|
|
|
Individual |
Opposition to Atlanticism in US Politics
|
The arguments which implied a linkage between domestic and foreign policy took several different forms and were given their first prominent hearing during the 1992 presidential election campaign. At the most basic level the linkage was simply that of resources; money spent abroad was money that could be spent at home where the benefits could be most directly seen. For instance, Senator Tom Harkin, a Democratic Presidential candidate in 1992, proposed that the "$416 billion spent in subsidising Western Europe would be better spent at home" and accordingly pledged to reduce defence spending by 50% over ten years. (62)
Similar sentiments were expressed in 1992 by Independent Presidential candidate Ross Perot, who advocated charging Germany and Japan, who he described as free-riding allies, "$50 billion each" to pay for the troops based on their soil. (63) Even though most of the day-to-day costs of those forces are met by their host governments, this theme played particularly well to audiences in the Mid-West whose knowledge of such details is limited. Foreign aid has been similarly targeted as a dubious use of resources at a time when domestic welfare programmes are being cut. Former governor of California and Democratic Presidential candidate Jerry Brown said that, if elected president, he "would not give a penny for foreign aid until every farmer, businessman and family were taken care of." (64) American perception of the size of its aid budget is actually very different to the relatively modest amounts given by the US, even if military assistance is included in the overall figure. In a 1989 poll for instance, 50% of the American public believed that foreign aid had become the largest single item in the federal budget, whereas in fact the total figure for 1990 had fallen to 0.21 % of US GNP, three-fifths of what it was in the 1960s, and it is now not only the lowest percentage of the seven industrial powers but also of the twenty five members of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. (65) More recent poll data shows a median answer of 15% in public estimates of the percentage of the federal budget spent on aid. (66) That the perception and the reality could be so different, however, is an indication of the resentment of the role which America is believed to be playing in the world in this and other areas of foreign policy. Popular perception of aid, without actually knowing how large it is, is that it is too large and ought to be cut back. The relationship between this sentiment and the domestic agenda is provided by the perception that America is no longer in a position to be generous, its poor economic growth acting as "a restraining hand on the foreign policy activism of earlier days." As Gergen argues, "While it remains rich, the country will think and act as if it is poor, choosing not to accept as idealistic and expensive a role as it has played in international affairs over the past 45 years... The standard by which policies will be judged will be much less 'What's in for the world?' than 'What's in it for us?'". (67) It is a perception which, by linking foreign policy involvement to considerations of the opportunity costs of those resources in the domestic realm, has the effect of redefining the national interest in a very narrow manner. This trend has continued under the period of Republican control of Congress where legislation has been proposed to cut foreign aid further, particularly in the developing world, because in the view of the new majority leaders, "African countries have little strategic importance and have grown too dependent on aid." (68) Similar overestimations apply to US participation in UN peacekeeping operations; as Kull explains, in an April 1995 poll "the median respondent estimated that 22% of the defence budget is devoted to UN peacekeeping (actual amount approx. 1%), 40% of the troops in UN peacekeeping operations are American (actual current level is 5%), and 30% of the troops in the UN peacekeeping operation in the former Yugoslavia are American (actual current level is 2%). (69) The resource question in the foreign policy debate is important for several reasons, not least because it is potentially corrosive of all of America's international commitments, including those to Europe. That it is part based on a misperception about the relative proportion of America's international commitments demonstrates its susceptibility to amelioration through education. Accordingly, the Clinton administration uses every opportunity to correct such misunderstanding; in his speech at Freedom House, for example, Clinton stated bluntly that "Foreign aid is unpopular in the abstract because Americans believe we spend a lot more of their money on foreign aid than we do." (70) Nor do such speeches fall on deaf ears. According to a November 1995 Gallup Poll, support for US peacekeeping in Bosniawas 48% among those who had not heard Clinton's speech but 59% amongst those who had. (71) The resource question, however, indicates more than misunderstanding. The willingness to redirect resources to domestic concerns shows a tendency no longer to consider this expenditure as a vital interest. As Friedman argues, "Some voters...see foreign policy as disconnected and irrelevant to their immediate lives - something that diminishes and detracts from domestic policy, rather than something that holds positive benefits worthy of support for their own sake... seeing foreign policy as a luxury they can no longer afford." (72) It is in part for this reason that the Clinton administration, in an attempt to make internationalism relevant to the American