Conference: NATO Enlargement: The National Debates over Ratification 7 Oct. '97

The Ratification of NATO Enlargement The Case of Italy by Marta Dass and Roberto Menotti

Ratification of NATO enlargement will not raise any serious problem in Italy, although the government is hardly enthusiastic about it and one of the parties that comprise its majority in Parliament (Rifon-dazione Comunista [RC]) is the only party opposed openly not only to NATO enlarge-ment but to NATO itself. (1) In the spring 1997, events in Albania reinforced this assessment: by threatening to cause a full-fledged govern-ment crisis, the Albanian crisis confirmed that the parliamentary majority on crucial foreign policy decisions is different from the majority that supports the center-left government of Romano Prodi. (2) This would not be especially troubling if it were to mean that Italian politics is developing a bipartisan approach to foreign policy. Unfortunately, this is true only to an extent: although there is a degree of bipartisanship, the majority is weakened when making crucial foreign policy decisions, due to the distinctive "anti-system" foreign policy positions taken by the RC, which has already voted against the Maastricht Treaty (as did the rightist Alleanza Nazionale). The key implication for the ratification debate on NATO enlargement is that the government will seek to avoid a "great debate" on the issue, as happened with the Maastricht Treaty when the debate in Parliament remained relatively muted. Conversely, both the center-right opposition and the RC may want to exploit the issue politically. How successful either side will be may depend on the effectiveness of the NATO-Russia agreeement until and during the ratification debate. This helps explain Italy's activism on the Russian question, as will be seen below. In the best-case scenario, the RC is likely to adopt a low-profile opposition of principle. Throughout, the substantive aspects of Italy's enlargement policy may well remain in the background because the real conflict will be over domestic issues. Indeed, up to now NATO enlargement has failed to attract much public attention, except for a few professional experts. In Parliament (including its relevant committees), only nine sessions were devoted to these issues from August 1996 to June 1997.

Uneasy Bipartisanship On NATO The presence of a large Communist Party among the anti-fascist forces and the existence of an important "neutralist mood" inside the Christian Democratic Party (DC) explain why joining the North Atlantic Alliance was a highly controversial decision in the formative years of the post-war political system. Once the decision was made, it became the symbol of the cleavage between the government parties (the DC and, beginning in the 1960s, the Socialist Party) and the Communist party (PCI). A political consensus over NATO membership emerged gradually. Only in 1976 did the PCI end its opposition in principle to NATO, thereby making it possible for the earlier ideological divide to give way to a relatively solid "bipartisan" consensus on the key reference points of Italy's foreign policy (NATO and the European Community). However, a significant minority within the PCI remained fiercely opposed to NATO (as did the post-Fascist Party, on the other side of the political spectrum). This continued presence of an anti-NATO minority within the PCI partly helps explain why the NATO consensus seemed in doubt whenever a major policy decision had to be made: such was the case, for example, with the issue of intermediate nuclear forces (INF) in 1979. With the PCI eventually voting against INF deployment in Italy, the ability of the government to host the new weapon systems, which greatly facilitated deployment in Germany, earned Italy the reputation of a highly reliable U.S. ally in times of political difficulty (vis--vis both the USSR and other European allies). In practice, however, the PCI's evolution had shifted the NATO controversy from the fact of Italy's membership (no longer in question) to the contributions made by the country to NATO policies. This picture of a fundamental Italian consensus on international alliances based on a number of factual dis-agreements was sharpened with the "routine ratification" of the NATO enlargement to Spain in 1982, when: ratification was especially expeditious, with only 31 members of Parliament taking the floor in the context of very limited and poorly informed public interest; the majority (which included Socialists, Christian Democrats, and three minor centrist parties) had the support of part of the opposition, i.e. the post-fascist MSI party; communist opposition remained muted although the PCI (the major opposition party) eventually voted against enlargement on grounds that Spain's accession would alter the East-West strategic balance, and stir up tensions in the Mediterranean. (The fact that the entire Spanish Left was openly opposed to the decision, obviously was a decisive factor.) After 1989, the domestic consensus over NATO issues increased, in part due to the tranformation of the PCI into a de facto social-democratic party. However, opposition to NATO remained very strong in the "left wing of the Left" which formed the RC after its split with the PDS. This could emerge as the crucial factor in determining the tone of the ratification debate, given the RC's role in the current majority. As a party which continues to define itself as "communist" the RC's position on NATO is a logical corollary to its anti-Americanism and its fear of a post-Cold War American hegemony that would rely on NATO as its primary military tool. The rest of the political spectrum mostly views NATO as the central institution of the security architecture in Europe: this is the position of both the center-left and the center-right coalitions (including the Alleanza Nazionale), although there remain differences on the role of NATO as the main crisis-manager, due to the heritage of a long pacifist and pro-Third World tradition in both the Catholic world and among the former communists. Both the PDS and the successors of the DC favor enlargement. As to the wholly new political parties of the post-1989 era (Forza Italia and the Northern League), they support NATO's role and enlargement as "mainstream" European thinking, although their positions are not articulated easily or well. In fact, what is most striking in Italy is the poor quality of the NATO debate. Without the traditional ideological lens, the issues that will determine the future of the Atlantic Alliance after the Cold War have become marginal at the very time when a bottom-up reform of the organization is being discussed. In short, except for a small group of officials and experts, the reform and future of NATO is a non-issue in Italy.

