Prague and Beyond: Implications for the Future of NATO

Moderator: Now I would like to broaden the debate a bit by bringing in the two distinguished Foreign Ministers, the Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs from Poland, Bronislaw Geremek, and the former Minister of Defence from France, Alain Richard. For those of us who have watched the rebirth of democracy in Poland, one of the heroes is undoubtedly Bronislaw Geremek. I met him first during the days of Solidarity and I have watched him play such a crucial role in guiding his country towards reunification, so to speak, with western culture. He is currently serving as the Head of the College of Europe branch in Poland and he has had a distinguished academic and political career. So I am privileged to allow him to speak now for a few minutes and then we will hear from Minister Richard.

Professor Geremek: Thank you very much, Chairman, for your words of introduction. Ladies and Gentlemen, the NATO Summit in Prague comes at the moment when the organisation seems to find itself in crisis. This is not an incidental issue related to internal frictions of conflicts between the Alliance member states, such situations have already occurred over the course of the 50 year history of NATO and have always been successfully solved. The clear framework of the Washington Treaty and the awareness of a common threat to the West posed by the aggressive ambitions of the Soviet empire made it possible for those problems to be overcome.

This time, however, we are not dealing with an incidental issue but one that goes to the heart of NATO's survival - its identity and continuing existence. The Warsaw Pact no longer exists; the Soviet Union has dissolved itself; communism is no longer a threat to Europe; Germany has reunited and become a stable democracy. Why then is NATO still necessary? This is the question regarding the Alliance's future existence and it requires a clear answer because a political and military Alliance cannot afford to become mired in the internal vacillations of latter-day Hamlets.

I exaggerate the point purposely, because remaining in a state of stagnation, the road of business as usual would be the worst possible outcome. Colonel Daganower said once that the North Atlantic Alliance would not last forever. The end of the Cold War has been associated with the concept of the end of history, but the events of succeeding years showed the error of this idea. Perhaps, however, the end of the Cold War spelt the end of NATO's utility and the Alliance continues to exist simply thanks to inertia, merely awaiting the coup de grace.

On 12 March 1999 at the Truman Presidential Library in Independence Missouri, when we the Czechs, the Hungarians, the Poles, were signing our countries' accession to the Washington Treaty, I had the feeling that this was not just an historical moment for our country in which we were regaining the rightful place in the Euro-Atlantic community of values and acquiring guarantees of freedom and sovereignty, but also a moment that confirmed anew the Alliance's relevance in the post-Cold War world and gave it a stronger basis to carry out its tasks.

During the end of the Cold War we were the people of the Eastern Bloc countries, people who had refused to participate any longer in the totalitarian system, who had kept alive the desire for freedom, whose dissidents had kept up the resistance, and who had produced social movements of hope, led by Poland's Solidarity and Czechoslovakia's Karka.

But then all these things were possible only because there was a NATO, was in its NATO membership formula, and the discussions of the Euro-Atlantic partnership at the Washington Summit of April 1999, illustrated the success of the 1990s Military Alliance of our time. This success was not just a thing of the past. After all, NATO had become the main, also belatedly implemented, instrument of peace-keeping and stabilisation in the Balkans. It was NATO that was able to join Europe and America, able to create a mechanism of co-operations with the OSCE and extend this process to include Russia. The policies of the world's only remaining Superpower, a tool for further American interest, both during election campaigns when such dangers came to our mind, we could think that NATO can be considered as useful only in one situation: when NATO will be considered as a Global Alliance.

We can think that the prompt response of the North Atlantic Council towards a terrorist attack on the United States, a decision that Article 5 of the Washington Treaty can be applied in this situation, was a positive development towards significance, cannot be under-estimated. However, the decision remained merely an element of political - real or imagined - of war fighting by committee is not a sufficient account for this. The main issue seems to conserve NATO's political philosophy and strategic concept. The blame, it seems to me, is on both sides, in America and in Europe NATO remains the original defensive alliance established to protect Europe and to phase the situation in light of the experience of two World Wars.

Today, NATO must adapt to the new situation in which the shape of war is worldwide from the very beginning and the effects of conflict are felt throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. In order to cut out the objectives set out in the Washington Treaty, and to continue fulfilling in the fundamental mission of ensuring peace, NATO must face the global challenges. Such a formulation of the Alliance Mission poses doubts and misgivings in the nations of Europe. They all fear that giving NATO a worldwide mandate will make it an instrument for carrying out the American interests or policies for American policies.

