Old Dominion University Graduate Programs in International Studies The Future of NATO Working Paper 95.3 Nov. 1995

Security in the Balkans: A Bleak Future? by Daniel N. Nelson Series Editor : Simon Serfaty Associate Editor : Tom Lansford This paper was prepared for a series of round table discussions, entitled The Future of NATO, held at Old Dominion University during the 1995-96 academic year. This Project, directed by Dr. Simon Serfaty, brings together leading analysts in the field of transatlantic relations as well as academics and military officers from the NATO countries. The papers and related meetings are made possible by generous grants from NATO (Office of Information and Press, Academic Affairs), SACLANT and Old Dominion University.

Europe's life as a continent about to become "whole and free" was short. Born out of a euphoric rhetoric pointing to a common future for the entire Euro- Atlantic community, such a vision soon became more modest in the midst of an economic recession in the West, nationalist resurgence in the East, and the resurrection of many old conflicts in between. More intensely than anywhere else in Europe, the southeastern peninsula of the Continent between the Adriatic, Black and Aegean seas - the "Balkans" - is haunted by its past. For in the limited geography of the Balkans lies an unlimited supply of irredentism and diaspora -- the "stuff" of intra- and interstate conflict. In the past century and a quarter, wars involving major European powers, devastating rebellions and civil conflicts, and dictatorships of the right and left have all afflicted this corner of Europe. Such afflictions will undoubtedly continue into the future, affecting all of Europe. Intrastate and interstate conflicts are numerous and intense, with ample opportunity for heightened tension and animosity for many years to come. An analysis of the region must consider the core issues of the Balkans' security dilemma and policies to ameliorate the factors most associated with an increase in the frequency or intensity of conflict. No one can prescribe an elixir guaranteed to rid the Balkans of conditions that disrupt peaceful development. Nevertheless, larger goals of U.S. and European foreign policies require that we ignore neither the threats to such goals from a Balkan imbroglio nor the conditions that exacerbate the region's instability. Bitter Legacies Earlier assessments that the historical cleavages of Southeastern Europe had been overcome by the veneer of late-20th century alliances have been overtaken by events. In the early 1990s such cleavages have recurred, as the Warsaw Pact was disbanded and efforts to provide NATO with a new raison d'etre got under way. In the Balkans especially, the erstwhile Cold War divide in the Balkans among the Warsaw Pact states (Romania and Bulgaria), NATO members (Greece and Turkey), and "non-aligned" countries (Yugoslavia and Albania) is a receding memory. Far more lasting are conflicts that predate both modern ideologies and alliances. Romania and Hungary disagreed over the treatment of ethnic Hungarians in Transylvania - an issue that has its most recent roots in the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, but which may be traced back centuries earlier. Hostility between Greece and Turkey has been heightened by contemporary problems -- including the division of Cyprus, control of Aegean airspace, and territorial claims affecting access to oil resources in the Aegean. Yet this, too, is a conflict of centuries' duration. Throughout, Southeastern Europe has had to deal with the legacy of conquest. In the last five hundred years, the Turks, Habsburgs, Germans, and Russians all had their turn with and in the Balkans. The Ottoman Turks, of course, had the most lengthy presence (in Thrace, Bulgaria and Macedonia). Habsburg rule proved to be shorter, but its effects were especially lasting as economic ties with Vienna and Budapest created profound transformations. Closer to us, Germany's decades of economic suzerainty became outright occupation during World War II. In late 1944, Russian control, sought during the heyday of Pan Slavism in the late 19th century, was enforced by the Red Army; although Yugoslav, Albanian, Greek and Turkish territories escaped Soviet occupation, Moscow's insertion into the Balkans was heavy-handed and ominous. Today's Balkan peninsula was molded by the expansion and contraction of these empires, and their combat against each other and native peoples. The distribution of ethnic groups, languages, and faiths is a direct consequence of migration often caused by threat and colonization due to conquest. As the landowners, administrators and clergy of every new victorious empire moved in behind their armies, whole existing populations fled, if and when they were able to do so. The resulting diaspora of every nation and irredentist claims of every state are the residue of empires. An intermingling of peoples and borders leaves a high- threat environment for today's low-capacity states. Without exception, the Balkans have been an arena from which human and material resources were extracted while the indigenous conditions decayed. Poor, underdeveloped and with Europe's highest population growth rates, the region invites instability. Efforts to address these problems have been inconsistent and desultory. After gaining independence from the Turks and the Austro-Hungarian Empire after World War I, Balkan elites added to their nations' difficulties by favoring "military preparedness and national expansion over internal development...." Military coups, royal dictatorships, and fascist and communist agitation meant that the sovereignty gained in 1918 remained disassociated from security. Lacking development and self-governing experience, the Balkans were ripe for a new wave of domination by large European powers and for destabilization by extremist ideologies. Such a cycle of weakness, dependence and conquest is characteristic of peripheral systems. That one imperialism ends matters little; in the wake of empires lie institutions and societies too fragmented to avoid a quick return to dependence. Thus, the demise of communist regimes and the disintegration of the Soviet Union have left the Balkan peoples with little enthusiasm over the lifting of yesterday's repression. Instead, there is a desperate search for 21st century institutions that will constrain 19th century conflicts now that the 20th century is ending at last. For the North Atlantic Community, Southeastern Europe appears less able to achieve a stable democratic future and thus merits less of an "investment" than the favorite sons of Central Europe - Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Indifference to the Balkans fostered by such an assessment is perilous, however. Threats emanating from an unstable Balkan peninsula will affect the rest of Europe, and any prognosis for Hungarian democracy, Austrian and Italian prosperity, or Ukraine nationalism, for example, will be affected immediately by the Balkan configuration. Beyond these narrow issues lies the wider concept of a new security for the Euro-Atlantic community. At Helsinki in 1975, and again in the Paris Charter of November 1990, all states in the Conference (now