Speech

Gentlemen,

Let me say that I am in no doubt about the hard task before me. It is certainly not easy for me to address such a meeting as this, in my very poor English, and say something new or interesting about such a well-worn topic as NATO. My only trump card is, perhaps, that, after six months as Secretary General of the Organization, I have had a better opportunity than others to concentrate on this subject, not being distracted by the numerous and important problems with which politicians have to deal daily.

I would first like to emphasise strongly my belief in NATO, in the need for NATO and in NATO's possibilities. As a signatory of the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949, in my capacity of foreign minister for Belgium, I feel extremely proud of having participated in that historic event - a major event indeed in the defence of the Free World. I know that here, among members of the British Parliament, this feeling will certainly not appear strange, as it was in fact two great Englishmen - two great British Parliamentarians, who were the originators of the Treaty.

As early as March, 1946, with that audacity so characteristic of his genius, Sir Winston Churchill, in his memorable speech at Fulton, solemnly appealed to the Free World to form a defensive alliance within the framework of the United Nations. Later on, here in the House of Commons, Ernest Bevin delivered his most famous speech. If the Brussels Treaty was the first consequence of Mr. Bevin's speech, the ultimate and logical result of it was the North Atlantic Treaty. The proof of this lies in the words spoken by President Truman before the American Congress on the very day of the signature of the Brussels Treaty:

"I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will bo matched by an equal determination on our part to help them."

Thus was established a historic responsibility, of which you can bo very proud. What was the fundamental reason for that awakening of the Free World ? The reason was - and we should never forget it -that a policy of friendship and alliance between the Soviet Union and the Free World, such as we would like to have followed, proved to be impossible. Such a policy was impossible because the Soviet threat and Soviet determination to achieve world-wide domination became unmistakably clear; because the Soviets, ignoring the need for equilibrium in the world, pursued an imperialist policy, the most audacious example of which was the coup d'etat in Prague.

The Russians denounce the policy of opposing blocs. But it was they alone who were responsible for the existence of this state of affairs. It was they who sabotaged thy work of the United Nations Security Council by abusing their right to veto. And it was they who; by their bold policy of internal subversion and external pressure, reduced most of the countries in Central Europe and the Balkans to the role of obedient and submissive satellites. But I would like you never to forget this- What we intended to do in 1949 was to stop the expansion of Soviet imperialism in Europe - and stop it without the use of force. We can congratulate ourselves for we have completely succeeded.

The Atlantic Alliance, by its very existence, has been the greatest defeat suffered by the Soviets since the end of the second world war. The Russians know this and that is why, in their eyes, NATO has become public enemy number one -an enemy that must be destroyed at all costs - a solid barrier that must be swept aside and crushed.

Why should we apologise for what we have done. Far from it. We were compelled by fear for our security, and we can be satisfied at having clearly realised the situation before it was too late. It is, however, reasonable to ask ourselves whether there is any reason why wo should modify this policy. If the answer to this question were in the positive, it would mean that Soviet foreign policy, as it has been since 1948, is now changing fundamentally. Let me state plainly my deep conviction: nothing has changed. The methods used today may sometimes appear different for a while, but the substance remains the same and if, instead of getting ourselves lost in the more details, we keep our attention fixed on the broad lines, must we not agree that this Mr. Gromyko of 1957 is the direct heir to Vichinsky and Molotov. -Those representatives of the worst era of the cold war.

We give much importance to all that happens in Soviet Russia. Our newspapers quote and comment all Mr. Khrushchev's statements, especially those he makes during cocktail parties. Indeed it appears that, since there is no Parliamentary life in Russia, the Soviet foreign policy is formulated at such parties. I am not convinced, however, that we give all Khrushchev's statements the actual priority classification their respective importance demands.

