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| Updated: 15-Mar-2001 | NATO the first five years 1949-1954 |
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Part 3
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NATO common infrastructure'Common infrastructure' is one of the many strange expressions that have now passed into everyday use in NATO. Planning in this field has given rise to problems that at times seemed almost insoluble and to arguments that seemed interminable. On the other hand, it has resulted in one of the most outstanding achievements of the Organization. The word 'infrastructure' comes from France, where it has long been used to denote all the work that is necessary before a railway track can be laid, such as embankments, bridges, tunnels, etc. It had been adopted by NATO as a generic term to denote all those fixed installations which are necessary for the effective deployment and operations of modern armed forces, for example airfields, signals communications, military headquarters, fuel tanks and pipelines, radar warning and navigational aid stations, port installations, and so forth. Installations which are set up for the maintenance and training of national forces in time of peace, and for the defence of the homeland in time of war, are called 'national infrastructure'. They are of course paid for out of national budgets. Installations which are set up at the request of NATO international Commanders for the maintenance and training of NATO international forces in time of peace, and for their effective operation in time of war, are called 'common infrastructure'. They are paid for collectively by member governments. The first projects The need for common infrastructure first became apparent - to the Western Union Defence Organization - in 1950- In those days there were very few forces available, and infrastructure requirements were correspondingly small - 30 airfields, one headquarters and about 34 signal communications projects. The estimated cost was about £ 32 million. (1) Most of these installations were to be set up in France and the Netherlands: but since they were intended for use by the forces of all members of the Brussels Treaty, it would obviously have been unfair to saddle those two countries with the whole cost of the construction to be undertaken in their territories. The five Powers therefore agreed to share the cost of this programme, which came to be known in the NATO vocabulary as 'the First Slice'. This was the origin of the principle of cost-sharing which was adopted by NATO as the basis of all later infrastructure programmes. The planning of the next programme - the Second Slice - of infrastructure requirements was begun by Western Union and eventually taken over by SHAPE. By that time, as we have seen in Chapter V, countries felt they had probably gone very near to their financial limit in providing for the raising, paying, training and equipping of forces, and for the national military infrastructure which those forces would need. In these circumstances it was clearly going to be no easy matter for them to find additional funds for common infrastructure. The cost of the Second Slice - 13 new airfields, 8 extensions, 53 signal communications projects -was estimated at £ 79 million. (2) The cost-sharing problem The problem of sharing this cost was referred to the Council Deputies in March 1951. There were many different ideas as to how it should be done. One suggestion was that the contribution of each country should be based on its 'capacity to pay'. This seemingly straightforward arrangement is in fact fraught with difficulties because it is almost impossible for nations to agree on a formula to determine the capacity to pay of each member of the Alliance. Another suggestion was that the 'user nation' criterion should be applied whereby the countries would pay in proportion to the extent to which their forces would use the facilities in question. But who could foretell the precise proportions in which member countries would use these facilities in time of war? This suggestion was therefore ruled out. There was also some discussion as to the extent, if any, to which account should be taken of the economic benefits which host countries would derive from the carrying out of extensive projects in their territory - e.g. the receipt of hard currency, the improvement of their communications, the employment of labour and so forth. But against this, it could be argued that host countries would be put to considerable expense in the purchase of land, and - in the case of airfields - in the provision of the necessary power, water and sewage systems, all free of charge to NATO. The Council Deputies, after protracted discussions, failed to agree to any of these criteria and the problem was still unsolved when the Council met in Ottawa in September 1951. After much hard bargaining, a cost-sharing formula for the Second Slice was negotiated by the Deputies and noted by the Council. Since the installations which were to be provided by this Slice were also to be used by the United States and Canadian forces assigned to SACEUR, the United States and Canada paid their share along with the Powers who had financed the First Slice. There were therefore seven contributing countries. The Third Infrastructure Programme submitted by SHAPE at the beginning of 1952 was a much larger one. It consisted of 53 new airfields, 27 extensions to airfields already under construction, about 58 separate schemes for improving communications facilities and the construction of ten war headquarters. The estimated cost was £ 152 million. (3) Since some of the new installations were to be built in Denmark, Italy and Norway, these three countries became liable to bear a share of the cost, thus increasing the number of contributing countries to ten. By this time, the Temporary Council Committee had made its report and pressure was being exerted on each member country progressively to increase its armed forces and thus its national defence budget. To make matters "worse it was already apparent that the actual cost of the Second Slice was going to be considerably in excess of the original estimate. Thus the provision of a further sum of £ 152 million, although only a fraction of the total defence expenditures, was rather like the proverbial last straw which broke the camel's back. It is therefore not surprising that at the Lisbon session in 1952 a Committee of Ministers had to devote no less than 16 hours to the problem of cost-sharing before agreement was reached. New factors After the Lisbon Conference, infrastructure planning had to take into account several new factors, namely: 1. the establishment of the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic. This involved