During the election campaigns between them, European politicians are mindful of certain misgivings about sending the young people to some far-off places whose importance to the national interests are difficult to perceive. However, NATO's future depends precisely on whether it is able to become a global alliance. September 11 clearly demonstrated that the primary threats are no longer local, original, but global in character, and that ordinary people understand the global nature of the terrorist threat much better than politicians believe they do. It is time for political discourse to harken back to the words of John Dunne: Therefore never seem to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for you”.

Ladies and gentlemen, what is needed to adapt NATO's military potential and extensive experience in operational co-operation to new requirements? The decision to participate in military action is in any case made by the governments of the member states. What is required is assuring that preparations are appropriate to combating the threat of terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, be they nuclear, chemical or biological. This requires increasing inter-operativeness within an organisation, and possession of mobile formations, able to react swiftly and prepared for anti-terrorist action. When used in this context, the European Union's announcement of the operation of its Rapid Response Force does not weaken NATO but, on the contrary, meets the organisation's needs and may in fact strengthen it. The Washington Summit's decision, both in strategic concept and the defence capability's initiative, have opened such a perspective. But it is the Prague Summit that will determine whether it is realised. This will require political will and determination.

It is also the reason why the issue of the Alliance's global character in the new international situation should be, I think, the first issue to be tackled in Prague. A second problem is the political dimension of NATO, differences between the Americans and the Europeans and their approach to the Alliance's staff can be overcome provided both sides are convinced of the need to renew NATO and strengthen in defensive potential in the context of the world on terror.

NATO could become the form for a decisive political debate that will smooth out present differences between the European Union and the United States. The new member states with their 375 million inhabitants, and a GDP of nearly 10 trillion, and the United States with 280 million citizens and a GDP of nearly 7 trillion spend strikingly disproportionate amounts on their militaries, with EU defence expenditures totalling some US$130 billion, spending more than $300 billion.

This proportion is reversed when it comes to expenditures for the removal of the sources of crisis situation and destabilisation in which the European Union proves to be much more generours than the United States. Even if this proportion does not disappear immediately, political dialogue within NATO can help in rationalising expenditures, bridging the gap between the United States and its European Alliance, at present a united stance within the UN system.

NATO's strength as a defensive alliance comes from the fact that it is an organisation that acts, not talks, that is not a forum for debate but for decision-making. Nevertheless, the strengthening of the Alliance's political dimension should cause concern since effectiveness in action results from a feeling of solidarity and shared fundamental values. It is politics that create this feeling and convince public opinion of the significance of a defensive alliance. We should not be afraid by this political dimension of NATO problem at the Prague Summit, I think that it should be discussed at the Prague Summit.

And the third problem, whose importance cannot be over-estimated, is the issue of NATO's next expansion to be decided at the Prague Summit. The entry of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary into NATO was accompanied by fears that it will decrease the Alliance cohesion and weaken its defence capability. This in fact did not prove to be the case. The expansion helped consolidate civilian control over the army in the three new member states and promoted the modernisation of the armed forces. During the last three years they have been able to steadily reduce the number of military personnel, whilst at the same time increasing the proportion of professional soldiers and going a long way towards adapting the armies to major requirements.

True, the countries have been modernising their weapons and equipment rather slowly but they did it as quickly as their limited budgets allowed, in fact, allocating to this purpose a larger proportion of their GDP than some NATO European members. The trend towards specialisation, as recommended within the Pact, has been followed strictly. For instance, the Czech Republic has successfully re-entered its capability towards defence against weapons of mass destruction and particularly chemical arms. The three countries still have much work ahead of them before they fully adapt to NATO standards, but they have already succeeded in bridging the gap between promises made and actual reality. Reacting to the new challenges posed by NATO membership, these countries took part in the armoured intervention in Kosovo, played a positive role in the exercise of the joint defence group. After September 11, all three stood solidly beside the Alliance and subsequently lent their support to the Anti-Terrorist Coalition. Expansion did not weaken the Alliance and can be used as an evidence in support of the argument that the aims defined in the Washington Treaty still remain current.

This is also borne by the fact that nine European countries are participating in the Membership Action Plan and more are planning to seek NATO membership. Some of them are seeking security guarantees, others want to assume the connection with the West and are counting on attracting larger foreign investment when they join NATO. Others still do not want to remain on the sidelines of Euro-Atlantic policy.

There is much to be said in favour of the idea that during the Prague Summit NATO offers membership to seven states: the three Baltic Republics, Slovenia, Slovakia as well as Romania and Bulgaria. Political and strategic considerations suggest a maximum scale expansion. There is also the significant argument that today the idea of NATO accession is enjoying strong popular support in the candidate countries , and a drawn-out waiting period could potentially erode this support. This is what happened in Slovenia which expected to be invited to join NATO in Madrid in 1997, when an overwhelming majority of Slovenians supported the idea. Today only 45% are in favour of joining NATO, whilst 36% are against.