public, has gone to great lengths to show the relationship between foreign and domestic policy. In this sense Clinton's foreign policy agenda can be considered a reforming one in that it usurps some of the themes of the radical critics in order to use them in the service of internationalism. For example, starting off with his inaugural address in January 1993, Clinton has consistently proclaimed that "there is no clear division today between what is foreign and what is domestic." (73) It is a theme he has returned to on many occasions; in a speech in October 1995, for example, he asked rhetorically, When the president of Mexico comes here in a few days time and we talk about drug problems, are we talking about domestic problems or foreign problems? If we talk about immigration, are we discussing a domestic issue or a foreign issue? If we talk about NAFTA and trade, is it their foreign politics or our domestic economies? (74) A central element of the Clinton administration's approach to this issue has been the notion of "economic security" presenting America's economic weaknesses as a security issue in order to demonstrate both its seriousness and the international dimension to the problem. It is partly for this reason that the administration's foreign policy has been so focused on both trade and economic policy. His initial successes with the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and in securing both the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) were in part intended to show the relevance of foreign policies to the domestic economy. In stressing the importance of the new economic opportunities in the Asia-Pacific region as a way of linking foreign policy to the domestic economy, however, the administration initiated a new anxiety concerning the internationalist direction of American foreign policy. Particularly in its first year in office the Clinton administration's reforming foreign policy seemed much less uniformly internationalist than that of his predecessor. The administration's inattentiveness to Atlantic and security relations relative to its interest in Asia-pacific and economic issues was of concern to both American internationalists and to the European allies. Clinton's failure to visit the continent until early in 1994 did little to assuage fears in Europe that his internationalism was not universal in its application. Warren Christopher's comments in 1993 that Europe was "no longer the dominant part of the world" did little to disabuse the Atlantic allies of this view. Nor did the remarks of Under-Secretary of State of Political Affairs, Peter Tarnoff. In an "off the record" briefing Tarnoff articulated what many feared was the administration's position. That "Friends" have difficulty understanding "how much has changed in the US after the cold war" and that "It is necessary to make the point that our economic interests are paramount" and with limited resources the United States must "define the extent of its commitments and make a commitment commensurate with those realities. This may on occasion fall short of what some Americans would like and others would hope for." Tarnoff was even more explicit on the administration's Bosnia policy, For those who would like this to become a US show, there is distinct disappointment out there. We are determined not to go in there and take over Bosnia policy... The approach is difficult for our friends to understand. It's not different by accident. It's different by design... We simply don't have the leverage, we don't have the influence, we don't have the inclination to use military force. We certainly don't have the money to bring to bear the kind of pressure that will produce positive results any time soon. (75) Although it was quickly denied that these remarks were administration policy, Tarnoff's comments did little to help the internationalist reputation of the Clinton White house. Former Secretary of State James Baker was one of many who denounced the administration for what he described as "a creeping isolationism" in its neglect of America's leadership role. (76) While differences persisted between the United States and Europe, particularly over Bosnia, from 1994 onwards the Clinton administration has made a concerted effort to present a much more engaged approach in its European policy, stressing at every opportunity the centrality of the continent to America's foreign policy. (77) This initiative started off in earnest with Clinton's launch of Partnership for Peace at the NATO summit in January 1994 and has continued through the US-EU summit in July 1994 and the agreement of The New Transatlantic Agenda and the Joint EU-US Action Plan at the Madrid summit in September 1995. Thus Assistant Secretary of State For European and Canadian Affairs Richard Holbrooke was able to write in 1995 that "President Clinton made four trips to Europe last year. This commitment of presidential time and attention underlines an inescapable but little-realised fact: the United States has become a European power in a sense that goes beyond traditional assertions of America's "commitment" to Europe." (78) Not only has the administration answered its critics over its European policy with firm initiatives, it has also done so in a way which addresses the underlying domestic concern over foreign policy's relevance to the domestic agenda. Accordingly, as well as stressing the importance of the geo-political and security reasons for US engagement in Europe, the administration has gone to great lengths to stress the economic ties that bind America to the continent. Thus Christopher, in an address in Madrid in June 1995 in which he warned of the "siren songs of isolation