Crisis-Management in Bosnia A conspicuous exception to this general trend is found in cases in which NATO's intervention is needed to manage an unfolding crisis. Here, a relatively new domestic debate interacts with the perception of NATO's role: a debate between interventionists and anti-interventionists, which partly reflects a discussion between the pacifists (from both the Catholic and Communist tradition) and "Wilsonian activists" (who are found in both the left and the centrist parties). Advocates of a "realpolitik" approach include "neo-nationalists" who favor interventions abroad only if and when major Italian national interests are clearly involved, and the more traditional, and still prevalent, multilateralist view. This debate is especially complex and at times confusing because it cuts across the existing political and party alignments; it is also based on shifting alignments, partly contingent on a case-by-case evaluation of each crisis: the alignments caused by the 1991 Gulf War, for example, differed from those generated by the 1994 operation in Bosnia. Important sectors of the Catholic parties sided against military intervention in the Gulf, under the cover provided by the positions taken by the Vatican and the Pope. Among the anti-interventionists was also the PCI, then struggling with its own possible transformation into the PDS. In short, a mix of pacifism, neutralism and anti-Americanism (which has not disappeared from both Catholic and leftist political thought) surfaced again on the occasion of the first post-Cold War test. Whereas NATO's de facto role in the Gulf for logistic support was virtually not debated, the Bosnian experience brought NATO and its operational capabilities to the forefront of the public debate. Discussions are again between interventionists and anti-interventionists, but the dividing lines have changed (except for the RC and tiny minorities in the Catholic parties and in the PDS). In 1994-96, the center-right government of Silvio Berlusconi and successive center-left governments all supported the Intervention Force (IFOR). Now, however, a new split is emerging, especially at the level of experts and analysts, between what might be roughly termed "idealists" and "realists" positions. In many ways, the debate over the Gulf War was the last debate to be influenced decisively by traditional political currents: after the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, the internal basis of political consent for multinational operations abroad appears to have broadened, and is in any case determined by new considerations, especially Italy's status and role in multilateral alliances and organizations, its geopolitical interests, and the right or even duty to intervene for humanitarian reasons. This implies that the worthiness of each mission will be assessed on an ad hoc basis. Alongside the debate on the management of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia pointed to another important element shaping the domestic perception on NATO's role and policies: namely, the Italian fear of exclusion from decision-making fora. Even though the first phase of the crisis found Italy embroiled in its own turbulent domestic affairs, and thus limited to a very minor role, exclusion from the Contact Group in 1994 was a shock, in diplomatic circles but, through the media, with some impact on the general public. The perception of Italian marginalization was made worse by the fact that Italy was paying a high financial, organizational, and political price in terms of the use of its bases and its air-space, with the related immediate dangers and possible, though never very serious, terrorist retaliations. In short, there were problems in playing the role of NATO's unsinkable aircraft carrier and logistical rearguard in a strategically vital area, in the absence of a satisfactory role in the de facto decision-making body. It is interesting to note that, although the government mostly sought to downplay the negative aspects of the situation, some commentators and diplomats unofficially urged that access to military assets on Italian soil be denied until Rome would be admitted in the Contact Group or given some other compensation. In September 1995, an increasingly frustrated Foreign Minister, Susanna Agnelli, announced that Italy would not permit the use of bases and infrastructure on its soil for new missions in Bosnia involving the "Stealth" F-117 aircraft, essentially as a response to Italy's continuing exclusion from the Contact Group. (3) Two major conclusions relevant to the current discussion on NATO enlargement can be drawn specifically on the basis of the Bosnian experience: First, most of the political and bureaucratic elites favor giving NATO a crisis-management role in Europe (and perhaps beyond). Yet opposition to this view, which still persists in segments of the Parliamentary majority (and is expressed most vocally by the RC), will consistently tend to strengthen Italy's official support for a stronger link between NATO and the UN (and the OSCE). Second, in the post-Cold War environment Italy can no longer play a passive or purely reactive role in security affairs, and will in any case become involved in situations that imply taking on responsibilities and accepting some direct risks. There is increasing awareness of such a shifting context, as shown by the relatively swift reaction to the Albanian crisis, but much still needs to be done to translate this into practical decisions and policies, especially in terms of reorganization and overhaul of the whole defense sector. In this context, the "exclusion complex" is all the more relevant as it is combined with fears of being kept outside of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). (4) As was often done in the past, Italy would compensate marginalization from Europe's "hard core" with closer alignment across the Atlantic. Italian ambiguities over the future of European defense should be evaluated in this context, as should the continuing importance of NATO as the main forum for institutional cooperation with the United States. In a sense, political and bureaucratic elites continue to view the Alliance as the primary guarantee against directoires that exclude Italy from key decisions on the future of European security. Italian fears of marginalization surfaced again in February 1997 when French President Jacques Chirac proposed that a summit on NATO-Russia relations be limited to France, Germany, and Great Britain, in addition to the United States and Russia. As articulated by Dini, Italy opposed a proposal that would raise a grave risk "for interallied cohesion and solidarity and, above all, for Italy, which could be excluded, de facto, from a decision-making process that concerns her in a most delicate dimension, that of her defense and security." (5) In short, after the Cold War Italy faces a rather uneasy predicament. On the one hand, its geopolitical position, affected by Balkan instabilities and uncertainties in the Mediterranean, appears to be a more important asset than before (when the dividing line between the two blocs ran along the intra-German border). On the other hand, Italy fears marginalization from the hard core of Europe - a tangible risk in the case of monetary union but also a perception that is reinforced by the dynamics of security issues. These factors may well impinge heavily on the prevailing Italian attitudes vis--vis NATO enlargement and the Alliance's role in the post-Cold War world.

Unenthusiastic Support The Italian government favors NATO enlargement-admittedly less than enthusiastically and with a number of caveats but without specific conditions. Until enlargement became clearly irreversible, Italian preferences were for a slower pace that would give the EU the time to think through the scope and implications of its own enlargement plans. Because the pace of EU enlargement turned out to be rather slow, to say the least, it followed that NATO expansion, too, had to be kept under control in order to avoid any major discrepancies between the two processes. This is why the Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative at the Brussels Atlantic Council of January 1994 was especially welcomed by Italian officials: not as a step forward on the way to enlargement but rather as a means to postpone it. As Prime Minister Carlo Azeglio Ciampi put it, enlargement would have posed real dangers because it would have been "tantamount to moving the line of confrontation eastward, while the path that has been chosen will foster bilateral dialogue with each of these [Central and Eastern European] countries." Defense Minister Beniamino Andreatta went even further as he explained that the Alliance had decided not to grant Article 5 guarantees to any non-member country in order to safeguard "Europe's overall unity" to help come to terms with "Russian demons." (6) This cautious approach was quickly overtaken by events in 1995, and