NATO expansion fits in with the logic of the new strategic concept and the Alliance global character, present on the shores of the Baltic of the Black Sea, expanding at present in Central Europe. NATO will gain a strong basis for its Euro-Atlantic stabilisation, a defence policy and a strong geo-strategic position to achieve its objectives. NATO infrastructure will be set up in proximity to areas of destabilisation, conflict and crisis. The entire area between the Baltic and the Black Sea can become a region of stability and democracy, and the inclusive character of Euro-Atlantic Security Policy will create the chance that this moderating effect will radiate outwards to even new areas.

However, the success of this process will require the organisation to improve its defensive capabilities which was announced during the Washington Summit, but has so far not been pushed firmly enough.

And finally, last but not least, the fourth problem is Russia. Dialogue and co-operation between NATO and Russia already has a history of its own. However, the events of September 11 were a turning point, replacing the 19+1 formula with a 20 formula in the NATO/Russia Council, decided in Rome and the rapid inclusion of Russia in the Anti-Terrorist Coalition laid the groundwork for actual very important co-operation. This co-operation, however, would not be served well by empty Russia-first political rhetoric. It would be bad for NATO, it would be not good for the future of Russia. What is needed are new plans for specific joint action compatible with NATO's strategy of inclusive security, plans that will support NATO global function and help Russia to transform itself into a state peaceful in its foreign policy and democratic in its domestic policies.

It is deeply symbolic, Ladies and Gentlemen, that the organisation's Summit will for the first time take place in the capital of one of the countries that freed themselves from communists. This should be clearly expressed in a message that NATO's raison d'être is ensuring freedom and security, protecting and promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law. NATO is a defensive alliance of free and democratic states and it is ready to oppose all threats to freedom and democracy. Since those threats to freedom and democracy in the Euro-Atlantic region have taken on a global character, therefore NATO must face such a challenge. The Prague Summit will give both the United States and Europe the chance to become firmly convinced that NATO is something they really need.

Thank you for your attention.

Moderator:
Thank you Professor Geremek for spelling out to us the reasons why this is such a momentous enlargement process that we will witness, not just in Prague but also in Copenhagen at the end of the year because I think that by January we will truly be able to say there is no longer any kind of East/West divide in Europe.

I would now like to introduce a man who has extensive political experience, having joined the Socialist Party in France forty years ago and served in a number of important positions throughout its hierarchy and also, having been Vice President of the National Assembly, for the past five years he has been Minister of Defence in France and as such has been quite a regular fixture at NATO events, so it is my pleasure to introduce Alain Richard.

Alain Richard:
(Transcript of speech by Alain Richard will be available soon.)

Moderator:
Thank you very much Minister Richard for this lucid exposition of the challenges that NATO and Europe and the United States and Canada, all members will face with the forthcoming enlargement. We have time for a couple of questions or comments before we break for lunch so we will open the floor to the audience at this time. I cannot imagine that we have covered everything so well, having had three perspectives from Steve Hadley in the United States, Bronislaw Geremek in Poland and now Alain Richard in France.

Question (Joe Fitchett, International Herald Tribune)
Looking back on the experience of NATO in arriving at a decision to intervene in Kosovo without the approval explicitly of the Security Council, do you think that that is a precedent that may have some bearing on future crises, and for example in the crisis right now with Iraq, or do you think that was an instance in which the West did something collectively that they would not like to do again?

Alain Richard:
Yes, we may have a somewhat different perception of what was the relationship between the UN rules and what was decided about Kosovo. I recall that previous to the decision by the Alliance to use force there had been resolutions by the UN which were based on Chapter 7, so we had a legal basis under the UN Rules to engage action on this occasion. So I am not sure that it can be quoted as a precedent in one way or another, but what I remember, speaking of the Alliance, was that just after that, in the weeks following the engagement in action about Kosovo in the debate of the Washington Summit, there was agreement within the Alliance that the superiority of the UN Rules were at the base of the Washington Treaty itself, ever since 1949. So I think it is in the benefit of the Alliance to have the strongest and the most extended relationship with the UN Rules and the UN Institutions because, in terms of expanding its security policy towards the rest of the world, having NATO behaving obviously conspicuously along rules of international laws and institutions is reinforcing the credibility and the utmost, the ultimate efficiency of the Alliance.

Professor Geremek:
That was an example of very effective action of all international institutions at this time. The OSCE sending a group of monitors, the Secretary General of the United Nations participating in not only debate but also in the decision-making process, and what is the most important thing, that was done in defence of human rights and it was effective.