and withdrawal" outlined how US exports to the EU and European investments in America support over seven million America jobs and how "Europe accounts for almost half the foreign revenues of American firms" and conversely American "investment in Europe alone roughly equals that in the rest of the world put together." (79) In a similar public address, Assistant Secretary of State Stephen A. Oxman spelled out that not only are European economic ties crucial to the United States, in many respects they are more valuable than those to Asia. While American trade volume with both areas is roughly the same, Oxman explained, the US has a positive trade balance with Europe and a $75bn deficit with Asia and whereas only 17 percent of all US overseas profits came from investments in Asia, 60 per cent came from Western Europe. (80) In private State Department officials are more candid in their eagerness to communicate the economic importance, as this interview extract demonstrates. At the moment seventeen million people in one German state of North Rhine-Westphallia export more to the world than one point two billion people in China. And if you toss in another eleven million Bavarians, those two German states alone produce more GNP than the four tiger countries in Asia. We have much more trade with Asia than we do with Europe, but two-thirds of that is imports not exports, and those cause frictions and not opportunities, that's why we spend so much time with Asia, because we have the problems. We don't have those problems with Europe, the import/export levels are about the same... [furthermore] investment flows across the Atlantic are four times what they are across the Pacific, and that figure in the Pacific is not growing at all... Europeans invest more in America than the rest of the world, and in the kind of economy we are in now investment flows drive trade flows... [and] its investment that creates exports for the United States. These kinds of figures show how deep that relationship is, and our point now, is to focus on those pillars in addition to the security relationship, because after all its the economic and human ties in the commercial field that bind us as much as anything else. (81) Nor have the administration's efforts to promote the economic dimension of internationalism gone unnoticed. Indeed some critics have adopted the case being made by the administration for the importance of economics, and Europe in particular, for their own purposes. Thus, for example, in an article arguing that America's continued involvement in European security is to the detriment of wider US-EU economic relations, Tonelson and Gaster explain that "American manufacturers have run trade surpluses with Europe nearly every year since 1980, even in telecommunications equipment and in civilian aircraft and aviation parts...[and] European companies create many more high-quality jobs in America, use more local content, and pay, proportionately, much more in US taxes than do Asian companies." (82)
Thus while still an issue in the foreign policy debate, the relevance of America's international involvement in areas such as Europe has been influenced by the actions of the Clinton administration even if these have not always had the full desired effect.
This resentment of foreign policy for its claim on Presidential time was a parallel issue to the resource question, the assumption being that if only the same amount of energy was given by the executive to domestic problems as was given to international questions then many serious problems would be resolved. Like the resource question, however, this argument both underestimated the relationship between the international arena and domestic issues and, more important, wrongly assumed that the freedom of action of the President was as great in the domestic realm as it was in that of foreign policy. Indeed, one of the ironies of this argument is that one of the main reasons why Presidents have traditionally concentrated on foreign affairs is that their freedom of action in this area is much greater than in domestic matters due the historical and constitutional arrangement of the separation of powers. Thus Bush was able to ignore, manipulate and override Congress in his execution of the Persian Gulf crisis, yet was effectively prevented from passing major parts of his domestic legislation, such as his budget, by a hostile and powerful Congress. Indeed much of the resentment of the Presidential role in foreign affairs has as much to do with the desire to seem as strong an executive role in domestic politics as it is to do with the subject matter itself. Historically, presidential power was also stronger in foreign policy since there existed a bipartisan consensus in this area, whereas no such agreement existed in domestic politics. So ironically foreign policy has become increasingly resented due to a frustration with domestic politics which in turn is based on the constitutional system in which "two presidencies" exist -a strong institution in foreign policy and a weak institution in domestic affairs. Although starting from a false premise the perception that more presidential attention should be given to domestic concerns was a powerful political theme of the 1992 election which was taken cognisance of by the incoming administration. Clinton, who campaigned vigorously on a domestic agenda of balancing the budget, revitalising the economy and tackling the issues of health care and crime was very much aware that it was George Bush's neglect of these issues in favour of foreign affairs which lost him the election. As a consequence Clinton applied these priorities in the first year of his administration believing