Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships 1994-1996

Administrative and Cadre Reform in Russia: Opportunities And Perils For Democracy Leonid Rodin [Back to Index] Chapter IV. Adjusting Administrative - Cadre Practices To Changing Realities IV.4. Foreign Policy 'Apparatus' In late 1995 one of the most pertinent questions of Russian internal power battles was, paradoxically, the conduct of foreign policy. It all centered around the embattled Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, whose demotion was being discussed incessantly almost since the time he occupied this job (Kozyrev was appointed Head of Russian Foreign Ministry establishment while the USSR was still in existence). The only unique quality of Andrei Kozyrev, outside his predominant pro-Western orientation, seemed to have been his survivability. By the time he was gone in early 1996, he was the only Cabinet Minister who was there at the time of Yeltsin's ascendancy to the Presidency. Andrei Kozyrev was the target of numerous assaults by the opposition and government officials throughout his tenure. In December 1995 President Yeltsin officially declared his 'dissatisfaction' with Foreign Ministry performance and mentioned the 'strengthening' of the Ministry, which in former Soviet parlance ment replacement of the Minister. However, the unavoidable 'termination' of Kozyrev happened only a few weeks later. Apparently, on the one hand the President was giving A.Kozyrev time to settle down at the Duma, whose elected deputy he became as of December 17, 1995. On the other hand, the delay in announcing Kozyrev's final departure might have been caused by the last-minute search for his successor. To confirm the latter supposition, eventual Kozyrev's departure was preceded by several bureaucratic moves. Firstly, a new Deputy Foreign Minister - Vasilii Sidorov, formerly Russia's Deputy Permanent Representative at the UN in New York - was appointed 'to assist Kozyrev in the performance of administrative and cadre functions' (30). Secondly, the so-called 'Council for Foreign Policy' was created, reportedly to oversee the entire spectrum of Russian foreign policy-making. The Council, that was to include Heads of the Foreign Ministry, the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Economic Relations, Finances, the Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service and the 'Apparatus' of the President's Assistant on Foreign Policy (currently Dmitrii Rurikov), was supposed to become a 'superagency' to assist the President in the conduct of foreign policy, and coordination of foreign policy efforts of separate agencies, including the Foreign Ministry. [It remains to be seen whether this body will be allowed to actually acquire such a status after the new nomination of Evgenii Primakov, known for his independence and given his superior government position]. Eventually, the post of the Head of the Secretary of the Council of Foreign Policy, andd simultaneously of a newly established 'Department of the Presidential Administration in Charge of the Council Affairs' went to Vladimir Slavin, member of the 'Apparatus' of the Presidential Assistant for Diplomatic Matters Dmitrii Ryurikov. The surprising fact that it was not Ryurikov himself, but his subordinate, to occupy that post, could only be explained later when the announcement was made that Minister Andrei Kozyrev would be replaced by the Head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service Evgenii Primakov. In all evidence a 'simple apparatchik' Ryurikov could not compete with the all-powerful political leader. Already the first substantive moves made by Evgenii Primakov in the pursuit of Russian foreign policy demonstrated considerable difference in style and orientation. For example, he announced his intention to considerably change the priorities of his Ministry, in particular to concentrate on Russia's closest surrounding - the CIS nations. Primakov was also expected to take a much tougher stand towards the West, especially to the proposed enlargement of NATO, perceived by many in the political and military establishment as totally enimical to Russian security interests. It is not at all surprising that soon after his appointment to the new position, E.Primakov started making serious personnel changes at the Foreign Ministry 'Apparatus'. He began what might eventually amount to sweeping cadre changes, by making two new important appointments in early February 1996. Thus he promoted one of A.Kozyrev's Deputy Ministers Boris Pastukhov to the position of the First Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs. That move could clearly demonstrate Primakov's preference for old-time Communist apparatchiks in favor of younger diplomats who could rize in Kozyrev times (31). Another high-level appointment, to the Deputy Minister's position, bore a different kind of significance. The man in question, Yurii Zubakov used to be Evgenii Primakov's close associate at the Foreign Intelligence Service, who had been serving as the Deputy Director of the Soviet Central Intelligence Service, later Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, since 1991. According to Foreign Ministry rumors, Y.Zubakov was to replace Vasilii Sidorov, mentioned above, in overseeing the Ministry's cadre policies. Footnotes Izvestiya. 29.12.1995. Boris Pastukhov used to be a well-known Communist Party official. He started in 1962-1964 as the First Secretary of the Moscow city Komsomol organization, followed by 18 years as the Secretary and then the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the entire Soviet Komsomol movement. Before he was appointed by Andrei Kozyrev to the position of his Deputy, Pastukhov worked as Soviet Ambassador in Denmark and Afghanistan (during the height of the war). Pastukhov's Foreign Ministry responsibilities centered around CIS affairs, which had evidently played another important role in his elevation under Primakov.