NATO Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships (1994-1996)

Collective Security System of the CIS States and Measures Providing Peace on the Territory of the Former Soviet Union Alexander Yegorov (Belarus) [Back to Index] 4. Creation of Collective Security System within the CIS 4.1 The Treaty on Collective Security (TCS) The first steps on the creation of a CSS, within the CIS, were made right after the Commonwealth was formed. In early 1992, within the framework of agreements on friendship and mutual assistance, the states of Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan prepared the Draft Treaty on Collective Security. Then, three more states -- Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan agreed to sign a multilateral treaty on collective security. On 15 May 1992, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, six months after the CIS was formed, six states of the CIS -- Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan signed the Treaty on Collective Security (TCS). The signing of this Treaty has become a starting point for the development of CSS within the CIS. 4.1.1 The Goal of the Treaty The goal of the Treaty is the introduction of a political and legal basis for the creation of a defensive alliance of all interested CIS member-states for unification opposing external military threats. Signing of the Treaty itself is the first step on the way to creating the aggregate CSS. Six months after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union and collective agreement by at first six Newly Independent States (NIS), then another three states -- Azerbaijan, Belarus and Georgia came to a conclusion that it was appropriate to set up a defensive alliance within the CIS. Having changed their previous attitude towards the TCS, the leadership of those countries decided that it is better to join the Treaty. Through this Treaty, these nations are, first of all, seeking ensuring their security from external military threat. 4.1.2 Mechanism of Consultations The participating states in the TCS agreed, that "the participating states will conduct consultations with each other on all important issues of international security touching upon their interests and will co-ordinate their positions regarding those issues". Further, it is specified in the Treaty, that "should a threat arise to the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or several participating states, or to international peace and security, the participating states are to immediately put the mechanism of joint consultation into play with the goal of co-ordinating their positions and implementing specific measures to eliminate the arising threat" (Article 2). These provisions of the Treaty reflect consent to conduct mutual consultations to co-ordinate positions in case of threat as well as on general aspects of international security. At the same time, the TCS does not determine a strict procedure for the development of a common position as a result of such consultations. 4.1.3 Key Provision of the Treaty A key provision of the Treaty is that the participating states agree to view aggression against one of them as aggression "against all participating states of the present Treaty". In accordance with the TCS, the participating states pledge: "In case an act of aggression is committed against any of the participating states, all other participating states will render the necessary assistance to it, including military, and will also provide support with the available means in terms of exercising the rights for collective defence in compliance with Article 51 of the UN Charter". In conducting those actions they commit themselves "to be bound by the corresponding provisions of the UN Charter" (Article 4). This provision consolidates the consent of the participating states, to view security of each particular participating state, as indivisible. It is this particular key provision that constitutes the major difference between the approach towards defence of the CIS countries, laid down in the CIS Charter, and that of the TCS participating states. 4.1.4 Use of the Armed Forces Additionally, there is another major difference between the Treaty and the UN Charter concerning the decision on the use of the armed forces. Unlike the UN Charter, specifying that a decision on the collective use of the armed forces is made by the Council of the heads of the CIS states, the Treaty says that "a decision on the use of the armed forces to repel aggression ... is made by the heads of the participating states" (Article 6). An important issue, concerning the use of the armed forces of the participating states, should be pointed out. The TCS signatories regard the use of the armed forces outside the territory of the participating states as admissible, specifying that such a use "may be conducted exclusively in the interests of the international security in strict compliance with the UN Charter and the legislation of the other participating states of the present Treaty" (Article 6). According to the TCS, the participating states confirm their obligations to restrain themselves from using force or threatening its use and to resolve all differences, both among themselves and with other states, exclusively by peaceful means (Article 1). The obligation to resolve all differences, by peaceful means, mentioned in the Treaty, shows that the participating states do not exclude the availability of such contradictions among themselves and found it appropriate to include in the Treaty the obligation