foreign policy to be a public support loosing area of policy. The administration's views on this subject were clearly revealed by Tarnoff in 1993 who recounted that while past presidents had sought foreign policy successes to compensate for domestic failures, with the cold war over,"unless our president is secure at home and confident that he has his domestic base covered, and has the kind of domestic support for internal programmes that he needs...it would be very difficult for an American president... to have that kind of active profile" on foreign affairs. (84) It was this approach that led to the widespread impression that the Clinton administration was interested in foreign policy only to the extent that it could be prevented from interfering with its domestic programmes. (85) In 1994, for example, Time magazine talked about an administration "determinedly immersed in domestic issues" displaying "a don't bother attitude towards foreign affairs." (86) Clinton's efforts to maintain public support by concentrating on domestic rather than foreign affairs did not prove a sustainable strategy for the president, however, for several reasons. The first of these was the administration's failure to get Congressional support for central elements of its domestic legislative programme such as health care reform, and the economic stimulation programme. The return to Republican control of both houses of Congress following the 1994 mid-term elections further thwarted Clinton's domestic ambitions. Thus the only policy area in which the President has had any lee-way to act is in the area of foreign affairs. Despite this development and several foreign policy initiatives such Partnership for Peace and attempts to advance the peace process in the Middle East and Northern Ireland the administration has suffered sustained criticism over its perceived lack of an international leadership role. The Clinton administration's lack of consistency in its handling of Somalia, Haiti and in particular Bosnia have attracted the most media, elite and Congressional criticism. This attention, however, has itself acted as a further stimulation to both the administration's foreign policy engagement and its presentation of that engagement. (87) In was in part the attempt by Congress to lift the Bosnian arms embargo which led to the administration's most decisive act of foreign policy leadership in Bosnia in September 1995. The decision to take full command of the NATO air strikes and to pursue that strategy in a forthright manner and to combine it with a diplomatic initiative, did a great deal to restore the credibility of both the Clinton administration and the United States itself. Thus to some extent the linkage between foreign and domestic policy which characterised the 1992 presidential race has been reversed. While Bush was criticised primarily for his inattentiveness and incompetence in domestic affairs the main criticisms of Clinton are over his lack of leadership skills as demonstrated by his foreign policy record. Importantly, foreign policy has become an issue in the 1996 race not because of the perceived saliency of the international agenda as such, but as a symbol of leadership qualities. Thus in 1996 the old cold war standard appears to have returned where, as Rosner explains, "In presidential contests, national security questions play a strong role in shaping voters' perceptions about the candidates' general leadership strengths as well as their competence to serve as commander-in-chief." (88) This is evident in the campaign rhetoric used by both parties in the 1996 race. Thus in advancing the candidacy of Robert Dole, Senator John McCain criticises the "feckless, inattentive, and uncertain foreign policy" of the Clinton administration which "has left the United States less secure that when President George Bush left office" concluding that "The President's mismanagement of this highest priority is the most persuasive reason for electing a new commander-in-chief this November." (89) In contrast to candidate Clinton in 1992, presidential nominee Dole has made America's international leadership role a central theme of his 1996 campaign. (90) Dole has criticised the Clinton administration for its "indecision, vacillation and weakness" towards Europe, of being "deliberately slow" on NATO enlargement and for its lack of leadership in Bosnia. "In an era of tectonic shifts in world affairs" Dole argues, "we must not continue to entrust would-be statesmen still suffering from a post-Vietnam syndrome" with American leadership. (91) Clinton has similarly trumpeted his foreign policy initiatives in Haiti, the Middle East, Northern Ireland and Bosnia as evidence of his leadership skills. Thus not only is foreign policy back as an issue in the presidential election it is so in a form where both candidates seek to demonstrate that they are more capable of providing an international leadership role than the other. One of the consequences of this development may be to influence the Congressional elections which are also taking place in 1996. Clinton's focus on the domestic agenda to the exclusion of foreign policy in 1992 and subsequently in office is widely credited with having set the theme for the campaigns and the candidates in the 1994 mid term elections. (92)
The return of Republican representatives with a disinterest in foreign policy was in part a result of them having learned the lesson of Clinton's 1992 victory. Accordingly, in a campaign in which the leadership/foreign policy question is once again centre stage it is possible that more internationalist representatives will be returned on the coat tails of which ever candidate wins the presidency.