Organization) for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) committed themselves to a new vision of human rights and security from the "Atlantic to the Urals." The testing of this new vision began in the Balkans as nations within Yugoslavia waged war against each other in 1991. For such neighboring countries as Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Albania, the belated Euro-Atlantic response to Yugoslavia's suicide pact and the delegation of the conflict to the United Nations when it spread to Bosnia- Hercegovina engendered little confidence about the collective resolve of the West. Bulgaria The discovery of Bulgaria came slowly in the West. In early March 1992, on the eve of former Prime Minister Filip Dimitrov's first visit to the United States,then-Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger was still describing the rise of democracy in Bulgaria as Europe's "best kept secret." But the secret began to unravel rapidly. Bulgaria's economic prognosis turned sour as the absence of external investment, internal capital, or any substantial export market left the country's reform stillborn. Simultaneously, creating a market economy from the thin air of IMF insistence and Western promises of assistance turned voters against politicians advocating rapid change. The resulting political instability plagued the country until the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BPS) won absolute majority at the December 1994 parliamentary elections. Although BSP Prime Minister Zhan Videnov could not (and probably was unwilling to) risk halting privatization and other steps toward a market system, he claimed a mandate to slow the process and seek relief from rising unemployment, high inflation, and spiraling crime. Bulgaria must also grapple with a new regional disorder that has visceral effects on its well-being, including the realities of Yugoslav wars, Soviet dismemberment, and cascading NATO weapons from Central Europe to flanks (particularly to Turkey). The perception, however vague, of external threats has enormous potential. Turkey has been an adversary for centuries. Although there is now no expectation of an armed conflict, and even though assiduous efforts have been made to develop bilateral confidence and security-building measures (CSBMs), Bulgarian military officials still routinely compare their force structure and weapons with those of Turkey. Such comparisons became more vociferous as excess weapons are provided to the Turks by the United States and other NATO allies. With more than eight percent of Bulgaria's population of Turkish background and/or the Islamic faith, the sense of some sociocultural division is real. Ethnic Bulgarians tend to regard the Turkish diaspora as dangerous, and egalitarian policies pursued by the government are deeply resented. In his waning years, communist dictator Todor Zhivkov used the "Turkish card" to clothe himself and his communist party in the garb of Bulgarian nationalism. During the latter part of the 1980s, attempts to deny Turks and Pomaks (Bulgarian Moslems) access to Turkish-language broadcasts and classroom instruction, and to constrain Islamic religious observance, failed, and the policy was repudiated after 1989. Yet, a vocal minority of Bulgaria's public opinion remains intolerant of laws designed to protect minority rights. Early in the 1990s the de facto partnership between the Turkish Movement of Rights and Freedoms led by Ahmed Dogan and the Union of Democratic Forces government of Filip Dimitrov was made all the more difficult as Dimitrov could not be too close to Dogan for fear of alienating the UDF's own constituency. Since the December 1994 elections, Bulgarian integration in the West has become more troubled. That a stable government became possible may help Prime Minister Videnov address some issues (such as crime). But, his party's view of ownership, taxes, and social policy deviate considerably from Western norms. A pro-NATO national security policy remains in place, but it could become increasingly contentious if the split between Russia and Brussels grows over the issue of NATO enlargement. Bulgaria and Macedonia Since 1991, Belgrade's conflict with Croatia and Bosnia, as well as the return of Macedonia as a regional issue, caused increased tensions between Bulgaria and Serbia. Sofia views Macedonia as generically Bulgarian, and suspects that Belgrade has once again encouraged Macedonia's claims to part of Bulgaria. The "Ilinden" Macedonian nationalist organization in Bulgaria is proof enough of such covert Serbian involvement: its goal is to incorporate "Pirin Macedonia" into an enlarged Macedonian state. In 1992, recognition of an independent Macedonia over strenuous Greek opposition reflected Bulgaria's preference for an independent Macedonia to a territory remaining within a Serbian-dominated federation. Notwithstanding the severe limitations placed on Skopje's autonomy, an independent Macedonia facilitates Bulgaria's goal to prevent Serbia's domination of the Balkans. Were war to spread from Bosnia-Hercegovina into Macedonia, however, Bulgarian interests - - reiterated by both the ruling socialist majority and the opposition parties -- would pull Sofia inexorably toward a direct military role. Athens and Sofia do not, of course, see eye to eye on Macedonia, and such cooperation would be shortlived, inviting further conflict. Yet, rather than allowing Macedonia to fall under Belgrade's control, Bulgaria might even cooperate with Greece in dividing it. Well into the next century, however, the Macedonian heart of the Balkans will remain tinder dry, awaiting any spark that might ignite a multi-state war. Bulgaria's involvement in such a war, once begun, is very likely. An inefficient mayhem, following on the "model" of the Russian attack on Grozny or the Serb siege of Vukovar, would likely be replicated many times over with ample efforts at "ethnic cleansing." From this most Bulgarians would recoil, but few would oppose engagement in a national war. Bulgaria, Romania and Russia Bulgaria's border with Romania remains deceptively quiet. Bulgarian concerns about air pollution emanating from Romania were raised, and even for a time encouraged, by the Zhivkov regime in the 1980s. The Bulgarian Danube city of Ruse had (and still has) exceptionally foul-smelling air. That the pollution seemed to be carried across the Danube from Romania made it even more unpleasant. Since 1989, charges and counter-charges have continued, from the willful pollution that allegedly comes out of Romania to the alleged safety violations found in Bulgaria's nuclear power-plants. Sofia has shut down one or more of Kozlodoy's reactors but cannot close it entirely because of the huge proportion (one-third) of the country's electrical energy it supplies. Even more significant are territorial issues -- most notably, Dobrudja, which changed hands several times between the late nineteenth and mid-20th century -- for which the environmental disputes may be a stalking horse. Bulgaria and Russia have residual historic affinity derived from czarist support against Ottoman Turks. After World War II, no communist regime was closer to Moscow than that of Todor Zhivkov. The interweaving of the Bulgarian economy was so thorough that 80 percent of