to resolve all the differences among themselves only by peaceful means. A long-term conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, turning sometimes into open military clashes suggest that a violation of that commitment does not lead to more or less serious consequences for the intruders. Thus, infringement of this obligation is apparently not considered to undermine the goals of the Treaty or to endanger the interests and security of the other signatories of the Treaty. The real status of bilateral relations of certain participating states of the Treaty (i.e. Armenia-Azerbaijan, Russia-Georgia) and the measures taken by these countries against each other, draws the question whether the following defined obligation is universal or not: "participating states will not join any military alliances or take part in any groupings of states, as well as in the activities aimed against another participating state" (Article 1). This obligation, not observed de facto in the relationship between each other, but observed in general in the relationship with the third countries, as well as the obligation "not to sign international agreements, discordant with the present Treaty" (Article 8), suggest that the main purpose of these obligations is to restrain the participating states, of the Treaty, from participating in other regional alliances or coalitions associated with resolving security issues. It is mentioned in the Treaty that, "in case a collective security system is set up in Europe and Asia and with this purpose in view agreements on collective security are signed ... the participating states are to immediately start mutual consultations to include appropriate intentions in the present Treaty" (Article 1). Despite the claims that the TCS signatories will "constantly strive" for signing such agreements, there were no consultations, allotted for, within the TCS, nor counter-initiatives, nor alternative proposals from the TCS as a reaction to NATO real plans to expand the sphere of influence and turn NATO into one of the basic components of the European security. It is only mentioned in one of the documents, Declaration of Participating States in Collective Security Treaty, adopted by the Council of Collective Security at the Alma-Aty session on 10 February 1995, that the participating states "view the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program as a real alternative to mechanical expansion of NATO". They feel that its practical implementation "should be oriented on forming a universal all-European structure of military-political co-operation that would strengthen the foundation of the OSCE" (Declaration of Participating States in Collective Security Treaty, "Sovetskaya Byelorussia", 4 April 1995). There is no solid ground to assert that this commitment of the TCS participating states is just a claim. Nevertheless, in practice there were no consultations on the TCS countries joining the NATO "Partnership for Peace" program. Along the same lines, no consultations were conducted for the development of co-ordinated position for all the TCS participating states, nor within the CIS, on NATO enlargement projects, at the expense of countries of Central Europe.

4.2 Bodies of the Treaty According to the Treaty, the Council of Collective Security (CCS), composed of the heads of the participating states, is set up (Article 3). "Co-ordination and ensuring co-operation of the participating states in correspondence with the present Treaty" is within the TCS responsibility (Article 5). The Treaty envisions that the bodies, formed by the CCS, will be involved in the same activities. 4.3 Implementation of the Treaty By now, in correspondence with the Treaty, the following decisions and decrees have been adopted: Decision on immediate measures of the TCS implementation (24.12.93, Council of the Heads of States, Council of the Heads of Governments) Protocol on conditions, mechanism and procedures of joining the TCS by non-signatory states (24.12.93, Council of the Heads of States, Council of the Heads of Governments) Decision on the set up of allied Air Defence forces of the CIS (10.02.95, Council of the Heads of States) Decision of the CCS on collective security concept of the TCS participating states (10.02.95, Council of the Heads of States) Decision of the CCS on the basic directions of deepening military co-operation of the TCS participating states (10.02.95, Council of the Heads of States) Decision of the CCS on the Declaration of the TCS (10.02.95, Council of the Heads of States) Decision on the implementation of the Agreement on the set up of allied Air Defence forces of the CIS (26.05.95, Council of the Heads of States) Decision of the CCS on the TCS registration (26.05.95, Council of the Heads of States) Decision of the CCS on the Collective security concept implementation plan and basic directions of deepening military co-operation of the TCS participating states (26.05.95, Council of the Heads of States). 4.4 Creation and Reforming of Bodies Attention to the following documents should be noted: Decision on the Allied Forces Headquarters of the CIS member-states (24.12.93, Council of the Heads of States, Council of the Heads of Governments) Decision on the Statute of the Council of Defence Ministers of the CIS member-states (15.04.94, Council of the Heads of States, Council of the Heads of Governments) Decision of the CCS on transferring the responsibilities of the CCS Secretariat to the Allied Forces Headquarters of the CIS member-states (19.01.96.) 