like imperial Spain around 1600 or the British Empire around 1900, is the inheritor of a vast array of strategical commitments which had been made decades earlier, when the nation's political, economic and military capacity to influence world affairs seemed so much more assured...[and now] decision makers in Washington must face the awkward and enduring fact that the sum total of the United States's global interests and obligations is nowadays far larger than the country's power to defend them all simultaneously. (93) The argument that America's commitment to an active foreign policy and an extensive series of military commitments was the cause of the country's declining share of world markets was, however, quickly disputed by many critics. (94) Krauthammer for instance was typically forthright in his assertion that "What created an economy of debt unrivalled in American history is not foreign adventures but the low tax idealogy of the 1980s, coupled with America's insatiable desire for yet higher standards of living without paying any of the cost." (95) Yet the arguments which Kennedy advanced were influential in the American political debate not for their academic accuracy but for the powerful chord which they struck in the American psyche. Thus this national best seller helped to create a climate of anxiety about America's world role at the very time when that role was being redefined as a consequence of the "imperial overstretch" not of the US but of the Soviet Union. This book and others of a similar vain were thus influential in persuading many Americans that large expenditures on the military and on other foreign policy commitments were detrimental to the long term well being of America's standing as a great power. It was a message which had a particularly persuasive resonance in the late 1980s when the full extent of the Reagan administration's lavish expenditure on the defence budget was becoming increasingly apparent at the same time as the federal deficit had grown. The influence of the declinist school and Kennedy's book in particular was very important in making the linkage between foreign policy commitments and domestic policy consequences. For example, while Governor of Arkansas, Clinton insisted that his staffers read Kennedy's book in order that they better understand America's decline. (96) The influence of the declinist argument was also apparent in the 1992 election campaign as is evident in this rather colourful statement by Patrick Buchanan in which he clearly plays on the anxiety created by Kennedy's work in order to advance his "America First" case: "All that buncombe about what history has placed on our shoulders sucked the Brits into two world wars. If America does not wish to end her days in the same nursing home as Britannia, she had best can this Beltway [Washington's ring road] geo-babble about 'unipolarity and our responsibility to lead'." (97) Thus unlike the arguments over fiscal resources or presidential energies, the declinist argument asserted that more than just being a distraction from domestic policy, foreign entanglements might actually be positively harmful to the well being of the American economy. It is an argument which found a ready audience amongst those opposed to America's continued internationalist foreign policy and has been frequently resorted to by those who seek a radically retrenched foreign policy. (98) Diclinism is an argument which is resorted to in an attempt to give quasi-academic authority to the notion that there is something inevitable about America's retrenchment from an engaged internationalist foreign policy. It is, however, a notion which both political parties reject. Despite this, however, critics of the Clinton administration accuse the White House of having accepted some of the premises behind diclinism and see evidence of this in Clinton's support for multilateral responses to some international crises rather than proactive American leadership. (99) It is part this argument, together with the failure of the UN mission in Somalia, which have given rise to opposition to multilateral involvements in international politics in favour of unilateral ones.
An associated argument of the declinists is that in the post cold war world "US military power, the coin of the cold war, is a dwindling currency". (100) More than anything else, the action of the Clinton administration in sanctioning the use of air strikes against the Serbs in Bosnia in September 1995, has gone a long way to dispel both this notion and the broader idea of American decline.
