NATO Research Fellowships 1994-1996

NATO
Individual
Democratic
Institutions
Research
Fellowships
(1994-1996)
The research reports reproduced here are the responsibility of the individual authors. Their reproduction does not imply any form of official or unofficial endorsement by NATO. The reports are offered in unedited form, as presented by their authors, with a view to make their findings available to a wide audience.

The Creation of Political Parties and the Institutions of Civil Society; Their Relations with Military Structures on Ensuring the Security Of Post Communist Countries.

Nicolae CHIRTOACA

(Moldova - 1996)

Contents:

Introduction
The Formation of the Democratic Political System, the Recreation of Civil Society in Former Communist Countries and the Impact of These Processes on National Security
Democratic Changes in Armed Forces of CEE Countries and the Specific Aspects of the Creation of National Armies in the Newly Independent States
Conclusions: Limits and Opportunities of Democratisation of Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist Countries.
Bibliography

Introduction
During the times of revolutionary events in the former communist bloc, there was great enthusiasm and euphoria generated by the victory of revolutionary democratic forces and by the successful national liberation movements in the ex-Soviet republics. This has now given way to a more realistic and pragmatic approach towards the nature and perspective of real social, political and economic transformations initiated by the progressive changes in Central and Eastern Europe.
The rapid demise of the Soviet Union, which had exercised rigorous control over this part of Europe as an imperial superpower in the post-war period, produced a dramatic decentralisation of political and military power. It transformed this part of the old continent into a zone perceived as a vacuum of security and solid guarantees for further development. Unstable situations in the post-Soviet territories, internal conflicts and tensions between CIS member states aggravated by deep economic crises and contradictions of the transition period to free economy and democracy, present real risks to security in Europe.
The majority of former communist countries are now passing through a period high in risks and dangers, but low in potential for independent recovery and development which should improve the living conditions for millions of their citizens. However, it is clear to almost all, that the security of the continent can be ensured either together with Eastern Europe or not at all, or at least in the foreseeable future. That is why it is so vital to progress from the current tendency for a commentary approach to the dynamic and contradictory processes at work in the post communist world. It is more important to identify the elements that play key roles in rejecting totalitarian regimes in favour of the democratic society, that will allow Western democracies to provide more assistance to the CEE nations on their painful road back to normality.
These nations don't only need assistance to work towards integration into Western networks of co-operation and dialogue. The practical content of these co-operative relationships on the role and function of defence forces in a democratic society, defence concepts, security and arms control, civil-military relations, education and environmental aspects of military activity are of great importance to them.
This also means an active and constructive role of the CEE nations in this process of final convergence of security interests of Western, Central and Eastern Europe, their capability not only to solve the economic problems, but also to create the true democratic political system, based on the activity of mature and responsible political parties, to recreate the civil society that was completely destroyed by the totalitarian regime.
The creation of political parties, the emergence of institutions and organisations of civil society and their constructive relations with military structures during different reform periods on ensuring stability and security - present one of the most important elements of the consecutive democratisation of the post communist countries. The democratic control over military structures, including armed forces, police and security services is the main link of such relations, capable also of considerably reducing the risks of their direct interference in political processes, and of withstanding the potential danger of losing control over military, and possible establishment of a military dictatorship in one or more former communist countries in the case of failure of progressive reforms.
To this extent, the main objective of civil control over the military, through democratically elected and created institutions of representative and executive power, with the assistance of organisations and associations of civil society in the conditions of openness and transparency consists in reaching of mutual understanding and confidence between the democratic society and the military. This interrelation and reciprocacy suggests we look at the problem from two points of view. The first assumes an objective estimation of the nature and depth of democratic reforms in a concrete post-communist country, and the degree of efficiency of the new democratic institutions. The second is related to the reforms in the army, police and security forces in accordance with the requirements of an open and pluralist society.
To study the nature of relations between political and social institutions of the new democracies and military structures means to study the following aspects of the process.

Peculiarities in the appearance and formation of the political parties and civic organisations in CEE countries after democratic forces overturned the communist regime.

Democratic changes in the armies and power structures as a whole in former communist countries, and specifically the creation of armies in newly formed former Soviet republics.

Relations between new democratic political and social institutions of CEE countries and national military structures on ensuring security at different stages of reforms.

It is clear that the CEE nations will pass through various periods of transition before becoming truly secure and stable countries, providing as well as consuming security. Becoming partners with Western countries directly after the demise of the Soviet Union within the framework of the North Atlantic Co-operation Council, the majority have later joined the Partnership for Peace, the most significant development in European security since the end of the Cold War. By signing the basic framework document, they commit themselves to honour the basic principles of democracy and mutual security.
These constructive relationships between former adversaries and successor states are based on the premise that NATO will maintain special responsibilities for securing a whole and free Europe as the prime Alliance objective. They will undoubtedly help the former communist countries to overcome the difficulties of tailoring defence and security requirements according to democratic norms and anticipating a further extension of the Euro-Atlantic system of collective security.

