Conference: NATO Enlargement: The National Debates over Ratification 7 Oct. '97

Spain and NATO's Enlargement by Fernando RODRIGO

Spain is not a "normal" member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Its "special" relationship with NATO owes to the fact that, because of political considerations Spain was not made a founding member of NATO and only became part of the Washington Treaty in 1982-and even then, against the will of a significant part of its population. This political "anomaly" was due to the Franco regime, which controlled Spain from 1939 to 1975 and emerged after a brutal Civil War won with the support of Hitler and Mussolini. In 1949, therefore, most of the founding members of NATO refused to consider membership for Spain, even for the purpose of enhancing the defense of Europe against the Soviet Union However, after the Korean War broke out and as Franco began to dissociate his regime from fascism and stress his anti-communism, the United States was ready to ignore past ideological flaws and take into account only strategic calculations. In 1953, a Defense Agreement was signed, which allowed the Pentagon to use military bases in Spain to contain the Soviet Union. In this indirect way, Spain was linked to Western security for more than 30 years, but it was left out of the events that shaped East-West confrontation during these decades. (1) For similar reasons Spain did not participate in the Marshall Plan or in the process of European integration. When the Treaties of Rome were signed in 1957, Spain was not invited to become part of the European Economic Community (EEC), nor was it accepted in 1962 when it sought admission. Thus, Spain, one of the oldest European states and geographically located in the southern corner of Western Europe, experienced the 20th century very differently from most of the other European states. It did not participate in either of the two world wars, nor did it take part either in the organization of NATO or in the process of European integration. (2) This exclusion from the main current of European affairs because of the antidemocratic character of the Franco regime, explains that in the mid-1970s, for the political parties as well as for the population at large, participating in the different circles of economic and political integration with a prosperous Western Europe was seen as part of the process of transforming Spain into a democratic regime. Nevertheless, security was an especially contentious issue for some political forces in Spain, most of all on the left, that had grown used to living in a clandestine situation and excluded from government for the previous 40 years. Therefore, socialists and communists alike condemned the Defense Agreement with the United States because of the U.S. support extended to the Franco regime, and continued to oppose Spain's application for NATO membership in 1982, looking instead for a more independent and neutral policy. (3) Spain's membership in NATO was approved in Parliament in October 1981 with the support of the center-right and nationalists political forces. After the socialist party gained power in December 1982, it froze Spanish participation in the organization pending a national referendum that was to allow the Spanish people to express its will about NATO membership. Felipe Gonzalez and the leaders of the socialist party, however, now under-stood more readily the significance of NATO membership as another aspect of the country's integration into Western Europe. Thus, after membership in the EEC had been secured in 1986, the Spanish prime minister decided to hold the promised referendum. Gonzalez's strategy combined his support for NATO membership with a promise to keep Spain out of the NATO military command structure, reducing the U.S. military presence, and ban the introduction of nuclear weapons in Spanish territory. Still, even after the referendum had been won, Spain remained a reluctant partner in Western security as the left, his party, and public opinion remained divided over NATO membership, a division that has conditioned Spain's situation in NATO until now. (4) When Spain was finally ready to participate in NATO in the latter half of the 1980s, it could only do so with an important number of limitations that obliged the Spanish government to develop a special formula for making its contribution to Western security. This "Spanish model" tried to overcome the lack of a Spanish presence in NATO commands through a set of "coordination agreements" designed to facilitate Spain's military contibution to Western security. However, Spain's model differed markedly from that of France because Spain participated in the Defense Planning Committee (DPC), the Military Committee (MC), the Nuclear Plan Group (NPG) and took part in the Aliance's defence planning process, although in a voluntary basis. (5) This unique way of participating in NATO, as well as the reduction of U.S. forces in Spain as a consequence of the new bilateral Defense Agreement that was signed in 1988, did not prevent a serious Spanish contribution to Western security. With the Gulf War in the late summer of 1990, Spain confirmed its willingness to support UN and U.S. policies not only on paper but by giving U.S. forces on their way to the Gulf the limited use of military facilities in Spanish territory and by sending naval units to the region in the framework of the Western European Union (WEU) to participate in the embargo imposed by the UN Security Council. (6) Such a decision meant a radical change in traditional Spanish foreign policy, after so many decades of more or less voluntary isolationism, as Spain not only accepted to be involved in a crisis that occurred many miles away from its territory or zone of interest but also due to the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy. In 1988, Spain's attitude had been significantly different as its will to contribute to the common defense appeared to lie "preferably within its area of strategic interest," which meant the Spanish part of the Iberian Peninsula, the Balearic, and the Canary islands. This new attitude became official policy in 1992, when the Government stated that "further away from Europe, different crisis have showed