"The Case for the West"

I have chosen for the title of my lecture: "The Case for the West", but I now realise that this title is perhaps deceptive, for it is not the case for the West that I really intend, to plead this afternoon. It could more accurately be described as a defence of Western policy.

I am unable to conceal that for many weeks and, I may say, many months I have become painfully aware of a certain uneasiness, if not outright.pessimism in Western public opinion. I have a feeling that a section, and I fear it is a large section of public opinion, has not got complete faith in the foreign policy of the Western Governments. I gather that this foreign policy is regarded as too static, too faint-hearted and even - though this accusation levelled against it in certain articles I have recently read is surely quite undeserved - of being mainly actuated by the desire to say, "No".

I am prepared to admit that Western diplomacy is not in a very happy position. The dominating problem today and we cannot evade it, is that of the relations between East and West. As regards diplomacy and the best way to use it I will concede that the East has us at.a disadvantage. It has the benefit of unity of concept and of action, besides being out of reach of all internal criticism, a position which it cannot obtain in an Organization such as NATO, made up as it is of 15 very different nations. Some of them are in the New World, others in the Old, some are as great as the United States, while others are definitely small, and in Europe alone they range from Turkey to Norway. The most noteworthy feature of our Alliance - a possible factor, of weakness but also a source of power - is our diversity,our need to retain our individualism, our yearning for the exercise of full freedom.

With us, no country even the smallest, would for an instant tolerate that another country even the greatest, should speak on its behalf. Each of them feels, knows and proclaims that it is the equal of all the others.

Viewed against the unity of concept and action, which I believe to be the characteristic feature of the Eastern World, we present the spectacle of an oddly assorted team, and our diversity particularly as regards diplomatic procedures, definitely confronts us with certain difficulties. I must pay tribute to the rapidity and skill with which Soviet diplomacy operates. A striking example of this is the letters dispatched on the eve of the NATO Heads of Government Meeting. Mind you, I am not complaining of this for it was perfectly good battle tactics and I should like to; think that in that matter we shall never know any but diplomatic battles.

At the very time when NATO was, in exceptional circumstances to hold a meeting at the highest level, Mr. Bulganin sent letters to all the participants. The result, as has been said with some justice was as if Soviet Russia was present in Paris.

Later, when we were studying under rather difficult conditions inherent in our Alliance the possibility of sending a joint reply, but even before our first replies had been dispatched, all the heads of Governments received a second letter, and while busy with the second letter, and before having time to reach any agreement, other spectacular and interesting moves were made, leaving us to look, I admit as though we wore always at least one letter behind with our correspondence.

What I wanted to tell you, however, was that behind a facade such as this, much important work is done, and in a little while, I shall have occasion to lay special stress on the truly significant progress which, within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance, has been consistently made as regards co-ordination and co-operation between the various member countries.

These limitations or technical constraints seem to make it rather difficult for us in the West to make known our views, and that is why, as the NATO Secretary General, I am prepared to come forward, as I am now doing and, before public opinion, to state the case for Western policy in the hope of demonstrating that behind this apparent confusion, are the beginnings at least of a far greater degree of continuity and co-ordination than is generally believed I do not propose to retrace the history of the Western Alliance. It is not my intention to justify the conception and birth of the North Atlantic Treaty, for this afternoon, insofar as my rather impetuous temperament will allow, I should like to avoid controversy, especially historical controversy and the temptation to look back upon the past. I know too well that such controversy is sterile and I can assure you that in the exchange of international correspondence which, as you know, has been going on for the last few months, nothing has been less constructive, and this applies to both sides, than the desire to justify the positions taken up in the past.

I shall disregard all the events which led to the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, all the reasons we had to unite to ensure our defence. I shall have nothing to say about the history of this Alliance which is already eight years old. As I consider it a good thing for an Alliance such as ours to take stock of itself every now and again, I shall come straight to the point and deal immediately with the particularly important event of the last few months: The meeting of last December, particularly important since, as you know, it was at the level of Heads of Governments instead of Foreign Ministers, as is usually the case. The purpose of this was to make it more solemn and to give more force, or so we hoped, to the decisions to be taken.

You are doubtless aware that at the end of the meeting we published two documents: the one we called a Declaration of Principles and the other, more modestly, although it is the more important of the two, the Communique.

The Declaration of Principles stated, in effect, that the time had now come to clarify basic issues and to reaffirm, with due solemnity and all the. authority necessary and desirable, the end in view and the means to that end. I shall not inflict the whole text on you, for it is far too long, as are all documents drawn up by upwards of 15 persons, but it contains several passages, at least, which without being sensational, without saying anything very new, at least say it clearly and simply and say things which ought to be heard not only by the peoples within the Organization but also by those outside the Alliance.

The 15 Heads of Governments... but before quoting them I must break off to place a preliminary remark about the words I have just used: "The 15 Heads of Governments". Do you realise, that these heads of governments are by no means all cast in the same mould? Not only do they come from places geographically wide apart, but they also hold divergent political doctrines where domestic policy is concerned - some are Christian Democrats, some Liberals, some Socialists - and the fact that they have all reached agreement on a certain number of truths, however hackneyed, should, I feel, make an impact on the masses and on public opinion.

The principles of our Alliance are clear: "We have given a solemn guarantee, each to the other, to regard an attack upon one as an attack upon all, to be resisted with all the forces at our command. Faithful to the United Nations Charter, we reaffirm that our Alliance will never be used for aggressive purposes".

I will pause a moment here. I realise that the words are trite, and that we have used them time and time again. But just imagine that for once this solemn reaffirmation has been heard and believed. The whole course of current international policy might be changed. "We are always ready to settle our international problems by negotiation and taking into account the legitimate interests of all, we seek an end to world tension, and intend to promote peace, economic prosperity and social progress throughout the world. In order to allay the legitimate fears of a world which views with dismay the armaments race, steadfast in our belief that general, controlled disarmament can be reached by stages, in spite of disappointments, we remain ready to discuss any reasonable proposal to reach these goals. Established to defend the peace, our Alliance will also enable us to reach our objectives of economic and social progress. For this purpose we have agreed to co-operate closely to enable us to carry the necessary burden of defence without sacrificing the individual liberties of the welfare of our peoples. We shall reach this goal only by recognising our interdependance and by combining our efforts and skills in order to make better use of our resources.Such efforts will now be applied particularly to the peaceful use of atomic energy and to the development and better organization of scientific co-operation.