4.4.1 The Council of Collective Security(CCS) On 6 July 1992, in Moscow, the TCS participating states signed the agreement on the Statute of the CCS, according to which the CCS "is the supreme political body of the Treaty on Collective Security participating states". The CCS provides for "co-ordination and joint activity of participating states directed at implementing the present Treaty" (The Statute of the CCS, part 1, paragraph 1, Basic provisions). 4.4.2 Decision-making Mechanism The Statute of the CCS does not clearly define decision-making procedures. According to the Statute, "decisions of the Council are made, at its sessions, in correspondence with the time-frame set separately for each particular session and come into force for each participating state in compliance with the provisions of its Constitution" (The Statute of the CCS, part 1, paragraph 2, Basic provisions). The lack of clearly defined decision-making procedure (on the basis of consensus by simple or qualified majority), time-frame, set specific agenda for each CCS session, developed procedure for implementation, cast doubt on the effectiveness of the decision-making mechanism of the TCS supreme political body. 4.4.3 CCS Responsibilities According to Part 3, paragraph 4 of the Statute of the CCS, this body "has the following responsibility": To consider questions associated with the intent of the Treaty. Conduct consultations, directed at co-ordinating the positions of participating states, should a threat arise to the security, territorial integrity and sovereignty of one or several participating states, or to international peace and security Develop measures on defence command and control of the participating states Consider rendering first assistance, including military action, to a participating state, subject to the circumstance of aggression by any state or group of states. Develop and takes measures necessary to support and restore peace and security. Information about such measures should be immediately submitted to the UN Security Council. Co-ordinate participating states' activity on the main areas of the armed forces and the national economy mobilisation training. Develop recommendations on the main avenues of military-technical policy and supply to the armed forces, of participating states, with weapons and military equipment". The analysis of the CCS responsibilities shows that this body is more involved in the co-ordination activity and is developing recommendations on the questions, associated with the TCS implementation, rather than the making of decisions, linked with joint activity, in the interests of collective security. Only one of the paragraphs, devoted to the responsibilities, deals with measures aimed at supporting or restoring peace and security. However, it says that these measures "are developed and taken", without being specified, as it should be. In addition, the nature of measures, to be taken, is described very vaguely. Particularly, which measures the CCS "will find necessary to support and restore peace and security" (The Statute of the CCS, part 3, paragraph 4). 4.4.4 Implementation of Decisions Implementation of decisions, depending on the Constitutional procedures in every state, on the one hand, is based on the national legislation of each state. On the other hand, it is lowering the TCS participating states activity within the Treaty, due to the national legislation of certain countries where it is possible to de-facto impede fulfilment of obligations under the Treaty. As practice shows, in terms of security and defence policy, the imperfection of the decision-making process and incompatibility of national legislations, of the TCS signatories are lowering the effectiveness of the TCT's intent. An imperfect decision-implementation mechanism is one of the TCS weak points. It was obvious from the beginning of the creation of the elements of the CSS, that non-effectiveness of this mechanism's work is slowing down the valued effectiveness of the CSS to it's TCS participating states. 4.4.5 Composition of the Council of Collective Security (CCS) The CCS is composed of the heads of states, ministers of foreign affairs, defence ministers of the TCS participating states and the Secretary General of the CCS, who is appointed by the collective decision of the CCS. The CCS has two supreme consultative bodies: The Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers, which handle "in matters regarding co-ordination of the domestic and foreign policy", consisting of ministers of foreign affairs; For "matters regarding military policy and military development", the Council of Defence Ministers, consisting of defence ministers of the TCS participating states, handle these items. The Secretariat of the CCS operates as a permanent working body as designated by the Secretary General of the CCS. This body is involved in carrying out every day administrative, informational, analytical and consultative work to support the Council and its working bodies activity. 