The Formation of the Democratic Political System, the Recreation of Civil Society in Former Communist Countries and the Impact of These Processes on National Security
The return of former communist space nations to normality is generally conceived as renaissance of the genuine political life of the society, based on the principles of political pluralism, institutionalised through the creation of political organisations, primarily parties, and of associations of individuals on a voluntary basis, capable of identifying and defending their interests and rights.
In the economic sphere, the main link of reforms reside in a private interest of the new economic agents and its massive and efficient inclusion in the process of production and distribution of goods using the mechanisms and rules of the market economy steadily and simultaneously with the decentralisation of the national economy and additional investment of capital. In social and political terms, the main aspect is the appearance of mature and responsible political parties, capable of overcoming the radicalism inherent in any revolutionary force and movement. No less important is the spirit of self-organisation in the population, essential for the appearance of associations which protect individual rights and freedoms.
The process of abandoning a totalitarian past has a complex and often contradictory nature. Its economic, social, political and security aspects and dimensions mutually compliment each other, carrying the specific features of every nation. During the transformation into democracy, the relations between the political, social and military structures depend on these features.
From the point of view of this study, it is important to estimate the real democratic potential of the post-communist countries, their readiness and willingness to provide progressive reforms and, finally, to reach a new quality of constructive development.
In almost every CEE country, the departing communist regime left behind a distorted civil society and ruins of a highly bureaucratic one-party political system. In a very short time, historically speaking, the regime had emptied the population of individuality and genuine social substance, turning them into a non-differentiated crowd. Educated in the spirit of collectivism and contempt for individual freedom and initiative, with no opportunity for self-organisation, the people were easily governed and manipulated by the party-state.
The army and security system were fully controlled by the Communist Party. Their leaders saw them mostly as instruments for providing internal and external policy, ensuring stability and order in the socialist camp, and extending their influence far beyond its borders.
The transformation of this non-differentiated mass into a civil society, able to function independently as a protective screen for individual rights and freedoms in the relationship of the citizen with the state of the law, the creation of the mature and responsible political system as a response to the emerging diversity of economic, social and political interests of the members of society can be considered the most important aspects and objectives of the period of rejection by the CEE countries of the totalitarian past, called the period of transition.
The relations between civil and military structures depend on their common understanding and joint effort in ensuring security. The level of mutual confidence can be reached with the condition of the creation of a responsible political system and active civil society. These positive relations, based on the recognition of supremacy of the national interest rather than political or corporate ambitions, can prevent the risk of an uncontrolled development of the military, and the danger of dictatorship. The lack of such mutual confidence can potentially provoke the destabilisation of the state at a delicate stage of fundamental structural changes.
At the same time the suspension of democratic reforms for one reason or another in the political or social sphere is equal to the restoration of an authoritarian regime and of the one-party control over the military in one or more of the former totalitarian countries. An anti-democratic regime sooner or later will provide an aggressive policy in relations with the outside world, at least at the regional level, being intolerant toward true democratic values and international norms. Unfinished economic political and social reforms in the CEE countries can present potential threats for European security and stability in the long term.
That is why an objective study of the nature of the social and political phenomena taking place in the post-communist countries through their military aspects is of great importance not only for security of the CEE countries, but of Europe as a whole.
In the absence of any general conception of philosophy or a model of transition from totalitarianism to the free society, the law-governed nature of this complex and complicated process can be revealed by making a comparative analysis of changes that have already occurred in the CEE countries since 1989 revolutions to nowadays. This analysis, is focused on the peculiarities and common characteristics of the self-creation of political and social organisations following the revolutionary events, allow us to make some conclusions:
In former communist countries of Central Europe, during the old regime existed and acted kernels of the civil society relatively independent from the state: volunteer associations of citizens, groups of dissidents and "non-formal" structures, other professional associations of people etc. capable to functioning inside the authoritarian regime. At the end of the eighties, with the liberalisation allowed by Moscow, new revolutionary democratic movements developed around these kernels. Shortly after the fall of communism, these movements generated the new political parties, forming a true multi-party political system. The rest of the mass organisations, which directly contributed to the victory of the democratic forces and new way of development, became the initial elements of the process of the recreation of civil society.
In this way occurred big and profound changes in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland, where new political forces succeeded to restore the continuity of times and traditions of the social and political life, which were interrupted after the Soviet occupation and later by imposing the communist dictatorship and the division of the world in zones of influence. As a rule all these countries from Central Europe which first stepped with certitude on the democratic way of development, were known in the former Soviet bloc as more evolved from the point of view of economic potential, having deeply rooted traditions for struggling for independence and belonging to European culture, history and civilisation. The events in Hungary (1956), the 'Prague Spring' (1968), the actions of the "Solidarity" trade unions in the early eighties have convinced the reformers from the Central European countries that neither revolutionary changes initiated from the bottom, nor the reforms started and conducted from the top of power inside the Soviet bloc are capable of altering the nature of totalitarian regime and of creating the conditions for irreversible democratic changes. The most efficient was the third way, which had at its basis two main components: the society itself organised from beneath had to become the leading force, the engine of democratic transformation; final objective should not be the total disintegration of the communist regime, but the recreation of civil society, its basic elements, able to ensure the steady development of the nation towards democracy and freedom.
It is important to mention the fact that this conception of peaceful transformation and evolutionary development, called autholimitated revolution within the framework of totalitarian regime, was at the same time the rejection and breakdown of the policy and the concept of traditional revolutions, which inevitably end up with dictatorship of new elites, trying to defend themselves and their power against the social class, which have destroyed the old system and promoted these elites to the top.
This conception of consecutive transformation of the communist regime, based on the interaction of groups of revolutionary democrats and the proto-elements of the civil organisations inside a closed society, having as a final objective the recreation of mature and independent organisation of such a society has been clearly described and formulated by Adam Miknic in 1976. In the above mentioned countries of Central Europe known also as the Vishegrad group countries, this conception was put into practice, creating the internal prerequisite of success of revolutionary movement in this part of the continent. At the same time the existence of such political and civil organisations capable of assuming the responsibility for democratic development and stability in the country have initiated a civilised dialogue between representatives of the communist regime and democratic, revolutionary forces at the most dangerous moment of political and social crises. This dialogue has secured slow and disasterless transfer of the state power to the new political forces and the beginning of the period of transition from communist to open society.
The existence of proto-civil society and political resistance inside the authoritarian regimes in Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland constitute the most important and significant aspects of democratic changes in these countries, having direct impact on political-civil-military relations just after the revolution and during democratic reforms.
In the rest of Eastern European countries and partly in the Balkans, communist regimes had much more brutal character, providing an aggressive policy of intolerance towards any kind of opposition to the power often as a result of a long term cult of personality. The revolutionary events in Bulgaria, Albania and Romania have taken place not because of the organised activity of the civil society in the initial stage of formation or as a result of a long-term struggle of progressive organisations against the dictatorship. The regime fell following the weakening of the Soviet totalitarian regime as a whole, and as the result of lack of willingness or ability of the local party bureaucracy to adapt itself to the new circumstances generated by Gorbachov's Perestroika. Not of less importance were the determined actions of reformists from local elites who have succeeded to mobilise masses at the necessary historic moment and to control their actions of protest against the reactionary orthodox circles in their countries.
This assertion does not diminish the importance and fullness of the democratic reforms, which have been launched by these events. It is only an attempt to broaden the existing knowledge about the nature of changes occurred in CEE countries more than five years ago and to under-line the peculiarities of the process of democratisation in different parts of Central and Eastern Europe.
As a rule, in former communist countries, where proto-civil society did not exist, after the acceptance of democratic norms and principles in the further development of these nations, on the political stage there emerged a large number of small political parties, whereas organisations of civil society practically are not created. For example, in Romania nowadays, there are acting more than one hundred political parties and formations focused mostly on the power in the state as a final goal. This phenomenon can be explained by social homogeneity of the post totalitarian society, lack of normal differentiation of the economic and social interests of individuals, absence of democratic experience, the power seen in a quality of main values and by old mentality, inherited from the old regime. In a short period of time after the victory the democratic movement is split up. The governing elite is strengthening its position and exerting its influence around and throughout the political organisations (party or movement), in the majority of cases of social democratic orientation, which means so-called "socially orientated market economy" and political pluralism mixed with a big dose of populism.