Italy made no explicit criticism of the shift from PfP to enlargement, led by the United States with an assist from the German government - a passivity reflective of Italy's habit of maintaining a reactive attitude with regard to NATO. Reasons for such a lack of enthusiasm emerge in the early documents on enlargement that were prepared by the Defense Ministry in early 1995. To avoid that NATO enlargement move the center of European security to the North-East, it would be important to strengthen the Southern flank. In addition, the Defense Ministry urged an explicit linkage between NATO and EU enlargement, including the highest possible degree of "coordination" between EU and WEU decisions. This did not mean a convergence of the two processes but the avoidance of significant gaps in membership and timing (the somewhat generic "harmonization" thesis). In parallel, the government in Rome was urged to develop a niche in which visibility and sub-regional leadership could be exercised with a strong political and economic presence. In this perspective, a Southeastern axis and the Balkan area were said to be crucial for Italian interests. In terms of military cooperation (to be pursued also at the bilateral level), countries in Southeastern Europe were singled out for Italian influence: Albania, Slovenia, Croatia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary. As will be seen, a series of diplomatic initiatives, focusing especially on Hungary and Slovenia, went precisely in this direction. (7) What emerges from this and other similar arguments is that most Italian policy-makers and experts had initially hoped that the "when" and the "who" of NATO enlargement would be postponed until the EU Inter-governmental Conference (IGC) could make key decisions on EU enlargement and the future of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The acceleration of the NATO track in 1995-96 made such hopes moot. As a result, intensified Italian diplomatic efforts sought to establish a working economic and political framework, at the sub-regional level, for relations with countries in Central-Eastern Europe. A swift enlargement of NATO with uncertain contours and without clear prospects for EU expansion led Italy to propose new incentives designed to re-launch old diplomatic initiatives (like the so-called Iniziativa centro-europea), and to try new ones like the "Trilateral Initiative" which had been conceived in the late 1980s to counterbalance the dominant German drive in the area, protect Italian commercial interests (Italy is the second largest trading partner for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe), and create conditions for an autonomous Italian "ostpolitik". The problem, which had already been evident earlier, was the limited practical impact of these efforts, due to fluid political conditions (both in Italy itself and in the countries concerned) and to financial and budget constraints (which have ultimately stalled some large infrastructural projects designed to give substance to the "Iniziativa centro-europea"). In any event, the search for a "niche" in Southeastern Europe (primarily in the areas adjoining Northeastern Italy) is conceived as a sort of balancing act vis--vis an enlargement focused upon central Europe. As argued before, the Italian Foreign Ministry has also emphasized the Mediterranean dimension of NATO's security function. The term "omni-directionality" was adopted to express the need for a unitary European security framework with NATO at its core, one in which the Alliance can project security and stability to the East as well as to the South-by keeping the Mediterranean basin on the agenda, and through practical initiatives promoting dialogue and coop-eration. This approach made sense as long as PfP was regarded by NATO as the core mechanism to promote and project stability "out of area". PfP made it possible to look at NATO's periphery as a relatively unitary strategic area, and thus seemed well suited to address, over time, some of Italy's natural concerns in Southeastern Europe and possibly the Mediterranean. As practical discussions over candidates and criteria for NATO membership began to unfold, Italy gained only a minor compensation with the "Mediterranean dialogue" initiative in December 1994, which has at least the merit of placing the Mediterranean on the NATO agenda. Its content still remains largely undeveloped; in any case, Italy retains a specific interest in developing, upgrading, and broadening the initiative-now involving six Southern countries that have no prospects for membership in either NATO or the EU. Italy's emphasis on the Southern flank of NATO would allow Rome to capitalize on its geographical location, which in turn is crucial for the relationship with the United States. Another reason is that enlargement threatens to divert resources to areas that pose no significant security risk to Italy at a time when an "arc of crises" from the Balkans to the East Mediterranean is seen as the major source of tension and instability for the entire European continent. In reality-as will also be seen with respect to the Franco-American dispute over the AFSOUTH command- Italy's approach to NATO's role in crises-management in the South remains ambiguous. Italian support for IFOR and SFOR operations thus recognized an out-of-area role for NATO in the Balkans, in spite of the problems generated by Italy's initial exclusion from the Contact Group. Whether Italy would also agree to a broadening of NATO missions in the Mediterranean remains to be seen, however. First and foremost, there is a persistent ambiguity regarding American policies in the region. On the one hand, the U.S. military presence is seen as the unquestionable guarantee against a major crisis (which helps explain the support for retaining the U.S. command of AFSOUTH). On the other hand, Italy is extremely interested in improved relations with countries such as Lybia and Iran. Its characterization of the bombing raid against Iraq of September 1996 as "inevitable" suggested a third path between British support and French criticism. Given the domestic context (the Italian parliament has often considered the possibility of suspending existing sanctions against Iraq and Lybia), new U.S. retaliation (for instance, against Iran) is unlikely to gain Italy's support, though probably without any open condemnation either. In addition, since the early 1990s Rome has also played a "European card" by joining the newly established integrated task forces for the Mediterranean (while remaining outside the Eurocorp, at least temporarily) (8) and contributing to the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership as well as the "constructive dialogue" with the Gulf regimes. To some extent, these options continue to exist together: the special link to the United States paralleled by a distinctive national policy toward Lybia and other countries (consistently with the traditional Italian policy in the area), and the construction of a true European common policy toward the region. As long as the European common front remains weak, Italy will tend to rely on the special relationship with the United States, which in turn Rome can hope to sustain only by emphasizing its role as a forward logistical base in the Mediterranean. This implies that Italy will not play a very active role in support of the European option. In practice, Italy's Mediterranean policy has been so inconsistent that Spain has made a succesful bid for a leading role in Euro-Mediterranean relations: since 1991-92 Italy has not been able to mobilize sufficient political energies and resources to sustain a high-profile policy in the area. In fact, in spite of frequent statements about its presumed priority in the Mediterranean, Italy's relations have been focused on continental Europe. In a sense, only a serious marginalization from the European hard core could stimulate a Mediterranean strategy, almost by default. In the foreseeable future, Italy's policy will remain largely declaratory. Given this interpretation, the focus on the Southern flank in the initial stages of discussions over NATO can also be regarded as the expression of an important interest in slowing down an enlargement to Central Europe. This approach, reinforced in 1994-95 by the crisis in Bosnia, was overtaken by events as the accession campaign staged by the three leading Central European candidates proved to be ever more effective after the Dayton agreements. By then, the only way to "balance" NATO's inevitable drive eastward was to support some credible candidate in Southeastern Europe as an exercise in damage-control that moved Italy from the goal of a slower to that of a larger enlargement. Major Italian interests Since enlargement by the year 1999 became official NATO policy, three major issues have conditioned the emphasis placed by Italian policymakers on internal reforms. First, as already pointed out, the single most important