I remember very well that Mr. Khrushchev once declared - it was after his famous speech of the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party - that, in the domain of foreign policy, Stalin had made no fundamental mistake and that he himself, Khrushchev and all his collaborators were in that field Stalinists. This continuity of foreign Soviet policy is perfectly-clear to me. Molotov, Chepilov; Gromyko still follow the same line and make the same statements. I do not think they are systematically preparing World War 3; they very well understand its dangers and its horrors; they know very well that the words "military victory" have no more meaning today. But, convinced as they are that communism will inevitably triumph over the Western World -and this is a capital point in their doctrine - they devote all their strength to hasten what they consider to be a predetermined law in history; to that end they foster throughout-the world any movement that is hostile to the West. They aggravate all conflict, at one moment artificially creating international tension at another lessoning it. In doing so, however, they are very careful not to force the Western World to the point where an irrevocable decision is taken. This is what happened. in Iran, in Greece, in Berlin, in Korea and today in the Middle East.

Quite frankly, I do not sec a single issue since World War 2, except perhaps for the Austrian Treaty, in which the Soviets have in the least way modified their initial approach or made the slightest concession. Why, therefore, should we change our Atlantic policy which stopped Soviet expansion in Europe first; and which is most probably the reason why World War 3 has been avoided. The Atlantic Alliance then must carry on. We cannot reduce our effort, out we must modify it and adapt it to the new requirements. At the same time we must realise what it is costing, and that it will be more and more expensive.

It is absolutely essential that we give our forces tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. But we can only do it if we organize and rationalise our efforts. The challenge that Mr. Khrushchev has thrown out to us is not a challenge by Soviet Russia to one or other of the countries in the Western World, it is a challenge of the Communist World as a'whole to the Free World as a whole. This challenge, a united free world must take up.

The launching of satellites by the Soviets, though it has not caused the balance of military power to swing in their favour, has brought us face to face with some hard facts and some real problems. Let us be "fair play" and acknowledge that this Sputnik is a big scientific success. Let us acknowledge too that Soviet leaders have an easier task than we do as they can achieve such scientific successes without taking into account the standard of living of their people, We cannot do this. We cannot choose between "Sputnik" and the washing machine. We must make them both and we can only make them both if, in the free world as a whole, we co-ordinate our efforts to the fullest possible extent and so avoid the immense losses in time and money that are implicit in our present organization.

Gentlemen, the gap between the requirements stated by our military authorities and our resources is great, and grows greater every day. The serious problems which this situation poses can only be solved by a greater integration of our forces and by organizing a common production of weapons. The prestige of the Western nations does not require them to re-invent what the Americans have already discovered and the security of the United States will not be endangered if they entrust their allies with secrets which their possible enemies already possess.

The communique published,at the end of the meeting between President Eisenhower and your Prime Minister is of the utmost importance. The two most powerful partners of the Atlantic Alliance have taken the lead in enunciating in a striking manner a set of new and daring ideas which will prove to bo our salvation.

It was indeed, a notable date in the history of the free world when the Representatives of the United States and Great Britain affirmed that "the arrangements which the nations of the free world have made for collective defence and mutual help are based on the recognition that the concept of national self-sufficiency is now out of date. The countries of the free world are interdependent and only in genuine partnership, by combining their resources and sharing tasks in many fields, can progress and safety be found. For our part, we have agreed that our two countries will henceforth act in accordance with this principle."

Never in time of peace have such things been affirmed so forcefully and if; as I am personally convinced, they represent something more than a facade behind which nothing will happen, if they are indeed the expression of a political determination which only remains to be put into effect, then I am persuaded that the great military problems of the Atlantic Alliance will be solved, and the solution thereof will notably strengthen the confidence and spirit of collaboration which ought to exist in the free world.

Let us assume, for the moment, that this optimistic view is justified. Let us assume that we shall be able, both to solve the problem of production and distribution of modern arms and to organize scientific research in a rational manner within the framework of the alliance. Even then our task would not be complete.

In order to maintain an effective military effort such as is imposed on us by circumstances, we must have, if not a single foreign policy, at least a co-ordinated one. It is a well-known saying that an army is only the instrument of policy, and that it is useless to possess military force if one does not have a common policy. This maxim was already known to the negotiators of the Treaty of Washington and the intention to collaborate closely in the field of foreign policy is clearly laid down in Article 4 of the Treaty.