To the many nations which have gained their independence since the. end of the Second World War and to all other peoples who, like ourselves, are dedicated to freedom in peace, we offer our co-operation on a basis of complete equality and in a spirit of fraternity. Conscious of our intellectual and material resources, convinced of the value of our principles and of our way of life, without provocation but equally without fear, we have taken decisions to promote greater unity, greater strength, and greater security not only for our own nations but also, we believe, for the world at large.

I realise while rending this that it contains nothing startling and that the style is not particularly good, but if what it says is not very novel, it must be admitted that the ideas are sound. To my mind, our determination never to have recourse to aggression is clearly expressed, as is our resolve to prepare ourselves for defence in case, one day, it should unfortunately be necessary, and also our desire to go beyond this purely military concept of the Atlantic Community. We wished to recall our intention to accomplish something in the political, economic and social spheres and to offer to other peoples the benefits of our wealth and power. The choice of the last few words is deliberate, for to my mind they exactly express what should always be and today certainly is, the prevailing feeling.

That is all I have to say about the Declaration of Principles.

The Communique particularly stresses three ideas: the need for co-ordination of the foreign policy of the western nations; the problems raised by defence; and the problems raised by negotiations. It is these three main points which I shall develop in the hope of throwing a little light on all of them.

To take co-ordination of the foreign policy of the West first. As I have just told you, although progress has not been dramatic, it has nevertheless been real and effective. I can give you a few instances of this.

You will remember that at the time of the Meeting, we, and by "we" I mean all the fifteen Heads of Governments, received a letter from President Bulganin, and this letter had to be answered. Of course, we could - and perhaps we should - have replied by a single letter. I shall now commit an indiscretion and reveal to you one of the secrets of the North Atlantic Council.

When the reply to be sent to President Bulganin came up for discussion, the first question put by the Secretary General, Chairman of the Council, was this: "Shall we send a joint reply, or shall we reply separately?" Before I had finished speaking, 15 hands had gone up and 15 ambassadors all asked to speak at the same time to say "Each of us will reply for himself." This shows that we have not yet reached the stage of being able to pursue a common Western foreign policy, and that we must restrict ourselves for the time being to what I never- theless consider to be a legitimate ambition, namely to have, if not a single policy, at least a co-ordinated policy. Since we could not reply by a single letter, we had to consider the feasibility of replying by 15 letters. Today, their contents are known; "I believe they have all been published, but I am not suggesting that you should go to the length of reading all 15, for I am afraid you would find it rather boring. But you v can take it from me, and I say this without fear of contradiction, in 15 letters there is not a single real divergency. Naturally, they do not all read alike. Fifteen different men wrote them and replied each according to his own temperament and, let it be said, with certain objectives of domestic policy in view. This is the inevitable and logical consequence of our system, but is of little account compared with the fact that in the difficult task of sending 15 replies to the same letter, all serious discrepancies were avoided.

Consequently, this is a point worthy of close attention in the contest of the problems of the day, for at the moment, the West has a co-ordinated policy. I think I can reveal that we are at present giving every consideration to what might be the Agenda and position to be adopted by the 15 Western Governments if there were a Summit Conference this year. I am absolutely convinced that we shall not only agree on the subjects that we believe should be included in the agenda, but shall also reach agreement on the views to be put forward and that these will be views held in common.

Does that mean that we shall find ourselves in Immediate agreement on all points? Certainly not. If this were so, there would be no need for negotiation and our task would be absurdly easy. It is certain that at first there will be shades of opinion, divergent views and even contradictory attitudes. At press conferences, I am often asked about these contradictions. I always reply: "What matters is not our divergent starting points but the point we eventually reach. Even if at first there are certain differences or even. contradictions, through frank and thorough explanations and discussion we manage to smooth them out, remember, it is only the result that counts".

Very well, then, since the letters to President Bulganin are based on a common policy and express the same attitude, I. am quite certain that if a few weeks or a few months hence, there is a conference in Europe or elsewhere, we shall have had time to bring about the desired community of .Western thinking in foreign policy which, to my mind marks the opening phase of a great experiment, I should like you to realise its importance for, a revolution in the history of diplomacy is in progress. For centuries, countries, especially the big ones, have followed independent foreign policies. I think I can even go so far as to say that the pursuits of an independent, strictly individual foreign policy was the hall mark of their sovereignty. Well, today it is the current practice and regarded as perfectly normal - I am choosing this example as the most striking - for the United States to submit to a meeting of 15 Permanent Representatives, the diplomatic notes they propose to deliver, and to accept that they should be discussed and criticised - this applies to the United States just as it applies to the other countries - that comments on them should be made and that they should be amended accordingly. Believe me,.this is truly a new departure in the history of diplomacy. Certainly, we cannot always expect this revolution in NATO to. be entirely successful. I am under no illusions on this score. We shall have to take the rough with the smooth and be satisfied if favourable results are obtained from time to time, for there are sure to be dis-sentions and, even between Western nations, incidents which we shall not be able to avoid or to settle immediately. However, what really counts is that when I look back only a few months to see whether good progress has been made in the matter of a common policy, I find I can say, without undue optimism, that everything is developing along the right lines.

Defence and Negotiation

I am now going to touch upon two very significant subjects: defence and negotiation. But before dealing with our defence problems, I should like to emphasise once more -although to me it is the most commonplace of remarks - that we are becoming increasingly aware that, when all is said and done, there can only be one really sound international policy, the one leading through agreement to general disarmament with controls. Until we have framed this policy, we may settle our differences, avoid incidents and progress steadily and with caution along the road to peace, but. so long as the atmosphere of peace is poisoned by the armaments race, no Foreign Minister will be able to go before his Parliament or address himself to public opinion in his country with the words: "I can now give you the definite assurance that peace in our time and for ever more has been established on absolutely sound foundations". This idea has been with me for a long time now, I need hardly tell you that it gains in strength with the increased range and destructive power of the most recent weapons and as the horror of a future war is revealed as ever greater and more catastrophic so we cannot, within the framework of the Alliance, consider the problem of defence without having first solemnly reaffirmed in no uncertain terms that our goal is first and foremost disarmament. I do not know whether you have noticed in the December Communique that there are several paragraphs devoted to a reminder of what we have already accomplished, of what we have already proposed and of what is feasible as regards Western policy, that much maligned and so unjustly criticised Western policy. As you will see, it contains a record of what we have already said and gives a preview of all we are prepared to do. In the section of the Communique dealing with disarmament we say, speaking of 1957: "the Western countries taking part in the London Disarmament talks put forward to the Soviet Union, with the unanimous agreement of NATO a series of concrete proposals providing, subject to effective controls; for reduction of all armaments and military forces; for the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes; for the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear weapons; for the suspension of nuclear weapons tests; for measures to guard against the risk of surprise attack."

