see the chair sending me the signal that I should stop. And I do hope that I have covered everything. Thank you.