The most powerful civil organisations, mainly from a quantitative point of view, are still the trade unions, the professional associations, veterans of war organisations, women's associations, which from time to time include themselves in the phenomenon and events of political character.
This new elite, emancipated by the revolutionary changes of the system of power in the conditions of the lack of the new ideology and conceptions of further development of the country is putting into practise in all spheres of political, economic and social life the principles and norms of western democracy, mixed with the idea of national identity and individual way of historic formation of the country. One of the manifestations of this tendency is the desire of full and prompt integration in all European and world organisations, primarily those able to ensure security and stability.
The use of democratic rules at a very initial stage of changes has allowed these nations to avoid big shocks and possible large scale involvement of the military in the revolutionary events. At the same time one of the first decisions of the new power was the abolishment of the communist party control over the armed forces and its substitution with parliamentary control. The demise of the Warsaw Treaty organisation has liberated these CEE countries from the tutelage operated by extremely centralised political and military common structures of the collective armed forces of the socialist camp. In this way, these nations came back to the normal conception of the role and functions of the army in a democratic state - to secure safety of its citizens and of the whole nation by opposing all kinds of threats, particularly the one of war. This is one of the most important initial transformations of military doctrine of former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe - from the conception of the army as the main instrument for the realisation of the idea of the victory of the socialist revolution and communism all over the world to the more pragmatic, realistic and reasonable sense of security for each country at less political and financial cost than previously under the bi-polar system.
Within the space of the former Soviet Union, the radical changes, that have occurred after the last empires demise, have quite a lot of similar features with social, political and economic process that emerged with the reforms in the Eastern part of Europe, having at the same time some significant particularities. To broaden the knowledge of these particularities means to appreciate more objectively and widely the nature of phenomena which lies in the wake of revolutions and movements of national liberation in former Soviet republics, actually the newly independent states, which are trying to implement the very difficult task to reject definitely the Leninist authoritarianism by transforming it into anything resembling open, tolerant, competitive societies. The majority of these nations building up sovereign, free market orientated states, are creating their armies and security system from scratch, simultaneously adjusting them to the requirements of the democratic principles. This makes them different from other former communist countries of the CEE which have been relatively independent even during the division of the world in antagonistic, rigid blocks.
In 1985, the liberalisation of the Soviet Union, started by Gorbachov, known as Perestroika, had the main objective the improvement of the communist regime, making it more efficient and competitive in the competition with the "capitalist system". This new impulse for the development was sought in the democratisation of one-party political system, resumed to the permission of the creation and activity of different social and political associations of citizens, relatively, at least formally, independent from communist party. At the beginning they had the objective to support the ruling party in its efforts to provide its "new course", and to ensure co-ordination in their activity with local party and Soviet administrations. The "improvements of a developed socialism" and its transformation into the regime "with a human face", which can be called the limited liberalisation controlled by the party-state and by the KGB, put the basis of the appearance of so-called "informal organisations" which were acting in accordance with their own programmes and often without the expected respect and obedience to the initiators of these reforms. The leaders of these "informal organisations", as a rule representatives of local intellectuals, have changed very quickly their political orientations and their objectives, eventually transforming them into democratic movements for national liberation, from communism and the dictatorship of the "Center". "Frontul Popular" in Moldova, "Saiudis" in Lithuania, RUH in Ukraine, where the first expressions of these tendencies in some of the former Soviet republics. At this very moment inside the former Soviet republics, appeared the elements of proto-civil society, which viewed the communist party, local and central bodies represented by Moscow being the biggest obstacle for genuine democratic and progressive reforms.
The strategists in the Politburo were not able to understand at the right time that their actions led to the recreation of the grave-digger of any totalitarian regime - the free organisations of individuals, acting independently from the state and in active opposition to the ruling party elite. In a very short period of time these organisations became very popular, having broad support from the population who considered them a real democratic alternative to the incompetent and incapable of ensuring normal conditions of life communist party. The attempts of Moscow to block the activity of these organisations, or at least to reduce their influence in the Soviet republics ended with massacre from Tbilisi and Baku, victims among defenders of the Vilnius television, and finally with the August 1991 coup d'etat in Moscow. These suicidal convulsions of the authoritarian regime contributed only to the consolidation of national liberation movements and of the new democratically orientated organisations. This massive and active involvement in political and social processes of large masses of the population around the democratic kernels of resistance is the most positive and spectacular aspect of the civil movement in the late eighties and early nineties in the Eastern part of Europe.
The proportion and extent of this movement can be explained mostly by the total disillusion of ordinary people in the capability of the old regime to provide the promised reforms and to improve the quality of life. The new independent political organisations, called in the majority of the former Soviet republics "Fronts" were consequently providing the policy in the sense of rehabilitation of national dignity and return to the historic of spiritual values. In the majority of the republics these fronts have brought to the top of their ruling structures the representatives of local intellectuals, radical in their way of thinking and political actions. Later on after the collapse of the last of the empires, when the period of formation of the new democratic society, based on the clear norms and principles, started this radicalism destroyed their unity from inside.
After the declaration of independence in August - September 1991 the majority of mass movements in former Soviet republics had to find a solution to a very important organisational problem. This solution was a prerequisite for the future and had a direct impact on the nature of the proclaimed democratic reforms; for keeping the identity of mass civil organisations, being the main element of the emerging civil society, or for the self-transformation in one or several political parties, providing its activity and operating in the society on the basis of doctrine and engagements clear for its members and supporters.
But the above mentioned radicalism characteristic to the mass movement which had the main objective to destroy the old social, economic and political order, practically incompatible with a new task of the creative application of democratic methods and rules in the democratisation of a former Soviet republic, has led these movements to internal crises and split them up into many political parties. In such a way, the very first democratic movements for national liberation have lost their influence in the society, allowing the former national communist pro-reformer nomenclature to come back to power. This time using legal democratic procedures and closing ranks in the political organisations of social-democratic orientation.
Taking into account these special features of the democratic processes, which were launched on a large scale in the space of the former Soviet Union after August 1991, making comparisons with the similar phenomena which occurred in other former communist countries of the CEE, the following conclusions may be made:
In the former Soviet socialist republics of the USSR during the communist regime there did not exist any elements of the proto-civil society, ready to serve as kernels of resistance and further able to transform themselves into the main oeganisations struggling for revolutionary changes. The mass organisations created at the time of the liberalisation of the Soviet regime were under the influence of local, radical intellectuals, focusing mostly on the problems of national liberation, cultural and spiritual identity.
The radicalism of these organisations and lack of knowledge, experience and professionals in ruling a country, especially at a very difficult period of consolidation on sovereignty and integrity has cleared the way to the former national nomenclature to come back to power. These ruling circles are trying to keep it providing market-oriented economic and social reforms, accepting the multi-party system and new reality at the regional and continental levels from the point of view of stability and security, necessary to reinforce their own positions at the top of power.
Radical changes in the former Soviet Republics have ended with the emancipation of a new governing elite composed mostly from the representatives of former party and Soviet nomenclature without a reliable alternative way of development, but market oriented democracy. This elite is continuing democratic reforms, being encouraged by political, financial and technical support of the Western world, but in strict accordance with its own corporative interests. It goes without saying that the consolidation of the position of new governing circles can be ensured first of all economically and socially in the conditions of stability and security. Here a link can be found, an interplay between political, social and security realms that affect the reforms.
Besides the causes of the disintegration of communist regimes from inside as a result of internal contradictions and activity of the progressive mass movements within the regime, of a negative influence on the Soviet economy of the arms race, a big role in the liberalisation of Central and Eastern Europe was played by the Western world. The Helsinki 1975 first European Conference was the first, and very important step towards the more open and co-operative Soviet Union and the socialist camp as a whole. Old leaders of the Politburo with the help of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe persued a goal to uphold the results of World War 2, including the existing borders, to make the westerners recognise the Democratic Republic of Germany, etc. without any concessions to the "capitalists". The Western nations accepting the convocation of the CSCE had different objectives; to stop the aggressiveness of the Warsaw treaty countries, to open the borders of the USSR for free circulation of people and ideas, to broaden the concept of peaceful coexistence of two systems. In some ways the CSCE since 1975 and until the final collapse of the "socialist camp" has been a logical result of permanent confrontation of these two lines. The initial notions of "security" has been transformed from pure political and military ones into a multidimensional notion which included the well known Helsinki "baskets", economic, ecologic, and most importantly, humanitarian. The latter dimension is remarkable for the processes in the Eastern bloc, because it sowed the seeds of civil society: human rights, free contacts between people, exchange of information and so on. This "third basket" played a very important role in the creation of proper conditions for the appearance of elements of proto-civil society inside communist countries, supporting human rights defenders, free associations of individuals and so forth.