Surely, the mere recital of these proposals should be enough to carry the conviction that there is little truth in the opinion so often held in the West that we are guilty of immobilism or negation? Discussing procedure, we said that we regretted that these various proposals had.been rejected. on bloc at the London talks, adding that public opinion in the West did not seem to have taken the true measure of what was really significant, namely that these proposals had already been accepted as a basis of discussion by an overwhelming majority at the United Nations. Finally we said: We have accepted the forms of procedure proposed by the United Nations and are prepared to discuss our proposals, for there is no question of their acceptance without discussion. They represent our basic convictions and explain our position. We are prepared to discuss them before the Commission which the United Nations, with difficulty, has succeeded in setting up, We went on to say that if, contrary to our expectations, the Soviet Union decided to boycott the United Nations Disarmament Commission set up by an almost unanimous vote, we should still be willing to call a meeting of Foreign Ministers to examine any form of procedure that appeared reasonable.

Ladies and Gentlemen, you cannot convince others unless you have first convinced yourself, but at the moment I am merely recalling the facts of the case, giving you the plain truth.

I fail to see how anyone can be blind to the strength, progressive nature and, as I shall demonstrate in an instant, the boldness of the position adopted by the West. Of course, we were obliged to note in Paris that disarmament had not been achieved, that the disarmament talks had become virtually deadlocked. However, we must not let this upset us too much, for diplomacy is nearly always in a deadlock and it is the function of diplomats to find a way out. But while we were in a deadlock, could we do otherwise than take steps to secure our defence? A problem which looms large today in the press, in Parliament and in public opinion, is that of atomic weapons. Before tackling it and trying to explain to you what would appear to be the general attitude of NATO, I should like to make a remark to which I attach some importance. Up till now, unless I am much mistaken, however far back we search in the history of mankind, and more particularly the history of military organization, those who were aware of the need of an army have always thought that it. must be made the best in the world. Nobody had ever doubted the soundness of this concept. Yet this truth, which seemed to be indisputable and eternal, is now being called into question, and some people tell us: Yes, you must continue to have an army, but it must be the best possible army, and we strongly advise against equipping it with the most modern weapons. I must admit that I find this reasoning somewhat disturbing. I also think that it poses political as well as moral problems of the greatest importance, I am unable to understand people who say: Yes, the army is necessary, but I am not in favour of giving it atomic missiles and think it should be armed as it was during the Second World War. I fail to understand why these people take the Second World War as the reference period, for the weapons used at the time were not particularly pleasant or agreeable. While we are about it, why not return to the weapons of the First World War and, going further back along the same road, there seems no reason to stop before we reach the cross-bow or the club. I fail to follow the reasoning of those who maintain that an army is necessary, but that it must be obsoletely armed.

Let us take a closer look at the situation Atomic weapons cause a great many people anxiety and not a littl repulsion. To my mind, the problem has not been clearly stated for I believe that a distinction should be made between the various atomic weapons. I am not a military man, but in military matters, I should like to see a little common-sense introduced, for I believe that the problem can be settled in that way.

I think that our ideas will be somewhat clearer if we distinguish between the various types of atomic weapons, and this is the distinction I propose: those which are strictly defensive; those which might be called "tactical nuclear weapons" and which are an oimproved modernised form of artillery; the IRBM or IRCM missiles, which are intermediate and long-range atomic missiles.

To take the purely defensive weapons first, I think I am right in saying that no one would maintain, even at the present time, let alone two or three years hence, that towns -and when I say towns, I am thinking of their inhabitants - can be defended against air attack with anti-aircraft guns of the last war, however much they may have been improved over the : last 10 years. I believe all the experts agree that today, and in an even greater degree tomorrow, only rockets fitted with atomic warheads will be capable of securing defence against air attack, whether by a lone aircraft or by close formations such as were used during the Second World War. So to the opponents of nuclear weapons I say: "I do not believe that even you would take the responsibility of relying, for the defence of towns and their inhabitants, on the old-fashioned anti-aircraft guns of the Second World War knowing as you - do that they would be unable to hit a single raider" Am I wrong or am I right in saying that it is absurd to try to uphold such an argument? Logically, you cannot leave the matter there, and continuing along the same line of reasoning you must eventually reach the conclusion that defence has become impossible. If you do so, however, you must also change your ethical approach and, if need be, adopt a new philosophy, become the champion of concepts, the value and utility of which may well one day be recognised and, in fact, come out openly in favour of passive resistance. That would be understandable and even logical; but I fail to see any logic in retaining weapons which can no longer serve their purpose. It. would almost amount to a contradiction in terms and would be quite inadmissible. I wish I could be proved wrong, but so far I. cannot discover any reason for renouncing the use of purely defensive atomic weapons.

Let us now turn to the other weapons, these which I call "tactical nuclear weapons" and which are an improved form of artillery. It is really quite simple. Nowadays, a gun fires shells with nuclear warheads instead of what have come to be known as classical or conventional shells, two delightful terms. Your artillery is a hundred, a thousand times more powerful than it was, and you mean to discard it, although your potential enemy has not, for his part, abandoned his tactical artillery, after which you will tell the young men you have enrolled and with whom you intend to make an army: "This is the gun I am giving you. I know it does not fire so far nor so well," (though in the circumstances 'well' sounds rather cruel,)" as the guns used on the other side". Can you imagine any politician taking this responsibility? I should really like to know what he looks like. Eventually he might say: "I plead guilty to having advocated the creation of an imperfect army, but I have an excuse: I was under the impression that it needed no improvement". If I were still a politician able to contribute to the organization of an army, I should never dare to place myself in such a position. It would be the greatest of crimes against the population. The man who with full knowledge of the potential enemy, would voluntarily forego equipping this army with the most modern weapons, would to my mind be taking a responsibility exceeding the bounds of imagination.