thread running through Italy's diplomacy is that eastward expansion should not mean a shift of Nato toward Central and Northern Europe, and that the Mediterranean region should remain on the agenda as the area where risks and threats are most likely to originate and where a multilateral dialogue should be pursued most actively. Hence Italy's support for Partnerships for the Mediterranean (PfM), modeled after the PfP. The response to the Albanian crisis with a relatively small "coalition of the willing" that failed to include Germany, Britain, and the United States may have heigthened the existing preoccupation with a growing geopolitical imbalance that would inevitably damage the Alliance's stabilyzing role in the Balkans (the possibility of a U.S. disengage-ment from SFOR reinforces this perception). The multinational "Alba" mission, involving about 6,000 troops, was organized for the greatest part by the "Club Med" of NATO and EU states (comprising Italy, France, Spain, Portugal and Greece, plus Turkey). In other words, the danger of enlargement, from an Italian perspective, is now over differentiated levels of security. A second element of concern is over Russia's role in European security, which rests on four major considerations. For one, the internal stabilization of Russia is viewed as a common-sense security priority. In addition, the already substantial economic interests that link Italy and Russia must obviously be cultivated. Moreover, Italy's conception of a pan-European security and political system has to include Russia as a full participant. Finally, there is the need to counterbalance existing pressures for a five-power concert including Russia, the United States, Great Britain, France, and Germany-a possibility against which Rome has lobbied both Washington and Moscow by extolling the virtues of real multilateralism and inclusive organizations like the OSCE. At times, this set of interests tends to take on a special twist, based on the idea that Italy can play a special role as a bridge to Russia, not only through its extensive trade links but also because of its tradition of dialogue that was not interrupted even at the peak of the Cold War. The historic precedent that is often recalled as a major manifestation of such a vision is then-President Gronchi's visit to Moscow in 1959, usually remembered as a diplomatic flop and an irritant in U.S.-Italian relations at the time, but also as a reflection of the widely-held view that Italy might make a significant contribution to defuse tensions with the USSR/Russia. Of late, this deep-rooted-though perhaps poorly conceptualized-attitude has taken a new form, with the perception that Russia must be an active and responsible player in the evolving security system of Eurasia. (9) Foreign Minister Dini was keen to emphasize the point on the occasion of his meeting with Secretary of State Albright in Rome in mid-February 1997, as he stated: "we believe such enlargement [of NATO], which will be decided by the NATO countries themselves, will also have to take place after we find a modus vivendi, an understanding on the nature of the close discussions and relations between NATO and Russia." (10) The Foreign Minister made a similar point in Moscow a few days later, when he repeated that "the enlargement of NATO is possible only with Russia's consent and not against Russia's will." (11) These statements did raise the important issue of timing with regard to NATO-Russia talks vis--vis the July summit in Madrid: in this context, Rome seemed intent on promoting every possible effort to reach a formal arrangement with Moscow prior to a decision on the first round of enlargement. This explains why the Paris agreement was presented in Italy as a vindication of its own diplomacy. Indeed, the emphasis placed by Italy on Russia provoked some tension with Central European countries. In particular, the Polish government complained about Italy's "Russia-first" attitude until Premier Kwasniewski's visit to Rome in the Spring of 1997 provided explicit reassurances that Italy would support Poland's application for NATO membership. The third distinctive aspect of Italy's position was its effort on behalf of Slovenia and Romania as two countries that would extend NATO's reach to the South and might even increase Italy's influence in the Southern command structure. Slovenia was a geo-political priority that was all the more compelling as it had minor strategic relevance for Moscow. (12) It was also a logical candidate because it would connect Hungary to Central Europe (and to Italy), thus providing territorial continuity in the context of NATO's article 5 guarantees. Subsequently, however, Italy's support for Romania gained momentum (partly due to the French position and the significant growth of bilateral trade relations). In the end, then, the Italian government opted for a 5-country enlargement, which some experts found to be counterproductive. (13) In Madrid, the Italian government had hoped to have at least one of its two candidates, Slovenia, included in the first round of enlargement. Had this goal been met, Rome would have sought to hedge against further enlargement or at least urge a long "pause for reflection." Limiting enlargement to three countries has been regarded as a halfway measure with a minor impact on the major issues relevant to Italian security (except for the advantage resulting from Hungary's inclusion in the Southern command), and has consequently attracted scant attention from the political parties and the broader public. Predictably, the government's response has been to seek to limit the damage of enlarge-ment on relations with Russia and on the self-confidence of new post-Communist regimes in the "leftout" countries of Southeastern Europe. All these motivations explain why the Italian government presented as a diplomatic success the explicit reference to Romania and Slovenia as likely candidates for the next round after 1999, in the final communique of the Madrid summit. The indeterminate character of future plans for enlargement is one of the most difficult problems faced by Italy. Officially, the United States maintains that NATO is committed to an open-door policy, as stated for example in the State Department Report to Congress on enlargement, and repeated by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright after the Helsinki summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin: "the first countries that would enter NATO," declared Albright on March 21, 1997, "would not be the last." (14) What has been left unclear, however, is the precise meaning of the "open door" principle, which seems highly flexible and is theoretically compatible with both a holding pattern that could last, say, 10 years, and a series of enlargements in rapid succession. The official Italian position, as stated by Defense Minister Andreatta in February, 1997, favours a "broader enlargement [rather than enlargement to only two or three countries], and following that, "a process that should not consist of very rapid enlargements one after the other." In spite of the slightly convoluted style of Andreatta's statement, it is easy to detect a concern both for Italy's own candidates and, at the same time, for an open-ended process that could create much uncertainty and unpredictability. As will be seen, this also affects Italy's approach to EU enlargement.

The Two Enlargements A major complicating factor has to do with the inevitable interaction between the forthcoming enlargement of NATO and future developments in the EU. Thus, some of Italy's reservations about expanding NATO eastward result from a concern that "hasty" decisions about NATO could influence the EU's own process of enlargement. In addition, many believe that the most natural long-term strategy for post-Communist states would be their gradual but steady integration into the EU zone of peace and prosperity rather than a selective and controversial extension of security guarantees to only a few of these states. As argued by Achille Occhetto, the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, "the promotion of economic development and the integration of new democracies do not appear to be a task for the Atlantic organization, but rather for the European Union-a view that is shared within the PDS by Giangiacomo Migone, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. (15) For these "NATO-skeptics EU-firsters" prior expansion of the military organization could either encourage the Europeans to proceed even more cautiously on EU enlargement than is currently the case, or force on Europe the burden of the "left-outs"-a risk that is most acutely felt in Italy-thus creating new pressures to open the EU's borders faster than might be desirable. In either case, the selection of new EU members would be seriously influenced by NATO's own process. A further problem is over the impact of NATO on the future of European defense: a significant and lasting