Bulgarian trade in the mid-1980's was intra-CMEA. As the Soviet market collapsed, the Bulgarian economy suffered (proportionately) the largest contraction in Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Bulgaria also long looked to Moscow for security against guarantee external threats (Turkey and Serbia). Bulgaria's scramble to develop close associations with NATO and other Western countries outside the Balkans is hardly surprising. But, as such efforts have failed to elicit much of a response from either side of the Atlantic, Bulgaria's efforts to repair bridges to Moscow have now resumed and increased. Bulgarian Nationalism Ironically enough, the former communists (now the Bulgarian Socialist Party or BSP) have become a principal source of nationalistic rhetoric. The parliamentary elections of October 1991 first, the February 1992 presidential campaign next, and the December 1994 national elections most of all, emphasized the threats to Bulgaria from external enemies. To some, including Bulgarian president Zhelyu Zhelev, external threats are dangerous primarily because of their impact on Bulgaria's own nationalism. Historically, the potential of Bulgaria's Army for nationalist and authoritarian appeals has been suspicious. Reforms to depoliticize the military have been criticized by the BSP as weakening the country's defense capacity. To ensure the Army's democratic evolution will require, therefore, both the retirement (or isolation) of communists and careful monitoring for any signs of extremist cells. An important step toward the former was taken in the summer of 1991 when a wholesale turnover of the general staff was ordered by President Zhelev, including the removal of the chief of the general staff, General Minchev, and the promotion of a dozen younger officers. Later in 1991, the UDF government of Filip Dimitrov attempted to accelerate such changes when it named Bulgaria's first civilian defense minister, Dimiter Ludzhev, and eliminated many positions in the Ministry. But Dimitrov and Ludzhev soon disagreed over ministerial autonomy and the degree of funding cuts and restructuring required to clean house. Such discord did not only slow civil-military transition: Ludzhev's ouster in early 1992 left the General Staff and its chief, General Lyuben Petrov, with sufficient strength to veto, two years later, Defense Minister Aleksandrov's attempt to retire several hundred colonels - thereby causing a political crisis that ultimately led to the resignation of the government. Beyond the Army, the pain of marketization has made Bulgaria ripe for further chauvinistic appeals. Burdensome debt payments, high inflation, severe recession, and mounting unemployment (over 12 percent in mid-1994) have worsened the difficult legacies left by the previous communist regimes. As could be expected, politicians find it irresistible to divert the public's attention away from such domestic issues with references to the external threats allegedly faced by the nation. But such nationalist logic can be perilous as it works its way through Bulgaria to southeastern Europe and the rest of the continent. Romania There was considerable international sympathy for Romania in the weeks that followed the December 1989 overthrow of the Ceausescu tyranny. But the country's image deteriorated quickly. In May 1990 (the first post-communist election) the overwhelming victory of the National Salvation Front (FSN) was clouded by incidents of intimidation and media manipulation during the campaign. A few weeks later, in mid-June 1990, the government of President Ion Iliescu made matters worse by ordering that demonstrators who had occupied a central Bucharest square for two months be forcibly evicted. A violent reaction to such police action led the Iliescu government to appeal for support from loyal elements of organized labor. Coal miners from the Jiu Valley responded with wanton abandon, beating demonstrators and ransacking opposition offices. These episodes (plus images of infants infected with AIDS and of towns suffocating on air pollutants) spawned a decidedly negative Western reaction to Romania's plight - encouraged by additional charges of crypto-communist influence within the government. Whether or not justified,the ostracism that followed was clear: Romania was the only country in post-communist Eastern Europe that was considered unworthy of America and (for the most part) Western largesse. This Western neglect, most vividly displayed in the U.S. denial of Most Favored Nation (MFN) status, continued until late 1992, exacerbating socioeconomic problems and leaving unattended domestic conditions that contribute to Romania's insecurity. By late 1992, however, relations with the West improved as the domestic environment stabilized, enhanced by Iliescu's large margin of victory achieved in the elections of September 1992. In 1993, MFN status was granted, thus reassuring those who had begun to doubt Western interest in a stable Romania. In early 1994, Romania's quick response to NATO's Partnership for Peace program also generated positive momentum in Brussels and other capitals. Yet, despite these improved relations, Romania is usually not included in the first tranche of NATO expansion, and it continues to receive proportionally less attention than some of its neighbors. Ethnic Minorities and Economic Insufficiencies in Romania The heterogeneity of Romania, as elsewhere in the Balkans, heightens insecurity. Nearly 13 percent of the population is non-Romanian, including 1.6 million Hungarians, another 1 million Gypsies and several other less numerous minorities. The sense of peril caused by the Hungarian minority is especially strong because Hungary is seen as offering more economic, cultural or educational opportunities for its ethnic kin across the border. Romanians suspect, not without historical cause, that such appeal will erode their control over Transylvania. Budapest's effort to strengthen its own cultural or economic presence are, therefore, resisted by Romanian governments regardless of their ideology. Anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic political organizations such as Vatra Romaneasca add to this potential for ethnic unrest. Although the hatred it preaches is widely opposed, political candidates and parties expressing comparable viewpoints perform quite well in Transylvania, and they have been attracting substantial support throughout the country, as confirmed in the presidential election of September 1992 and subsequent public opinion polls. Organizational efforts by the Romania Mare party within the Romania Army and other institutions (although denied by former Defense Minister Spirou) could become destabilizing even if the party remains a small minority. In 1993-94, extremist parties on both sides of the political spectrum grew stronger as President Iliescu's party failed to gain support from the center-right opposition parties. Led in the Chamber of Deputies by Adrian Nastase, the PDSR signed an accord in January 1995 with the Romania Unity Party, Romania Mare, and the Socialist Labor Party to obtain their legislative support in return for cabinet posts and policy access. Thus far, Iliescu and Nastase have neither acceded to demands from, nor avoided criticism of such extreme