4.4.6 Secretary General of the CCS Secretary General of the CCS is appointed by the decision of the Council of Collective Security (CCS) "from civilian employees". This position is tasked with: Conducting political consultations and co-ordinating the positions of the TCS participating states on military issues; Preparing the CCS meetings and summarising issues for discussions and making applicable decisions; Representing the Council in relations with heads of states, international organisations and mass media; Representing the Councils mutual interests, and those of the participating states, on the issues regarding co-operation with NATO and other military-political groupings, blocs and alliances; Directing the work of the Secretariat of the CCS. 4.5 The Concept of Collective Security The Concept of Collective Security of the TCS participating states was adopted on 10 February 1995 at the Alma-Aty session. The Concept is the aggregate view of the TCS participating states on preventing and eliminating threats to peace, collective defence from aggression, providing for their sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Concept includes the basic tenets of the participating states' military policy, of providing collective security, the basic directions and stages of the collective security system creation. According to the Concept, collective security of the participating states is based on the following main principles: indivisibility of security, whereupon aggression against one participating state is to be viewed as aggression against all participating states; equal responsibility, of participating states, for maintaining security; observance of territorial integrity, respect for sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs, and consideration of the interests of one another; collective defence on a regional basis; adoption of decisions, on key issues concerning collective security, on the basis of consensus; direction as to the composition and preparedness of forces and resources to meet the scale of the military threat. A CSS must be the foundation of collective security posture. It is viewed as the aggregate of interstate and state bodies of administration and the forces and resources ultimately provided towards defence of the participating states' interests, sovereignty and territorial integrity on a common legal basis (with regard for national legislation). The following are interstate bodies of the system of collective security: The Council of Collective Security; The Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers; The Council of Defence Ministers. The bodies of political and military leadership, of the participating states, are to be the state bodies within the CSS. The following outline the forces and resources of the CSS: the armed forces and other troops of the participating states; regional coalition of joint troop force resources that are created, as necessary, to repel aggression against participating states; the combined (joint) air defence system, and other systems. The Council of Collective Security may create collective peacekeeping forces for operations in order to maintain peace, carried out in accordance with the decisions of the United Nations Security Council and the OSCE. The principal directions supporting the creation of the CSS are: Reconciling the basic provisions of legal acts by the participating states, pertaining to defence and security; Consulting regularly on the problems of military development and training, of the armed forces, for the participating states; Developing new approaches to handle the problems of raising troops (forces) to the highest levels of combat readiness, the forms and means of their training and their operational and combat use, and to co-ordinate mobilizational preparation by the economies of the participating states; Reaching multilateral agreements on utilising components of the military infrastructure and the airspace and waters of participating states; Co-ordinating on the problems of preparing the territory of participating states towards the interests of collective defence; Conducting joint measures of operational and combat training of armed forces and other troops of the participating states; Co-ordinating on training programs for military personnel and specialists; Co-ordinating plans for developing, producing, supplying and repairing armament and military equipment; Generating unified approaches to the practices for creating and maintaining materiel stockpiles. The system of collective security is for each state to form gradually, in stages, with regard to a systematic development toward its military and political situation in the world. In the first stage: creation of the armed forces, of the participating states, is to be basically complete; a program of military and military-technical co-operation, among participating states, is to be drawn up, and its implementation is to begin; legal acts, regulating functions of the CSS, system are to be drafted and adopted. In the second stage: Coalition of joint troop force groupings are to be created in order to repel possible aggression, and their use is to be specifically defined; a combined, joint air defence system is to be created; the possibility of creating joint armed forces is to be examined. In the third stage: Creation of the CSS, of the participating states, is to be concluded. 