gap between the membership of the two Western institutions would undoubtedly erode prospects for a substantive European pillar within NATO. It is largely as an attempt to address widely shared concerns over the imperfect overlap between security and economic expansion that some Italian government agencies appear to have envisioned a sort of linkage between the two processes. In other words, when integrating new members the EU will have to take into account the new NATO membership so as to avoid further complications in the establishment of ESDI. The logical conclusion of this argument is that in the medium term, NATO enlargement will essentially set the limits of EU enlargement. Such an extreme position has not been adopted by the government, however. For Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Piero Fassino, for example, an excessive "harmoni-zation" between the two processes would eventually create a large category of "left-outs" from both institutions, with difficult political consequences for those states. (16) Yet, more flexible versions of the "linkage theory" have advocates in both the Foreign and Defense Ministries, and Italy's official support for EU enlargement in principle remains quite cautious in practice and points to the necessity of a prior institutional reform of the EU, a so-called "Maastricht 3". All things considered, the six candidates to EU enlargement slected by the EU Commission in its "Agenda 2000" partly meet Italian expectations. At the same time, as the list excludes Romania, from the Italian viewpoint a second round (inclduing Romania this time) is even more crucial than before. Economic considerations complicate further Italy's policy on EU enlargement. With the most likely candidates for membership competing with Italy in a number of EU-related areas, the economic benefits of enlargement to the East for Italy could well turn out to be less substantial than the costs of adjustment (in terms of reforming the common agricultural policy and reducing available structural funds, for example). (17) According to recent polls, public skepticism may be growing among Italian opinion leaders regarding the positive spin-off of the EU enlargement process, although more than 70% of the sample of common citizens still believe that enlargement to the East is a positive development ("very positive" for 12.5% of them). (18) The harmonization scenario preferred by Bonn would simplify the overall political, security, and economic institutional framework in Europe, and provide reasonably precise guidelines for future defense and diplomatic planning. Such a scenario, however, would also make the evolution of the EU dependent on a series of decisions taken at NATO headquarters, with specific NATO goals and under forceful U.S. leadership. Since this is one of the main criticisms of NATO enlargement in Italy, the harmonization thesis may not be enough to overcome the skeptics in Parliament. With France, too, as the other NATO country likely to raise a similar policy question, a sort of "domino effect" between these domestic debates might reinforce Italy's resistance to linking NATO and EU enlarge-ments. In any case, that NATO enlargement will precede and affect EU enlargement can be taken for granted. Even more, one of the "perverse" effects of the process could well be to increase the pressures for EU membership from NATO's left-outs. (19) The first waves of EU enlargement are expected to involve the Central-Eastern European countries (most likely, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, as well as Slovenia and Estonia) by the year 2002. The impact of NATO enlargement is that new NATO members will not be easily denied EU membership (which, given the current context of NATO enlargement, is not a major issue even though it emphasizes Turkey as an even more conspicuous exception). The enlarge-ment process, however, could complicate the already slow evolution of ESDI as the "hard core" of a European CFSP. A gradual but full integration of the WEU in the EU is the institutional solution that was endorsed by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Spain at the special EU summit held in Rome on March 25, 1997. The trouble with this proposal (beside opposition from Great Britain, Denmark, and the four neutral EU members) is that it could provide a back-door entry to NATO, as EU candidates would expect protection from the EU's defense arm-which, in the current circumstances, remains NATO plus a WEU chain of command (as envisaged, in fact, in the concept of Combined JointTask Forces). Thus, even assuming that the principle of "flexibility" will be fully adopted, any attempt to make a European common defense capability "no longer a theoretical but a real prospect" (as foreign ministers Dini of Italy and Herv de Charette of France wrote on the eve of the EU Rome summit) would have to take NATO dynamics into consideration. (20) In any case, it has to be kept in mind that the top Italian concern is the creation of a balanced European security and defense core, that is, one that is not limited exclusively to France and Germany but is based instead on multilateral mechanisms that are deemed more reliable. This is why Italy supports the integration of WEU into the EU, and remains all the more supportive of ESDI as it does not undermine the vital link with the United States. Italy's official position on EU enlargement has been that the EU should negotiate with all countries that have applied for membership. Now that it has become clear that the timing of new accessions will be phased, it can be assumed that Italy will place a high priority on its candidates in South-eastern Europe but neglect such countries as the Baltic states about which it only holds minor interests. In addition, Rome will also encourage sub-regional agreements as "clearing house" through which relations with the left-outs can be managed during the entire phase of exclusion or the period preceding their accession to Western institutions, for example with customs unions and (for NATO) the PfP framework,. In former Yugoslavia, Italy will both cooperate and compete with Austria (as already happened in the context of the iniziativa centro-europea), because competitive trade relations offer no significant fallout on the security realm (While Austria has chosen, so far, to stay out of NATO, a different choice would not be opposed by Rome. Indeed, Austria's unique position could well provide a "model" for the "left-outs".) Relations with Croatia, of which Italy is now the largest trading partner, are especially sensitive: Rome is willing to consider more extensive forms of economic-commercial cooperation with this country, which has not yet applied for EU membership and cannot expect to receive any institutional security guarantees from NATO. Another important set of Italian geopolitical includes Greece and Turkey. The former is seen by its long-time rival in the Eastern Mediterranean as largely responsible for the EU's adamant objections to Ankara's bid for membership. In the future, trans-atlantic differences between the Europeans and the United States may well escalate: while the United States view Turkey, its NATO partner, as a vital player in the context of U.S. policies in the Middle East, European states are likely to opt for Greece, their EU partner, in the event of a conflict with Turkey (possibly over the threat of a veto of NATO enlargement or future negotiations on arms ceilings as a retaliation against the EU's refusal to open negotiations toward Turkey's membership). Recent developments point toward a degree of detente between these two countries, but their relations remain far from stable. In this context, Italy is taking a somewhat oscillating stance on what remains a very sensitive issue for most European countries: for instance, in March 1997, Prime Minister Prodi found it necessary to denounce explicitly as a major mistake a declaration about Turkey's lack of qualifications for EU membership, made at a gathering of premiers belonging to European "People's Parties" to which he had participated: as pointedly corrected by Prodi, such a view was not to be construed as Italian policy. (21) Tension have also surfaced with Greece in connection to the "Alba Operation" which includes Greek participation in a country, Albania, in which Italy and Greece have historically competed over traditionally diverging interests. A remark by Foreign Minister Dini brought Italy to the brink of a diplomatic crisis with Greece in mid-August 1997, when Dini referred to "two entities" on Cyrpus (a candidate to the next round of EU enlarge-ment). His remark was promptly rectified but the incident had nonetheless taken place. According to the foreign policy spokesman of the PDS, Umberto Ranieri, Italy might consider assuming some special responsibility for the solution of the Cyprus issue. In the same context, Ranieri also added that Turkey should be gradually "anchored" be Europe.