Let us now discuss the weapons in the third category, those which have raised a positive storm of criticism; the controversial intermediate and long-range atomic missiles. I know the arguments used against them. Certain people, whom I believe to be well-intentioned but mistaken and therefore the more dangerous, proclaim: "We do not want your intermediate and long-range missiles because they are offensive weapons". Ladies and Gentlemen, if there were any question of asking for the introduction in Europe of offensive weapons, that is to say, weapons which would enable a policy of aggression to be followed,. I should without hesitation join the ranks of those who declare: "I want nothing to do with weapons of that kind, they must be banned from Europe". However, within the framework of the NATO philosophy, if I may call it so, is there room for aggressive weapons? If there is, it can only be at the sacrifice of all we stand for, namely, defence and nothing but defence, and we should have to repudiate the principle we have solemnly reaffirmed. I should first like to bring you my personal testimony for what it is worth. I signed the North Atlantic Treaty on behalf of Belgium in 1949, and you will remember that the Treaty had to be unanimously ratified. There can be no doubt that the Belgians and their Parliament consisting of deputies and senators who authorised me to sign in their name were definitely convinced that it was a defensive Treaty. Had it contained any hint of aggression, had the North Atlantic Treaty appeared to leave the least loophole for its use as an instrument of aggression, they would never have given me the opportunity to affix my name to it. You can be sure that when I did so I was firmly convinced that I was signing an act which could only serve for defence.

Since then, in spite of world events and subsequent developments nothing has occurred to shake my intimate conviction that the Alliance excludes all idea of. aggression.. I have been the Secretary General of NATO for nine months, and now see things from the inside. What I want you to know is that during those nine months, have never heard the slightest allusion, whether by the NATO civilian or military authorities, and whatever the subject of debate, to aggression in any shape or. form. The only thing we discuss among ourselves is how to ensure our defence in the event, of an attack. Senior NATO leaders do all they can to demonstrate that this is indeed our attitude, and to my mind, one of the most interesting passages of the letter from President Eisenhower to President Bulganin is where he reaffirms our purely peaceful intentions. I should like to quote the following lines for they deserve to be read and retained: "In the United States, the people and their Government desire peace and in this country the people exert such constitutional control over Government that no Government could possibly initiate aggressive war. Under authority already given by our Congress, the United States can and would respond at once if we or any of our allies were attacked. But the United States cannot initiate war withour prior approval of the people's representatives in the Congress. this process requires time and public debate. Not only would cur people repudiate any effort to begin an attack, but the element of surprise, so important in any aggressive move, would be wholly lacking. Aggressive war is not only abhorrent; it. is impractical and impossible".

How many times must we to repeat that we align our policy with this principle before everyone, not only in the West but also in the East, understand that this really is our position? Then again in an Alliance such as ours, what is the meaning of the term "'offensive"? It is quite meaning-less whichever way you look at it. For this is the position: the only assumption we accept is that of our being attacked and of our being attacked by an enemy who has at his disposal the full range of atomic weapons, the strategic as well as the tactical, those which are carried by aircraft and those which could be delivered by means of rockets and guided missiles. Since we have to wait until we are attacked, will someone please tell me on any strategic, political or moral reason which, if we arc attacked, would debar us, or should debar us, from attempting to destroy the bases from which the attacks-were being launched? Frankly, although there may be a flaw in my reasoning, I am quite unable to see it, and I consider the above demonstration to be conclusive. If it is, there is no point in claiming that certain weapons should be banned on the fallacious grounds that they are offensive weapons. If you have been attacked, you have not taken the offensive.

While we are about it, should we not also rule out heavy bombers since they, too, can carry war into the territory of the enemy? What mental aberration What stark, staring madness! To what dangers are we exposed if we take a decision of principle without giving a thought to the inevitable, to the logical consequences of such a decision!

I should like to say right away, to reassure those of you who are perhaps a little frightened by speech-makers, that the so-called offensive weapons would not necessarily be sited on the territory of all countries. Neither the NATO military nor the United States authorities have ever requested such a thing They would be sited in certain places with the assent of the Governments concerned, and I do not for a moment suppose that these Governments would give their assent without the approval of their Parliaments and until certain important points to which I will revert later have been settled and which concern pledges regarding the use of these weapons. Nevertheless, all these sound arguments which to me are perfectly convincing, may not convince everybody, so I have tried to visualise in advance what the objections might be.

The first objection, and we have already encountered it, is this: "Our main reason for being against this kind of atomic weapons is that their launching sites would quite obviously become target areas in the event of a war". I do not deny it, for it is probably true. But do people really imagine that launching sites would be the only vital targets in the event of war? Surely they know that the industrial districts, military formations, capital cities and seats of Government, railway junctions and more things than I can think of on the spur of the moment, would also inevitably be targets. Is it not rather childish to think that in the event of a third world war the enemy would necessarily attack a certain target with machine guns and another with an atomic bomb? I ask those who refuse to have any truck with this aspect of defence what their attitude towards the United States may be. We have asked the United States to send its Army or part of its Army to Europe and United States troops now participate in what is known as our protective shield; for our defence system comprises a shield plus atomic weapons for reprisals. Do they think it would be easy to say to the United States: "We refuse to participate in a war of this kind, but of course we expect you to remain in Europe with your troops, and if one day there should be an attack on Europe alone, we ask you to declare unambiguously that on that very day you will throw yourself into the battle with the full weight of your military strength, whatever the weapons used". Do they think it would be easy to adopt that attitude?

Let us say no more about it for the present, for I am not pleading the cause of war but of peace. All these questions give rise to a great deal of talk. I certainly feel that a change has come about in the strategic situation of the world today. I am well aware that the balance in which the world lives today, so aptly described by a French journalist as a "balance of terror", is obviously not the best possible balance, and that it is high time. Mankind developed a better one. However, even this balance is, I think, better than no balance at all and, when you. come to think of it, what is the problem which a would-be aggressor must solve at the present juncture? Is it the dropping of two, 10 or even 50 bombs on enemy territory? No. The problem for a would-be aggressor is the simultaneous destruction of all the bases from which reprisals could be launched, for the force of reprisal could be so powerful that unless the aggressor was certain of being able to arrest it,he well knows, as do all the world's statesmen, that even if he embarks on a war of aggression and counts on the element of surprise, even if he delivers the most murderous blows at his enemy, owing to his inability to destroy simultaneously all the bases from which reprisals could be launched, there would be destruction and loss of. life on such a gigantic scale that all, hope of a military victory would vanish.