that Spain's security is not only related to the security of our territory but also depends on what is happening in other areas of the world." (7) Therefore, as of the early 1990s Spain was ready not only "to defend its own territory and own nationals, but to cooperate with neigboring states in the common defense, particularly within the framework of existing alliances, and to contribute to world peace, especially under the UN umbrella." (8) This new policy of engagement in world affairs has been driven by Spain's participation in peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate. In 1989, some Spanish military officers participated in the mission organized by United Nations to verify the withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola (UNAVEM-1) and a UN mission organized to facilitate the independence of Namibia (UNTAG). Spain has also participated in other peacekeeping operations in Africa, including UNAVEM-2 (again in Angola), ONUMOZ (in Mozam-bique), and UNAMIR (in Rwanda). (9) In Central America, the participation of Spain in UN peacekeeping operations proved even more important. In 1990, an Spanish general became commander of ONUCA, the UN operation organized to establish peace in Central America. The operation led to the deployment troops in five different countries and was crucial to ending the civil war in Nicaragua. In 1991, a Spanish general also commanded ONUSAL, the UN-led peacemaking operation in El Salvador, and Spain was an active participant in the UN mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA) and in Haiti (ONUVEH). Spain's contribution to international peace has not limited itself to the UN framework, nor to Africa and Central America. In fact, it has been in the framework of NATO and in the former Yugoslavia were Spain has made its major contribution to world peace in the last years. After contributing around 1,400 troops to UNPROFOR since 1992, Spain has become an active partner in the implementa-tion of the Dayton Peace Accord as part of the Intervention Force (IFOR). Spain has also contributed two frigates to the naval operation led by NATO and WEU in the Adriatic to enforce the blockade against the belligerants in the Balkan War-operation known as Sharp Guard-and in "Deny Flight", the NATO operation to stop military air activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the Spanish Air Force have participated with 8 EF/A-18. Accordingly, today's Spain is very different from the isolated country it was in the early 1980s, or the reluctant partner it used to be in the early 1990s. Now, it is a trustworthy ally, as shown in late 1995 with the selection of former ministry of Foreign Affairs during the socialist period, Javier Solana, as Secretary General of NATO even though Spain was still a relatively new member of the Alliance that, worse yet, did not participate in the military command structure of the organization.

Domestic Politics of NATO But what about current domestic politics in Spain? How could the present domestic political landscape affect its future behavior within and regarding NATO? Not suprisingly, the most important internal political change was the electoral triumph of a center-right party, the Popular Party (PP), led by Jos Maria Aznar in March 1996: coming after more than 13 years of socialist rule, the PP was a known supporter of NATO that had oppossed Felipe Gonzalez policy of limited integration of Spain in NATO's military command structure. Yet, because of the PP's narrow margin of victory, and because of the continued appeal of the socialist party and Felipe Gonzalez personally, it was not practical for the new Government to launch a bolder policy towards NATO without first coming to an understanding with the socialist party. (10) In the fall 1996, negotiations for the transformation of the NATO military structure coincided with Spain's desire to pursue a new policy, as the experience of 10 years out of NATO's military commands had convinced Spain's military and political authorities that a limited relationship with NATO was working against Spain's interest. (11) Still, changing Spain's status within the Alliance was a very sensitive public issue because the "Spanish model" had grown out of a policy approved by referendum after a very acrimonious public debate that has divided Spanish society in the early 1980s as no other issue of public policy has done before or after. Therefore, the Government decided to call a parliamentary debate asking political forces for their support to integrate Spain fully in NATO, although it was not obliged to do so, legally or constitutionally. The parliamentary debate was held in mid-November 1996: waged over the scope of changes in Europe since 1989, it confirmed the marginalization of NATO as a disruptive issue in Spain's domestic politics relative to what had been the case a few years earlier. In fact, the Government viewed the debate as one about "Spain's participation in a new NATO," as Gonzalez explained that "speaking of the Atlantic Alliance at the end of 1996 is totally different of speaking of the Atlantic Alliance in 1989, not to mention 1986 or 1981." (12) This approach allowed most political forces to think about the Alliance without the limitations of the 1980s and looking for a role in NATO that would be proportionate to Spanish interest and commitment. "Spain," argued Aznar, "has now the opportunity to fully participate in a NATO that is more European and more advantageous for our interests." Only the communists, who had won 10.5 % of the votes and 21 seats in the last election, were totally opposed to full Spanish participation in NATO. As in the early 1980s, their position relied on a mixture of anti-American and pacifist rhetoric that no longer had the appeal needed to produce sufficiently strong public support for the sort of vigorous anti-NATO campaign that might have been mounted earlier. The final decission to be a full NATO member was adopted, therefore, with the support of both the Popular and the Socialist parties, as well as with the votes of the moderate nationalist parties from Catalonia and the Basque Country. (13) The vote ended effectively 15 years of internal divisions over this issue and gave Spain, for the first time since signing the Washington Treaty in 1982, a pro-NATO policy that enjoys the support not only of the Government but of the major political forces, from left to right. (14)