4.6 Plan for Gradual Development of the Collective Military Security System of the CIS Member-States, on the TCS Basis Plan of gradual development of the collective military security system, of the CIS member-states on the basis of the Treaty on Collective Security, was developed in 1995 in the Headquarters of the Allied Forces. Generally, it is comprised of the following: The First Stage (1995 - 1996) Completion, of the build-up of the armed forces, of the CIS countries having signed the Treaty on Collective Security, creation of the Coalition forces, military command and control bodies and a foundation for their practical activation support. The Second Stage (1997) Creation of the regional Coalition forces and their military command and control bodies, operational planning of their use, and organisation of tactical, combat and mobilisation training. The Third Stage (1998) Completion of development of the collective military security system. Build-up and training of the Coalition defence forces. According to the viewpoint of a representative of the Council of Defence Ministers, by the CIS Executive Secretariat major-general Vasiliy Volkov, most TCS participating states are not willing to have such a CSS architecture that entails rigid and centralised administration and creation of new costly interstate operating bodies. It is obvious, that on this stage, it would be appropriate to transfer the majority of work to the individual nations and regions, and to authorise the governing body to resolve administrative, legal issues, and to develop the overall tenets of the CIS collective security. The following fact also shows that this option is more favourable: the basic intellectual potential for the whole scope of the Council of Collective Security activity is concentrated in the nations and, therefore, it should be utilised to the maximum towards the interests of the whole Commonwealth. There was a certain response, both in the CIS countries and in the West, to the position on the CIS collective security problems as set forth by the secretary of the Council of Defence Ministers, Lieutenant-General Leonid Ivashov. According to his standpoint, creation of the collective security system should be based on regional subsystems with regard to common territory, the nature of threats, groupings of it s forces, its unique infrastructure, and other conditions and factors. Coalition defence forces, with the corresponding military command and control bodies, are to become an important element of each subsystem. Actually, the creation of a grouping of troops and forces, in the theatre of operations or at the operational level is desired. Coalition defence forces will constitute a foundation of the Allied Armed Forces, that might also comprise a common, for the whole CIS system reserves, coalition operational Navy units, and other components. Command and control bodies, of the Coalition defence forces and the Allied Armed Forces in accordance with this statement, should have comprehensive authority responsibilities regarding certain matters associated with combat readiness, combat and operational training of troops (forces), and their command and control in peace and war time. The Council of Collective Security should authorise the coalition command and control bodies with appropriate authority which should be consolidated within the participating countries' legislation. From Leonid Ivashov's standpoint the following area breakdown might be a possible option to the regional set-up collective security subsystem: East-European Region: Territories of Belarus, West-European part of Russia and the Kaliningrad region. Caucasian Region: Territories of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and North-Caucasian part of Russia. Central-Asian Region: Subdivided into balanced Western and Eastern zones: Western Zone: territory of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Eastern Zone: territory of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and the Ural-Siberian part of Russia. East-Asian Region: Territories of the Eastern Russia and Eastern Kazakhstan. A political-economic body (Council of Defence) and coalition command, for the grouping of forces, are to be created to maintain security and manage defence. Participation of the Tashkent Treaty non-signatory states (Moldova, Ukraine, Turkmenistan) into regional subsystems, is envisioned, rather than excluded. Their involvement can be both partial, i.e. in certain areas (guarding and protection of border parts that are the CIS external borders, the defence industry co-operation, and use of the infrastructure, etc.) and more on the large-scale. We assume, that in the current situation, there are three theoretically possible types of military union of the TCS participating states: Coalition of States: Commitments between allies, for a specified period, without united co-ordinating bodies or single or unified command. Military-political Alliance: Creation of the continuosly operating political and military bodies, unified military structures, groupings of forces and resources, availability of compatible operational plans and plans of forces and consolidated training. Deeper military integration - with coalition structures, having comprehensive authority. Their decisions are mandatory for the participating states. They maintain the common military budget (apart from the national budget) and co-ordinate joint armed forces under the unified coalition command. According to the opinion of most experts, in defence security area, the second form of military integration is most acceptable for the present status of relationships within the CIS. The selection, to forms of military integration, is not limited by the Treaty on collective Security. It applies, as well, to the military-political defensive alliance that might become the military foundation of the collective security system within the CIS territory. The effectiveness of the collective security system will depend on several factors, two of which will be paramount and dominant. First: The security level of the participating states, and Second: The status and capability of the applied mechanisms which will consolidate security potentials of single nations in one system.