The obligations assumed by the heads of the Soviet Union within the European process step by step washed out the Soviet orthodoxy, contributing to the penetration of democratic values and conception of human rights inside the Soviet empire. As a result of such an influence from outside in the last Soviet Union constitution of 1977 were included the well-known ten Helsinki principles, the first step towards Perestroika. Just before the end of the Vienna meeting in 1989 important democratic changes had begun in the countries of Eastern Europe.
Considering a point of departure of the radical democratisation of a communist state a proto-civil society inside the totalitarian regime, playing the decisive role in the formation of the democratic political order, there can be made the following conclusions about the law governed aspects of this process of democratisation. Of its nature and profoundness on which eventually depend relations between social, political organisations and force structures of the state, first of all the army and the military as an institution.
The collapse of the totalitarian system in Central and Eastern Europe opened the way to millions of people to return to the genuine social and political life. The revolutionary changes in the former communist countries put the basis of transition to an open society able to develop itself in accordance with the norms and principles shared by the majority of nations belonging to modern civilisation, including the sphere of security and stable internal and external evolution of the nation.
After the disintegration of the communist regime mass democratic organisations of the proto-civil society transformed themselves in a short period of time into numerous political parties and social-political formations. In the conditions of non-differentiated population, of lack of clear economic and social interests of different layers of the society at the initial stage of democratisation, majority of political formations act and exert their influence on the electorate and power as the groups of political pressure.
Political parties appear and act like corporations of individuals based mostly on group corporative interests (for example, agrarian parties in former Soviet republics - organisations of agrarian bosses, different parties of liberal orientation founded by small groups of intellectuals, etc.). The main objective for these, the very first political organisation, often without clear doctrine and programme of reforms, is power itself. The military structures are seen by the majority of these parties not only as guarantees of external security, but being a possible tool of winning power or of keeping it. This factor is the most important for our study. On it depends the real relations between new political parties and force structures of the state at the very fragile period of its deep structural reforms.
In these political corporations which are struggling with their adversaries for the electorate and a larger social basis a very important role is played by the leaders. Often their ambitions have a decisive importance and impact of the political course and final targets of the organisation. The complexity and difficulties of the creation of new democratic order in the post communist space as a rule is underestimated by new leading elites of the CEE countries.
Practically in all of the former communist countries of CEE at the initial stage of creation of multi-party system and of the attempts of the self-organisation of the society is observed the supremacy of the political vector on the social one. That means that in the post totalitarian country first emerge from the crowd left behind him by the communist regime, the Political Society. During the period of transition in these countries there does not exist a contradiction between the political and social aspects of the activity of free individuals, which is a normal phenomenon for mature democracies. The organisations and institutions of genuine Civil Society appear later and in more difficult way in comparison with political parties. These specific aspects of the democratisation process can be explained by the total lack of horizontal links within the post totalitarian social systems, the absence of experience and willingness of individuals to protect their rights and freedoms through the creation of associations and as a result of identification of their specific interests. Psychologically - by the remnants of totalitarian mentality and the amplification of the role of political and state power in the community life.
In the Central European countries where democratic traditions and sense of freedom were not definitely destroyed by the totalitarian regime and elements of the proto civil society existed during and inside communist formation, the mass movement upholding democratic reforms after the reactionary forces were defeated, split up into many political parties trying to ensure the evolutive development of the country within the framework of dialogue with all political forces. It is characteristic for these nations to consciously use the democratic norms and mechanisms in order to build up a new democratic regime, including the military domain, the civil-military relations and reformation of the force structure in accordance with these principles. The corporative and group interests are subordinated to the national ones and do not play the leading role.
In the former communist countries of the Eastern Europe including the ex-Soviet republics, actually new independent states, where proto-civil society did not exist or was completely destroyed by the political police, the mass movement of protest against the old regime is more radical than in Central European countries. After the change of the regime, this radicalism and the lack of the experience of social dialogue and solidarity do not allow to these revolutionary forces to hold out at the top of the power for a long period of time. The nationalistic tendencies, inevitable at the beginning of consolidation of reforms and used as system of basic values and efficient propaganda for the mobilisation of the masses in destruction of the old system, later goes into contradiction with the objective necessity of the society in more pragmatic and concrete approach to the most important problems: economic reform, social welfare, ethnic minority rights, stability and security. At the same time these contradictions destroy the unity of mass movements from inside, transforming them into many small political parties and organisations.
In the former Soviet republics this weakening of the democratic movement is easily used by the former state and party reformer nomenclature. Using democratic means and procedures this political class after regrouping its forces around political parties, as a rule of social-democrat or socialist orientation, is strengthening its position and ensuring its return to power. The most orthodox and old-thinking representatives of the former totalitarian regime are legally recreating communist parties, speculating on the sense of revenge of formed aparatchiks and on the nostalgia of ordinary people for the times of equality in poverty.
The lack of the efficient control from the electorate on the political parties corporations, a common phenomenon at the beginning of democratisation, usually is compensated by the concurrence between them, by the growing role of the independent mass-media, and the international engagement of the respective country. All together these factors contribute to the maintenance of the fragile balance on the political stage of the new democracies. The most important element of the political stability is the deliberate subordination of the political ambitions to the main national interests, especially in the field of security and stability. These priorities, willingly accepted by political formations and their leaders, should ensure the new, civilised attitude toward the reformation of the military and security structures in accordance with and based on the results of a clear analysis of the new risks and dangers.
This fragile balance within the political society generates objective need in a mediatory force, expression of general national interests and scopes, which should moderate the rivalry between the political players. This function is realised by the institution of Presidency. In practically all the former communist countries from Russia to the Czech republic, the head of state, as a rule is a Commander-in-Chief of the army. This special role and mission of the President in moderating the relations between parties have a direct impact on the relation between political corporations and the military.
Another important aspect of democratisation of former communist countries, which have a direct influence on democratic control on the military is a level of real division of authorities in the state allowing the parties represented in Parliaments to ensure permanent control over the force structures. One of the special features of the period of transition of the post-totalitarian states to the democracy is a certain level of rivalry between the representative and executive branches of power while judicial power is still dependent on the first two. This imbalance contains the permanent risk of the involvement of the military in the political processes which remains a real danger for progressive reforms in CEE countries.
From the point of view of systems and real democratic, market orientated reforms, all former communist countries from the CEE still distribute along a continuum that ranges from proto-democratic to new authoritarian. Some of the criteria mentioned above in connection with the processes inside the political society of former communist regimes can be used for the appreciation of real nature of changes occurred in these countries. Besides them, a big role is played by the economic factor. The improvement of the quality of life of the majority of the population is able significantly to encourage the democratic reforms in other fields of social behaviour, to strengthen the stability and give the sense of security to millions of people. On the contrary, the economic disaster is a straight way to the restoration of the authoritarian regime in one or more European countries.
At this extent a crucial role can be played by Western nations. Nothing is more important now than the projection of stability and confidence into the Eastern region of Europe, which is passing through the deepest structural, economic, social, political and military transformations. One of the critical questions for European security is to understand and to meet the main needs and concerns of the former communist countries of the CEE in accordance with the level of development of democratic institutions and readiness to adjust the military structures to the new reality and to help them to meet the basic standards of developed democracies. In this way can be found the answer to the most difficult question how NATO can extend its potential, strengthening the security of more nations without thereby excluding any of them from this effort of promoting security throughout the continent or provoking a new division of Europe.