NATO's Enlargement The parliamentary debate was centered around Spain's relationship with, and full membership in, NATO but only slightly on NATO enlargement-even though the Parliament did ask the Government "to take into consideration the legitimate security interests of Central and Eastern European States." Significantly, the parliamentary record shows only one laconic remark by Aznar about the Government's support for enlargement. One explanation for such passing interest is that Spain's political and economic relations with Eastern Europe in the 20th century have been very limited. (15) Another possible explanation is that enlargement is not a conflictual issue for a general public that is mainly in favor of it, as confirmed by polls taken since the Madrid summit. (16) Another element that can help explain Spain's apparent lack of interest in NATO enlargement is that Spaniards see it more as a foreign policy decision, a matter, that is, of providing support for democracy and helping extend prosperity, than as a security question. This is probably so because there is no public perception of any threat that might precipitate or reult from enlarging NATO. In fact, one of the more consistent features of Spain's public opinion is a strong perception that no country is a threat to Spain's security, as shown through the polls carried out since 1991 by INCIPE, a private institution, and CIS, a public organization. (17) Is any country threatening Spain? 1991 1992 94/95 1997 NO 76.4 74.3 77.4 71.1 YES 14.4 14.4 14.2 12.9 Unsure 9.5 11.3 8.4 16 A final explanation could be that even though Spanish decision-makers have much room for maneuver on this matter, they see NATO's enlargement as a distant issue that they are ready to support but is not a high priority in their agenda.

The Madrid Summit The decision to extend an invitation for membership to three Central European countries in Madrid helped focus the attention of Spanish politicians in this issue. Not only was it the first time a NATO summit would take place in Spain, but it was also the first great opportunity for Prime Minister Aznar to host some of the most important heads of state or of government in the world. (18) As the Spanish minister of foreign affairs put it before a parliamentary committe, a few days before the Summit, "the Spanish Govern-ment has insisted that the agenda of the summit should deal with all the dimensions of the adaptation process of the Alliance, not only the reform of the military structure, but enlargement, relations with PFP partners and specially with Russia and Ukraine." (19) The minister also expressed Spanish support for inviting not only Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to become members of NATO, but also Slovenia and Romania, in order to balance enlargement geographically and to extend stability towards the Balkans and the Mediterranean. Nevertheless, the minister pointed out that "The Spanish Government gives all his attention to a U.S. opinion that has not yet decided to support the candidacy of Romania and Slovenia, because of the major cost of enlarging to five countries, as well as due to the great contribution that the United States gives to allied security, including that of future members." Finally, the minister explained to his audience that enlargement towards the East should be equilibrated with more attention towards the countries of the Southern shore of the Mediterranean. Therefore, Spain, which has always been a leading supporter of the Mediterranean policy of NATO, pressed for the creation of a Mediterranean Cooperation Group that would increase NATO involvement in this area. The summit was a great opportunity for making the Spaniards aware of the importance of NATO enlargement, as the king of Spain, Don Juan Carlos, explained to the leaders when he hosted an official dinner at the Royal Palace: "Spain gives a very special meaning to the fact that the process of NATO's enlargement towards the East has begun in Madrid." The Madrid summit was also instrumental in deepening the support of Spanish political parties towards the reformed NATO. Thus, a few days later Prime Minister Aznar suggested, at a plenary meeting of Parliament: 'Before going to the details, I think it is essential to take account of the fact that if the Atlantic Alliance receives such large support from the political forces assembled in this Parliament is because we all shared the values that are the basis of the Washington Treaty." (20) Aznar expressed his agreement with the way in which NATO enlargement was proceeding, leaving the door open for future members, showing respect for the feelings of Russia and Ukraine without forgeting the legitimate security concerns of the Mediterranean countries. Joaqun Almunia, the new parliamentary leader of the socialist party, also expressed the support of his party for NATO enlargament to the East, as he argued: "Without enlargement, NATO would remain anchored in the past, without enlargement our North American allies would probably lose their interest in European security, without enlargement we risk the renationalization of our defence policies." (21) This view was echoed by all the parliamentary leaders, with the exception of the coalition led by the communists. In fact, Aznar used his meeting with Spanish press after the summit to announce that defense would be a priority for the next budgetary year beginning in January 1998, together with education and public health. This decision is not very popular, coming at a time when the Spanish Government is fighting hard to cut budgetary deficits with the aim of introducing Spain in the EU's monetary union, but it is part of a strategy to professionalize Spanish armed forces by the year 2003. (22) This is the final effort in a long process of modernization of the Spanish armed forces initiated more than 15 years ago that is transforming the large and inefficient military establishment into a small one, better equiped and trained, and able to deploy abroad and work with the modern armies of NATO countries.