I believe this to be one of the most striking-characteristics of the world of today and, I think, of the world for many a long day. All idea of a military victory must be abandoned. No military victory will be possible so long as there remains the possibility of reprisals. It therefore seems clear that if this is the major obstacle to be faced by an enemy, the more reprisal sites there are to destroy, and the greater their dispersal, the greater will be the difficulty of waging a war of aggression. - Let me over-simplify the case by supposing that there was only one reprisals base. If that were the case, it is clear that an aggressor could easily destroy. it; if. there were 10, it would be rather harder, but as we gradually increase the number to a 1000, the problem becomes progressively insoluble. This makes me believe.that for the time being, at all events, there is little danger of war and that this will remain the case until a solution has been found to this intractiable strategic problem.

From what I have just said, I draw the following conclusion: Apart from disarmament, the only, the best possible defensive system is the one whereby peace can be maintained. I have spoken at some length on the problem of defence, but I think it was necessary since there are so many contradictory ideas on the subject. However, I now come to a subject which is certainly more agreeable, the possibility of securing a solid basis for peace through negotiation.

Is it true that the West does not believe in negotiation? Ladies and Gentlemen, I can assure you that it is completely false. How could it be true? Negotiation is the quintessence of diplomacy. Diplomatists who had decided to renounce recourse to negotiation would be diplomatists who had voluntarily decided to join the ranks of the unemployed. Every diplomatist wants to negotiate and hopes to have the opportunity to do so. The problem has been badly expressed. As I see it, the right way to put the question is like this: "How and about what shall we negotiate"? It arises at a time when keen discussion is taking place as to the level at which negotiations should take place. It is being discussed by everybody because it is a matter that everybody can understand: whether negotiations should be conducted at the level of Heads of Governments or of Foreign Ministers.

As the Secretary General of NATO I should not like to treat this question as a joke, particularly as it is not completely trivial, but let me tell you that determination of the most suitable level for negotiations is nevertheless an unessential, in fact quite a minor point. In any case, I believe that opinions are tending to converge. Some people say: "Let us first hold a meeting of Foreign Ministers followed by a meeting of Prime Ministers", to which others reply: "First a meeting of Prime Ministers followed by a meeting of Foreign Ministers". Very well, then. With a little goodwill there must surely be some way of reaching agreement, for everybody seems to be agreed on one thing, namely the need, whatever kind of meeting is held, of preparing it. I can hardly imagine that anyone believes that it is possible without preparation to convene 5, 10, 15 Heads of Governments or statesmen who will sit round a table and be told: "Go ahead"! It is obvious that a meeting prepared, if that is the right word, in this way could only be disorderly, anarchic, chaotic and unsuccessful.

Without bringing up a controversial point, I should nevertheless like to add that the position of the Western leaders is somewhat more difficult than that of their Soviet opposite numbers because, in a country in which public opinion has a say, as is the case in the West, if President Elsenhower goes to a conference and comes back empty-handed, I can assure you that it will not pass unnoticed in the press. Whereas, in the Communist world, the rules of the game demand that President Bulganin, if unsuccessful, does not fail to explain that the whole fault rests with the other side. It is therefore only natural that the Western Heads of Government should ponder awhile before embarking on the adventure of a discussion without an agenda or even a draft agenda. Let us then not discuss at what level the meeting should be held but agree that whatever the level, preparation is necessary. I must admit that in the last letter of President Bulganin in reply to the last letter of President Eisenhower, the idea of preparation seems at last to have been grasped. Now everybody seems to have come over to this common sense idea. Well then, how shall the meeting be prepared? About that, everyone is likely to have views of his own. personally, I am not in favour of its preparation by means of open letters, for I have never had a very high opinion of the diplomacy of the forum. I am rather behind the times in this respect and still believe that diplomatists have their uses - I instinctively turn to a part of the room in which I am sure to be approved -and I believe that the traditional diplomatic procedures are necessary. I firmly believe that careful, direct preparation of the meeting is better than exchanges of open letters which are bound to be spectacular and, on one side as on the other, the subject of hot debate. I hope a satisfactory method will be found for the preparation of the Meeting. A Meeting on what? Peaceful co-existence? Ladies and Gentlemen, peaceful co-existence, of course. When we adhered to the United Nations' Charter, I do not believe the term peaceful co-existence had been coined, but it is nevertheless in the spirit of the Charter, and I fail to see what is to replace peaceful co-existence. Either you have peaceful co-existence or you have war, and I unhesitatingly choose peaceful co-existence. I agree that we should harbour no illusions, for luckily, we have been treated to some plain speaking. Peaceful co-existence, we know, is a life and death struggle between the. Communist system and the one which we continue to call - and which for convenience sake I shall continue to call, although I rather dislike it - the Capitalist system. It must be realised that this struggle will be carried on in all fields, but especially in the economic and social field, and I accept it. We must rid ourselves once and for all of the idea that Communism can be stamped out by force of arms if there is still anyone who holds this idea. I wish to be objective, and if we no longer entertain this idea today, we did so for quite a long time, I believe the historic episode which followed the 1917 Revolution is still firmly impressed on our minds No-one today dreams of destroying Communism by force of arms not only because to attack it thus would be impossible, but also because we have become more keenly aware of our own principles and the need, if we would stand by them to apply them fully. It Is perfectly clear that fhe principles of democracy, freedom and respect for human rights are inconceivable apart from their final consequences, namely, the renouncing of force as an instrument of foreign policy, Let us therefore accept peaceful co-existence as it is understood by the Communist world, that is to say, as a challenge sent out by one system to another, and we shall see a few years hence which is the better of the two. I accept the challenge unmoved. I am sure that unless we commit major errors, we shall give a convincing demonstration of the superiority of our moral, philosophical, and political concepts, and even of our social and economic organization.