NATO Reform T he many dilemmas raised by the complex interaction between the two processes of institutional enlargement will not have to be tackled by Italy alone, but represent problems for the Alliance as a whole. In theory at least, they should prompt Italy to address some of its traditional ambiguities over the future of European security and defense. This is especially true with respect to the internal reforms of NATO: inevitably, enlarge-ment raises a series of issues for the current structure of allied regional commands, and this, too, will have consequences on the development of the ESDI. Although the Italian government has failed to develop an overall position on the broader question of the new command structure, it was forced to take a stand on at least one specific component of that issue, namely, the negotiating stalemate over AFSOUTH, which can be seen as an early litmus test for Alliance reform. (22) French insistence that command of AFSOUTH be given to rotating European commanders failed to win Italy's support primarily because of extreme Italian sensitivity to the role of the American Sixth Fleet but also because of France's unilateral action on the issue. Failure to attempt, at least, to develop a common European position prodded Italy to rely on its American connection, which, of course, did not further the aspiration to a coehesive European view of Europeanization of NATO. In reality, although uncertainties abound with regard to the prospects of ESDI, Italian decision in the AFSOUTH controvery was predictable. As clearly stated by Dini in his joint press briefing with Secretary of State Madeline Albright on February 16, 1997, "in view of the importance [the Sixth Fleet] has for the Mediterranean, we believe that the redefinition of commands throughout Europe should not involve AFSOUTH." (23) In the short term, this meant rebuffing the French proposal as inappropriate and untimely. One counterproposal suggested by some of the Italian experts-namely, to return, in the name of the "Europeanization" of NATO, to the idea of a European SACEUR -has not been considered, so far at least, as a practical option. Less ambitiously, the official position is simply to favour the principle of a rotating European deputy-SACEUR, as a means to give some relevance and a degree of visibility to the ESDI. In this specific case, immediate Italian interests (including maintaining the slot of deputy commander) help explain the sharp rebuff to the French proposal. Yet, it is undeniable that Italy finds itself in a difficult position when the "European track" in its security approach collides with the "American track." What we see at work, therefore, are two distinct sets of goals and concerns in Italian diplomacy: preserving the Atlantic link and, at the same time, searching for ways to advance the cause of European unity in the realm of common foreign and security policy. A degree of ambiguity is inherent in this duality, but both tendencies usually reflect interests and perceptions that are real. Advocates of a bolder Europe-first attitude would probably be willing to incur greater political risks by siding with France on the upcoming battles for the future structuring of allied commands and responsibilities. The "American lobby," especially at the Defense Ministry, is instead very keen to safeguard the U.S. connection in the hope that Italy will be regarded in Washington as an especially useful ally. One lesson that can be learned from the controversy over AFSOUTH is that because of its difficult geopolitical position, Italy will not go along with plans that do not give specific assurances regarding what Italy gets in return for a relative loosening of the American ties. In other words, much depends on how European cooperation is to be managed, not on the principle of European defense cooperation per se. In the long run, the precondition for Italy's adoption of a true "Europe-first" policy is the creation of common institutional mechanisms rather than exclusive decision-making or consultative groups and fora, which may always leave Italy outside the door. In the simplest terms, if CFSP will not make progress and ESDI will fail to materialize, Italy will maintain an attitude of studied ambiguity and extreme caution in instances of Franco-American clashes. By implication, this means that, in spite of statements to the contrary, the Italian contribution to creating the above mentioned preconditions will be secondary at best, as illustrated, for example, by the refusal to join the Eurocorp from its inception.

The Parliamentary and Public Debates Plans to enlarge the Alliance are a low-key issue in the domestic political debate, especially as compared with EMU and the related debate over the Maastricht criteria of economic convergence. Even the issue of the AFSOUTH command in Naples, which is seen as a critical problem by the foreign policy and defense establishment, has failed to evoke any significant response from the broader public or the mass media. Except under crisis conditions, the role of NATO tends to remain a marginal concern for Parliament, the political parties and, most of all, public opinion at large. No broad-based debate has emerged so far in the press on the enlargement issue, and this is not likely to change in the future. There is one caveat, however, which has emerged out of Italy's recent experience during the Albanian crisis that erupted (or rather climaxed, given the warning signs) in the Spring 1997, when the intensity and especially the almost immediate politicization of the crisis in the Italian domestic context surprised many observers. In other words, few expected that a foreign policy issue could so rapidly become linked inextricably with the country's domestic political equilibrium. To be sure, this crisis offered special characteristics which made it particularly relevant to the public (including migration flows from Albania to Italy). But the broader lesson to be drawn from this recent case is probably that domestic disputes may easily erupt over foreign policy issues on the basis of temporary and unusual political alignments. The one issue with the potential to spur some serious debate in Parliament is that of funding, but only if the costs of NATO enlargement for current members should prove to be significant and immediate, which seems unlikely. However, it appears that no serious attention has been devoted yet to the prospect of an increase in national defense spending as a byproduct of NATO enlargement. (24) Should this become the case, however, especially during the closing weeks of the ratification debate, objections would be serious at a time when Italy, like many other EU states, is almost exclusively focused on the goal of compliance with the Maastricht criteria through a tight financial squeeze. In general terms, the current Parliamentary majority is not united on the entire NATO issue. Members of the PDS, the major party in the governing coalition, who now hold official positions in the Prodi government, favour a strong role for NATO in European security provided the European component of the Alliance is gradually strengthened and Russia's concerns are taken into account. This is indeed stated govern-ment policy. Piero Fassino, the Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs who is one of the main proponent of a more active Italian Ostpolitik, has argued that "the enlargement of NATO is not aimed at threatening Russia or anybody else, but rather at guaranteeing the security of other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, e.g. Poland." Fassino urged, therefore, that NATO adopt a double track-internal discussions within the Alliance on all the relevant issues and with no external interference, but also negotiations with Russia in order to define the nature and mechanisms of a "system of common security in Europe." (25) While the PDS is thus pro-enlargement, numerous caveats and nuances appear within the party, as expressed, for example, by Occhetto, the former PCI secretary. Ochetto's positions of conditional approval-"yes, but"-have been echoed by a number of parlamentarians from both the majority and the opposition's ranks, as will be seen below in more detail. These different nuances became particularly evident in early April 1997 after a group of eight parliamentarians, led by Occhetto, visited Moscow for a round of talks with most political forces in Russia. Speaking as Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Occhetto concluded that "the strategy of NATO enlargement is questionable and simply wrong on certain aspects." In its current form, added Ochetto, it contrasts sharply with ongoing efforts to achieve a unified Europe in which Russia might have a legitimate place. He thus suggested that the EU, in particular, should re-examine the