nationalists as Georghe Funar and Vadim Tudor. But in 1995 and beyond, the capacity of these extremists to bring down the government remains, and the political conditions are uncertain. It is not ethnonationalism that is at the core of Romania domestic insecurity, however, but the disastrous economic conditions inherited from the past and made even more arduous by subsequent efforts to convert Romania's economy into a free market economy. Ceausescu's policies left the country with no "cushion" in its living standard; his forcible austerity squeezed from the population the money to repay his regime's foreign loans, leaving no hidden savings and no family treasures to sell-off. As price control ended, huge cost of living increases were registered from late 1990 through 1994. In the same period the Romania leu continued to fall in value relative to the dollar down to over 2000 to the dollar. Opening the country to imports, while exports dropped precipitously, quickly created massive balance of payments deficits. And, as privatization began, unprofitable enterprises closed, thus adding to a pervasive sense of impending economic disaster. To make matters worse the residual presence of Ceausescu's Securitate, inside and outside the new Romania Intelligence Service (SRI), causes much unease among Romanians. Dubious, too, is Army's loyalty to democratic ideals. These uncertainties, however, could be muted by a government that had the credibility of sound economic performance and strong Western support. Such a combination of positive scenarios is unlikely to be achieved soon. Romanian External Relations From without, Romania faces strained relations with Hungary, uncertainty in Moldova, doubt regarding relations with NATO, and concerns regarding the possible spread of Yugoslav wars. As noted earlier, the Transylvania issue seems intractable. From the standpoint of Bucharest, almost regardless of political orientation, statements by the late Prime Minister Antall and former Defense Minister Lajos Fur (regarding their responsibility for the entire diaspora of 15 million Hungarians) were interpreted in a threatening manner. Although the militaries of Romania and Hungary seem to have every intention to avoid any mistake that could lead to conflict, politicians have been less cautious. The early 1991 "Open Skies" accord between the two countries was more important for its symbolism than for its military significance: four overflights a year without any surprise inspection are unlikely to produce any interesting observation. Yet, transparency is served by such gestures, and Transylvania may remain relatively tranquil if military leaders retain their moderation in the face of nationalistic appeals. Meanwhile, the negotiation of a basic Romanian-Hungarian treaty -- long sought by Budapest -- quickly encountered a sizable roadblock in early 1992. Romania's demand for an unequivocal pledge to renounce any territorial claim in Transylvania was rejected by Hungary as being part of the Helsinki Final Act and Paris Charter signed by both countries. Romania's position was adamant; the guarantee it sought could be made all the more easily if Budapest really had no claims. In turn, Hungary's detailed minority rights demands were rejected by Romania as being an infringement on its sovereignty. As Budapest acceded to unequivocal language on territorial guarantees, it insisted -- as demanded by its Transylvanian diaspora -- that minorities be guaranteed a "right" consistent with the Council of Europe recommendation for political autonomy based on ethnic identity -- a recommendation rejected by Romania as a threat to its national unity. Cognizant of the damage being done to Romania's image by continued acrimony over the treaty, President Iliesu announced, in August 1995, an effort to create an "historic reconciliation" between the two countries. This initiative, meant to leap over the specifics of treaty language, was useful diplomatically, and may have tangible benefit in 1996. During the electoral campaign in the summer of 1992, the fate of Moldovan kin was one of the main issues around which the nationalist "credentials" of parliamentary and presidential contenders were tested. Fighting between Moldovan police and irregulars of the break-away "Dniester Republic" (where the majority of the population is Russian and Ukrainian), which had begun a few months earlier, had elicited widespread calls for a more forceful reaction from Bucharest, and may even have involved the participation of some volunteers and the distribution of some weapons from Romania. That the Moldovan candidate for the Romanian presidency, Mircea Druc, received only a few percent of the vote confirms, however, Romanians' general lack of interest in trying to absorb Moldova. Instead, the cautionary policy advocated by President Iliescu avoided any military involvement beyond the Prut. In the fall of 1992, after the intervention of Russia's 14th Army had changed the course of the fighting, Russian, Moldovan and trans- Dniestrian forces negotiated an agreement that allowed semi-permanent autonomy for Trans-Dniester as the preferred alternative to renewed combat. By 1994, Moldova had swung decisively toward accommodation with Moscow as Romania's vision of "two states, one nation" - suggesting a de facto cultural unity - was feared even by the Romanian-speaking minority in Moldova. Now, Moldovan President Mircea Snegur actively follows a policy of actively protecting of his country's sovereignty while negotiating a withdrawal of the Russian 14th Army and accepting autonomy arrangements for the Turkish-speaking Gagauz minority. In neither of these two cases -- Hungary and Moldava -- does Romania face any imminent military threat. But both sets of issues serve as reminders of how little Romania can do to end criticism of its own minority policies or to act on behalf of its lost territory and ethnic diaspora. Such frustration can readily be used by demagogues of the right and left. Although military solutions are hardly relevant, Romania has not reduced the size of its military forces as much as other former Warsaw Pact states, retaining an active duty force over 200,000. But, the effectiveness of this army remains dubious, and high-ranking military officials themselves question the combat readiness of their troops and equipment. While insisting that the army is disciplined and loyal, the Defense Ministry warns that modernization is lagging, and that budgets are so limited as to make it difficult to maintain existing equipment. That Romania's security will have to come from other regional and security arrangements sources was recognized by the first post-1989 government. The EU, a Danubian basin cooperation group, the Black Sea Economic Cooperation zone - among other endeavors - form a vision of interlocking "harmonious relationships amidst the new all-European architecture and its sub-regional components." During the years since, and for the years ahead, Romania has had, and will continue to have, little choice but to continue this multifaceted approach to security. Particularly after the presidency of Ion Iliescu, whose much-criticized leadership has nevertheless provided continuity and experience, Romania will need to identify foreign policies