Democratic Changes in Armed Forces of CEE Countries and the Specific Aspects of the Creation of National Armies in the Newly Independent States
Armed forces within the framework of a communist regime usually played a bigger and more important role than was officially declared. Indeed their role was far beyond the function of the defence of the country in the case of external aggression.
Together with the party apparat and secret service, the army is one of the pillars of the communist system, often used by the ruling party groupings to restore order, not only inside the concrete country, but also in the "socialist camp" as a whole, or to realise the strategic conception of the victorious socialist revolution to the entire world. The occupation of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 by Soviet and other Warsaw pact troops, the seizure of power by the armed forces in Poland in the early eighties and the Afghanistan military campaign are eloquent examples of the deep involvement of the armed forces of the communist countries in the process of ensuring stability and at the same time expansion of the totalitarian system in Europe and other parts of the globe.
One of the main strategic goals of Soviet Union was the establishment of a political and military block, which could be used by the Kremlin to control social, political, economical and military situation and development in the countries of the Eastern part of the continent. The dominance of the Soviet interests over those of other Central European nations has led to the creation of a centralised and rigid administrative and monitoring structures and mechanisms inside the block itself. Within the USSR, the political interests of the Russian Federation dominated those of other nationalities. The irony of the history consists of the fact that this extremely centralised system called the socialist camp with its military organisation the Warsaw Pact, used to obey any command from Moscow, but was absolutely unable to resist the process of liberalisation and decentralisation, started by the "Center" in the spring of 1985 by M. Gorbachov and called 'Perestroika".
The Eastern Block disintegrated in 1989 along the force lines of the national states of Central Europe and then, two years later, after the breaking of the USSR, the administrative borders of former Soviet republics became the frontiers of the emerging, newly independent states. The basic difference between these two stages of the same process lays in the fact that the former European satellites of the USSR had functioned as nation states even during the division of the world in large blocks, having the majority of institutions and bodies necessary for further free existence, whereas the Soviet republics were part of the same country which had the same army and common security structures. This is one of the main causes of the aggressive attitude of the former Soviet military elite toward reforms in Central and Eastern Europe. The orthodox circles considered that these reforms led to the loss of advantages gained from the victory in the Second World War. It also led to the disappearance of the superpower called the USSR.
Besides the direct and brutal involvement of the troops of the armed forces in the political processes outside the Soviet Union, there were the attempts of Moscow to suppress the democratic movement for national liberation in some of the former Soviet republics before August 1991, mentioned in the first part of this study. After the abortive coup, officer corps in some of the troops of ground forces and fleets in the Baltic region, in Moldova and Crimea had confrontational relationships with the new government of the Russian Federation, trying to dictate their will to the politicians. The case of the two-star general Alexandr Lebed, the former commander of the Russian army in the Transdneistr region of Moldova, actually one of the leaders of the national patriotic forces of this country is especially eloquent from that point of view. In June and July 1992, Russian troops under his command massively supported the separatists of the so-called "Transdneistrian Moldavian Republic". The involvement of the army in the internal conflict of the Republic of Moldova was, and still is, considered a brutal armed intervention in the affairs of another sovereign state. Officially Moscow has always denied the use of the 14th Army in supporting the separatists. Later, Lebed practically became the military governor of the Eastern part of Moldova, accumulating political capital from the permanent confrontation with the "democrats" in Moscow and President Yeltsin himself.
But more important for our study is to reveal the law-governed peculiarities of the democratisation and restructuring of the armed forces of the former communist countries of the CEE in the context of the establishment of real control of society on military structures of the state.
To do that, it is reasonable to start with the answer to this question: In what position did these armed forces find themselves after the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the military organisation of the socialist camp? And what about their relations with the rest of society?
After the Second World War the armies of the CEE nations, which remained under Soviet control were conceived, formed and developed as component parts of a common military organisation, having the same strategic goals, highly centralised and practically under full command of the Soviet General Staff. National security of every communist country taken apart was sacrificed to the geopolitical ambitions of the Soviet leaders.
During the communist regime, the armed forces were the exclusive monopoly of military staff. At the same time, the army was infiltrated by communist party organisations and representatives of the political secret services. In the Red Army, the so-called "special-sections", were answering directly to KGB structures. The ministers of Defence, as a rule, were members of a local "Politburo", having a goal of preserving the party administration from the top of the party state pyramid, to the bottom of the army. At a certain point of their military career, officers had to become members of the communist party. Those who were not part of the "first ranks of the builders of communism", who didn't carry the red membership card were unacceptable as a high ranked officer, and no chance of graduating from leading military academies. This party involvement in purely internal military affairs steadily led to the promotion of mediocre officers and encouraged a career-orientated attitude which distorted the true values which existed inside the armed forces during the post-war years and the early sixties.
The military policy, the main element of state policy, was carried out by the military establishment. The military doctrine in a communist state was a theoretical expression of this policy containing the main ideas and directions of preparation of the entire state for war. In the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact, the development of the military doctrine was entrusted to the armed forces. The General Staff of the army was the author and ensured the expertise of the main conceptions of the preparation and conducting of the war. After being approved by the leaders, the doctrine was imposed on the nation, followed by huge financial and material expenditure.
The army is always in a privileged position within a communist state, being the main instrument in the relations with its neighbours in the outside world. Taking into consideration the fact that a totalitarian regime is not able to ensure its own internal stability and the raison d'tre without the idea of an enemy, the military inevitably becomes the defender and main guarantee against this enemy, taking all advantages from this special position. During the cold war, the role of the "scarecrow" for the communist camp was played by "world imperialism". The USSR for the West was the "devil's empire". It is well known that over 75 % of the economic and financial potential of the former Soviet Union were used for military purposes. The official propaganda explained that this huge military expenditure was necessary to withstand the "aggressiveness of world imperialism".
The new political forces that took power in the CEE countries, and their new governments had no effective means of exercising control over the military and their institutions. But there were at least three factors that played a positive role in the initial period of reforms that stopped the military going out of control. The first, initiative in providing all the liberal reforms were coming from Moscow, making "little brothers" of the local communist elites of the CEE nations be obedient in the application of Perestroika. This paralysed any resistance of the old guard, including the top commandants of the army and military elite as a whole. Secondly, with the armed forces being extremely centralised, purely military institutions from the bottom to the Ministers of Defence, they were relatively easy to take control of, by changing the top officers of the army and other armed structures. The third, the break up of the Warsaw Pact happened at the moment, when the military establishments from CEE countries were able to identify their own security interests and initiate the reforms as genuine national armed forces. The sole exceptions was the Red Army, or more exactly its high ranked officers, who were in opposition to Gorbachov, especially at the final stages of Perestroika. By this time the ruling party and military elite of the former USSR already had the impression of losing control of the situation in the country and in Eastern Europe because of a total failure of the policy of limited reformation.
In Romania, the army ensured the victory of the democratic revolution when it took sides with the revolutionary masses in Bucharest in December 1989. This was a crucial moment in the struggle of progressive forces against the ugliest dictatorship in CEE space. One of the first decisions of the new provisional Romanian government was to do away with one-party control over military institutions, which was ensured by the Political Army Council through the dense network of primary party organisations. At the same time, this Council was the decision-making structure in all problems concerning the military. This was done by the adoption of a decree, a legislative document which stipulated the abolishment of party control, and declared the democratisation of the army and its institutions. This was the first step toward the reorganisation and progressive reforms inside the Romanian Armed Forces.
Another important measure taken by the revolutionary government in January-February, 1989, was the substitution of all the higher ranked officers that made their career in the Ceausescu regime, by a new generation of senior officers. This refreshment of the officers' corps was made under the pretext of the necessity that promotion in the military hierarchy has to be made according to military criteria and personal contribution of every officer to the activity of the armed forces, especially during revolutionary times.
The introduction of a system of democratic control over the armed forces started with the creation of specialised Defence Commissions on the Parliament. From the very beginning they were also responsible for public order and national security.
Nowadays, the Romanian Parliament is the sole public authority, having the right to make vital decisions in the domain of national defence. The approval of the state budget, the declaration of general or partial mobilisation of a state of war, suspension of a state of hostilities are in the exclusive competence of the joint sessions of the two chambers of Parliament- the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. They also have the right to examine reports of the Supreme Council of National Defence, headed by the President of the country.
Another important aspect of democratic control, which allowed the new political forces to have more information about military institutions of the country and their problems, consists of the transparency of activity of the Ministry of National Defence and its structures. The public in former communist countries, and in particular in Romania, were not informed about the real situation in the army. They had only a vague idea about the real spending for defence and did not take part, either directly or indirectly, in the process of designing and implementing military policy. Now, when political authorities depend directly on the electorate, they have to assume the responsibility for information released to their public. Military authorities continue to see their relations with mass-media as means and opportunity to defend their interests. The numerous enquiries and interviews facilitated by high level officials from this ministry and civil servants engaged in its activity contributes to a new, open-to-society image of the Romanian army. These first elements of transparency of the authority of military institutions are able to create a new, qualitative relationship between the civil society and armed forces, based upon mutual confidence.
No less important for the majority of the post-communist countries, is the creation of an adequate legislative framework for the military institutions and armed forces as a whole. The basis principles and norms defining this new legal framework are contained in the Romanian Constitution, ratified in 1991, and in laws concerning national defence. For example, article 2 of the basic law contains the main principle which regulates the place and role of the military establishment in post-communist Romania: "National sovereignty resides with the Romanian people, whom shall exercise it through their representative bodies and by referendum. No group or person may exercise sovereignty in their own name". This stipulation means that the country's armed forces are subordinated to the representative bodies and authorities, democratically elected by the people.
Parliament has the right to approve the country's defence budget, a component part of the state budget, and also the main direction of its use, in this way imposing the financial limits of national military activity. At the proposal of the Romanian President, Parliament approves the participation of Romanian military personnel in peace-keeping operations and processes, as well as in the activity of humanitarian multi-national forces.
Despite the fact that Romania has achieved some positive results in the way of democratising the armed forces, and in establishing new civil-military relations, the country is still suffering from fundamental problems common to many other CEE states.
The new political reality makes the CEE nations provide radical changes to the armed forces, first of all in reforming civil-military relations. After their depoliticisation, the armed forces and security services are now more responsible to the state and its institutions of power rather than any political party. These reforms continued, as a rule, with the Ministry of Defence, which have been reorganised on the basis of the principle of civilian management and control, and through the positioning of civilians throughout military structures. Recently, in the majority of CEE countries, Ministers of Defence are civilians
One of the main problems in this restructuring remains the division of responsibilities and spheres of authority of three branches of state power and the place and role of the head of state in this context. For example, in Bulgaria, the constitution of the country does not clarify the roles of the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defence and the General Chief of Staff. The creation of two other institutions (the Consultative Council for National Security in January 1994, and later the President's Military Cabinet) which are both mainly concerned with the military aspects of national security, has contributed to further institutional confusion. Parliamentary supervision of the armed forces is implemented by the National Security Committee, established by National Assembly in November 1991. Composed of members of Parliament, this Committee is charged with monitoring the armed forces and exercising parliamentary control over them.
Despite the fact that Poland is one of the leading countries in CEE space in providing far-reaching and radical economic and political reforms without altering a substantial defence potential, it faces important problems in the complexed transformation of its armed forces. According to Western experts, one of the main problems at the moment is a lack of communication between the civilian Ministry of Defence and the military high command and authorities. This is mostly due to recent history, when the military was one big corporation, a state within a state, to the national features and to the lack of democratic experience of the nation.