the provision of new air bases and improved fleet facilities; As a result the Fourth Slice, as originally estimated by Subordinate Commanders, amounted to no less than £ 297 million. This demand was later reduced by Supreme Commanders to £182 million, by eliminating all items except those which, as far as they could then see, would be required by 1954. Unfortunately, however, when this programme was presented to the Council in Ministerial session at Paris in December 1952, the Annual Review for that year had not been completed. As a result, the cost-sharing discussions took place in an atmosphere of uncertainty as to the validity of the assumptions made by Supreme Commanders about the forces which would be available in 1954, and consequently of their estimate of the infrastructure installations needed to support them. The Council, therefore, requested the military authorities, as a first step, to reduce their programme by leaving out of account for the moment all projects on which construction need not begin at once. The bill was thus reduced to £ 80 million. The Council eventually agreed on the cost-sharing of this sum, leaving the financing of the remainder of the Fourth Slice to be settled when the Annual Review was completed. All member countries, except Iceland, contributed towards the cost of the Fourth and subsequent Slices. The three years programme Immediately after the Ministerial session of December 1952, the Council decided that a determined effort must be made to avoid a repetition of the long drawn out discussions on cost-sharing which had taken place at the last three Ministerial sessions. Accordingly they evolved the idea of trying to agree on the cost-sharing of a long-term programme which would cover the military requirements up to the end of 1957. If this could be done. Ministers would be relieved of much detailed discussion; arbitrary cuts in the military programme would be obviated; provision could be made for long-term, construction, and governments would be able to make adequate and timely budgetary provision for infrastructure expenditure. Accordingly, the Council asked the military authorities for a broad forecast of the cost, and a general outline of the probable content of their common infrastructure requirement for three years ahead. The Military felt unable to estimate more closely than to say that the sum would be somewhere between £ 235 million and £ 315 million. The Council, after consideration, agreed that a sum of £ 250 million should be spent on the three years' programme and set about negotiating the percentages in which governments would contribute. Thanks to these negotiations the Council, at its Ministerial session in Paris in April 1953, were able to reach early agreement on the cost-sharing, not only of the three years' programme, but also of that portion of the Fourth Slice which had been left over from their previous Ministerial Meeting - the Council by now having scaled this last figure down to £ 67 million. The cost-sharing ghost, whose lugubrious presence had haunted previous Ministerial sessions, had at last been laid. To bring the story up to date, the first instalment of the three-year
programme, or Fifth Slice, of common infrastructure amounting to about
£ 90 million was approved by the Council in December, 1953. A considerable
part of this Slice is devoted to the completion of the jet fuel pipeline
system by connecting it to the ports of entry. Other features of the Slice
are the improvement of naval bases, particularly in the Mediterranean,
the extension of the signals projects, particularly in Belgium, Greece,
Italy and Turkey, and the provision of long-range aids to navigation in
the Eastern Atlantic. Meanwhile, the Infrastructure Committee of the Council had been patiently at work on devising techniques for the proper control of the expenditure of the funds provided in common for infrastructure. The rules which have now been agreed and are in operation represent a remarkable achievement in the solution of novel international problems. There is a close parallel between these rules and those by which each member government operates. Indeed, most of the constitutional principles governing the expenditure of public money in individual member countries are being followed in the administration of the NATO infrastructure programme. The executive branch of a government has to present to the legislature estimates of the expenditure required by the military authorities. In NATO, the Military Committee has to present to the Council detailed estimates of the infrastructure programme. In an individual country, the legislature usually has a committee which examines the estimates. In NATO, the Council have their Infrastructure Committee consisting of members of the delegations, which 'screens' the infrastructure programme. In an individual country, the legislature votes money on the basis of the estimates: it being understood that, if possible, the work must be done for less than the amount voted, and that if more than the amount voted is required, the legislature must be asked for an additional authorisation. In NATO, there is a rule that, when a host country has worked out its estimates for a particular piece of work, authority to spend the money on it must be given by the Payments and Progress Committee which also consists of members of delegations. This Committee has the right to scrutinise the estimates (with the aid of technical experts on the NATO Staff) and to suggest alternative methods of doing the work more cheaply but not less effectively. A government department which is responsible for the spending of public