This feature of the American political debate is most evident in Congress where interest and expertise in foreign policy are dwindling assets. The retirement in November 1996 of Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Bradley is symptomatic of the disappearance from Congress of a generation of lawmakers who were seriously engaged in international issues. Unusually high turnovers of congressmen since 1990 means that over half those now passing laws in Washington have no experience of cold war foreign policy making. (101) Just as important as this lack of experience is the lack of interest in Congress in this area of policy. Places on the two key House committees, International Relations and Armed Services, which were highly sought after positions of influence during the cold war are now difficult to fill. The same is also true in the Senate where the lack of dynamism of these bodies is reflected in the fact that the average age of the chairman of the two committees - Senators Jesse Helms of Foreign Relations and Strom Thurmond of Armed Services - is eighty four. (102) Committee membership may be influenced by the fact that the foreign travel which these positions involve tends to attract unfavourable comments from opposition spokesmen at every election. (103) This is only part of the explanation, however, since even among committee members interest is lacking. At recent visits to Washington of European parliamentarians the turn out of committee members was very low. In June 1995 only one of 43 members of the House International relations Committee turned up. This was a better turn out than that which greeted a group of Western European Union ministers who came to Washington to discuss NATO, the WEU and Bosnia. Not one Representative of the House Committee showed while only one of 18 members of the Senate Foreign Relations committee turned up for the meeting that followed. Nor are these examples untypical. (104) There are some new members of Congress who are out-spoken in their opposition to the internationalist foreign policy orthodoxy, such as Republican freshman Rep. Joe Scarborough of Florida who describes NATO as a "relic of the cold war which won't have much relevance to the 21st century" and who co-sponsored a bill requiring the US to leave the UN within four years. (105) They are, however, the exceptions. Given the widely reported inward focus of the United States and Congress in particular it is as interesting to note that no members turned up to berate the Europeans parliamentarians over burden sharing or Bosnia, as it is that they failed to show up at all. Clearly then opposition to Atlanticism, and internationalism more broadly, is less animating an issue than indifference and apathy towards the subject. The most common response from Congress seems to be a lack on attention to foreign policy which reflects the priority lawmakers give to the subject. In the 1990s, House Speaker Newt Gingrich observed, "we're now married to the world. We keep acting as though we're on a big date." This complacency, it seems, is a result of the fact that America's foreign affairs no longer seen as urgent or threatening as they once did. As Gingrich observed, "when we get exited we rush around with more energy than any other people on the planet, and when we're not exited we all go to the lake." (106) Going off to the Lake, however, neglecting the outside world to, in effect, go fish, is potentially very corrosive of America's internationalist foreign policy. This is especially the case at a time when foreign policy issues are no longer a major concern to the general public. In Gallup's most recent poll only 2 per cent of the population named international concerns as the most important problem facing the country whereas this figure was roughly between 20-27 per cent in the mid 1980s. (107) Neglect of internationalist positions amongst elected officials and other elites, however, allows more scope for unrepresentative positions to have an influence, particularly in Congress. As Rosner explains, With the salience of foreign policy at extraordinary low levels, Congress has more room to act in a political or extreme way on such issues. Senate majority leader Bob Dole can push legislation that might end US payments to the UN for its peacekeeping operations, even though most Americans say they support peacekeeping, with little fear of backlash... Moreover, the few voters who do care a great deal about foreign issues are likely to have atypical views...[which] may drown out those of the "silent internationalist majority". (108) Instances of serious harm to America's international position being casually inflicted by Congress are already a feature of the 104th Congress. Speaker Gingrich's support for US recognition of Taiwan and subsequent visit to the US of Taiwanese President Lee-Teng Hui was enormously destructive of the progress that had been made in Sino-American relations. The repeated attempts by Congress to lift the arms embargo against the Bosnian muslims was another policy initiative which added further difficulties to the strained relationship between the US and its European allies over this policy area. Of more lasting damage to the fabric of America's international engagement have been Congressional efforts to systematically cut the budget of all non-military elements of America's international programmes and commitments. The Senate proposed cuts to America's annual contributions to international organisations- the UN, the World Trade Organisation, the International Atomic Energy Association and other Institutions of over $600 million, 45 per cent of the budget. Other cuts to the State Departments' budget will force the closure of dozens of embassies and consulates around the world, including Europe. (109) Budget cuts also mean that the US Department of Agriculture recently announced plans to chop by nearly half its annual shipment of food to poor countries, the first such cut in twenty years. (110) The very existence of such foreign affairs agencies as the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), United States Information Agency (USIA), and the Agency for International Development (AID), have also been under threat as a consequence of Republican action. Additionally, the passage by both houses of the National Security Revitalisation Act in February 1995 was a Republican attempt to update the 1973 War Powers Act and to place more severe restrictions on the President's ability to deploy US forces overseas on UN peacekeeping operations. (111) This measure, like so many other attempts by the 104th Congress to restrict America's international presence was prevented from becoming law only by the exercise of a presidential veto. A large part of the motivation for these actions is driven by a desire to cut budgets rather than a desire to cut commitments. This mood in Congress, according to Karatnycky, "cannot be characterised as isolationism" since the new approach lacks even such a coherent, if flawed, framework. The proponents of reduced foreign aid and pro-democracy efforts do not say it is time for America to come home. Rather they see their assault on US engagement overseas as a means to cut the deficit. (112) Part of the motivation for these cuts is the vulnerability of these programmes compared to the politically more costly option of cutting domestic entitlements or raising taxes. As one Congressional staffer observed, "its a lot easier for Republicans to go home and say our cuts were made over there, not here at home." (113) Stopping money being spent on foreigners, as these programmes are seen, is perceived to be politically cost free and amy even be popular with the political fringes. It is, however, damaging to the internationalist credentials of the Unites States. As Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott recently warned, "Some in Congress are flirting with ideas and proposals that are isolationist in their potential consequences if not in their motivation." (114) The potential damage to America's internationalist foreign policy position as a consequence of these attitudes in Congress is recognised by the leadership of both parties. Speaker Gingrich has even organised a series of foreign policy seminars for new members and their young staff in order to address the problem. (115) Efforts have also been made by Gingrich and by European parliamentarians to build closer links in the cause of greater understanding. (116) The long term implications of this trend, however, are unclear. According to one analyst, unless the voters themselves are made to appreciate internationalism then the members they return to Congress will continue to reflect their disinterest. For him such a result would require a sustained effort, it will not happen of it's own accord... it would be a process of socialisation... and nobody's really doing anything about it, including the administration. They're not teaching anybody... the people who are going to be voting in the next crop of Congressmen and Senate... nobody is really telling them anything about why we need to stay engaged except for export promotion and NAFTA and APEC and American jobs are on the line, even when it comes to Bosnia, there really hasn't been an articulation about the point and what the stakes are, especially by the president... so I think that unless there's a role reversal the next generation [of Congressman] including the current people who have recently been elected aren't going to be any more internationalist. (117) Other commentators, disagree, however. Newnham, for example, argues that long periods in opposition can cause "political parties to fret and flirt with unrealistic ideas and policy proposals. Conversely, governing can instill discipline and cause even the most ideological inclined politicians to trim their sails to the needs of the moment." (118) The argument that the reforming zeal of the 104th Congress has been largely exhausted in its first two years does seem to support this idea. (119) Another argument advanced is that far from rejecting foreign policy as an issue, members of Congress are merely trusting this policy area to the administration and when for leadership on those issues that are vital. As a state department official explained, I was with a Congressman from Alabama last weekend, he said well naturally we're going to be inward looking, that's our focus right now, that's why we need the executive to tell us and lead us on foreign affairs. That was actually not an argument saying we're inward looking so you the executive also have to be inward looking, its saying we don't have time right now because of all these great domestic problems so we look to you to come and tell us on certain priority issues what's really important and we'll only talk about those. (120) Another argument advanced is that the Republican control of Congress will prove short-lived and thus the insular freshman Republicans and their approach to foreign affairs will be swept from office in November 1996. Opinion polls in advance of the 1996 elections certainly suggest that the Republicans will not retain control of Congress. (121) Whether this has a noticeable impact on