The armed forces are responsibly trying to adapt themselves to the new democratic requirements to solve their organisational problems and continue steady reforms. However, experience of other nations indicates that the military has problems to solve independently such a task, isolated from other civil and governmental institutions.
In Poland the army is highly regarded by the population, but at the same time there is wide spread opinion that defence should not cost so much following the end of the Cold War, with the decrease in the likelihood of a large-scale conventional war in Europe. Many parliamentarians and politicians support the idea of necessary deep cuts in military spending.
In Polish society, it is understood that the real and stable guarantees for its security can be ensured by full integration into the North Atlantic political and military structures. The process of adoption of Polish armed forces to modern standards needs Western help for purely technical and military aspects. With this help, Poland will achieve the desired military and defence reforms, together with building new democratic civil-military relations, essential for the real democratisation of the country.
If Central European countries without exception consider the main guarantee for their further secure development the adherence to NATO, trying to adjust in a short period of time their military and security structures tot the new and strict requirements, the former Soviet republics, newly independent states, are in a more difficult, contradictory situation.
The radical and deep changes which occurred within post-Soviet space after the union's collapse, has proved to be laborious and painful process. The new independent states not only have to find an appropriate, civilised solution to their internal security and stability problems, but also form relationships with neighbouring states, based on mutual interest and common goals. These "growing pains" together with old, but unforgotten ethnic, political or cultural dissentions led to an escalation of tension in the different regions of the former Soviet Union provoking crises and military conflicts. Armed forces could play a positive role in these conditions, as a guarantee of stability, or involved in conflicts, they could destabilise a country or a region for a long time to come.
As a successor state to the Soviet Union, and being the most powerful both militarily and economically among the constituent parts of the union, the Russian Federation inherited the greater part (up to 70% by some estimates) of the Soviet armed forces. Immediately after the formal demise of the USSR, in autumn 1991, the former Soviet republics started intensive negotiations on the redistribution of the Soviet military potential. These negotiations resulted in a generally accepted formula of redistribution of Soviet military property, based upon proportional quotas, especially regarding conventional armed forces and armaments. Nuclear weapons should remain under Russian Federation control. In some of the former Soviet republics, such as Azerbaidjan, Georgia and to some extent Moldova and Armenia, the new governments unilaterally took former Soviet units located on their territory under their jurisdiction. The exceptions were the Baltic states, which categorically refused to take part in the redistribution of military property, and have started the construction of their military forces from scratch. In parallel with this, they have demanded total and rapid withdrawal of foreign troops from their territories. As the Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr.Valdis Birkavs, has so eloquently put it, "She [Latvia] doesn't start from zero as far as defence is concerned. Latvia starts from below zero. It's easier to build a new house than to rebuild an old one, especially with old thinking.".
In this time, hundreds of thousands of officers of the former Soviet army have migrated back towards their "motherland", the new sovereign states. These ex-Soviet officers, from generals to lieutenants, have made up the basis of the new national armies, bringing with them the experience and mentality of a former military superpower.
Ukraine, the biggest Soviet republic after the Russian Federation, inherited an impressive armed force after a relatively peaceful distribution of military property from the Soviet superpower. Within the framework of the military reformation, Ukraine is trying to adjust this potential to its new position in Europe, which requires a modern and dynamic defence capability. Without doubt, Ukraine is seeking strong guarantees for its own security and independence in the West, while being aware of specific Russian political and military interests inside Soviet strategic space and the key role it can play in constructing the new security system in Eastern Europe.
The experience of the Ukrainian army in the years after independence can be seen as a typical example of a continuous effort of a newly independent state to solve a series of difficult military and political problems. This also includes the establishing of qualitative new relations between society and the force structures which implies the control and management of the armed forces.
The modern military history of Ukraine started with the transformation of the Kiev Military District headquarters into the Ukrainian National General Staff and the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. As in the majority of post-communist countries, there wasn't a great distinction between the functions of these military institutions; the General Staff being considered de facto the most important, but a component part of the ministry. The Minister was a senior officer, all other high ranking commanders were subordinate to him. The democratically elected President, in accordance with the supreme law of state, is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. At the beginning of democratic reforms, this system was assumed to be sufficient in ensuring civilian control over the military.
By summer 1994, at the initiative of the former President Kravchuk, the Ukrainian Parliament introduced some amendments to military legislation which clarified the role and main tasks of the Ministry of Defence and explicitly described the function of the General Staff. This was an important step towards separating the Ministry, as a leading authority in defence, from the purely military structure that was the General Staff. This high-level administrative re-organisation made the armed forces more independent from possible fluctuations on the political scene and political rhetoric as a whole. Since then, the Ministry of Defence has been responsible for analyses of the security environment, identification of potential threats, management of the military industry and co-operation with other countries in the military field.
Another important and radical step towards democratisation and civilian control over the military, was the appointment of a civilian as the Minister of Defence. The new Minister, Valery Shmarov, is a career politician. He is able to play a constructive role in ensuring a useful and permanent dialogue between the civilians and the military when the former haven't sufficient experience, and the latter are still unprepared and unresponsive to the idea of civilian control. Officers of the Ukrainian armed forces, trained on the Soviet model as in other former Soviet republics, are still having problems accepting the new relationships with civil, political structures. Indeed, they regard attempts of military reform by civilian politicians as interference with their own special sphere of competence and responsibility. No less important to the armed forces is their "desovietisation" and a search for a Ukrainian identity for the army and its service men. This process involves the replacing of the Russian language by the Ukrainian one, and a return to the culture, traditions and history of Ukrainians in the military field. In the majority of units, however, the number of ethic Russians is still very high, so careful diplomacy in this field is important for ensuring stability and keeping the armed forces out of politics.
These changes are made simultaneously with crucial structural changes designed to overcome the inertia and traditions inherited from the Red Army, and to follow the conceptions contained in Ukraine's military doctrine, adopted by Parliament in 1993.
In Latvia the management of the armed forces and the division of authority also is still a big problem. The National Guard (Zemessade) are subordinated directly to the President of the country, while the Defence Forces report to the Defence Minister. This situation produces confusion. The Latvian armed forces and the structures of High Military Command are in the process of formation. Thus the organisation of the Ministry of Defence, the division of responsibility between the Supreme Commander, the General Staff and the Ministry is of the utmost importance.
The Republic of Georgia plays an important geopolitical role in the Caucasus region, forming a king of bridge between Russia and two other Caucasus countries, Armenia and Azerbaidjan which continue to be in a state of war. Without doubt the internal security and stability in Georgia is of paramount importance for the definitive settlement of the long lasting military conflict in this region.
The crises in this former Soviet republic has many facets, embracing interethical relations, civil conflict, political divergence, the economy, legal structures and institutions of the state itself. One of the dimensions of these crises was the permanent failure of the Georgian Parliament and Government to ensure control over the armed forces, first of all Mkhedrioni, an ethnically Georgian paramilitary organisation and the strongest military force in the country, the Georgian National Guard.
When the first President of Georgia, Z. Gamsakhurdia, started to deal with his principle adversaries, and to suppress the opposition, the National Guard forces went out of control. Later, conflict between supporters of the government and partisans of the President involved all the military and paramilitary units, putting Georgia on the brink of catastrophe and total disintegration. The inability of the state to control its military forces had a negative effect during the war in Abkhazia. The weakness of the Georgian state allowed the uncontrolled activities of different armed grouping which thrived on chaos. These mercenaries felt very comfortable in the conflictual environment and almost total absence of legacy. They were not interested in political and peaceful settlements of conflicts, and objectively they were tempted to preserve this situation of uncertainty to undermine any effort to achieve long lasting peace.
There is a direct link between the capacity of the state to assume and realise its duties and responsibilities and the political weakness. When the ambitions of the politicians are not subordinated to the main goals of society, the whole state becomes a hostage of "strong leaders" or it is condemned to permanent crisis. The recent results in Georgia have proved once again that democracy does not necessarily mean stability and prosperity, neither is it the remedy for all social and political diseases.
In the Republic of Moldova, the creation of armed forces started just after the first democratic parliamentary elections in May 1990, more than a year before the republic declared its independence from the USSR. The main task of the Department of State for Military Problems, the first state authority in defence and security matters, at the initial stage of its activity was to establish constructive relationships with the Soviet Ministry of Defence. It was hoped that this would avoid useless confrontations over the command of Red Army troops located in the republic. At the same time, the Department initiated the process of creation of a new legislative framework for the National Armed Forces, based upon the new perception of defence. By the end of autumn 1991, the four basic laws on National Defence, The Armed Forces, Military Service and the Concepts of their construction were adopted by the first Moldavian Parliament.
The creation of the parliamentary Commission for Military and Security Problems, responsible for national security as a whole and the activity of force structures in an emerging Moldavian state, began the process of putting the military under political control. During the armed conflict with Russian separatists in the so-called "Transdniestrian Moldavian Republic" in 1991-92, the Supreme Council of Security, headed by the President, also the Commander-in-Chief of the army, assumed the role of the supreme military authority. It had the right to start and conduct the operations of the armed forces and of the units of Ministries of internal affairs and security, and the right to make decisions in this field. The members of this council were the Speaker of the Parliament, the Prime Minister, the heads of the main Parliamentary commissions and the Ministers responsible for the security services, foreign affairs, economy and finance. Such a composition of the Council avoided potential contradictions between the representatives of the different branches of state power at a vital stage of the struggle of Moldovans in terms of territorial integrity and independence. After the end of the military conflict, the Supreme Council of Security became a consultative institution to the head of state.
Nowadays, only the Parliament of Moldova has the legal right to adopt very important decisions regarding national security. But, like in the majority of the CEE countries, the division of responsibilities and spheres of authority between different branches of power is still one of Moldova's unsolved problems. It is also a problem which could generate tension and instability within the state itself.
Another problem, common in a number of ex-Soviet republics, is the public opinion of the armed forces. Currently, there is common consent in Moldavian society that the republic doesn't need any sort of defence force, and security can be ensured by units under the command of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and by the border patrol service. This negative perception of defence can be explained by economic difficulties, by other pressing priorities, claims on limited tax resources and lack of a defence strategy. These are considered to be understandable and acceptable reasons for the majority of the citizens.
The population, educated in the spirit of military super-power, is still suspicious of the feasibility of an efficient national defence system in a small country. At the same time, new politicians rarely show the will and capacity to create a defence system based on their perception of the new threats, and adjusted to the needs to counter them. Political consensus in these matters, public support and willingness of citizens to make a long term effort in the creation of an effective defence and security system, are of vital importance to former communist countries and especially for the new independent states.
In this context, civil-military relations can be significantly improved by an open discussion in society, centred on how Moldova can defend itself in the new strategic environment and identified threats using small resources but a dynamic and mobile armed force.
In Moldova, like in other former Soviet republics, the security concept is no longer a dogma, and remains open for discussion in society. This context allows politicians, government officials, military personnel and media to use a positive and constructive approach to the basic principles of the national security concept and so to ensure its further development.
To this extent, the security concept, being a national message sent to internal and external audiences, has to be a product of consensus from political players above narrow party politics. The common strategy course and understanding of security needs, and perspectives set above corporate interests should contribute to reach stable, mutual confidence between civil and political societies on one side and the military on the other.
The common law governed features of the period of rejection of the communist totalitarian past prevailing in most CEE countries, directly affect the civil-political control and management of their armed forces. Summarising the above mentioned peculiarities of this complex process of democratisation of the army, one can put into evidence the following main aspects:

The establishment by the new democratic forces of political control over the armed forces and security structures as a whole. This is the most important link of the transmission of real power from the representatives of the old administration to the democratic, reformist organisations just after the collapse of the communist regime. At the initial stage of democratic reforms in the CEE countries, the aim of civil-military relations was to ensure that the military were kept firmly under the control of revolutionary forces. In addition, that through appropriate legal frameworks they will carry out their main functions, to serve and defend the population from which they are drawn.

The creation of a legal framework for armed forces, based upon democratic principles and on qualitative new relationships between the military and society. The Constitution of the post-communist countries is a main legislative document which contains the principles which regulates the place and the role of the military establishment and its relationship with political authorities and society as a whole.

The enforcement of political control by the creation of specialised parliamentary commissions, the organisation of the Ministry of Defence on the basis of civilian management and control and through the positioning of civilians throughout military structures, including the appointment of a civilian as the Minister of Defence. The democratically elected parliament became the main authority, having the right to take vital decisions for the state and society in the domain of national defence.

The creation of a new, open image of the armed forces on the basis of transparency of its activity. This transparency is ensured by the parliamentary commissions, the media and the civil servants engaged in the functioning of the military institutions. These all contribute to the formation of an objective image of the armed forces in society and enhances the mutual confidence between the civilians and military.

