Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience. The Role Of Nuclear Weapons And Its Possible Future Missions Igor SUTYAGIN [Back to Index] Origins Of Nuclear Strategies Of The "Nuclear Club" Members - Brief Overview I.6. Other countries There are four examples of the "other countries" which tried to obtain nuclear weapons to be discussed - very briefly - here. These are India, Pakistan, the South Africa and the North Korea. The Israeli case is discussed separately. India Pakistan South Africa North Korea Israel India The now well-known Indian test of the so-called "peaceful nuclear device" in 1974 took place three years after the Indo-Pakistani Crisis and the War of December 1971 and definitely as inspired much by that crisis and the subsequent stable (what was important) deterioration of the Indo-Pakistani relations. The Indo-Pakistani War originated in a domestic conflict between Bengali nationalists and the central government of Pakistan. Following the breakdown of negotiations with Awami League (which had demonstrated overwhelming electoral strength in East Pakistan) in March 1971, the Pakistani government embarked on a policy of repression, which led to a massive flight of refugees into India.

India then internationalized the crisis by supporting the Mukti Bahini guerrillas of East Bengal, who were fighting the Pakistani Army. When the Pakistanis, in retaliation, launched an air strike against India on December 3, 1971, the regular Indian army advanced quickly in the East, forcing the Pakistani commander in Dacca to surrender on December 16, 1971. On the following day an armistice was concluded in the West. (62) Meanwhile the tensions between India and Pakistan (which was considered in Dehli to be backed by the United States) became the common point in their relations. There are little doubts the Sino-Indian dispute over the Jammu and Kashmir Province was the great concern for the Indian leaders as well. The Chinese nuclear arsenal played the role in that dispute. That was the conditions in which the Indian government made the decision to carry out national military nuclear project. No doubts the purpose to strengthen India's capabilities to withstand pressure from both nuclear China and Pakistan supported (as it was considered in India) by the nuclear United States was the sole task of that project. The fact that Dehli wisely freezed the program upon obtaining the positive result (thus sending very clear message to both Islamabad and Beijing) in order not to give Pakistan too strong reasons to launch its own nuclear program thus increasing the dander for India - in this author's point of view supports such the conclusion.

Pakistan In discussion of the Pakistani efforts to built its own Bomb one should remember that it was the Indian policy which contributed a lot into breaking the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War up. Indeed, even before the flow of refugees, the Indian government had given the all-out support to the Bengalis; it had permitted the formation of an exile government on the Indian soil; and in April 1971 it had secretly decided to prepare to war. (63) Hence it was India who sought the war in 1971 and its obtaining of a nuclear weapons design knowledge displayed in 1974 must be considered in such the conditions as the additional tool to press Pakistan in Indian possession. Probably the need to counterbalance that fact played the role in Pakistani efforts to launch its own nuclear program which culminated in 1987 "technical" test of the nuclear weapons' principles. The South Africa The South African Republic have given world the "only" unique case of deliberate total nuclear disarmament and in this sense must be listed even above the another "only" - China, which after sharp deterioration of its relations with the Soviet Union turned its nuclear strategy (and forces) 180 degrees - against the recent closest ally. Meanwhile the South African case is very interesting because the "clinically" pure role the nuclear weapons played in the policy of the South Africa's leadership. Indeed the main purpose of the creation of the very modest nuclear arsenal - just seven weapons, while some say there were plans to built more - was to keep it as the mean to attract the superpowers' attention to the ruling White minority problems in case of imminent threat to its existence from the suppressed Black majority. That to be carried out through a very peculiar sort of nuclear blackmail by warning the superpowers on possibility of the nuclear weapons use against both the rioting Black majority and neighbor countries, supporting it (Angola first of all), to force the Soviet Union and the United States to intervene thus saving the ruling regime. One must agree that the last step in the South African nuclear project history was very wise in its political sense. Indeed, it supposed the deprivation of the political adversary whose political responsibility still was to be confirmed of weapons of enormous destructive power by absolutely peaceful means. The direct result of that action was exclusion of possibility to exercise the policy of pressure against the South Africa's neighbors - if the Nelson Mandella's leadership decided to try one (while the author strongly doubt it would). The North Korea The Korean People-Democratic Republic's (KNDR) nuclear weapons program is the very illustrative case of the role the Bomb can play in a country's efforts to resolve some problems it meets. It is noteworthy - from this author's standpoint - to notice that the most clear signs of the KNDR will to build its own nuclear arsenal appeared when North Korean leaders suffered of probably the most serious economic crisis over last thirty years. At that point Pyongyang warned the West (South Korea being the part of it) about its determination to build the Bomb and threaten the security of the Republic of Korea and the U.S. troops stationed there. The West which has already been well-informed about the unintelligent and "aggressive" nature of Pyongyang regime intervened in a moment in what probably could be called the "Munich style". The previous paragraph under no conditions means the author wants to criticize the measures undertaken. Moreover the author thinks those measures gave much more positive results than forceful one could and on that ground fully supports them. Nevertheless the case is the very interesting example how a declarative policy accompanied by the renome of unpredictable and "unmanageable" player of international relations - bluff in fact - even without real efforts aimed to obtaining the nuclear weapons allowed Pyongyang to reach its purposes: after all, with the Western assistance the North Korean leadership managed to soften the seriousness of the crisis.

Israel The case of the still unrecognized nuclear power - Israel - is complicated for discussion due to a "fog" over its nuclear strategy created by the Tel Aviv's necessity to simulate non-nuclear status in order not to loose the vitally important for the country U.S. financial and political support (as it happened with the Pakistanis when some details of Islamabad nuclear project were revealed). Nevertheless the author probably should frankly recognize that Israeli case does not perfectly lay in the general trend mainstream, described for the official "Nuclear Club" members as well as four other nuclear weapons aspirants. The Israeli nuclear arsenal, as one can consider, was being created with almost sole military purpose of defense against Arab World in mind. Meanwhile even that was not purely military enterprise. Like the South Africans, the Israelis planned to have Moscow intervened in case of an vitally serious Arab-Israeli clash to force the USSR Arab clients to break off. The peculiarity of the Israeli case - and its difference of that South African - was that Tel Aviv planned to reach that Soviet move through endangering Moscow (literally) with nuclear-tipped intermediate-range "Jerihon" missiles. According to the sensational statement made by the former Director of the Israeli Center for Defense Studies Dr.Ilan Amit during the conference "Strategic Stability after the end of the Cold War and the Future of Nuclear Weapons", hold under the NATO auspice in Warrington, Virginia (USA) in early April, 1995, by that time Israel possessed 228 nuclear warheads with necessary delivery means.