that reinforce domestic stability. For example, heightened emphasis on absorbing Moldova and risking war would run counter to public opinion in Romania, while accepting a radical acceleration of privatization as sought by international financial organizations would also meet with stiff domestic resistance. In short, Romania needs a cautious, risk-adverse foreign policy guided by the country's resource deficit and fragile social cohesion, with heavy emphasis on cementing strong relations to multilateral organizations rather than looking for a patron among larger powers. The Former Yugoslavia Yugoslavia died violently in 1991. Thousands of deaths, monuments of the rubble of Vukovar and Sarajevo, and killing fields near Srebrenica will remind future generations of ethnic enmity that erupted into a kind of suicide pact. After Tito's death in 1980, and the end of a Soviet threat, no "Yugoslav" institution could hold the disparate nations together. A communist party that had been discredited by its own corruption many years earlier, and an army that was primarily an instrument of its Serbian-dominated officer corps, proved insufficient to control the centripetal forces of historic and cultural distinctions, ethnonationalism, and socioeconomic inequalities. Concerned that "progressive internal disintegration" would be manipulated by external forces,Tito had pursued greater stability in the region while casting a wider net for Yugoslav security. The Non-Aligned Movement was that broader framework, which Tito, together with Nehru and Nasser, organized at the 1961 Belgrade conference. Non-alignment as opposed to neutrality enhanced Yugoslav visibility and brought levels of influence and assistance that Belgrade could not have expected otherwise. By the mid-1970s, however, the Non-Aligned Movement began to splinter, with more radical Third World voices moving the "message" away from the dangers of East-West alliances and towards the opportunities of North-South confrontation. Now, many years and much painful history later, no remnant of the old Yugoslav federation is likely to play a significant international role any more. Security policies for a rump Yugoslavia, consisting of Serbia and Montenegro, or for independent states of Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, or Bosnia- Hercegovina bear little resemblance to Tito's security policies. None of these smaller entities, notwithstanding the higher living standards of Slovenia or the larger population of Serbia, have the capacity to act outside the confines of contiguous areas. Yet, even as the territory and peoples that used to comprise Yugoslavia now require new sources of security, they are perceived by their neighbors as a significant source of regional insecurity. Already regional leaders usually emphasize their mutual need to avoid any involvement in Yugoslav wars, even as they offer specific renunciations of territorial claims among them and negotiate their interest in a regional collective security enterprise for guaranteed borders. Slovenia and Croatia Slovenia, having expelled the Federal (i.e., Serbian) Army in the early summer of 1991, is facing no imminent military threat. Germany's support for Slovene and Croat independence resulted in EC (and, by the spring of 1992, American) recognition. High-visibility trips by such figures as then Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher in February 1992, when he called for immediate UN and CSCE membership for both Slovenia and Croatia, underscored Bonn's commitment to Ljubljana's security. In more recent years, unrest due to an economic decline in a country accustomed to high living standards is affecting political life, as few of the immediate benefits of independence have become apparent. In late 1992, the center-Left Democratic party replaced the Christian Democratic government, and in 1994-95 Slovene nationalists have gained some substantial support from voters concerned with the neo-fascist rhetoric of Italy's Umberto Bossi and Gianfranco Fini. Croatia's war against Serbs in Krajina and Slavonia has been extremely costly. Most of the estimated 15,000 deaths suffered from July 1991 through the spring of 1992 (when 14,000 UN troops were deployed) were Croats. In Vukovar alone, as many as 3,000 civilians died during the prolonged siege. Until its successful counterattack in August 1995, the government of Franjo Tudjman had lost control of virtually all of Krajina and Slavonia, as well as substantial portions of the southern Dalmatian coast. Together, these territories amounted to roughly a third of pre-war Croatia. Besides the physical destruction of towns, roads, bridges and other infrastructure, the Croatian economy suffered an enormous disruption of commerce that will not be resumed easily. Even after the imposition of a UN-monitored ceasefire in Croatia, the Tudjman government threw its support behind the Bosnian Croats, thereby committing the Croatian National Guard to active combat roles that continued the erosion of resources even as Bosnian lands were taken. In early 1992, the deployment of UNPROFOR troops (United Nations Protection Force) in disputed zones of Croatia ensured that no further territorial losses would take place while these troops remained on station. Tudjman's initial objections to UNPROFOR can be easily explained, however. The presence of these 14,000 UN troops risked the de facto separation of these lands from Croatia, at a time when the Croatian Army was near a counter-offensive designed to regain lost territories. Tudjman's own leadership had suffered considerably during the earlier fighting, and his vow that "Croatian legal order" would be fully restored seemed to respond to his weak political position -- even though it directly contradicted UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali's commitment to deploy forces in Krajina and Slovenia without a return to Croatian administration. Indeed, this issue almost brought an end to the UN mandate in Croatia in early 1995. Had this happened, the Serb-Croat war would have resumed at once. But Tudjman eventually agreed to a redefined UN presence in March 1995, reduced in size and directed toward border monitoring. That this compromise meant little more than a delaying tactic, while preparations went ahead for a massive August counterattack, is clear in retrospect. Because the United Nations could not restore Zagreb's control over Croatian territory as defined before the war, and because the U.N. failed to disarm Serb military units, resentment rose among Croats. Throughout the 1992-95 period, Croatia increased its military capacities in order to ensure the decisive Croat counter-offensive that was effectively launched in the summer of 1995. Croatia's buildup may embolden the right-wing Tudjman government to expand control in Bosnia-Hercegovina, completing defacto annexation into a "Greater Croatia." Rather than a peaceful balance of power, such Croatian aggrandizement would cause Serbia's reentry into the war. Bosnia-Hercegovina Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina have been the principal actors in the extension of the Yugoslav battleground. After Croats and Muslims in that republic sought to implement a referendum for independence in late February 1992, fighting