The result of the depoliticisation of the armed forces is the fact that nowadays they answer to the state and to the democratically created institutions of power, and not to the political parties or their groupings.
The division of responsibilities between a civilian Minister of Defence and the Commander of the armed forces, based upon a constructive relationship and co-operation, is one of the important issues of the democratisation of the military.
One of the main problems in this restructuring remains the division of responsibilities and spheres of authority between the three branches of state power and the role of military and civil institutions. The creations of different organisations concerned with military aspects of national security, when legislation does not clarify their roles, leads to institutional confusion.
The majority of CEE countries suffer from a fundamental problem: lack of civilian expertise in security and defence affairs. Many new politicians have a very vague idea about these special activities and duties of the new state in the new security environment. The democratic forces which have recently come to power in the communist's place, haven't got a sufficient number of trustworthy civilians, that are educated, trained and experienced in the field of defence and security issues. At the same time, the officers have problems in willingly accepting the democratic principles and norms of organising the armed forces remaining devoted to the Soviet model, even understanding that it contradicts the new needs of national security and conception of restructuring the national armed forces.
This inertia in thoughts and actions makes reforms very difficult and reduces the capacity of CEE nations to develop a national security doctrine or to work out a new and efficient military structure, to adopt the military institutions and formation to the needs of an open and democratic society.
All these considerations mentioned above prove that fitting armed forces in the process of democratic reformation within the post-communist society is a complex and laborious process. It requires time, an intelligent approach and common effort of many partners responsible for stable and secure development of the country.

Conclusions: Limits and Opportunities of Democratisation of Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist Countries.
A correct understanding of the processes of desovietisation of the post communist countries is of the crucial importance for feather co-operation and steady integration of Europe at large. It means, first of all, the proper application of the basic principles of representative democracy in a very specific social and political environment of post totalitarian space, which is marked by the rejection of the totalitarian past and efforts of institutionalisation of democracy. The nations of Central and Eastern Europe are trying to meet the challenge of these profound structural changes which will without doubt shape the future of the continent and the balance of interests in the modern world.
As a notion and rules of organisation of social, political life, of decentralisation of the economy through mass privatisation, democracy was accepted by the majority of ex-communist countries from Albania to Georgia. The implementation of these principles in everyday practice, the setting up of a whole range of institutions able to ensure the balance of interests and separation of power, the normal functioning of Parliament and the efficiency of the Government, the modernisation of the armed forces and the democratic control of the military in the conditions of open and transparent society is a much more difficult task.
A country with an established democratic system differs from non-democratic societies by the high level of vertical and horizontal integration, by the mature Political and Civil Societies, possessing the institutions, able to solve in a correct, non-antagonistic way the inevitable contradictions arising in the course of development.
In the post-communist space of the CEE after the disintegration of the totalitarian regime from mass revolutionary movements, the Political Society first emerges, while the Civil Society with its organisations and institutions appear much later.
Within this context, and taking into consideration the evolution of the Civil and Political Societies in post-communist Europe, one can make the conclusion that at the initial stage of democratic reforms in the CEE countries, we can speak only about political control on armed forces exercised by the ruling majority and political authorities through democratically elected Parliament and legally created Government.
However, the period of transition is characterised by a certain level of rivalry and periodic tension in the relations of the representative and executive branches of state power.
In the majority of cases, new political parties are acting, being led by their corporate interests and focused on power itself as a main and lone goal. As a rule, the new governing elites have a vague idea of the role of power in democratic society, how power should be established and legitimised, how laws on government institutions should mediate the relationship between the individual and the state, etc.
In the countries with established democratic systems, the armed forces represent a stable element and source of order. In the post-totalitarian societies, especially in those which continue to be dominated by political radicalism, intolerance and rivalry, the military may yet become involved in the internal political process and used by political parties or grouping to enforce their dominance. The possible restoration of an authoritarian regime in one or more of the CEE countries depends on an entire range of factors of an economic, social, cultural and historical nature and on the level of development of democratic institutions and constitutional arrangements.
The system appears to be more complicated because the democratic structures in former communist countries are still not secure enough. The role and the place of the military and civilians are still in the process of settlement, the legacy of civil-military relations in all of its aspects is not yet well understood or established. At the heart of civil-military relations, the army is also one of the socio-economic institutions and organisations in which soldiers and officers are acting as citizens, carrying out a special duty. To diminish the possible tensions between military and civil structures, means to make order in a political environment and to ensure that the armed forces occupy an appropriate place in society.
Without doubt, the supreme legislative institution have to play a substantial role in political control. Being directly responsible to the electorate, the Parliament has the necessary means and tools to keep the military within the legal framework, first of all through the adoption of a military budget and through direct participation in the defence and security decision-making process. At the same time parliamentarians can broaden the public knowledge about the armed forces and to create public support for the army and the military.
As was mentioned above, democratic control over the military cannot be reduced to the Parliament, its special commissions and civil servants positioned within military institutions. To be truly democratic, the relationship between society at large and the armed forces must involve a substantial role of the organisations of civil society, first of all the media, volunteer associations of citizens and non-government organisations. In other words, as far as democratic control is concerned, the main condition of its efficiency is the normal functioning of the Political and Civil Societies, their institutionalisation and harmonisation of their authority. In the new democracies, democratic control should also be able to ensure the necessary balance between the adequate military potential and the reduced economic possibilities of the country in its transition to a normal economic, social and political system.
If Political Society in the former communist countries of the CEE is more or less established, the evolution of Civil Society, based upon the reappearance of the citizen in community life, will have a direct impact on the development of the democracy in this part of the world. All together these social and political processes will exercise a big influence on the security environment. If civil society is not established and deepened in one or more of the post-communist countries then their future is unpredictable. The vacuum of democracy and legacy can be easily fulfilled by "charismatic" leaders a la Zhirinovsky or Lebed, or by emerging new military elites. Europe could again be divided. through "the West and the Rest", using Huntington's formula.
It seems to me that there can only be one solution - the final and irreversible convergence of the vital interests of all nations living together in security on the old continent, and able through common effort to overcome the European division in the West, the Centre and the East.

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NATO Individual Democratic Institutions Research Fellowships (1994-1996)

The Creation of Political Parties and the Institutions of Civil Society; Their Relations with Military Structures on Ensuring the Security Of Post Communist Countries.

Nicolae CHIRTOACA

(Moldova - 1996)

Contents:

Introduction

The Formation of the Democratic Political System, the Recreation of Civil Society in Former Communist Countries and the Impact of These Processes on National Security

Democratic Changes in Armed Forces of CEE Countries and the Specific Aspects of the Creation of National Armies in the Newly Independent States

Conclusions: Limits and Opportunities of Democratisation of Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist Countries.

Bibliography

NATO
Individual
Democratic
Institutions
Research
Fellowships
(1994-1996)