broad security issues it confronts and find ways to allay Russian fears of encirclement. More specifically, Occhetto urged that the EU aim primarily at preventing a second round of NATO enlargements (the first being admittedly irreversible), and asked that the Alliance forego any further step until specific arrange-ments are reached on how Russia will be involved in an overall scheme for European security. These high-profile statements, which were toned down in the aftermath of the Helsinki summit, were also made by other members of Occhetto's group. "What is inappropriate," said Dario Rivolta of Forza Italia (the major center-right opposition party), "is the mode and timing of enlarge-ment," as they both project a negative image of the Alliance and feed Russian feelings of exclusion. (26) The view that NATO enlargement might cause new divisions across Europe was obviously weakened after agreement on the NATO-Russia Founding Act prior to the Madrid Summit of July 1997. The Foreign Affairs Committee's other interest in one broad enlargement that would include at least Slovenia, over an open-ended process that would extend over time finds broad support in the Italian government and bureaucracies. Outside the PDS, but within the parliamentary majority that supports the Prodi government, the RC continues to call for the dissolution of NATO as an organization permanently linked to a Cold War rationale evidenced by the leading role that continues to be played by the United States. Anti-Americanism and a basically "anti-system" view of international affairs underline the RC view, and the more radical objections to enlargement have thus been placed in the wider context of a general criticism aimed at a military alliance. Consequently, this criticism comes together with various demands for a clarification of the "defense" function that the evolving NATO is supposed to perform in the post-Cold War environment, pointing to the primacy of military missions over broader conceptions of "cooperative" security. (27) Because of their extreme character, these strong reservations will hardly have a direct impact on the ratification of enlarge-ment, although they may affect the general attitude toward Nato's new missions in the near future: indeed, criticism of the multi-national mission in Albania reveals this deep-rooted skepticism toward any kind of military intervention abroad. Given that both the major parties in the government coalition and the opposition parties have stated their intention to vote in favour of NATO enlargement in any event, however unenthusiastically, it can be concluded that a widely shared position emerging so far from Parliamentary debates argues that: Russia's acquiescence is a necessary prerequisite for a reasonably smooth process of enlargement, and requires accordingly that NATO develop a mutually satisfactory and stable relationship with Moscow. That this expectation was satisfied, at least in part, by the NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 27, 1997, makes it more likely that RC opposition to enlargement will keep a low profile; a stronger political and security role for the EU should be regarded as a main concern in devising a strategy to manage stability and democracy in the East. The inter-action between the two processes of enlargements is thus of crucial importance; Italy's interest in a broad first round of enlargement (which would include at least Slovenia) was designed to avoid a displace-ment of the center of European security to the Center-North and away from the South-East, and will now have to be accomodated differently. The extreme consequence of the latter concern has to do with a "German problem" that remains mainly implicit although wide-spread. For Saverio Porcari (Alleanza Nationale), the vice-chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, a climate of cooperation with Russia would serve as "a counterweight to German preponderance in Europe" and thus contribute to a "balanced European security system." (28) The assumption behind this concern is that unchecked German economic and cultural influence in Central-Eastern Europe and in the Balkans would marginalize Italy. The "German problem" is also raised by some influential voices in the defense establishment, including Carlo Jean, the President of the Defense Ministry's Study Center, who singles out the "Weimar triangle" as the most serious threat to Italian interests. Jean's scenario posits that with Germany expected to play a leading role in Euro-Atlantic security, the core area of NATO-led stability would be Central Europe, with a strong emphasis on a "Kerneuropa" (Little Europe) centered on the Franco-German core within an enlarged Atlantic Alliance. The consequence of such a conception of European security (with Romania excluded from the first round of enlargement) would be a de facto line of separation between the Central-Northern and the Southern-Eastern part of the continent: the latter-also comprising Italy, Spain, Greece and Turkey-would be regarded as a buffer zone to protect Kerneuropa from instabilities in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Mediterranean basin. Italy's sense of marginalization and perhaps isolation from a truly transatlantic or European context would grow significantly. As can be seen from the preceding remarks, the three tenets of Italy's approach - dialogue with Moscow, compatibility with EU enlargement, and emphasis on Europe's Southeastern periphery-are inrerrelated as they all tend to prevent a situation in which enlargement is conducive to a fragmented Europe in terms of security. By pointing to this danger, the broader political debate clearly echoes the concerns expressed by government sources with respect to the constant risk of "marginalization." These fears are voiced even more openly when they do not commit the government, as for example by Valdo Spini, the Chairman of the House Defense Committee: in a Hearing with the Foreign and Defense Ministries in early February 1997, Spini warned that "worrisome" trends point to a growing "exclusion and marginalization" of Italy in a number of important areas- including the French insistence for the Southern Command, the proposal for a five-power summit on NATO and Russia, and, last but not least, the various proposals considered for a reform of the U.N. Security Council. Spini was clearly referring to, and possibly reflecting on, the above-mentioned "exclusion complex" as a major concern for Italian policy-makers (also present in the battle over the Maastricht criteria of economic convergence). Among the different aspects of Italy's policy on NATO enlargement, the "Southern" component has a potential to translate into a relatively broad public debate, especially under the impact of the Albanian crisis. Indeed, the end of the Cold War seems to have brought about more stability in Central Europe (with enlargement promising to make the region even more secure) and less stability and security in the South, as demonstrated by the former Yugoslavia, Albania, and throughout the Islamic world. The most recent attempt by the Defense Ministry to define the concepts and operational instruments of Italy's defense policy has been awaiting Parliamentary approval since it was first presented in 1991: the document strongly emphasizes the relative growth of the risks and potential threats from the South, which it sees as the major strategic shift that occurred with the end of the Cold War. The debate over the potential role of multilateral organizations in dealing with the multifaceted "risks from the South" may thus have some resonance with the political parties and the general public. (29) They may even produce more internal divisions, as suggested earlier in this analysis. Given the serious political and economic repercussions of the North-South divide within Italy itself (evidenced by the political rise of the "Northern League"), this issue also relates to the wider problem of redefining the country's identity after the end of the Cold War. Italy's Northern regions are highly integrated with the continental economies, while the South is mired in a situation of high unemployment and serious social ills. As a consequence, on a growing number of international issues the country tends to express more than one set of interests at the same time. As local politics (which also played a significant role in the Albanian crisis because of its immediate impact on the Southeastern regions) becomes more prominent, foreign policy initiatives are sometimes influenced by a concern to strengthen the sense of national identity and shared purpose. These considerations can explain the decision to launch the Alba operation; more broadly, they could also have an impact on the much wider debate over the future architecture of European security.