began in earnest and need not be reviewed here. Within Serbia, the Albanian population concentrated in Kosovo has been denied any autonomy due to constitutional changes imposed by Slobodan Milosevic's nationalist government in Belgrade, and subjected to severe repression. The chance that this conflict, too, may lead to significant violence is always present, and even grows when Serb forces hold their conquests in Bosnia. Supporters of Radovan Karadzic and the Bosnian Serbs anticipate Kosovo as the next target of a greater Serbia. Almost any violence in Pristina, which could be provoked by Serbs or their agents, may be a harbinger of further tragedies. Recognizing that future confrontations are likely, Milosevic has sought to ensure "normal" relations with other neighbors. His visit to Bucharest in February 1992 began a clear attempt to obtain Romania's commitment to maintain commercial relations that allow a supply of oil and other commodities critical to Serbia's economic survival following Romania's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. In late 1992, however, UN, NATO and EC pressures led Romania to board vessels on the Danube (rather than merely examining a manifest), with its border police and customs agents joined by foreign observers in inspecting cargos bound for the former Yugoslavia. The predicted warfare in Bosnia-Hercegovina has had horrible consequences. At issue in this complex republic was the challenge by two of its three principal ethno-religious groupings -- the Croats and Muslims -- to join Slovenia and Croatia in the march toward independence. The Serbs (about 31 percent of the 4.3 million inhabitants who lived there before the war) resisted and boycotted the referendum. Led by Radovan Karadzic, they used unrestrained violence, with the support of the Serbian Army. In March 1992, armed Serbs threw up roadblocks around Sarajevo in a temporary blockade of the city. Two days of violence left several people dead. Armed groups had been created throughout the republic in 1991-early 1992, and they were prepared for combat. The many important bases, weapons depots, and military-industrial sites spread in the republic meant that it, too, was ready to fight. Croat paramilitary units had proliferated in the first months of 1992 and were prepared as well. In the course of the war, tens of thousands were killed as Serb units established de facto control over as much as 70 percent of the territory, forcing out or murdering Muslims and anyone other than their own nationality in vicious "ethnic cleansing" campaigns. Croats and Muslims also fought against each other in many places, particularly in and around Mostar. Despite a large UNPROFOR presence, great power negotiations (constituted as the "Contact Group") and the continuing depopulation of Bosnia, the war continued unabated until late 1995. Not until the United States and the Clinton Administration finally set aside an ambivalence that had perplexed the combatants and American allies did a ceasefire and peace talks commence. A U.S.-led bombing campaign, coupled with a Croatian offensive to retake territory occupied by Serbs since 1992, motivated the Serbs to talk. U.S. guarantees of post-war assistance and security also played a role in bringing Croats and Muslims to the table. But the turning points of late summer and autumn, 1995 offer no assurance of permanent peace. Retribution and revenge are so deeply embedded in psyches of the region that only a longstanding international presence will ensure a chance to reduce armaments and reconstruct stability. Albania, the Albanian Diaspora, and Macedonia The Balkan problem is exacerbated by the weakness and instability of an Albania diaspora (nearly two million Albanians in Kosovo and about a third of Macedonia's total population) that heightens ethnic strife elsewhere. Because of its poverty, population growth and political instability, Albania is both insecure and a source of regional instability for the foreseeable future. Previously, the problems that involve Albanians -- whether in the Albanian state of today or the Albanian diaspora -- were managed (not solved) via external dominance: in the communist period, the country swung from Moscow to Beijing; earlier in this century, the Italians played a similar and more proximate role. But a return to Albanian dependency on Italy is no solution. Italy's own resurging nationalism might all-too-willingly drag Rome back into problems in Albania and conflict with Slovenia or Croatia's over disputed territory and minorities. Were each country in the Balkans by default if not by design, become the primary concern of a major power, the prospects for anything approaching free market democracy in the region would be gloomy. Italy will protect itself from the threats of uncontrolled migration from Albania. But Italy's security will not enhance Albania's capacities to meet threats from domestic upheavals due to popular desperation or from Serbia. And, unless a country is secure, its chances to nurture democracy will be minimal indeed. As for the diaspora, one significant clash between Albanians and another group, in Kosovo or Macedonia, may be enough to precipitate the endgame of the Yugoslav wars: a wider conflict in the south. If fighting were to envelop Kosovo and Macedonia, neighboring states will become involved in the fighting. Indeed, such a true Balkan War can be expected in the next decade as long as there is no large international peacekeeping presence in the region. A U.S. and Scandinavian commitment totaling about a thousand troops has, since 1993, patrolled the Macedonian-Serbian border. Such commitment has contributed to avoiding a wider war. But tensions are far too high, and the attitude that "we have nothing to lose" is far too prevalent to continue to do so indefinitely. Macedonia's fate, linked to its large Albanian population, has also been severely tested by a Greek boycott and embargo, imposed because Athens reacted with nationalist fervor to Skopje's provocative choice of flag, constitutional language and symbols. Again, U.S. pressure--unwelcomed in Greece--brought some movement towards resolving this tension in 1995 (e.g. Macedonia changed its flag design). But Macedonian tensions continued, including an attempted assassination of President Gligorov in Skopje, in early October, 1995. NATO and the Future Balkan Security Dilemma Southeastern Europe will not avoid a major war during the next decade unless there is more credible and substantial multilateral engagement by the West in the region. In a region of limited capacities - political, economic or military - insecurities cannot be resolved by a resort to war or confrontation. No state will be able to defend and keep the spoils of its victory. This was Bulgaria's fate after the First Balkan War (1912), when its neighbors decided to join in reversing Sofia's temporary gains. For the balance of the 1990s and into the first decade of the next century, more Balkan conflict and little Balkan security are likely and even probable. In the absence of an imposed hegemonic "solution," outside guarantors have always been sought. Formerly, these were adjoining powers: the Ottoman Turks, Russia, Germany, the Hapsburg Empire, or Italy - namely, those powers most