The will to give full effect to this article has always existed. It took shape last year when Mr. Pearson, Mr. Martino and Mr. Lange were charged by their colleagues with drawing up a report on how to strengthen the Alliance.You know that, in the meantime, the events of last summer have confirmed this accepted need in a striking manner. The Suez crisis had grave repercussions within the Atlantic Alliance. I think it is no exaggeration to say that the Alliance would hardly withstand a repetition of a similar situation. We must therefore do all we can to avoid it in the future. This is what the Three Wise Men clearly understood. The conclusions of their report were bold. They affirmed:

"The essential thing is that on all occasions and in all circumstances member governments, before acting or even before pronouncing, should keep the interests and the requirements of the Alliance in mind. On the assumption however that this will and this desire do exist, the following principles and practices in the field of political consultation are recommended;

(l) Members should inform the Council of any development which significantly affects the Alliance. They should do this, not merely as a formality, but as a preliminary to effective political consultation;

(2) A member government should not, without adequate advance consultation, adopt firm policies or make major political pronouncements on matters which significantly affect the Alliance, or any of its members, unless circumstances make such prior consultation obviously and demonstrably impossible."

Gentlemen, these conclusions were unanimously adopted by the foreign ministers of the NATO countries during the December meeting, last year. If the words of this report had any real meaning, if they are more than a fine declaration of principles, if they represent a firm political purpose, then, a new page of diplomatic history is beginning.

In order to apply these principles we must, frankly, break with tradition. Individual, independent and often egoistic foreign policy has, for centuries, been the hallmark of the sovereignty of nations.

To break with the past is to recognise in diplomacy that interdependence in the economic field, which the Washington communique proclaimed, is an essential truth; it is to confirm that little by little, in every field, the problems of today are not within the power of single nations to solve, but only groups of nations.To apply these principles is to confirm that it is possible to achieve, not a single foreign policy for all the 15 countries of the Alliance, but a policy that is closely co-ordinated.

In the last 6 months, we have made some useful progress. As far as disarmament is concerned we have succeeded in building up a common Western position. When, at the end of August, the four Western Powers in the Sub-Committee made their proposals, they were speaking, not only in their own name, but in the name of all the other powers in NATO.

In the same way we have followed closely recent events in the Middle East, exchanging information and discussing the situation frankly. If we have not succeeded in establishing a common positive policy, at least we have succeeded in preventing a repetition of the events of last year, and in maintaining a common front in face of the danger that threatened us all.

All this, of course; is far from perfection. But it marks a certain progress and I have now the impression, and the hope, that in all the capitals of NATO countries, governments are realising that this new method of diplomacy; complete frankness and prior consultation between allies, instead of being an added difficulty, makes things easier and more sure.

Gentlemen, I do not believe I have exhausted my subject, but I think I have made the essential points clear. If we succeed in the future in reinforcing our alliance, in solving the question of standardising our armaments, and co-ordinating our production; If we establish a common programme of scientific research, which, without lowering our standards of living will enable us to make up for lost time; If wo stand together and co-ordinate our foreign policies so that we present a united front in face of our great problems. Then, I think we shall have done much for the defence of the free world and the triumph of our ideal.

May I remind you, Gentlemen, that I lived here among you for four critical years of my life, and it is these four years which formed me politically. It is here, above all, that I learned how freedom is defended.

But this struggle for the freedom of the world and the dignity of man, in which you have played so vital a part, is never finished. The challenge must be taken up again and again and the struggle unceasingly maintained, but even so it is not our generation which will see that final and decisive victory in which I believe.

Like you I pray with all my heart that this struggle will be a peaceful one. I pray that it may be so, by the very virtue of our principles, and by the very strength of our organization I pray that we show our superiority in a world of peaceful coexistence.

We do not want to make war on anyone, but we shall reply to violence. We are inspired by no aggressive purpose, but the whole free world must emulate that steadfastness in the face of threats, which was the eternal greatness of Great Britain, when alone, in 1940 and 1941 she faced the peril; when alone and glorious she made her own unique contribution to the safe-guarding of what makes life worthwhile.