Another point at issue is disarmament. Everything will revolve around disarmament, and as you will see, the problem has taken concrete shape in a series of proposals. I should like to compare four or five of the Western proposals with the Soviet proposals which I consider to be the most important as well as the most typical. You are no doubt aware that one of these suggestions is that atomic and nuclear tests should be abandoned. I must digress for a moment. We shall see in a minute where the true interest of this proposal lies, but I should like to say here and now, that as it stands, the proposal has nothing whatever to do with disarmament. Supposing we do agree to hold no tests for two years, during those two years there would be nothing to stop those able to do so from continuing to stockpile all the atomic bombs they would continue to produce. In the laboratories, there would be complete freedom of action. A great many people know how to manufacture an A bomb and an H bomb, and under cover of the prohibition to conduct tests, there would be no interruption in the even flow of whatever new bombs might be thought necessary. It is beyond me how any more bombs could be considered necessary. I am told that there are already enough to destroy mankind several times over. (This seems to be further evidence of our cruel tendencies, for to wish to destroy your enemy once is already proof of cruelty, but how much more cruel it is to seek, having destroyed him once, to do so a second, a third, a fourth or a tenth time). There are already enough to kill us all once. There is no question about that. Consequently, to abandon tests is meaningless within the context of disarmament. Nevertheless, should this proposal be rejected out of hand? No. And for that, I see two reasons, the first being a psychological one. We are seeking points for discussion with the hope of reaching agreement, so it is as well to start with something easy to which we can say "Yes" Since this "Yes" would be harmless and would do nothing to upset a necessary balance, I recognise that this reason must not be dismissed as unimportant. However, I must warn the optimists not to think that the first "Yes" will necessarily be followed by a succession of other "Yesses". Life is not as simple as all that.

Nevertheless, in the field of disarmament, this might, after all, occur and a chain reaction ensue ending up in more substantial proposals. This lends a certain value to the first proposal. The other reason for not considering it as negligible has no connection whatsoever with disarmament, but concerns public health. As we all know, public opinion, at least in the West is thoroughly alarmed by the warnings issued by certain scientists who, I am sure are perfectly honourable and inspired by the best intentions. Their message is: "Take care, by multiplying nuclear experiments, radioactivity is increasing in the world and threatening the health of future generations. This is a reasonable line of argument but is not the only one, for I am also told that these appeals, though sincere, go too far; anyway we shall soon have a report on the subject drawn up by scientists appointed by the United Nations. However, I am quite ready to believe that the continuance of nuclear experiments is really a danger for the human race, and that unless there is an extraordinarily strong argument in favour of this course, it would really be better to give them up. However, in this connection, is the position of the West a negative one? Not at all. It is definitely positive and certainly far bolder than that of the Soviets, for what do we propose? We are prepared to suspend nuclear tests, not for one year or two years but for ever. Only, as this proposal does not affect disarmament, we wish to link it up with a disarmament programme covering atomic weapons, so this is what we tell the Communists: '"We, for our part, are ready to abandon nuclear experiments for ever if you, for your part, are ready to accept control of the existing stocks and the production of fissionable material, and if you are prepared immediately to accept as a first step, the transfer of a certain quantity of fissionable material from warlike to peaceful uses concurrently with the destruction of a certain number of atomic bombs". And I shall now add something that the West does not know, namely that the United States has said in addition: "Since our stockpile of fissionable material and atomic bombs is greater than that of any other country, we are prepared to make a proportionately greater transfer".

Ladies and Gentlemen, you can say what you like about these proposals except that they are negative. You cannot say either that they are lacking in boldness for if they were accepted and there perhaps lies: the real difficulty - the question of disarmament would be settled for the next 25, 80 or 100 years and perhaps for all time. The only objection I can find, "is that we are possibly proposing too much, that the difficulty is too great and that the moment has arrived to apply the French proverb: "Ie mieux est l'ennemi du bien", (A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush) and that if we do not succeed in obtaining the "two in the bush" we shall have to be content with "'the bird in the hand". It is possible; but can we resign ourselves to this before haying put up a fight for our original proposal, without having tried to convince the world that it is the best proposal and that renouncement of nuclear tests is not enough, but that a start must also be made with the destruction of atomic weapons and with7ensuring, by adequate means, of course, that their production is not continued? I think you will agree that this proposal, at least, is a very firm one.

There is another proposal: renouncement of the use of atomic weapons. Here again, I must admit that Western public opinion seems inclined towards its acceptance. However, without indulging in controversy I must tell you that when the Soviets propose renouncing the use of atomic weapons they add - and I find this a curious confession - that. it is easier to accomplish because it does not call for controls. Is it really very significant to renounce the use of atomic weapons without accepting the destruction of those already in existence? What faith can you have in a pledge of that kind? Everyone seems to forget that we have gone further than merely to offer to renounce the use of atomic weapons. : We renounced recourse to any war of aggression when we joined the United Nations. If someone is capable of breaking- his promise to the United Nations by engaging in a war of aggression, why should he be thought capable of keeping a second promise to the effect that in the event of war which could only be a war of agression - he would not make use of atomic weapons? In the present state of the world, can one really accept as a basis for the security and tranquility of our peoples, verbal undertakings unaccompanied by controls? This really does not seem to me to make sense, and I do not believe the proposal to be fundamentally sound. I must immediately admit that I do not regard the answer of the West as a much better one, for it is this: "We are prepared to renounce the use of atomic weapons except for our legitimate defence". Now, since we declare that the only case we envisage is that of legitimate defence, I acknowledge that it is not a remarkably good reply, and all we can say opposing is: "If you do not renounce atomic weapons, you must control and permit of the control of the existing atomic weapons", and this the West is prepared to do.

In this context we are told: "Supposing, on either side of the Iron Curtain, on either side of the demarcation line, that we established a zone in which special controls would be operated with, for disarmament purposes, special regulations. It is not a bad idea and, moreover, it is a Western one. It was first mooted by President Elsenhower at the June, 1955 Summit Meeting. However, in the form in which it is now put forward, its acceptance would be very wrong. The present proposal is for a zone of 800 kilometres astride the line of demarcation. I should be inclined to agree with the principle on which it is based, but on looking at the map, I perceive that the 800 kilometre strip covers Federal Germany, the Benelux countries and a little piece of England, on our side, but that on the other side it does not extend even as far as the Russian frontier. This does not seem quite fair. If you are going to establish geographical areas and special controls, surely you cannot accept that all the European NATO territories should be placed within this strip, but no Soviet territory at all! Were we adopting a negative attitude Ladies and Gentlemen, when we proposed - and I am sure that most of you do not even know that we did so - a zone with special controls which was to cover -just think of it - the whole of the United States, the whole of Canada, the whole European NATO area, but also, of course, the whole of Soviet Russia? Does this show lack of boldness? However, I quite realise that our proposal which we should like to see accepted for a variety of reasons, will probably not get much of a hearing. So we have also put forward a whole set of intermediate proposals which would diminish the area of the zone of special controls v/hile, of course retaining the principle of reciprocity. Can you call that negative?