Conclusion Although Spain's policy towards NATO in the past has produced serious disagreements not only between the elites but also in the population at large and has been tied to domestic considerations, there is now a broad consesus about NATO and NATO enlargement across the political spectrum. The parliamentary procedure for the ratification of an inter-national treaty is very simple in Spain, because it is neither necessary to approve a bill nor possible to introduce changes in the text of the treaty during the process. The only options are to approve or reject the treaty as a whole. The Government first submits the treaty to a plenary session of the Lower House, and if approved by a simple majority it is then sent to the Upper House where a similar procedure is followed. (23) Although the Upper House could theoretically vote differently from the Lower House, in practice this is almost impossible, because in the Spanish constitutional system the Lower House is the key to the political process, and the Upper House, because of the electoral system, is controled even more tightly by the Government than the Lower House. Therefore, when NATO's enlargement arrives before the Spanish Parliament for ratification it is unthinkable that any serious opposition will arise because pro-NATO forces in Parliament hold an overwhelming majority of 293 votes to 23. End Notes A more detailed account of Spain's security policy during the Franco regime appears in Antonio Marquina, Espana en la politica de seguridad occidental, 1939-1986 (Madrid, 1986). A good historical analysis of Spain's foreign policy in the 20th century is provided by Charles T. Powell, "Spain's external relations, 1898-1975," in R. Gillespie, F. Rodrigo and J. Story eds., Democratic Spain: Reshaping external relations in a changing world (London, 1995) To understand the conflict around Spain's accession to NATO and its resolution, see F. Rodrigo, "Western alignment: Spain's security policy," Ibid. The referendum was held in March 1986, with 52.5% of the people in favor of NATO membership, and 39.8% against. See Jaime de Ojeda, "El modelo de participacion espanol en la Alianza Atlantica," Politica Exterior, no. 9 (1989). Also, F. Rodrigo, "The end of the reluctant partner: Spain and western security in the 1990s," in R. Aliboni ed., Southern European Security in the 1990s (London, 1992). Spain's role in the Gulf war is anlyzed by Rodrigo, ibid. These statements were formulated in the "Directive de Defensa National," which is the main document used by the Government to formulate its security policy, and which contains the guidelines for the Ministry of defense and the Armed Forces to develop Spain's defense and military policy. See Manuel de operaciones de paz, Ministerio de Defensa (Madrid, 1993). Spain's evolution relative to that of other Southern European countries is analyzed in F. Rodrigo, "Southern European countries and European Defense," in J.W. Holmes ed., Maelstrom: The United States, Southern Europe, and the Challenges of the Mediterranean (Cambridge, Mass., 1994). For an explanation of Spain's participation in peacekeeping operations and its contribution to NATO military activities in former Yugoslavia, see Defensa, op. cit. The election returns of March 1996 gave the PP 38.85% of the vote and 156 seats in Parliament, but the PSOE share (37.48% of the vote and 141 seats) remained very substantial. The balance of power is held by the moderate nationalist coalition from Catalonia (CIU), with 4.61% of the vote and 16 seats, and the moderate nationalist party from the Basque Country (PNV), with 1.28% of the vote and 5 seats. This was especially clear after Spain's participation in IFOR, where Spanish officers could not take part in the major military decisions cercening their own troops. See the Government's position and Felipe Gonzales' speech in Diario de Sesiones, Comparecencia de los senores Ministros de Asuntos Exteriores y de Defensa ante la Comision Conjunta de Asunto Exteriores y Defense, 24 de junio (Madrid, 1997). The decision was approved by 293 votes against 23. This policy is approved by 38.9% of the population, with only 17.1% against. See Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, La defensa national y la profesionalizacion del Ejercito (Madrid, 1997). Exports from Spain to Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania amount to only 1.2% of total Spanish exports, with only 1.1% of Spanish imports coming from these countries. See Direccion General de Aduanas, Sector Exterior en 1995 (Ministerio de Economia y Hacienta, Madrid, 1996). See Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, Barometro de Julio (Madrid, 1997). Salustiano Del Campo, La opinion publica espanola y la politica exterior (Madrid, 1995). Also, Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, Barometro de Julio (Madrid, 1997). In fact, 44 states were represented at the Madrid Summit at the highest political level. See Sesniones, op. cit. Ibid. See Diario de Sesiones, Comparecencia des Gobierno ant el Pleno de la Camara para informar sobre la cumbre de Madrid de Jefes de Estado y de Gobierno de la Alianza Atlantica 17 de julio (Madrid, 1997). Ibid. Felipe Gonzalez resigned as leader of the socialist party in early June 1997. For the parliamentary procedure, see Antonio Remiro Brotons, La accion exterior del Estado (Madrid, 1984).