Conclusions As argued at the start of this analysis, the ratification process will probably be relatively smooth in Italy, and a positive outcome is to be anticipated. The NATO-Russia agreement has responded to the central objection put forth by Italian critics of NATO enlargement. Even the American debate on ratification is unlikely to exert a decisive influence, barring the extreme outcome of non-ratification. The arguments that will be advanced by opponents of ratification in the U.S. Senate are not likely to provide the RC (the only political party that will actually vote against enlargement) with enough useful weapons in its own battle against enlargement. Possibly, the Parliamentary debate will produce a number of recommendations addressed to the executive, mainly designed to water down the RC's opposition but also reflective of the lack of enthusiasm by the Presidents of the two Foreign Affairs Committees. For instance, these recommenda-tions might include the need for a gradual evolution of NATO toward collective security functions (however vaguely defined), as well as the need to keep a non prejudicial attitude vis--vis possible future candidates (jncluding Russia). (30) As we have seen, the enlargement issue poses a series of questions which Italy, after decades of relative passivity in foreign and especially security affairs, will have to answer on its own. The country can no longer rely on the NATO framework as the sole guarantee of its basic interests abroad: as the crisis-management effort in Albania have shown very clearly, NATO (which refused to get involved in that crisis) may become irrelevant on issues of primary and specific interest for Italy's security. The debate over NATO enlargement might, therefore, at last force Italy to solve some of the ambiguities in its policy: the bargaining over candidates for membership is bringing about a clearer definition of the geopolitical priorities for a country that is located along the unstable Southeastern "flank" of Western Europe. However, some aspects of the ongoing debate are somehow "virtual"; for example, on the complex issue of a common European defense, the Italian position is still characterized by a significant gap between statements of principle and practical policy choices. In the final analysis, Italy's approach is heavily influenced by the enormous importance attributed to matters of "status" (meaning essentially prestige, and "positional" factors like being "in" or "out"). Even when the goal of enhancing the country's status is attained, this does not necessarily correspond to a "role" (meaning its actual capacity to make a diplomatic and military contribution to allied or multilateral tasks) that the country can actually play. The mismatch between status and role is bound to re-emerge in several dimensions of Italy's approach to European security issues. Above all, the fact is that more urgent priorities will probably continue to prevail in the near future, and shadow the debate over NATO enlargement: past the challenges of managing the intervention in Albania (as well as its aftermath), the exacting effort to become part of the EMU will inevitably dominate the Italian political scene for some time to come. End Notes Ratification of international treaties is mandated by Article 87 of the Italian constitution: technically, it is the President's responsibility, with the specific authorization of Parliament. In practice, however, the President cannot withold ratification after the Parliament's authorization. The normal procedure is for the executive to send the treaty to the Foreign Affairs Committees of both the House and the Senate, before submission to Parliament for a final vote on the authorization law. The Prodi government is based on a coalition between the PDS and the PPI, the Italian Popular Party founded after the split between various wings of the old DC. The government coalition is called "Ulivo" (olive branch). The opposition also formed a coalition, usually called "Polo" and consisting of Forza Italia (led by Silvio Berlusconi), the other parties created after the split of DC, and Alleanza Nazionale (the "post-fascist" party). The Italian government confirmed its commit-ment to support the missions in Bosnia that had already been agreed upon, but declared that new commitments regarding the F-117 would require a review of Italy's role at the negotiating table, which was "not commensurate" with Italian contributions. Although a direct linkage between the two issues was officially denied, and bilateral relations with the United States remained relatively smooth, Rome exerted unusually strong diplomatic pressures. When Italy finally joined the Contact Group, this ad hoc body was already losing its relevance as the Dayton process was being set in motion. The "exclusion complex" runs deep in the history of the Italian state, back to the 19th century when it came to be perceived as the first among the second-rank powers or the minor among the major powers. Most generally, this is partly a problem of self-confidence: the habit of conducting an essentially reactive foreign policy under strong external constraints-confirmed by the whole post-World War II experience-is hard to overcome. At the same time, some objective factors currently tend to reinforce the feeling of being only a "second-rank" country, as will be seen. Important echoes of this underlying concern in the parliamentary debates will also be seen below. See Dini's letter to the Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committe, made public on February 12, 1997 (Giunte e Commissioni Parlamentari, 99 resoconto). In his letter, Dini added: "Our country has so far succeeded in placing itself at the core of decision-making mechanisms on security in Europe, thus ensuring protection against its geo-strategically exposed position.... The memory of our initial exclusion from the Contact Group for the former Yugoslavia is still vivid, and could be interpreted as a concrete warning or harbinger of a marginalization of Italy from those decision-making fora to which, instead, it has a right to belong". The Foreign Minister concluded that the French initiative was just another "approach that excludes Italy," and had to be countered by a most vigourous opposition on the part of the Italian government. ANSA Press Agency Report, January 10, 1994; L'Avvenire, January 12, 1994. The major initiative was the trilateral agreement reached in October 1996, conceived by Italy as a sort of "hard-core" of broader forms of integration in Central-Eastern Europe which should prepare some of the countries in the area to become full members of Western European institutions, and serve as a "clearing house" for the left-outs. Italy, however, participates in the EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR, created by WEU in May 1995, and initially composed of French, Spanish and Italian forces. A view of the Russian problem, with some advocates in the ranks of the Ulivo coalition, holds that the new, democratizing Russia is being treated unjustly after the end of the Cold War. USIS file, EUR203, February 18, 1997. Il Sole-24 ore, February 21, 1997. A fresh start in Italian-Slovenian relations followed a serious diplomatic crisis under the Berlusconi government, due to a controversy over Italian land properties that had remained unresolved since the war. On one occasion, Italy threatened to veto the EU Treaty of Association with Slovenia. CeSPI, "L'Italia e l'allargamento dell'Unione europea ai PECO" (research conducted for the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 1997). "Report to Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications", February 24, 1997. Press Briefing of March 21, 1997, Office of the Press Secretary, The White House. Senator Migone was interviewed by the authors. Interestingly, with some differences in emphasis, this position is shared throughout the political spectrum. For instance, vice Chairman of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committe, Porcari, explicitely stated his preference, in April 1997, "if the frontiers of the European Union were expanded before those of the Atlantic Alliance" ("The European Union and Nato", April 4, 1997, Societ Italiana per l'Organizzazione Internazionale, Rome). It must be added, however, that important components of the bureaucracy have always been hostile to a rapid enlargement of the EU. L'Unit, January 30, 1997. See Pier Carlo Padoan in the CeSPI study on Italy and EU enlargement, quoted above, which shows that for the countries of Southern Europe, including Italy, the balance of economic costs and benefits deriving from enlargement is less favourable than for the countries of Central and Northern Europe. PRAGMA, L'Europa degli italiani, VI edizione (1997); and PRAGMA in collaboration with CeSPI, Autumn 1996. The Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee had already hinted at this issue following a visit to NATO headquarters, November 27-29, 1996. In his report to the committee, Occhetto remarked that the United States might support EU enlargement as a compensation measure for some of the "left-outs": such an interference, he added, would represent an "unacceptable interference" in the EU's decision-making process (Bollettino delle Giunte e delle Commissioni Parlamentari, Camera dei Deputati, XIII Legislatura, Marted 14 gennaio 1997). A special summit for the 40th anniversary of the Rome Treaties was held in Rome in March 1997. France, Germany, Italy and three other EU members presented a joint proposal for a major reform of the EU's "second pillar" in spite of Britain's known opposition to a full subordination of WEU to EU bodies. Nneutral EU members (Ireland, Denmark, and Austria) are also opposed to such a measure. ANSA, March 4, 1997. Stefano Silvestri was asked by the Foreign Ministry to write a position paper on the issue of NATO reform. February 16, 1997, Rome, US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. How enlargement will be paid for is an issue that is only beginning to emerge. Because there are no independent studies conducted by Italian official sources on this issue, a rough estimate can be made only on the basis of the official study presented to the U.S. Congress by the Clinton Administration in February 1997. According to unofficial Italian sources, this estimate of overall costs to all NATO countries for the 1997-2009 period implies that Italy will have to bear a minimum additional cost of $140 to 170 million a year for the same period. L'Unit, April 6, 1997. Corriere della Sera, and La Stampa, April 5, 1997. Ramon Mantovani expressed these concerns most strongly during the Hearing of February 6, 1997. "The European Union and Nato," speech given on April 4, 1997 at the Societ Italiana per l'Organizzazione Internazionale, Rome. See for example an overall assessment in Carlo Maria Santoro (ed.), Rischio da Sud. Geopolitica delle crisi nel bacino mediterraneo, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1996. This hypothesis has been made by Giangiacomo Migone, the President of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, who believes that a broad consensus can be reached on these points.