This brings us to what is perhaps the newest element in the discussion. I am referring to the plan produced by M. Rapacki, the Polish Foreign Minister, for de-atomising a part of Europe. Here, I must digress once more for a moment. In the Belgian press, which still takes an interest in my doings, I am often reproached with having rejected, this Plan out of hand. This is quite untrue. No one suggests that the Rapacki Plan should be rejected, without serious examination, and I can assure you that it has been the subject of very serious study. However, after-having read it and pondered it, there can be no denying that it does present a number of dangers.

The story behind this plan is rather curious. M. Rapacki had made an important speech before the United Nations in which he devoted seven lines to what has since developed into his Plan. At the time, he did not seem to attach particular importance to his idea. But in Europe it took root in ground that had been carefully prepared, and the Europeans took it up as something rather out of the ordinary. It has not been easy to. get a thorough grasp of the Plan because luckily it is no longer what it was at the outset. It keeps changing. I say "luckily" because in its original form, it was certainly unacceptable. A use will possibly be found for it one day. Why was it unacceptable? First of all, for a psychological reason akin to the one I mentioned a little while ago in connection with the possibility of finding something we could agree about. I shall not go over it again. There is, however, also another factor to be considered which has a good and a bad aspect and can be put this way: "If a local war were to break out in this de-atomised zone, it might turn into a war in which atomic weapons would not be used, and this would keep the damage to a minimum". I spoke just now of a good and a bad aspect because I very much dislike the term "local war". I am against war, any kind of. war. People who speak of a "local war" are people who would not be implicated in it. That is not a diplomatic position which I regard as either a sound or a strong one, and I consider it wrong to condone the idea of such a war because it would be local. If there were.a local war, it should be fully realised that it would be between Germany and Poland, and one day, perhaps even between Germany and Russia. You can call that a local war if you like, but it seems to be stretching the word "local" and could conceivably get us into a lot of trouble. What the Polish Foreign Minister said later was that the two parts of Germany would first have to reach agreement. I know that he no longer says quite this; he seems to have changed ohis mind, but the original idea was nevertheless a potentially dangerous one since it required the previous agreement of the two parts of Germany. This would spell the end of the policy followed by the Federal Republic and of the policy pursued by all the NATO countries, for so far they have all refused to recognise the East German regime. Although this is a very important point, I cannot stop to consider it now. The Rapacki Plan ran like this: It is not only the Germans who will bo denied atomic weapons (and, incidentally, he makes no distinction between atomic weapons), but also all the foreign forces stationed in that country. This provision is clearly aimed, not at the German forces, but at the American, British and other forces stationed in Germany. This immediately suggests the following question: "Will it be feasible to maintain in Germany American forces deprived of their atomic weapons, in view of the fact that in respect of conventional weapons, the balance between East and West is, without quoting figures, very much in favour of the East''? Do you really think it possible to tell the United States forces: "You will remain in Germany, but under new conditions; you will be without atomic weapons and the forces opposite will be five or six times stronger than you are"? They would have to be withdrawn, but how far? There are two alternatives. Either withdrawal to, shall we way, the banks of the Meuse and the Scheldt. I have selected these two rivers without any preconceived idea The Meuse and the Scheldt: that would mean that the atomic defences of the West would be entirely concentrated between the Atlantic and the Meuse and Scheldt Let us suppose that the Belgians have thought it over and have agreed to this. Very well then, Belgium, the Netherlands and France would become the European atomic store-house! I. should like a little more time to think this oout. Anyway, it remains to be seen whether the tactical position would be acceptable. I think not, and if it is not we must consider the other alternative. The American troops would pack their bags and return to the United States; the British troops would return to the United Kingdom, and Europe would be left to face the East alone, Ladies and Gentlemen, I should be much obliged if someone would explain to me how, in these conditions, Europe is to organize its defence. The fact of the matter is that, in these conditions, there is no denying that defence would become impossible. That is why a great many well-meaning people seeking a solution to this problem say: "You must combine the Rapacki and the Kennan Plans". The idea is to merge the two Plans, but if you do so, you must also accept all the consequences, for these people reason thus: "We must make peace with the Russians" - a very sound idea. To make peace with the Russians, there is a precondition - and here the reasoning is already a little more difficult to follow - Soviet Russia must be asked to evacuate all the territory of East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Mr. Kennan adds, rather oddly that this is the only means of permitting these countries to cease being Communist. It may be an excellent argument, but I wonder what M. Khrushchev and M. Bulganin third of it. Because you have got to be broad-minded about these things, lot us suppose that the Russians tell us:

"We're leaving". Good. But in that case, says Mr, Kennan, we must pay the price of this concession and leave Germany. Germany having been evacuated, it is hoped that its reunification will follow. How? We are not told, but are left to hope that it will. Mr. Kennan, after speaking ironically, speaks ironically no longer. As he is a man of great intellectual integrity, as he is a logician incapable once he has adopted a line of argument of stopping half way, and as he has said: '"We will evaluate Germany he adds that this Germany will be kept neutral, for its neutrality and departure from NATO are the conditions which must permit of reunification. It is clear that France, Belgium and the Netherlands can no longer defend themselves. Very well, then let them be given atomic weapons. However, these are too expensive and it would bo a dangerous move. So the price of the concession is not only the neutrality of Germany, but also the neutrality of all Continental Europe. This is where reasoning along these lines almost inevitably leads. You may think, Ladies and Gentlemen, that I am exaggerating, but that is not the case. You have certainly read press reports on the Kennan Plan. I am only sorry that the press did not report Mr. Kennan's lectures in full for it is not enough to know the premises, you must also know the conclusions drawn from them. Well, this is what Mr. Kennan, a former United States diplomat. and a former university professor says: (I am not making this up, although for a moment you will think I am. I am merely quoting): "If the armed forces of the United States and Britain were not present on the continent, the problem of defence for the continental. nations would be primarily one of the internal health and discipline of the respective national societies, and of the manner in which they were organized to prevent the conquest of their national life by:unscrupulous and foreign-inspired communities in their midst. What they need is a strategic doctrine addressed to this reality". With such a doctrine, armed forces would, of course, still be necessary. "But I would suggest", continues Mr Kennan, "that as a general rule these forces might better be para-military ones of a territorial type rather than regular military units on the World War II pattern. Their function should be primarily internal rather than external. It is on the front of police realities, not on regular military battle-fields, that the threat of Russian Communism must primarily be met. The training of such forces ought to be such as to prepare them not only to offer whatever overt resistance might be possible to a foreign invader but also to constitute the core of a civil resistance movement on any territory that might be overrun by the enemy..."