prone to impose their dominance. France or Britain came into the Balkan conundrum later: they were the more distant but less effective security partners of the early 20th century. After World War II, Soviet hegemony and American influence, in part exercised through NATO, imposed an East-West veneer over the region's intrinsic disputes. Regardless of direction, however, the Balkans behavior was typical of peripheral systems wherein weakness and dependency reinforce each other. At the core of these debilitating conditions is the erroneous equation of security with power. This remains a region where any attempt to gain military or economic strength threatens others, requiring protection from elsewhere and/or the resort to authoritarian solutions domestically. Each of these systems exhibits a high degree of internal insecurity, which heightens its sensitivity to perceptions of an external threat. Attempts by any state to enlarge security with more domestic capacities or through an external benefactor thus initiates a threat cycle: a slippery slope of perceived peril that pulls the Balkans back into the cauldron of its past. Balkan insecurity is deeply rooted in the historic uncertainty of its political boundaries, the high degree of heterogeneity within each political unit, underdevelopment relative to the rest of continental Europe, high population growth rates among some groups, and the absence of stable, legitimate governments. In this environment, these conditions have been associated with a high frequency or intensity of intra- and interstate conflict. Such threats, in turn, damage the prognosis for pluralistic and open political systems. Demagogues of the right and left characterize democracy as a frivolous luxury, and attack free speech and other liberties. Where democracy cannot be nurtured during a prolonged infancy, its survival is doubtful. The advantage of democracy for Balkan security is clear insofar as democracies are less likely to initiate war on their neighbors. Unfortunately, the high level of insecurity within the Balkans makes the achievement of stable democracies difficult. A vicious circle of authoritarianism and insecurity cannot be broken solely from within the region. Moreover, conditions that foster insecurity are not amenable to regional control. These states, regardless of political leadership, cannot adjust borders, move people without force or monitor the well-being of all minorities, or finance developmental programs. Outside frameworks and processes are essential foundations for Balkan security. Those frameworks and processes are absent, however. United Nations' peace-keeping forces were deployed in Croatia after thousands died while Lord Carrington and Lord Owen sought a political settlement on behalf of the European Community. The Balkans require ways in which to avert war and costly confrontations, not to halt the killing after thousands have died and cities have been destroyed. An ongoing system of Euro-Atlantic collective security, not a last-ditch peacekeeping effort by the United Nations coupled with desperate political intervention by the European Union or a NATO-enforced embargo, is the Balkan's best hope to avoid other conflicts. Another attempt at a Balkan Union or merely a number of bilateral arrangements will not suffice. A holistic approach to Euro- Atlantic security, adopted in both the Helsinki Final Act and refined by the Charter of Paris, underscores the belief that the inviolability of borders, rights of minorities, transparencies of military activities and other principles are the business of everyone. Unless these principles are enforced externally by the entity far more powerful than the Balkan states can ever be, the region will be unable to avoid calamity. That external entity cannot be NATO. As an alliance for common defense, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization generated heightened military capacity to deter aggression while deepening security cooperation across democratic states. But NATO never was in the business of abating threats as much as deterring an unequivocal peril (the USSR and Warsaw Pact) with counter-threat (including nuclear weapons). In forty-five years there has been no NATO role in reducing the origins of conflict. While the case of "managing" Turkish-Greek relations is often mentioned as a NATO success, one should recall that the U.S. influence, not NATO's, was critical; and, of course, the Cold War environment provided a convenient common threat to which Greek and Turkish armed strength could be attributed. NATO cannot be all things to all people, metamorphosing into both an alliance for common defense and a collective security organization. The latter could, via permanent well-funded institutions, offer negotiation, arbitration, human rights observers, threat monitors, sanctions and ultimately peace-keeping operations. Particularly for peace-keeping, a robust collective security partner to NATO might offer, through a permanent security commission, a way around the debilitating impasse between NATO and the U.N seen in Bosnia. By the early 21st century, we are likely to have seen things get much worse in the Balkans before they have begun to get better -- unless there is a radical and purposeful shift of Western policy towards conflict-prevention mechanisms invested in a collective security organization. Lacking indications that a rosier scenario will soon begin to unfold, we can expect that the fledgling democratic institutions will be pushed aside as nationalist and militaristic parties of the right or left gain ascendancy, perhaps even in countries (such as Greece) where democracy has a longer contemporary record. This is a bleak reading of prospects beyond 2000. But, for those who think of these views as hyperbole, listen to the pronouncements of Karadzic in Bosnia, Funar in Romania, and other demagogues, for whom ethnic hate is a route to political prominence. And, with an eye toward history, compare the mounting tolls from war in 1991-1995, and ask if we can expect vengeance and retribution not to play a significant role in the next decade of Balkan experience. Footnotes Daniel N. Nelson, Balkan Imbroglio (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), p. 29. Daniel N. Nelson, "NATO - Means But No Ends," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (January/February 1992), and "NATO: Use in Moderation," Ibid (November/December 1994). Miron Constantinescu et al, Unification of the Romanian National State: The Union of Transylvania with Old Romania (Bucharest: Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, 1971). In early 1995, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou charged Turkey with violating Greek airspace and threatening war if Greece should extend its territorial waters to 12 miles. Reuters Dispatch (January 15, 1995). Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983). The role of Austria-Hungary in bringing industrialization to Bosnia, which was in Vienna's control only after 1878, is discussed in Peter Sugar, Industrialization of Bosnia-Hercegovina, 1878-1918 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1963). Roy E. H. Mellor, Eastern Europe (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975). Albania's annual population growth exceeds 3 percent; Turkey has averaged 2.4 percent in the 1980s. Within the former Yugoslavia, the Albanian population grew at nearly 3.4 percent a year. Central Intelligence Agency, Handbook of Economic Statistics (annual). Barbara Jelavich, op. cit., Vol. 2, p. 3. Terence Hopkins, Immanuel Wallerstein, et al, "Patterns of Development of the Modern World-System," in World-System Analysis: Theory and Methodology (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1982). Secretary Eagleburger's speech of March 4, 1992, reported in Sofia in the daily Democratsia. Statements made by President Zhelyu Zhelev and General Tsvetan Totomirov at an international conference on A New Future in the Balkans. Bulgarian Telegraph Agency (October 2, 1994). In November 1991, for example, the First Deputy Chief of the Bulgarian General Staff went to Turkey specifically to discuss a draw-down of Turkish forces. See reports on this visit in Bulgarska Armiya (November 20, 1991). The Ministry of Defense spokesman comments frequently about the disposition of Turkish forces. For example, see the text of a news conference by Major General Stoimen Stoimenov, as reprinted in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Daily Report: East Europe 91-231 (December 2, 1991) pp.6-7. Bulgaria's goals include reduced troops and equipment strength in Eastern Thrace where the Turkey's First Army is deployed. As many as a half-million Gypsies also live in Bulgaria, but their political influence is markedly weaker. Luan Troxel, "Bulgaria's Gypsies: Numerically Strong, Politically Weak," Radio Free Europe, Research Report (March 6, 1991), pp.58-61. As suggested to the author by parliamentarians accompanying Prime Minister Dimitrov to Washington, D.C. in March 1992. Former Defense Minister Boyko Noev still insists that Bulgaria is "strong enough to stay out of conflict." Comment made to author, Sofia, February 21, 1995. Daniel N. Nelson, "The Rise of Public Legitimation in the Soviet and Eastern Europe," in S. Ramet, ed. Adaptations and Change in Eastern Europe (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993). Author's interview with Romania's Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, Bucharest, Romania (November 1991). In an interview held two months before he was named Bulgaria's Deputy Foreign Minister, Stefan Tafrov offered a parallel assessment of Romania's motives. In 1987, about $2.8 billion of Bulgaria's almost $17 billion in exports went to non-CMEA states, while a little more than $3 billion of over $17 billion in imports came from non-CMEA sources. CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics (1988), pp. 168- 169. In February 1992, President Zhelev's official visit to France resulted in a treaty of friendship and cooperation (including provisions for security cooperation) and a French endorsement of Bulgaria's membership in the European Community. An "Atlantic Club" with NATO membership as its goal was created in early 1991 with the blessing of the UDF. Numerous NATO delegations have been in Sofia, but prospects for NATO membership remain distant. In March 1995, Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski received Nikolay Afanasyevskiy, Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs. See reports in FBIS-EEU-95-056 (March 23, 1995). Interview by the author. See, the party's daily Duma (August 30, 1994). Daniel N. Nelson, "Romania Needs Help Not Sanctions," New York Times (June 19, 1990). Dennis Deletant, "Convergence Versus Divergence in Romania: The Role of the Vatra Romaneasca Movement in Transylvania," unpublished paper, SSEEES 75th Anniversary Conference, December 8-14, 1990. Constantin Vranceanu, Romania Libera, July 6-7, 1991, p. 3. Mugur Isarescu (Governor of the National Bank of Romania), "Romania's Economic Reform", in Daniel N. Nelson, Romania After Tyranny (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992). Daniel Nelson, "Post-Communist Romania's Search for Security," in Stephen Larrabee, ed., The Volatile Powderkeg (Washington, D.C.: American University Press, 1995. See, for instance, the interview with Mihai Stan, the principal deputy director of SRI, in Tineretul Liber, February 8 and 9, 1991. See also Larry Watts, "The Romanian Army After December, 1989," in Daniel N. Nelson, ed., Romania After Tyranny, op. cit. Author's interviews with President Iliescu, then Foreign Minister Adrian Nastase, and Ioan Mircea Pascu, then Iliescu's foreign policy advisor, in Bucharest and Washington, D.C. between September 1991 and March 1992. Author's conversations with Hungarian Foreign Minister Geza Jeszensky and State Secretary Geza Entz (Budapest and Washington, D.C., February and March 1992). Author's interviews with General Culda and Col. Vaduva in Bucharest (September and November 1991). Also see former Defense Minister Spiroiu's admission that equipment and standards for conscripts require urgent attention. Libertatea (July 4-5, 1991), pp. 1-2. More recently, these complaints have been heard again. See Defense Minister Gheorghe Tinca in AZI, 30 January 1995. Interviews with Defense Minister Spiroiu (September 1992) and with senior Romanian defense officers (May, 1995) in Bucharest. Ion Iliescu conveyed this image when he spoke to a seminar on "Perceptions and Concepts of Security in Eastern Europe" in Bucharest on July 4, 1991. James F. Brown, Eastern Europe and Communist Rule (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1988), p. 363. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Yugoslavia and the Non-aligned World (Princeton University Press, 1970); Richard L. Jackson, The Non-Aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers (New York: Praeger, 1983), pp. 24-36. Author's interview with Ioan Mircea Pascu, then foreign policy advisor to Romania President Iliescu. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, February 24, 1992. See the author's "Croatia's Countdown to War: Can It Win?," Christian Science Monitor (February 1, 1995). Author's interview with senior Croatian defense ministry personnel and UNPROFOR analysts on various occasions in 1994. Author's interview with Dr. Ioan Mircea Pascu, then foreign policy advisor to Romania President Iliescu, March 12, 1992. Daniel N. Nelson, "Why We Need to Act on Yugoslavia," Philadelphia Inquirer, September 29, 1991. About the Author Daniel N. Nelson is currently professor of East European security studies and democraticization in Old Dominion University's Graduate Programs in International Studies (GPIS). He is also president of Global Concepts, Inc., an international consulting firm. Previous to his appointment at Old Dominion University, which he initially joined as GPIS founding Director, Dr. Nelson served as Senior Foreign Policy Advisor for the House Majority Leader, Representative Richard Gephardt (1990-92) and as a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment (1989-90). From 1977 to 1989, he was professor of Political Science at the University of Kentucky, with a joint appointment in the Department of Russian and East European Studies. Dr. Nelson is the author of many books and monographs including The Balkan Imbroglio (1991), Romanian Politics in the Ceausescu Era (1989), and Elite Mass Relations in Communist Systems (1988).