the treatment of foreign policy, however, remains to be seen. The argument that opposition to internationalism in the more general foreign policy debate is now in decline may itself influence the mood of Congressional deliberations. (122) In the specific area of relations with Europe the actions of the allies themselves may also be an important influence on Congressional attitudes towards foreign policy. This was certainly the case in the immediate aftermath of the end of the cold war. The prospect of European integration caused concern in the US not just in Congress but in the Bush administration as well. (123) European integration was seen as a potential threat to America's economic position with monetary union perceived as a challenge to the dominance of the dollar and many Americans fearing protection from European markets and greater economic competition on the world stage. (124) Certainly the fanfare which surrounded the implementation of the Single European Act in 1992 and the passage of the Maastricht Treaty gave many Americans an exaggerated idea of the process and significance of European integration. As one observer in Washington noted, "The rhetoric on the European side that was intended to push the process ahead was interpreted, particularly by the escapist mood we were in, as being reality". (125) The comment of Jack Poos, while Luxembourg had the Presidency of the European Union, that "This was Europe's hour" in relation to the former Yugoslavia, is also cited as an invitation to the Americans to abrogate a leadership role. (126) As a consequence of this attitude it took Americans several years further to realise that, as one US analyst observed, "we can't rely on Europe being a cohesive actor internationally and picking up responsibilities that the United States has carried, in fact they are incapable of carrying them off." (127) Misunderstandings, however, have worked both ways in this process. Amongst these on the European side is the belief that demographic changes in the US somehow makes America's eventual withdrawal from Europe inevitable, which in turn influences their attitude towards that commitment. This in turn also has an impact on the way American law makers view the US-European relationship. Thus while European observers such as Christopher Coker argue that demographic trends inevitably influence American foreign policy, this is disputed by opinion poll data. (128) Citing Chicago Council on Foreign Relations data, a Senior State Department official explained that, there is no noticeable, or statistically important distinction on significant European issues, of vital interests of the US in Europe, whether you're from the South, or the West, or the Mid-West, or anything... and there are no significance by ethnic group either, in fact... when Hispanic Americans were asked to rank countries most vital to American interests they ranked Germany and Great Britain above Mexico, because... people come to America because they want to be Americans and they adopt the broad prospective of what's vital in the world.... The biggest difference on foreign policy issues is education, that is the clear difference. More educated people will think Europe's is important, less educated people think it's not important, clear breakdown. (129) There have certainly have been many misunderstandings as well as genuine differences between Europe and America over the evolving crisis in Bosnia. There was frustration on the part of the Americans who could not understand the European's reluctance to adopt the US position of lifting the arms embargo and bombing the Serbians and there was irritation by the Europeans over America's apparent inability to see the implications of the British and French troop deployments in Bosnia. Importantly, however, once the Bosnian situation began to threaten the continued existence of the Atlantic alliance this forced a re-evaluation of American policy towards this area and with it the return of American leadership. From being a contained civil war a long way from the US, the stakes became appreciably greater. As Defence Secretary William Perry explained, "What is at issue here is the coherence of NATO, the future of NATO, and the role of the Unites States as a leader of Europe." (130) Despite great reluctance initially, support for the deployment of US ground troops in Bosnia within the administration, Congress and among the public gives some indication of the way in which American international leadership is viewed in the United States. The Clinton administration's resumption of American leadership over Bosnia in September 1995 through, and in support of NATO, was a popular move. This fits in with recent Chicago Council on Foreign Relations polls which show 6 per cent of the public believe that the United States should play "an active role" in world events, an even higher percentage than during the late 1970's and early 1980s. (131) What is more, while support for acting with and through the United Nations has declined in the wake of UN policy failures in Somalia and Bosnia, NATO is largely immune from the unilateralist - multilateralist debate since it is seen primarily as a US policy instrument. Thus while the long term implications of foreign policy rejectionism in Congress are cause for concern, Atlantic relations and NATO in particular are less threatened by this trend that other areas of foreign policy.
![[ Go to Index ]](../../../../icons/btn-indx.gif){kind=icon}
![[ Go to Homepage ]](../../../../icons/btn-home.gif){kind=icon}
![[ Go to Next Page ]](../../../../icons/btn-next.gif){kind=icon}
|