money on, for example, the purchase of supplies for the forces or the
construction of public buildings, is obliged to place the contract on
the basis of fair competitive tendering. Similarly, contracts for common
infrastructure works are open to competitive bidding from reputable firms
in all the member countries. This system of international competitive
bidding for infrastructure contracts has only recently been introduced,
the underlying idea being that since thirteen NATO countries contribute
towards the cost of a project, they should all have a chance to benefit
from the economic advantages which result from its construction. In most countries, auditors, responsible directly to the legislature and independent of the executive branch of governments, examine all the records and accounts of the spending department to ensure that the money has been spent on the items for which it was voted, and that every possible economy has been secured. The audit authority submits its reports direct to the legislature. Similarly in NATO there is a Board of Auditors for infrastructure accounts, which is independent of the individual host countries and directly responsible to the Council. Government departments responsible for spending public money on, say, the building of airfields, employ civil engineers who are experts on how the work should be done and what it ought to cost. These experts draw up the specifications which form the basis of the tenders for the contract; they examine the tenders from the technical point of view, and they participate later in the inspection of the work to see that it has been done properly. Similarly, the International Staff of NATO have their experts in civil engineering, telecommunications and petroleum storage and pipelines. These members of the International Staff do not duplicate the work done by the experts of host countries. But it is their business to check the plans and specifications submitted by those experts and to assist in joint inspections of the work. In this way it is ensured that what NATO wanted is, in fact, done. How a programme is devised In order to explain the parts played by the various agencies responsible for getting common infrastructure programmes under way, let us trace briefly the sequence of a typical programme. The first step is for Subordinate Commanders to submit to their Supreme Commanders proposals for infrastructure in their commands. The next step is for the Supreme Commanders to co-ordinate these plans and to satisfy themselves that the installations proposed are militarily essential to support the forces which have been agreed in the Annual Review and that they are for common use, in accordance with the established criteria. It is noteworthy that during this process Supreme Commanders have sometimes been able to make very substantial reductions in the proposals of their subordinates. In the course of preparing their programmes Supreme Commanders draw upon the advice of the technicians of the International Staff in order to ensure that: 1. the cost estimates submitted by host nations are reasonable; The programme is then passed to the Standing Group and to the Infrastructure Committee of the North Atlantic Council. The Standing Group examines it from the standpoint of military necessity and urgency and submits its comments to the Military Committee. The Infrastructure Committee examines it from the financial and technical point of view, and verifies that the projects are in fact for common use and therefore qualify for common financing. The final reports from the Military Committee and the Infrastructure Committee are then placed before the Council and considered simultaneously. It remains to explain how infrastructure projects are actually constructed. This too may be done by taking an example of a single project, say a typical NATO airfield in Europe. As soon as financial approval has been given, the full responsibility for construction rests with the host country. Its first duty is to determine the exact site for the airfield, the Military having indicated only the general area. The next step is to complete the blueprint for the airfield and to acquire the land on which it is to be built. When it is remembered that a standard NATO airfield requires 1,100 acres and that this land is often owned by anything up to fifty different farmers, it will be realised that acquisition raises considerable financial, economic and social problems. So far as finance is concerned, the authorities in the host country have not only to purchase the land free of charge to NATO, but also in many cases to compensate the owner by the provision of alternative accommodation. However generous the purchase terms may be, the objections to uprooting a man whose family have owned the land for generations are obvious. While the acquisition of the necessary land is being arranged, engineers of the host country draw up the master plan of the airfield. If it is a main airfield allocated for peacetime use, say, by the Royal Canadian Air Force or the United States Air Force, this master plan is drawn up in consultation with the Canadian or United States authorities in order that any special faculties which they require (and pay for) may be taken into account. The master plan is then sent to SHAPE for approval. When the plan has been approved the host nation authorities prepare a detailed cost estimate of the' construction, which must be passed by the Payments and Progress Committee of the North Atlantic Council before funds are actually committed. It often happens that this Committee