Ladies and Gentlemen, when you are handling plans of all kinds and the Kennan Plan in particular, and you wish to have the courage to say: "This is the Kennan Plan, and I am prepared to stand up for it before the nation", and if you accept its conclusion, namely organising against a hypothetical enemy a hypothetical occupation and making a "maquis" of the whole of Europe, I not only say that this cannot be taken seriously, but that it is positively dangerous. It is what comes of accepting a set of ideas without due discrimination and without weighing up the consequences. If these proposals were followed up, the neutrality of Europe would be the result, and I for one reject the neutrality of Europe. The day Europe is neutral, do you realise what this would signify in world history the day on which France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, to say nothing of the other countries, declare: "I take no further interest in world, affairs; I proclaim my neutrality", It would mean that the countries which have been world leaders for centuries had decided that the time of their decadence and of their abdication had arrived. Nothing, at the present juncture, can justify such a surrender and, I may add, such arrant cowardice, Consequently, nothing of the kind must be accepted. Is that to say that there is nothing to be done as regards a geographical zone subject to special conditions of control? Of course not. It can be tried, and I repeat that this was a Western idea of which President Elsenhower was the spokesman. It is possible, in a reasonable manner and without going to the terrible and absurd lengths I have spoken about, that it will be found to have its good points and become the subject of one of the prospective discussions with the East.

I should now like to touch upon just one more point, for it has given rise to a good deal of comment: a non-aggression pact. It is a good idea to ask the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to put their signatures to a Non-Aggression Pact. I am not giving away any secret when I say that as far as I personally am concerned, I am inclined to favour it, although I realise that the proposal has very serious implications. Some people say with reason: "Why sign a non- aggression pact since we have already signed one, the United Nations Charter? By signing another, Would we not be displaying lack of confidence in the first? And would it not be a serious blow aimed indirectly at the confidence and respect due to the United Nations?" It is the countries which give the greatest support to the United Nations, namely those with the least sympathy for a policy of blocs, which remark: "Perhaps a formula could be found.. Perhaps there is a clue to the road to be followed which might provide us with the elements of a temporary solution.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I really must apologise for keeping you so long. I have gone far beyond the reasonable time- limits of a lecture, but I could not stop until I had explained to you at the necessary length - and I do not get the opportunity every day - that the policy followed by the West is not, as so many people say, negative and weak, and that it is not lacking in true boldness. Our difficulties are not unsuperable, and if the diplomatic preparations I spoke about are pursued in a reasonable manner with the firm resolve to separate once and and for all diplomatic preparation from all controversial issues and propaganda, there is good hope of agreeing an Agenda and directing the discussions towards questions on which a "rapprochement" is possible. We must, however, harbour no illusions. Moderation and prudence will both be called for, and it must be clearly understood from the first that only by successive stages will it be possible to advance beyond the historical phase we are now traversing and slowly but surely to construct peace on solid foundations, thus providing security for all and removing the feeling of being under the constant threat of a great danger.

Although the situation, as I have already said, is not without peril, including the risk of a clumsy move by men unable to keep their own destinies under control, we seem to have enough time ahead of us to seek a way out of the deadlock and to succeed in doing so. To my mind, one thing is essential, and it is with that that I shall conclude my talk. In my opinion, the policy of the Soviets is based on two errors. First they refuse to recognise that we have no aggressive intentions. I know they could say the same of us, for they proclaim with as much force as we do that they will never wage a war of aggression, and many people on our side certainly do not believe them. The day we are belived the whole atmosphere will change. Everything which today must be regarded as impossible will then become possible.

The second error of Soviet policy is its uncertainty. The Soviets constantly proclaim that the future is theirs, that they arc in line with history and that the Western world is doomed whatever efforts its political leaders and statesmen may make to save it. Up to a point, this conviction of the Soviets, now so often reiterated with force and sincerity by M. Bulganin and M. Khrushchev, serves the interests of peace. So long as the Russians are certain that they have history on their side and that in the end they must come out on top, it can be deduced that there is no reason why they should start a world war which would so cripple them that even if they won it, they would need many years and even decades to recover from its effects. This conviction is therefore a factor for peace, but also a factor making agreement with them difficult, because in view of their conviction that the Western world is doomed and that Communism will one day triumph, there is no reason why they should help us out of our difficulties. So you see, we must find our own way out. That is my firm, my definite belief, and every day it grows stronger.

We are perfectly capable of finding our own way out and of solving the problems which confront us: our military and political problems, and especially, our economic and social problems of this we can give tangible proof. It is quite untrue that the Western world is doomed. Although we are going through hard times, it is because wo are in a period of transition, but we arc quite capable of recovering our power and influence, capable of spreading throughout the world our message with all its potentialities and all its characteristic features. We are well on the road to doing so, and last year witnessed great advances in Europe. The Common Market and Euratom are as yet only treaties but their effects will be felt in two, three, four or five years time. I am certain that the integration of Europe will have almost unhoped for results as regards increased wealth and higher living standards and that this, in turn, will do much to ease our economic and social problems, and will enable us, moreover, to accomplish to an increasing degree what I consider to be that very remarkable thing which countries such as ours began a long time ago, which during the last few years has been particularly brilliant and which constitutes another stage leading to a future still more secure and inviting - namely the progress we are also making within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance.

Today, we are no longer only a military organization, we are well on the way to becoming a community with a common foreign policy. Only a few days ago we appointed a Scientific Adviser and soon, in not more than a month's time, we shall convene the first meeting of the Science Committee of the Atlantic Alliance in the hope of achieving the scientific co-operation between our member countries which should do so much to promote our economic interests. If it is successful, we shall find ever-increasing occasions for considering in common and attemptimg to solve in common one of the most difficult problems of our times, that of our relations with the so-called under-developed countries. We are on the right road. Given time, then little by little and step by step, we shall afford clear and tangible evidence of our capabilities and be able to point to our successes. This will at last give us an opportunity of initiating genuine negotiations with the Communist world, not on side issues, not on what I regard as appetisers, but on the main dish. We shall have saved the West, and with it world peace.