can suggest modifications to the plan which result in considerable financial saving. In almost all cases the next stage is for the host nation authorities to invite all NATO nations to bid for the contract, and to notify delegations of opening and closing dates. Construction starts as soon as the contractor has been selected. When it is under way technicians from the International Staff, representatives of the Supreme Commander and of the user nation, visit the site and in due course submit progress reports to the Infrastructure Committee of the Council and to the Supreme Commander. As work proceeds, the host nation authorities send NATO statements for the reimbursement of the money to be spent in the next quarter in accordance with the authorisation given by the Payments and Progress Committee. The money is then refunded according to the appropriate cost-sharing agreement. It may be thought that the planning and construction of infrastructure projects are unnecessarily complicated and lengthy. To a certain extent this has to be accepted because of the complexities of multilateral agreements and the need for most stringent economy. It must be borne in mind, first, that a large number of authorities are involved in almost every transaction - the host country, the user country, the North Atlantic Council (working through the Infrastructure Committee, the Payments and Progress Committee and the International Staff), the Standing Group, the Supreme Commander and the Subordinate Commanders: secondly, that the installations are generally highly technical and of considerable variety, and that they must in all respects be up to the standards required by the Military: thirdly, that installations have to be set up in twelve different European countries: and finally, that, if NATO is to get full value for money, the most thorough check and cross-check and the most drastic screening and pruning are essential at all stages. Nevertheless, every effort is being made to find ways and means of simplifying and speeding up all these processes. Achievements up to date This Chapter may well conclude with a summary of the achievements of
NATO in the field of common infrastructure. Up to the 1st July, 1954,
the expenditure of £ 700 million sterling had been approved, and
detailed programmes costing £ 540 million had been worked out and
accepted. The balance of £ 160 million sterling will be used for
additional projects to be started in 1955 and 1956. Signals Communications: In April, 1951, the signals communications available were wholly inadequate for military requirements. Today more than 300 new projects, from Northern Norway to Turkey, are under construction. About half of these are already completed and the rest are being completed in the course of 1954 and 1955. It is estimated that 16,000 km. of land lines, 10,000 km. of radio relay circuits, and 1,700 km. of submarine cables will then have been added to the existing civilian networks. These facilities, apart from their military value, will clearly be an appreciable reinforcement to some of the peacetime communications systems in Europe. New war headquarters are being constructed linked up with the signals network. Fuel Supply Systems: The enormous consumption of jet fuel by modem aircraft
has rendered obsolescent the conventional methods of fuel supply by rail
and road. Consequently, jet fuel must, wherever possible, be supplied
by a system of pipelines. The construction of this system was started
during the autumn of 1953 after the basic standards and specifications
had been worked out and agreed by all countries concerned. Orders for
pipe, steel for storage tanks and pumping units have been placed, and
the first pipelines have already been laid. More than three-quarters of the funds committed are devoted to the above types of project. Training Facilities: Four air training bases are being constructed in the Mediterranean area where good flying weather prevails and the maximum number of flying hours can be obtained during the training period. These bases can accommodate 300 officers and 1,100 men at a time for training in air-to-air firing and bombing. The land forces are being provided with training grounds which will permit simultaneous exercises of all elements of a single infantry division or a substantial portion of an armoured division. Tank training grounds will permit, all the year round, training of one tank battalion or equivalent unit at a time. Naval Projects: About 26 naval projects are under construction for the use of naval forces. These consist mainly of storage faculties for oil, fuel lubricants and ammunition at naval bases. Nor have the needs of SACLANT been overlooked. He is being provided with fleet facilities, maritime airfields for his naval air forces, and a chain of stations providing navigational aids in the Eastern Atlantic giving his naval forces coverage in that area. Among minor infrastructure projects worth mentioning, there are aids to air navigation and radar warning stations, where these are required to fill gaps in national systems. To sum up, one cannot fail to be impressed by the magnitude of the co-operative
achievement of NATO in the field of infrastructure. From the military
point of view, a volume of infrastructure has been, and is being built
that would have been unattainable by national or bilateral plans alone.
From the financial and constitutional point of view a remarkable new technique
in the expenditure of money contributed to an international undertaking
has been evolved. From the political point of view the realisation of
a common effort of such dimensions does resounding credit to the spirit
of mutual understanding and joint purpose which has grown up in the Atlantic
Community. In infrastructure, member countries have worked together for
the success of an enterprise which serves each and every one of them.
This is the very foundation of the North Atlantic Alliance. Related chart:
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